Transport for London (United Kingdom)

Update following rating affirmation

Summary

Transport for London’s (TfL, Aa3 stable) credit profile reflects its strategic importance as the main public transport provider in London, strong demand and institutional framework, in addition to budgetary pressures from removal of its government operating grant, the key project risk of the Elizabeth Line and high, but predictable, debt levels. Its credit profile also reflects the very high likelihood of extraordinary support expected to be provided by the UK government (Aa2 negative) in the event that the issuer faced extreme liquidity stress.

Exhibit 1

Ridership on London Underground improved modestly in FY2019 by 2% on a year-on-year basis, alongside a continuation of the decline in bus passengers

Passenger numbers (millions, LHS), year-on-year change in passenger numbers (%, RHS)

-5% -4% -3% -2% -1% 0% 1% 2% 3% 4%

FY2015 FY2016 FY2017 FY2018 FY2019

London Underground Bus London Overground DLR

YOY Trend - LU (RHS) YOY Trend - Bus (RHS)

Excludes passenger numbers for the Elizabeth line (currently TfL Rail), London Trams and other operations including London River Services and Emirates Air Line.


Credit Strengths

» Strategic importance for national transport plans
» Capacity improvements will increase ridership, and operating surplus, in medium term
» Strong institutional framework providing a high level of transparency

Credit Challenges

» Increased budgetary pressures including the removal of government operating grant
» Delayed opening of the Elizabeth Line, crucial to capital and operating plans
» Debt levels will remain high but predictable given borrowing limits
Rating Outlook
The stable outlook on TfL’s rating reflects our assessment that TfL will continue its strong management of its credit challenges.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade
Upward pressure on the rating could result from: the successful completion of the Crossrail project including realisation of projected revenue growth; and an improvement in TfL’s overall financial position, including a material reduction in its debt burden.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade
Negative pressure on the rating could result from one or a combination of the following: (1) underperformance in meeting operational or financial goals, specifically if fare revenue growth is materially slower than projected levels, or planned expenditure savings do not materialise, (2) material delays in the Crossrail project timeline which result in a materially higher capital expenditure burden and further pressure on TfL’s operating budget and/or (3) if the UK government were to signal a clear dilution of its support for TfL’s capital programme.

Key Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exhibit 2</th>
<th>Transport for London</th>
<th>Year-ended 31 March</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Own Source Revenues / Total Revenues (%) [1]</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>52.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants / Total Revenues (%)</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>47.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating Surplus (Deficit) / Total Revenues (%)[2]</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Payables / Total Revenues (%)</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct and indirect debt / Total Revenues (%)</td>
<td>85.8</td>
<td>96.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short-term debt / Total Debt (%)</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Assets / Current Liabilities (%)</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>179.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) For all ratios, total revenues include grants, including those ring-fenced for Crossrail. (2) Operating surplus refers to operating revenues minus operating expenses (not including capital grants or capital expenditures). Source: Issuer, Moody’s

Detailed credit considerations
On 13 November 2019, Moody’s affirmed TfL’s long-term credit rating. The affirmation followed Moody’s change in the Government of UK’s outlook to negative from stable, Aa2 rating affirmed, on 8 November 2019.

The credit profile of Transport for London, as expressed in an Aa3 stable rating, combines (1) a baseline credit assessment (BCA) for the entity of a2 and (2) a very high likelihood of extraordinary support coming from the UK government (Aa2 negative) in the event that the entity faced acute liquidity stress.

Baseline Credit Assessment
Strategic importance for national transport plans
Transport for London is a key functional body of the government of Greater London (Greater London Authority). Its Board is chaired by the Mayor of London, who is also in control of Board appointments. Future economic growth in London and the capacity of its public transportation system are closely linked and are significant policy concerns to citizens, businesses and the local and national levels of government.

Transport for London is the largest urban transit system in the United Kingdom, and one of the largest in the world. It serves a large population (8.8 million in London) and benefits from very strong ridership. TfL’s underground, bus and rail network provide 4 billion rides annually. TfL’s very strong utilization ratio of 451 (annual ridership relative to the service area population) continues to be the highest of any system we rate under the Mass Transit Enterprises Methodology, reflecting the pervasiveness of public transport and its importance to London’s economy.
Capacity improvements will improve ridership and operating surpluses over the medium term
FY2019 saw a small improvement in London Underground (LU) passengers of 2% when compared to FY2018. Bus passengers continue to fall, by another 1% in FY2019, the same as in FY2018. Passenger numbers are expected to stay relatively flat overall until the Elizabeth line is introduced into service, in FY2022.

