

## Agenda - Public

**Meeting: Safety and Security Panel**

**Date: Monday 19 May 2025**

**Time: 11.00am**

**Place: Elizabeth Line Room, 11th Floor,  
Palestra, 197 Blackfriars Road,  
London, SE1 8NJ**

### Members

Zoë Billingham CBE (Chair)  
Omid Shiraji (Vice Chair)  
Seb Dance

Mark Phillips  
Peter Strachan

Copies of the papers and any attachments are available on [tfl.gov.uk How We Are Governed](https://tfl.gov.uk/How-We-Are-Governed).

This meeting will be open to the public and webcast live on [TfL YouTube channel](#), except for where exempt information is being discussed as noted on the agenda.

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### Further Information

If you have questions, would like further information about the meeting or require special facilities please contact: James Varley, Secretariat Officer, Email: [JamesVarley@TfL.gov.uk](mailto:JamesVarley@TfL.gov.uk).

For media enquiries please contact the TfL Press Office; telephone: 0343 222 4141; email: [PressOffice@tfl.gov.uk](mailto:PressOffice@tfl.gov.uk)

Andrea Clarke, General Counsel  
Friday 9 May 2025

**Agenda**  
**Safety and Security Panel**  
**Monday 19 May 2025**

**1 Apologies for Absence and Chair's Announcements**

**2 Declarations of Interests**

General Counsel

**Members are reminded that any interests in a matter under discussion must be declared at the start of the meeting, or at the commencement of the item of business.**

**Members must not take part in any discussion or decision on such a matter and, depending on the nature of the interest, may be asked to leave the room during the discussion.**

**3 Minutes of the Meeting of the Panel held on 12 February 2025**

General Counsel

**The Panel is asked to approve the minutes of the Panel held 12 February 2025 and authorise the Chair to sign them.**

**4 Matters Arising and Actions List**

General Counsel

**The Panel is asked to note the updated Actions List.**

**5 Bus Safety Overview**

Chief Safety, Health and Environment Officer and Chief Operating Officer

**The Panel is asked to note the paper.**

**6 Protecting London's Transport Network Against Terrorism**

Chief Operating Officer

**The Panel is asked to note the paper and the exempt supplementary information on Part 2 of the agenda.**

**7 Safety, Health, and Environment Cultural Programme Update**

Chief Safety, Health and Environment Officer

**The Panel is asked to note the paper.**

**8 Enterprise Risk Update – Failure to Prevent a Significant Safety Incident or Deliver Safety Obligations (ER01)**

Chief Safety, Health and Environment Officer

**The Panel is asked to note the paper and the exempt supplementary information on Part 2 of the agenda.**

**9 Safety, Health and Security Report Quarter 4 2024/25**

Chief Safety, Health and Environment Officer and Chief Operating Officer

**The Panel is asked to note the report.**

**10 Risk and Assurance Report Quarter 4 2024/25**

Director of Risk and Assurance

**The Panel is asked to note the paper and the exempt supplementary information on Part 2 of the agenda.**

**11 Members' Suggestions for Future Discussion Items**

General Counsel

**The Panel is asked to note the forward plan and is invited to raise any suggestions for future discussion items.**

**12 Any Other Business the Chair Considers Urgent**

**The Chair will state the reason for urgency of any item taken.**

**13 Date of Next Meeting**

Tuesday 2 September 2025 at 1.00pm.

## **14 Exclusion of Press and Public**

The Panel is recommended to agree to exclude the press and public from the meeting, in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 7 of Schedule 12A to the Local Government Act 1972 (as amended), in order to consider the following items of business.

### **Agenda Part 2**

## **15 Protecting London's Transport Network Against Terrorism**

Exempt supplementary information relating to the item on Part 1 of the agenda.

## **16 Enterprise Risk Update – Failure to Prevent a Significant Safety Incident or Deliver Safety Obligations (ER01)**

Exempt supplementary information relating to the item on Part 1 of the agenda.

## **17 Risk and Assurance Report Quarter 4 2024/25**

Exempt supplementary information relating to the item on Part 1 of the agenda.

## Transport for London

### Minutes of the Safety and Security Panel

**Conference Rooms 1 and 2, Ground Floor, Palestra**

**197 Blackfriars Road, London, SE1 8NJ**

**10.00am, Wednesday 12 February 2025**

#### Members

Zoë Billingham CBE (Chair)

Omid Shiraji (Vice Chair)

Seb Dance

Mark Phillips

Peter Strachan

#### Executive Committee

Andy Lord

Andrea Clarke

Stuart Harvey

Lilli Matson

Commissioner

General Counsel

Chief Capital Officer

Chief Safety, Health and Environment Officer

#### Staff

Jules Gascoigne

Siwan Hayward

Lorraine Humphrey

Claire Lefort

Stuart Reid

Mike Shirbon

James Varley

Shashi Verma

Chief Information Security Officer (from Minute 08/02/05)

Director of Security, Policing and Enforcement

Director of Risk and Assurance

Legal Manager

Head of Analysis and Direction

Head of Quality, Safety and Security Assurance

Secretariat Officer

Chief Technology Officer (from Minute 08/02/05)

### 01/02/25 Apologies for Absence and Chair's Announcements

There were no apologies for absence from Members. The meeting was quorate. Claire Mann, Chief Operating Officer, was unable to attend the meeting.