Continued growth in total ridership and, subsequently, fare income, is critical to TfL’s ability to produce balanced budgets - a legal requirement. As set out in TfL’s 2018 Business Plan, TfL’s funded capacity improvements to FY2023 will contribute to TfL’s planned reversal of its net cost of operations from £494 million in FY2019 to £47 million in FY2022 and towards an operating surplus of £144 million in FY2023. These include the Elizabeth line (which will increase central London’s rail capacity by 10%), signalling upgrades on the Circle, District, Hammersmith & City and Metropolitan lines, new trains on the London Overground and the extension of the London Overground to Barking Riverside.

Strong institutional framework provides a high level of transparency
Since FY2003, TfL, the Mayor of London and the Department for Transport (DfT) have agreed long-term funding and planning frameworks. These frameworks take into account a combination of TfL’s own resources - mostly fare revenues - and grants from the government, which are balanced against spending in the TfL Business Plan. In March 2017, the Secretary of State for Transport set out a new multi-year funding agreement for TfL for the years FY2018 to FY2021 which sets out DfT grant and TfL’s annual borrowing limit. The funding agreement confirms the removal of the general operating grant from FY2019 and the passporting of the investment grant through the GLA’s 100% business rates retention pilot from FY2018. The 100% business rates retention pilot has been continued in FY2019, and in FY2020 it has been confirmed at the lower rate of 75%. In FY2020, TfL will receive some £1.9 billion in business rates and another £300 million in grants from the GLA and central government (excluding Crossrail funding). However, there is currently no funding certainty post-FY2021, although we expect TfL will continue to be resourced appropriately due to its importance to strategic transport in London.

Although TfL’s day-to-day funding arrangements for operating and capital expenditure purposes will now be the responsibility of the Mayor via the GLA, we expect that any nationally significant infrastructure projects such as Crossrail 2 will continue to be part-funded by central government.

Historically, the links between the Mayor and TfL have been very strong and well co-ordinated on key matters of operations and funding. The Mayor develops the Transport Strategy, which is the guiding document for TfL’s specific programmes of operation and investment, appoints TfL’s Board and sets fare levels. The London Assembly, in turn, holds the Mayor democratically accountable and oversees the Mayor’s budget. TfL’s Board appoints the Commissioner of Transport for London, the executive head of TfL. It also oversees the creation and delivery of the multi-year business plan and annual budgets through various committees, including the Remuneration Committee, the Finance Committee, the Programmes and Investment Committee and the Audit and Assurance Committee. TfL also has an external body providing independent assurance and expert advice to the Mayor, the Independent Investment Programme Advisory Group.

Increased budgetary pressures including the removal of its government operating grant
TfL faces a number of medium term budgetary pressures, including the removal of its government operating grant, the Mayoral fare freeze and the delayed opening of the Elizabeth line. The latter is discussed in the following section.

TfL is now more reliant on its operational performance to fund its activities than it was in the past, with operating grant levels falling from 29% of total operating income in FY2014 to 16% in FY2019. In the March 2017 funding agreement the Secretary of State for Transport confirmed the removal of the general grant - the general operating grant that TfL has used historically to subsidise its operations. However, its operating grant has to some extent been replaced by non ring-fenced business rates from the GLA. As its operating grant and investment grant are now paid using retained business rates, it gives TfL more financial flexibility as business rates receipts are not ring-fenced and can therefore be used for capital or operating purposes as required. This flexibility has been used to partially offset the operating pressures of the delayed opening of the Elizabeth line on TfL’s operating budget. In FY2019, TfL received £3.0 billion of total grants, £1.9 billion of this amount related to non ring-fenced business rates, of which the majority were used to fund TfL’s operations, with £219 million used to fund its capital programme.
The freeze on passenger fares set by TfL commenced in January 2017 and is expected to last until December 2020. This does not affect all of TfL’s passenger income, about half of it is linked to national rail fares which are not directly controlled by TfL. These fares are set by DfT and do not fall within TfL’s fare freeze. The true impact of the fare freeze is difficult to estimate - it is likely that it will have depressed and continue to depress some fare revenue, however it is equally likely that it is helping to mitigate some of the decrease in demand caused by the economic slowdown in London.