The Chair welcomed everyone to the meeting. The meeting was broadcast live to TfL's YouTube channel, except for the discussion of the information on Part 2 of the agenda which was exempt from publication, to ensure the public and press could observe the proceedings.

The Panel's and Executive's thoughts were with the family, friends and colleagues of Jorge Ortega, a colleague who worked for MTR Elizabeth line at Ilford station. Jorge was seriously assaulted on 4 December, and sadly died in hospital on 6 December 2024, while doing his job, helping customers travel around London. Jorge had served the railway community with dedication and kindness for 24 years.

The safety and wellbeing of colleagues is paramount to TfL. Everyone should be able to go about their day without fear or intimidation and it is unthinkable that someone could lose their life due to unprovoked violence while just doing their job.

TfL is working closely with MTR Elizabeth line, to provide support to Jorge's family and to all colleagues affected, and with the British Transport Police to support the investigations and will continue to strengthen safety measures for staff.

The Chair reminded those present that safety was paramount at TfL and encouraged Members to raise any safety issues during discussions of the relevant item or with the appropriate member of the Executive Committee after the meeting.

## **02/02/25    Declarations of Interests**

Zoë Billingham CBE advised that her role at the Security Industry Authority was now that of Associate Non-executive Director, she was previously a Non-executive Director.

All other Members' declarations of interests, as published on [tfl.gov.uk](https://tfl.gov.uk), were up to date and there were no interests to declare that related specifically to items on the agenda.

## **03/02/25    Minutes of the Meeting of the Safety and Security Panel held on 2 December 2024**

**The minutes of the meeting of the Panel held on 2 December 2024 were approved as a correct record, and the Chair was authorised to sign them.**

## **04/02/25    Matters Arising and Actions List**

Andrea Clarke introduced the item, which set out progress against actions agreed at the previous meeting of the Panel.

**The Panel noted the updated actions list.**

## **05/02/25    Rail Customer Safety Update**

Lilli Matson and Stuart Reid introduced the item, which set out the current status in relation to performance and achieving targets for customer safety on rail modes (London Underground, London Overground, DLR, London Trams and the Elizabeth line).

The Mayor's Transport Strategy established the goal of eliminating death and serious injury from London's transport networks by 2041 and TfL's internal Strategy for Safety set out the interim target to halve customer deaths and serious injuries by 2030. The death and serious injury rate decreased during the coronavirus pandemic and had stabilised, however the recent increase in the number of passengers on the network had seen the absolute number of deaths and serious injuries increase.

TfL had looked across the rail industry to see how it compared. While its performance was favourable, the aim was to continue to reduce risk in line with the Vision Zero goal. It was an industry-wide challenge and TfL was organising a summit with other rail operators to share learning and innovation on addressing passenger/train incidents. TfL had recently

engaged with authorities in Singapore to look at the safety detection systems in use and understand if they could be trialled in London.

The most significant source of risk for customers was slips, trips and falls on stairs and escalators, and for fatal injuries, the Platform Train Interface (PTI) was the area of most concern regarding fatal injuries.

Messaging and educating customers in safer behaviours took place.

The PTI Plan was published in 2024 and was developed to address incidents and would use a systems-based approach. This looks at action to prevent, detect and respond to incidents. There needed to be multiple interventions due to the differing nature of locations and incidents. Trials were being planned to utilise detection technology which needed to be scalable to work effectively on the network.

It was acknowledged that the network was used by customers who could be intoxicated and that intoxication could be a contributory factor in some incidents. Staff were being trained to intervene safely and encourage safer behaviour for all customers. The key was for staff to be empathetic and alert to vulnerability.

Work was also taking place to address deliberate and unauthorised access to the network, with staff also receiving training for suicide prevention.

TfL used data from incidents but did not have the same information gathering powers as the police. It was felt that while more data was useful, the data currently held was sufficiently rich to inform and direct mitigating actions.

Customers, such as those with temporary injuries, or with babies and buggies, or who had some mobility issues, had seen their risk reduced by using step-free access provision.

The Panel suggested that it would be useful to understand how the numbers of slips, trips and falls related to fatalities to see how reductions in risk impacted the full range of outcomes.

It was observed that significant numbers of customers used mobile phones while moving around the network and there may be potential, in the future, to use technology to alert customers when they were in an area of increased risk.

Financial resources were prioritised to keep the TfL network safe and fund trials of mitigation activities..

**The Panel noted the paper.**

## **06/02/25 2024 Crime and Antisocial Behaviour Update**

Siwan Hayward introduced the item, which provided an overview of recent crime and antisocial behaviour trends on the public transport network and, where possible, compared them with London-wide and national trends.

The availability of data had been impacted by the recent upgrade of Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) systems and the cyber incident in September 2024 affecting TfL systems, and covered the period January to August 2024.

The data showed the risk of being a victim of crime on London's transport network remained low, set against the context of a drive to increase reporting and a changing society.

Significant investment had been made into partnerships with the MPS and the British Transport Police (BTP), as well as TfL's own enforcement function.

Most crime was theft/pickpocketing, and this was seen to be due to the network being a target-rich environment, due to the large numbers of customers using it and crowding. TfL was encouraging customers to be vigilant while the BTP had been proactive to make it a hostile environment to robbery, and this had seen a decrease in offences from 2023 to 2024.