TfL’s fare income projections in its 2018 five-year Business Plan are ambitious. The removal of operating grant means that they also increase in importance in TfL’s budget: they are expected to increase from 47% (£4.8 billion) of its total budget (including its capital programme) in FY2019 to 63% (£6.6 billion) in FY2024. Some £0.9 billion of the £1.8 billion projected increase in fare income is expected to be delivered by the Elizabeth line, and the remainder relates to increases in passengers driven by population growth, increased capacity and services on London Underground lines, London Overground and the DLR, as well as fare increases over the period. Achievement of fare income projections is critical to the financial performance of the organisation and is reliant on elements within TfL’s control including successful realisation of upgrades on a number of London Underground lines, in addition to the Elizabeth line, as well as elements outside TfL’s control such as population and economic growth in London and the wider South East.

In order to improve the long-term financial sustainability of the organisation, TfL is implementing a major transformation programme that is aimed at removing £1.2bn of annual operating costs from the organisation by FY2023. This will help to limit the increase in operating costs (before capital renewals and financing costs) to £7.3 billion by FY2024 from £6.3 billion in FY2019 - with the increase being predominantly due to the costs of operating the Elizabeth line and inflation. The transformation programme follows a comprehensive TfL-wide cost review in order to maximise value for money and improve efficiency of operations and support functions. The different internal workstreams have already led to more than 600 individual initiatives and projects, including reduced layers in the organisation, merged functions and eliminated duplications as well as commercial contracts renegotiations, that should help reach the savings target. The transformation programme is progressing well. TfL’s full year results from FY2019 demonstrate operating costs £345 million lower than budget and net cost of operations £479 million lower than initially budgeted, indicating that savings are being generated earlier than anticipated.

Successful opening of the Elizabeth line, crucial to capital and operating plans

TfL is the joint sponsor of the Crossrail project (operational name: Elizabeth line) with DfT. The Elizabeth line is a new 118 kilometre railway line for London and the South East. A series of delays for the project have been announced over the past year, which have impacts on TfL’s operating and capital plans, although the former will have a more material impact on TfL’s credit profile. Most recently, on 8th November 2019, Crossrail Limited announced that the central section of the Elizabeth Line, which had previously
been anticipated to open within a six month window between October 2020 and March 2021, will now not open in 2020 but at an unspecified point in 2021. In our latest estimates, based on the window previously announced in April 2019, we estimated that the delay would cost TfL around £1 billion in lost Elizabeth line passenger revenue between FY2020 and FY2022 (around £300–£400 million more than anticipated in TfL’s 2018 Business Plan). The further delay announced in November 2019 will result in more lost Elizabeth line passenger revenues, although the materiality will depend on when the central section opens in 2021.

In respect of the capital impact of the delay - this had previously been estimated to be between £1.6 to £2.0 billion following an independent review by KPMG (including an amount of £300 million which was agreed to be provided to the project equally by TfL and DIT in July 2018 in respect of pre-delay cost escalation). As part of the funding package agreed between DIT, the GLA and TfL in December 2018, the majority of the cost of the capital overrun will be provided by the GLA to TfL in the form of a grant of £1.4 billion. If the cost overrun exceeds £1.7 billion (£1.4 billion grant plus £300m agreed to be provided in July 2018), DfT will provide a loan facility of up to £750 million to TfL which will be incremental to the previously agreed borrowing limit. With respect to the November 2019 announcement, Crossrail Limited has indicated an additional £400–£650 million of capital cost in excess of the existing funding package. There is no indication yet as to how this will be funded. We now expect TfL to use all of the £750 million loan facility, adding to its debt burden.

Other major ongoing capital projects include signalling, modernisation and rolling stock upgrades to the 11 London Underground lines aiming to improve service and capacity across the existing London Underground network, and the Northern Line Extension to Nine Elms and Battersea. The latter project is being funded by the GLA, through a hypothecation of future business rate revenues in an Enterprise Zone and developers’ contributions, up to £1 billion. However, any cost increases above this level would be the responsibility of TfL. The tunneling work is now complete, however there are still some station fit-out testing and commissioning works which remain to be completed.