There had been an increase in violent offences of approximately 20 per cent against the same period in 2023. Around 70 per cent of offences were violence without injury, such as pushing and shoving. There had also been a 27 per cent increase in hate crime against a backdrop of wider global issues. Within the hate crime figures, there was significant victimisation of young people, which could lead to long-term concerns about using public transport. Sexual offences had also increased, noting that at present, sexual harassment was categorised as a public order offence, although this would change to a sexual offence soon. A lot of effort was being put into encouraging reporting and engaging with communities to ensure they understood the importance of their safety to TfL.

Customers were surveyed to understand what made them feel safe and this was used to inform actions. The challenge was to balance the direction of capability to ensure customers felt safe on the network while also addressing the highest harm activities.

The Panel noted the increase in crime volume on London Underground over the last three years. Theft was the main driver of the increase and could be attributed to the high value of items carried by customers. TfL worked closely with the BTP and the MPS and had funding arrangements with both forces. There was a focus on high harm crimes but a balance was sought to address theft and pick pocketing. The solution to delivering greater security across the transport network was not simply a case of greater financial resources to fund more policing but to collaborate, share technology and data, and work seamlessly with all parties.

The increase in hate crime was, in part, related to the events of October 2023 and impacted the Jewish and Muslim communities. Action was being taken, which included messaging of the zero-tolerance policy of hate crime. This work had strengthened TfL's relationship with both communities and provided valuable insight.

TfL worked closely with the London boroughs through its Community and Partnership team, as well as through the Greater London Authority. Customer safety was a key part of any dialogue with those bodies.

At the next meeting, the Panel would be updated on what the focus of the next update would be and when it would be scheduled.

**[Action: Siwan harm]**

Representatives from the BTP and the MPS would be invited to a future meeting of the Panel.

**[Action: Siwan Hayward]**

**The Panel noted the paper.**

## **07/02/25 Safeguarding Customers at TfL**

Siwan Hayward introduced the item, which provided an overview of the activity to safeguard those people sleeping rough on TfL's services and infrastructure, and the work to prevent suicide on the transport network.

It was the aspiration for the TfL network to be seen as a beacon of safety, where help and support could be accessed 'under the roundel'.

A structured approach was used, with a specialist team within TfL advising and guiding policy and prioritisation. Frontline and customer operations staff were trained to recognise vulnerable people and be empathetic and aware.

Rough sleeping was a complex issue. People often chose to rough sleep on the network to avoid being found for a variety of reasons and this made it challenging for outreach organisations to assist. TfL recognised that rough sleeping increased the risk of being a victim of crime, resulting in poor health outcomes and was life-limiting and accordingly, worked with outreach agencies to connect people to help and support.

The process for prioritisation of dealing with rough sleeping was informed by complaints and concerns from staff and customers. It was noted that while activity was focussed on TfL property, engagement and assistance would be provided to local boroughs where proximity to a station was a cause for concern.

Suicide prevention was an integral part of safeguarding and staff training was essential. Despite the efforts and vigilance of staff, in 2024, 22 people had died by suicide and a further 15 attempted suicides had occurred on the network where there had not been an opportunity to intervene.

The following staff had received lifesaver awards for their interventions which had successful safeguarding outcomes: Alex at Golders Green station, Joseph and Diana at Westminster station, and Malli, Ladi and Nigel at Manor House station. Panel Members expressed their thanks to staff for their efforts.

It was commended that the British Transport Police (BTP) recognised that responding to mental health issues was part of its role in policing. It was noted that no powers currently existed to allow the BTP to prevent individuals with known conditions and vulnerabilities from entering the network but this was under ongoing discussion.

A multi-agency approach was essential to successfully deliver safeguarding and TfL worked closely with the Greater London Authority. The London Office of Technology and Innovation had worked with London boroughs to develop a dashboard to identify rough sleeping across borough boundaries and consideration would be given to engagement with this work.

The Quarterly Safety, Health and Security Report would include updates on safeguarding and a deep dive would be added to the forward plan. **[Action: Siwan Hayward]**

**The Panel noted the paper.**

## **08/02/25    Enterprise Risk Update – Significant Security Incident including Cyber Security (ER04)**

Siwan Hayward and Jules Gascoigne introduced the item, which provided an update of Enterprise Risk 04 (ER04) – the risk of a significant security incident (including cyber security).

The understanding of the threat was informed through working in partnership with organisations including the National Protective Security Authority, the National Cyber Security Centre, the police and the security services. This input provided insight into the threats to London and TfL as operator of transport services, infrastructure and technology. The nature of the threat was volatile and rapidly changing, with significant actors in the arena being hostile states, terrorist groups and criminal organisations with interplay between them.

Cyber security was an integral part of security within TfL. An ongoing improvement programme was in place and actions had been taken in response to the cyber incident in September 2024.

It was agreed that cyber security and physical security would be split to create two Enterprise Risks given the size and complexity of both elements. Any lessons learnt, recommendations and improvements identified from the detailed investigation of the cyber incident and the independent review would be picked up as part of this work.

It was noted that the Panel would receive an update on terrorism risk mitigations at the next meeting.

**The Panel noted the paper and the exempt supplementary information on Part 2 of the agenda.**

## **09/02/25    Safety, Health and Security Report – Quarter 3 2024/25**

Lilli Matson and Siwan Hayward introduced the item, which provided key information and trends reported in Quarter 3 of 2024/25 (15 September to 7 December 2024), including performance against Scorecard targets.

The Panel again noted the tragic death of Jorge Ortega, who was seriously assaulted while on duty at Ilford Elizabeth line station. The thoughts of TfL colleagues and Board Members were with the family, friends and colleagues of Jorge.

Colleague safety performance was not on track for the year, due to the fatal incident involving Jorge Ortega and the serious injury numbers being higher than forecast. This was an area of focus going forward. Customer safety performance over the quarter had been challenging, with a tragic fatality at Chalk Farm station on 4 November 2024, and 67 serious injuries across the network. The number of people killed or seriously on London's roads were also higher than target. Bus safety performance was within target.

Engagement took place with stakeholder and user representatives when designing and implementing risk mitigations. This also carried over into the citizenship work and hyper local engagement to inform design. The Panel noted that TfL's safety data related to travel

outside the TfL network, such as boroughs and other transport operators and thus, it was essential to get alignment and agreed principles with other parties.

Delivery of Vision Zero required partnership working with British Transport Police, transport operators and London boroughs. The Panel would receive an update on Vision Zero, which would include short and medium term milestones to help assess performance. This would also explain how performance trajectories may be subject to change, arising from differing travel patterns and changes in risk. **[Action: Lilli Matson]**

Colleague sickness absence performance was broadly on the same trend as last year. The top three causes of long-term absence were mental health, musculoskeletal and work-related accidents/assaults. Work was taking place to improve rates and early intervention, particularly in the case of trauma related incidents, had been seen earlier returns to work. A pilot project was taking place to engage with managers in the trains and depots' teams to equip them with a full understanding of the wellbeing provision and referral process and this had seen positive results in terms of earlier returns to work for staff. The benefits to both colleagues and TfL as an employee were well understood. Data on cancer related absence would be clarified at the next meeting. **[Action: Lilli Matson]**

The Rail Accident Investigation Branch had issued a report into the tragic death of a customer who died after falling onto the tracks at Stratford station in December 2023. TfL welcomed the recommendations from the investigation into this incident, which aligned with the findings of TfL's own internal investigation, and work had already begun to implement them.

In June 2024, TfL commissioned an independent review of safety governance within the organisation. The overall finding was that current safety performance was good when benchmarked against other UK transport providers and the general trend is one of continuing improvement, but set out recommendations to further improve performance. An action plan had been produced and work would take place to track the recommendations. The report would be published on the TfL website.

The report set out the work-related violence and aggression performance and this had been overshadowed by the tragic death of Jorge Ortega at Ilford station.

**The Panel noted the report.**

## **10/02/25 Risk and Assurance Report Quarter 3 2024/25**

Lorraine Humphrey introduced the item, which provided the Panel with an overview of the status of and changes to Enterprise Risk 01 (ER01) – 'Inability to deliver safety objectives and obligations', and Enterprise Risk 04 (ER04) – 'Significant security incident including cyber security'. It also summarised the findings from the associated assurance activity of these risks based on second line of defence audit work by the Quality, Safety and Security Assurance team and third line of assurance work by the Internal Audit team within TfL's Risk and Assurance Directorate during Quarter 3 of 2024/25 (15 September to 7 December 2024).

ER01 was being redeveloped and would be reviewed by the TfL Executive Committee in May 2025. The Audit Plan for the first half of 2025/26 was being finalised and would be presented to the Audit and Assurance Committee in March 2025.

An audit on 'Cubic Risk Management' under ER04 had been deferred so as not to deflect resources from the cyber incident recovery process.

Fifteen audits against the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard that related to ER04 had been cancelled in Q3 as these audits would now be undertaken by the TfL Technology and Data Payment Operations and Assurance team.

There had been a reduction in overdue actions, moving from 24 open and 10 overdue in the previous quarter to 27 open and two overdue in Quarter 3.

**The Panel noted the paper and the exempt supplementary information on Part 2 of the agenda.**

### **11/02/25 Members' Suggestions for Future Discussion Items**

Andrea Clarke introduced the item. No additional suggestions were raised for future discussion items on the forward plan, other than those already noted during the meeting.

**The Panel noted the forward plan.**

### **12/02/25 Any Other Business the Chair Considers Urgent**

There was no other urgent business to discuss.

### **13/02/25 Date of Next Meeting**

The next scheduled meeting of the Panel would be held on Monday 19 May 2025 at 11.00am.

### **14/02/25 Exclusion of the Press and Public**

**The Panel agreed to exclude the press and public from the meeting, in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 7 of Schedule 12A to the Local Government Act 1972 (as amended), when it considered the exempt information in relation to the items on: Enterprise Risk Update - Significant Security Incident including Cyber Security (ER04); and Risk and Assurance Report Quarter 3 2024/25.**

The meeting closed at 12.45pm.

Chair: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

## Safety and Security Panel



**Date:** 19 May 2025

**Item:** Actions List

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### **1 Summary**

- 1.1 This paper informs the Panel of progress against actions agreed at previous meetings.

### **2 Recommendation**

- 2.1 The Panel is asked to note the report.