TfL also has a number of other large planned and proposed capital projects including the London Overground extension to Barking Riverside which will enter construction in FY2020, the Bakerloo Line Extension, a number of river crossings and Crossrail 2.

In TfL’s 2018 Business Plan, total capital expenditure is expected to be £11.0 billion between FY2019 and FY2024, including £2.6 billion on Crossrail and excluding capital renewals. This is expected to be funded by £5.8 billion investment grant, £1.6 billion from property and asset receipts (a significant proportion of this arising from the now completed sale of the Elizabeth Line rolling stock to a lessor through a sale and leaseback transaction), £3.2 billion of new borrowing, £2.2 billion related to Crossrail funding sources and the remainder by other capital grants.

**Debt levels will remain high but predictable given borrowing limits**

TfL’s debt level is high, but relatively stable and predictable. TfL’s debt increased to £11.7 billion at FYE2019 (including finance leases), or 133% of total revenues, compared to FYE2018 figures of £10.9 billion and 139% respectively.

Under the Prudential Code, TfL may borrow for capital purposes up to a level approved by the Mayor, subject to reserve powers retained by the government. In practice, increases in debt are agreed in the multi-year funding settlements with DIT. DIT approves and establishes limits for TfL’s debt projections, subject to requirements of prudence and affordability required under the Prudential Code. Between FY2018 and FY2021, TfL can increase its debt by up to £2.55 billion. The £750 million loan facility granted to TfL with respect to the Crossrail cost overrun will be incremental to this amount. Favourably, the 2016 funding settlement gave TfL flexibility to roll borrowing capacity into future years, meaning debt will grow only when funds are required. Local government finance law imposes statutory obligations upon officers and permits government intervention in cases of mismanagement or financial failure. Accounting standards are high. Audited financials are produced under IFRS accrual formats, but, as with UK local authorities also using this system, can be difficult to reconcile to the more cash-based systems used for budgets and long-term planning.

TfL has guaranteed a number of loans linked to Public-Private Partnership (PPP) contracts. In the last few years most of these PPP contracts were brought back “in-house.” TfL’s total retirement benefit obligations, which currently are not included in TfL’s debt stock, were at £5.3 billion at FYE2019, or 61% of total revenues. The latest full actuarial valuation of the TfL Pension Fund was carried out as at 31 March 2018, which showed a deficit for funding purposes of £603 million.

TfL benefits from a diverse investor base and may borrow from the Public Works Loan Board (PWLB, statutory body operating within the UK Debt Management Office, an executive agency of the UK Government’s Treasury Department), which could also act as a lender.
of last resort for the entity and hence mitigate the threat of liquidity shocks. TfL has a £5 billion European Medium Term Note (EMTN) programme, last updated in July 2019, of which £3.3 billion was outstanding as of FYE2019. In April 2015, TfL issued its first green bond (£400 million) under the EMTN programme. For short-term liquidity needs, its European Commercial Paper programme of £2 billion allows for rapid and flexible access to liquidity at rates close to LIBOR. TfL has £750 million corporate loan facilities with Export Development Canada; £250 million was drawn down in FY2017, £150 million in FY2018 and £150 million in FY2019; £200 million remains available for future drawdowns. TfL had £3.4 billion debt outstanding under various facilities with the European Investment Bank (EIB) as of FYE2019; £500 million was drawn down in FY2017, £800 million in FY2018 and £200 million in FY2019; all EIB facilities are now fully drawn.

TfL had £1,666 million of cash and cash equivalents as of FYE2019 and a further £216 million in short term investments. The majority of the reserves are not ring-fenced and may be used for debt service payments or other costs of TfL and its operating subsidiaries. TfL has a policy of maintaining a minimum level of cash of 30 days of operating cost on average (representing approximately £550 million for FY2019).

Extraordinary Support Considerations
The very high support assessment for TfL reflects the importance of the transport system and infrastructure improvement in London for the UK government (Aa2 negative) as reflected in the multi-year funding settlement and the agreement to proceed with Crossrail and the London Underground upgrades. The very high support also reflects the reputational risk for the central government, should TfL face acute liquidity tensions, given the overall funding of the system and close oversight from the sovereign. Such event would also call into question government support for other sectors (such as local authorities) that the national government tightly controls and funds.