#### **List of appendices to this report:**

Appendix 1: Actions List

#### **List of Background Papers:**

Minutes of previous meetings of the Panel

Contact Officer: Andrea Clarke, General Counsel  
E-mail: [AndreaClarke@tfl.gov.uk](mailto:AndreaClarke@tfl.gov.uk)

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## Safety and Security Panel Actions List (to be reported to the meeting on 19 May 2025)

### Actions from the meeting held on 12 February 2025

Minute No.	Description	Action By	Target Date	Status/note
06/02/25 (1)	<b>2024 Crime and Antisocial Behaviour Update: Next update</b> The Panel would be updated on what the focus of the next update would be and when it would be scheduled.	Siwan Hayward	2 September 2025	The next Crime and Antisocial Behaviour Update is scheduled for 2 September 2025 and the focus will be on high harm crimes.
06/02/25 (2)	<b>2024 Crime and Antisocial Behaviour Update: Police representatives at meetings</b> Representatives from the British Transport Police (BTP) and the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) would be invited to a future Panel meeting.	Siwan Hayward	2 September 2025	Representatives of BTP and MPS will be invited to the 2 September 2025 meeting.
07/02/25 (1)	<b>Safeguarding Customers at TfL</b> The Quarterly Safety, Health and Security Report would include updates on safeguarding.	Siwan Hayward	19 May 2025	A safeguarding our customers section has been included in the Quarterly Safety, Health and Security Report on the agenda for this meeting.
07/02/25 (2)	<b>Safeguarding Customers at TfL</b> A Safeguarding deep dive would be added to the forward plan.	Siwan Hayward	12 November 2025.	The deep dive session will be held at a future meeting.

Minute No.	Description	Action By	Target Date	Status/note
09/02/25 (1)	<b>Safety, Health and Security Report – Quarter 3 2024/25: Vision Zero update</b> The Panel would receive an update on Vision Zero, which would include short- and medium-term milestones and how performance trajectories may be subject to change.	Lilli Matson	2 September 2025	To be included in the Vision Zero Road Risk Update paper scheduled for the 2 September 2025 meeting.
09/02/25 (2)	<b>Safety, Health and Security Report – Quarter 3 2024/25: Cancer related absence data</b> Data on cancer related absence would be clarified in at the next meeting.	Lilli Matson	19 May 2025	Update to be given at this meeting.

**There are no outstanding actions from previous meetings of the Panel**

## Safety and Security Panel



**Date:** 19 May 2025

**Item:** Bus Safety Overview

### **This paper will be considered in public**

## **1 Summary**

- 1.1 This paper provides the Panel with an overview of trends and performance relating to bus safety and the measures we have in progress or planned to support in meeting our 2030 TfL Safety Strategy and Mayor's Transport Strategy (MTS) Vision Zero targets.

## **2 Recommendation**

- 2.1 **The Panel is asked to note the paper.**

## **3 Background and Context**

- 3.1 Improving safety on our bus network is a vital priority for improving safety more widely on London's roads. It is a key element of our Vision Zero target to eliminate death and serious injury on London's transport network by 2041. As well as a policy imperative, we also have additional obligations and opportunities as the primary contractor of bus services in London. To deliver safety benefits as soon as possible, we have several targets for 2030, with bus safety contributing to:
  - (a) MTS: no-one killed on or by a bus (tracked via police STATS19 data for the public highway, on calendar years to align with Department for Transport requirements), and a 70 per cent reduction in number of people killed or seriously injured on the road network (from 2010-14 baseline). STATS19 data definitions excludes medicals, intentional acts of harm, assaults between members of the public and incidents that occurred on private land; and
  - (b) TfL Strategy: halving customers killed or seriously injured (from 2022/23 baseline) and no colleagues to be killed or seriously injured (tracked using bus operator and TfL Safety, Health and Environment (SHE) incident reporting in financial years to align with TfL scorecard and internal metrics).
- 3.2 The use of multiple data sources ensures we capture all type of incidents involving buses including those with other users of the road network, our customers and colleagues on both the public highway and our own or private land.
- 3.3 Progress has been made in reducing the number of people killed and seriously injured in collisions involving buses, however, we know we need to do more. We will also continue to ensure that we are responding to persistent and new challenges. Sadly, in the 2024 calendar year there were 13 tragic fatalities involving buses, the highest for over 10 years. In the last five years, four people were killed

walking in, or in close proximity to, bus stations. In 2025, we received a Notice of Contravention (NoC) from the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) relating to driver monitoring and communication at Walthamstow bus station, having previously received NoCs for Walthamstow (March 2024) and for Victoria bus station (December 2022).

- 3.4 Our 2023 Bus Safety Strategy sets out the extent of the challenge and approach to tackle bus safety around the Safe System pillars of Safe Speeds, Safe Streets, Safe Behaviours, Safe Vehicle and Post-collision Support and Investigation.
- 3.5 This strategy is designed to adapt and respond to emerging issues. Considering each potential contributory factor aims to ensure that, should one part of the system 'fail', another part may act to prevent the incident or reduce severity. A continual cycle of incident review will support in strengthening the programme and ensuring we focus on the right areas. Our analysis is enhanced through working with stakeholders internally and across the bus industry, technical and academic experts and through partnerships with the Bus Centre of Excellence's Bus Knowledge Sharing and Incident Network and International Bus Benchmarking Group.
- 3.6 Buses do not operate in isolation and wider activities supporting bus safety are delivered via our Vision Zero and Bus Action Plans, Colleague Safety Strategy and operational, contract management and assurance activities.
- 3.7 This paper sets out a review of bus safety performance and existing measures, identifying areas of focus to support meeting our 2030 targets.

## **4 Bus Safety Performance**


### **Summary**

- 4.1 Performance relates to TfL buses (excluding private coaches, charter buses and Dial-a-Ride).
- 4.2 Our Bus Safety Programme has been running since 2016 and has made considerable progress in reducing bus involved injuries. By 2022, we achieved a 65 per cent reduction in the number of people killed, and 54 per cent reduction in the number of people killed or seriously injured, by a bus from the 2005-09 baseline (updated from 2023 to 2010-14 average). Buses continue to be the safest form of transport per million passenger journeys, and least likely to be involved in a collision killing or seriously injuring other road users, but we cannot be complacent.

**Target: 70 per cent reduction in people killed or seriously injured on London's streets by 2030 (all modes) from 2010-14 baseline (Police reported, STATS19)**


- 4.3 Provisional data from 2024 shows a 34 per cent reduction in the number of people killed and seriously injured in collision involving a bus (compared to 24 per cent fewer people killed or seriously injured by any mode) from the new baseline 2010-14 used since 2023. Despite a downward trend pre-coronavirus pandemic, the number of people killed and seriously injured post-pandemic are back to 2016/17 levels. There was an increase in those injured on board buses post-pandemic,

which may have settled, but there appears to be a slight upward trend in people being injured in collisions involving people outside of the bus.



**Target: No-one killed on or by a bus by 2030 (Police reported, STATS19)**

- 4.4 In 2024 a total of 13 people died in incidents involving a bus, the highest number recorded for over 10 years. There were 11 people killed in collisions involving a bus, and two people died in incidents related to falls on a bus.



\*2024 data is provisional

- 4.5 Small numbers of low probability events mean it is not possible to determine definitively whether this represents a worsening in bus safety or statistical

variability. Buses remain the safest way to travel on the roads, carrying more people than any other transport mode. We must and continue to thoroughly investigate every fatality to learn and prevent future incidents.

- 4.6 The categories of road users most likely to be seriously injured in incidents involving a bus remain broadly consistent over time, with the majority being those involved in collisions outside the bus. The highest is pedestrians (32 per cent) followed by pedal cyclists (12 per cent), motorcyclists (six per cent) and car occupants (five per cent). Those on the bus account for four per cent, and other one per cent.
- 4.7 Representation differs for fatalities, where pedestrians make up 63 per cent, pedal cyclists five per cent, motorcyclists nine per cent and car occupants four per cent. Bus occupants make up 18 per cent and bus drivers one per cent of fatalities.
- 4.8 Serious injuries and fatalities do not always arise from causes directly related to the bus operation. Fatality figures include, for example, car occupant deaths where a vehicle hits a stationary bus.

**Target: Halving customers killed or seriously injured by 2030 (from 2022/23 baseline) (Operator and TfL SHE Reported)**

- 4.9 Of the 223 customers killed or seriously injured across all TfL modes in the baseline year 2022/23, 93 were travelling on a bus, three of whom were fatally injured. In 2023/24, 56 of the 204 customers across all TfL modes were seriously injured travelling on a bus and one person killed. Provisional figures for 2024/25 suggest there were 78 bus serious injuries and one bus customer fatality of the 212 customers killed or seriously injured on all modes. This is an increase in the number of bus customers seriously injured in 2023/24 but represents a 15 per cent reduction from the target baseline year.

**Target: Zero colleagues (including contractors) killed or seriously injured by 2030 (Operator and TfL SHE Reported)**

- 4.10 Provisional figures for 2024/25 suggest that four bus colleagues were seriously injured, with no fatalities. This is an improvement on the seven recorded for 2023/24 and five in 2022/23. All these serious injuries were to bus operator employees.

**Towards a detailed understanding and evidence-led programme**

- 4.11 While summary incident reporting is useful to review overall numbers and possible trends or areas of focus, it is limited in detailing the context or multiple, complex contributory factors and causes of incidents. We can gain further insight through investigations and analysis of the most serious incidents. We consider the circumstances and wide range of contributory factors in each fatality separately asking, 'What may have prevented this incident?' and 'What could have reduced the severity of injury?'. This informs the development of counter measures and mitigations. We completed the first round of this [research in 2018](#) and are due to commence an update using 2019-2024 data, this year (2025).

- 4.12 In periods between research, we review the most serious incidents as they occur. Bus operators are required to carry out investigations of collisions, identifying root causes and corrective actions. Our Notification and Investigation of Major Incidents process was developed to ensure incidents are reported and investigated to a high standard, including all relevant information that may prevent a similar incident happening again. Where a fatality occurs on TfL or private land (for example a bus station) we carry out our own investigation, including experts from TfL and the operator.
- 4.13 This evidence-based approach has been and continues to be the foundation of our Bus Safety Strategy and wider supporting Vision Zero activities.