Moody's also assigns a very high default dependence between TfL and the UK government, reflecting the ongoing assurance over funding of its capital programme and its historical co-ordination with national investment policies.

ESG considerations
How environmental, social and governance risks inform our credit analysis of Transport for London
We take into account the impact of environmental, social and governance factors when assessing sub-sovereign issuers’ economic and financial strength. In the case of TfL, the materiality of environmental, social and governance considerations to its credit profile are as follows:

Environmental considerations are material to TfL’s credit profile. TfL is central to the London Mayor’s ambition to achieve a zero carbon London and improve air quality. This involves significant expenditure on the TfL bus fleet such as introducing low-emission buses, increasing energy efficiency on the London Underground and Rail services, introducing the Ultra Low Emission Zone (ULEZ), upgrading London’s cycling and walking infrastructure alongside many other capital projects and programmes. TfL’s services can also be affected by flooding and other weather-related events but these do not have a material impact on the issuer’s finances.

Social considerations are material to TfL’s credit profile. Socially-driven policy can have a material impact on TfL’s credit profile. For example, the Mayor of London, Sadiq Khan, introduced a fare freeze in January 2017 in light of affordability concerns for London’s residents which was credit negative for TfL. In addition, TfL’s ridership is strongly correlated with the health of London’s economy and growth in its population; ridership growth on TfL’s bus network in particular has weakened in recent years due to a slowdown in London’s economy. This is material because 47% of TfL’s total revenue (including revenues spent on its capital programme) came from passenger revenues in FY2019.

Governance considerations are material to TfL’s credit profile. TfL has high standards of financial management and governance, and has a number of internal committees that review investment and spending decisions. There is also an external body providing independent assurance and expert advice to the Mayor, the Independent Investment Programme Advisory Group (IIPAG). TfL has high standards of transparency and all material documentation including its annual five-year business plan, budget, financial statements, board meeting notes and material spending decisions are published on its website.

Further details are provided in the “Detailed credit considerations” section above. Our approach to ESG is explained in our cross-sector methodology General Principles for Assessing ESG Risks.
Rating methodology and scorecard factors

The assigned BCA of a2 is the same as the scorecard-indicated BCA.

TfL’s rating reflects our assessment of the company’s business profile and financial performance in line with our Mass Transit Enterprises Methodology, published on December 2017.

Exhibit 4
Transport for London

Global Mass Transit Enterprises Methodology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor 1: Size (15%)</th>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Annual Ridership</td>
<td>Aaa</td>
<td>Aaa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Service Area Population</td>
<td>Aaa</td>
<td>Aaa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor 2: Market Position (35%)</th>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Stability and predictability of federal, state and local transportation policy and funding subsidies</td>
<td>Aa</td>
<td>Aa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Job and population trends</td>
<td>Aaa</td>
<td>Aaa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Utilization</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>Aaa</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor 3: Financial Flexibility (20%)</th>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Score</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Farebox Recovery Ratio</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
<td>Aaa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) 3-Yr Avg Fixed Costs as % of Operating Expenditures</td>
<td>23.2%</td>
<td>Baa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor 4: Debt &amp; Financial Metrics (30%)</th>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Net Debt / Revenues</td>
<td>1.3x</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) 3-Yr Avg Interest as a % of Operating Revenues</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) 3-Yr Avg Net Margin (Operating surplus / revenues</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>Baa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Days Cash on Hand</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adjustments / Notching Factors

Factor 4: Debt and Financial Metrics

2) Large capital program and/or future borrowing plans
   -1

Other factors:

3) Credit Event / Trend not yet reflected in existing data set
   -1

Rating:

a) Indicated Rating from Grid After Notching Adjustment | A2 |

b) BCA assigned | a2 |

c) Actual Rating Assigned | Aa3 |

Note: Financial year-end 31 March 2019
Source: Moody’s Investors Service, Issuer

Ratings

Exhibit 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Moody’s Rating</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TRANSPORT FOR LONDON</td>
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<tr>
<td>Outlook</td>
<td>Stable</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senior Unsecured -Dom Curr</td>
<td>Aa3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commercial Paper -Dom Curr</td>
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</table>

Source: Moody’s Investors Service
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