## **5 Bus Safety Programmes and Activities**

### **Our Approach: A Safe System**

- 5.1 As described above, our Bus Safety activity is structured around five Safe System Pillars detailed in our [2023 Bus Safety Strategy](#). This section summarises the activity under these pillars. Interventions include aspects across multiple system pillars, ensuring they work together. For example, improving driving standards includes work to limit speeds and ensure compliance, assessing routes and risks on streets, supporting behaviour through training, and looking after driver health and wellbeing or providing optimum vehicle cab design to enable safe driving.

### **Strengthening each of the Safe System Pillars**

#### **Safe Speeds**

- 5.2 Reducing speeds reduces severity of injury, in both bus involved and other road user collisions. Over 5,300 vehicles (approximately 60 per cent of our bus fleet) are fitted with Intelligent Speed Assistance (ISA), which uses GPS and speed limit data to ensure buses remain within the signed speed limit. New vehicles entering the fleet have ISA fitted as standard and we continue to retrofit older vehicles. Bus ISA is based on the London Digital Speed Limit Map, setting out the speed limits across all public roads in London, approximately half of which are now 20mph.
- 5.3 We monitor use of speed and speed limit compliance. Our Speed Compliance Tool tracks excess speed incidents and allows for network-wide analysis, our Driver Quality Monitoring scheme assesses individual drivers, and most bus operators have telematics systems which record speeding and other events such as harsh braking and acceleration. Safe speed is an ongoing focus of operators' communications with drivers, with many using data from the above sources to target their messaging and engagement appropriately.

#### **Safe Streets and Safe Bus Stations**

- 5.4 Buses operate in complex street environments, with known issues and potential for unpredictable conditions or events. Route risk assessments are conducted by the bus operators and kept under review for every London bus route, and the information collected is used by the operators in driver training. Assessments are complemented by the operators' use of telematics data, which can be used to highlight 'hotspots' based on a richer dataset than collision or incident data alone.

- 5.5 Bus involved collision data and operational considerations are used to inform wider street improvement schemes, such as Safer Junctions programmes or the positioning of bus stops around cycle lanes or pedestrian crossings.

#### Bus Stations

- 5.6 We are using behavioural science reviews to identify desire lines, common behaviours and near misses to inform bus station layout improvements. Improvements at Victoria bus station were delivered in December 2023, and since the tragic fatality there in January 2024 we have delivered further changes, including measures to encourage and require bus drivers to treat Terminus Place as effectively part of Victoria bus station, driving at slower speed and being particularly alert for pedestrians. In 2024/25 we completed bus station layout improvements at Walthamstow, and Phase 1 improvements at Harrow and Edgware bus stations. A prioritised programme for 2025/26 has been developed with a target of completing a further seven bus station layout improvements.
- 5.7 Following the tragic death of a pedestrian at Walthamstow bus station on 15 December 2023, the HSE in March 2024 served a NoC on TfL. The HSE identified a failure to provide safe crossings for vehicles and pedestrians. In response TfL delivered temporary and then permanent signalised pedestrian crossings at the north and west of the bus station, which were completed in December 2024. In March 2025 the HSE issued another NoC having observed examples of drivers not allowing pedestrians priority, and other issues, at Walthamstow bus station following completion of the physical works. It is clearly disappointing that there were contraventions, and we are committed to redoubling all efforts, alongside the bus operating companies, to ensure such issues do not continue so that our safety ambitions can be realised.
- 5.8 Our response to the March 2025 NoC focuses on two related elements: monitoring and communication/enforcement. We are implementing a new programme of monitoring. This will allow us to gather valuable data and assess any potential safety concerns or trends. We are initially piloting this process at Walthamstow, with plans to expand it across further sites.
- 5.9 For communication and enforcement, the Director of Buses has written to all bus operators instructing them to communicate the requirements for safe driving at all bus stations and to outline the measures they are taking to communicate and enforce these requirements. These issues will remain discussion points for review at appropriate governance meetings with all operators. To support this communication campaign, we have just finished filming a collaborative video with all our operators outlining driving requirements and role model safety behaviours expected at bus stations, and this will be available shortly to be shared with all drivers. If issues are identified through our programme of monitoring that require further communication with drivers, we will ensure this happens.

## Safe Behaviours

### Drivers/Colleague

- 5.10 Driving standards and driver alertness, health and wellbeing are critical to ensuring safe driving standards and responses to road conditions.
- 5.11 Following one of the 13 fatalities in 2024, the bus driver failed a drug and alcohol test. In autumn 2024, we carried out detailed assurance activity with all operators, assessing policies for drug and alcohol testing. The analysis of drug and alcohol testing practices across operators revealed all were compliant with policies and procedures, but there were some inconsistencies in training, data reporting and post-incident protocols. Some operators demonstrated strong adherence to best practices, but others required improvements in policy review cycles, staff training, and testing data management. This includes commitment from operators to test above the 10 per cent of drivers as per the bus operator framework agreement.
- 5.12 Recommendations include standardising policies to ensure uniform review cycles and training requirements, harmonising testing protocols and reporting, enforcing mandatory record keeping, new employee pre-employment testing and separate monitoring during probationary periods. We are working with the operators on the implementation of recommendations.
- 5.13 We are committed to understanding and managing the potential for driver fatigue. All London bus operators have comprehensive Fatigue Risk Management Plans in place. Last year, these were reviewed by an expert consultant and subsequently revised to ensure they met required standards. Approximately 400 buses have been fitted with fatigue detection technology, as fitted to most new cars, as part of a trial. Managers at bus operating companies have been trained to support drivers receiving an alert, signposting them to support from occupational health or employee assistance programmes. Data is being independently analysed showing the routes, times of day and operators most vulnerable to fatigue, allowing for analysis against rosters and targeting measures.
- 5.14 Loughborough University is working with us to consider whether the current system for driver medicals sufficiently safeguards the health and wellbeing of drivers. The research has been completed, with a report expected later this year.
- 5.15 A key area of work for the future Bus Safety Standard 2027 is the focus on holistic and ergonomic re-design of the driver's cab. This aims to support wellbeing and improve inclusivity, attraction, and driver retention by being aware of the risks for different groups and considering gender, disability, pregnancy, and other elements.
- 5.16 We continue to invest in improving bus driver welfare facilities. Good facilities are essential in improving safety and wellbeing as well as driver retention. Since 2017, new toilet facilities have been provided on 72 bus routes and a further 58 bus driver welfare facilities, such as toilets and mess rooms, have been renewed and upgraded. We have also formalised bus driver access to facilities at London Underground locations. This year we are on track to provide three additional driver toilets on the bus network and renewals of 17 driver welfare facilities.

## Customers

- 5.17 We have strengthened our bus customer injury workstream, focusing on slips, trips and falls in response to these incident types resulting in serious and fatal injuries. Our customer injury Bus Safety Innovation Challenge will see sensor-initiated safety messaging being trialled on two bus routes this year (summer), as well as trialling a seat counter display indicating the availability of seating on the upper deck (winter). The trial of the original Routemaster 'Ding Ding' sound to indicate the bus is about to depart will shortly be rolled out on two bus routes, with the aim of nudging customers to hold on or find a seat before the bus departs. The trial of 'hold the handrail' posters in the stairwell is to be evaluated to determine whether the messaging is effective in changing customer behaviour. All trials mentioned above will be evaluated using CCTV analysis comparing a baseline with trial period, to see if the desired behaviour change has taken place.
- 5.18 Recent behavioural science research into slips, trips and falls included a behavioural audit reviewing available literature, in-depth review of CCTV from incidents on our buses, observational work, and bus driver and other stakeholder interviews. Recommendations from this work are focussed on using effective communications to nudge customers to carry out safe behaviours on buses.
- 5.19 Research at the world-leading testing facility University College London Person-Environment-Activity Research Laboratory ([UCL PEARL](#)) is carrying out stakeholder engagement with stakeholders including disabled bus customers and bus drivers on new lighting positions on buses. This will influence future lighting design on London buses.

## Road users

- 5.20 As stated above, we need to consider all parts of the Safe System, including all the users of the network. Our wider Vision Zero work seeks to support road users in understanding risks and support safe behaviours and interactions on the roads.
- 5.21 Some fatal incidents have involved private vehicles hitting stationary buses, some of which were driving inappropriately for the conditions. We have road danger reduction marketing campaigns focusing on promoting safer road behaviours, improving awareness, and encouraging responsibility among all road users. We have two key campaigns in development, due to launch later this year:
- (a) 'Riders Campaign' targeting drivers to get them to proactively look out for riders (motorcyclists and cyclists) and show the threats posed from failing to look; and
  - (b) 'Highway Code: Need to Know' targeting all London road users to help them to understand that not following the rules puts at-risk road users in danger.
- 5.22 We support improving road user behaviours through provision of free cycle and motorcycle training. Our training helps riders build knowledge and confidence. From 2024 we have engaged with Meal and Grocery Delivery companies to develop the Meal and Grocery delivery charter, to improve safety in this sector.

- 5.23 We also work closely with young people via schools and the London Transport Museum to provide the tools for safe and responsible travel on public transport, including how to cross the road safely when alighting from the bus, understanding bus stop bypasses, and staying safe on the bus, alongside other personal safety messages. Follow up sessions in Years 7 and 8 can also be booked if there have been reported problems with safety or anti-social behaviour in or around the bus.

#### Safe Vehicles

- 5.24 Our largest programme of work relates to the [Bus Safety Standard \(BSS\)](#), our specification for safety features to be included on all new buses. The first phase set out specifications for 2019, followed by 2021 and 2024. The BSS is reviewed on a three-yearly cycle corresponding with the bus manufacturers' development cycles.
- 5.25 Currently, 1,960 new buses (March 2025 figures) are in the London bus fleet that meet the BSS out of a total of 8,800 buses. This includes the first batches of vehicles which meet most of the 2024 BSS requirements, including optimised front-end design to reduce severity of injuries in collisions and enhanced interiors to protect passengers. Advanced Emergency Braking (AEB), a key technology in avoiding collisions, is currently being tested in 'shadow mode' to ensure it will operate correctly when 'live' by one bus manufacturer and planned by three others in 2025.
- 5.26 Our vehicle specification also includes technologies allowing us to better understand the causes of, and factors in, collisions. For example, footwell cameras provide a valuable source of information about driver actions prior to incidents. Footage is used to inform work to prevent and mitigate the impacts of pedal application error (where a driver mistakenly presses the wrong pedal), such as feasibility of accelerator suppression and continued roll out of brake toggling (where the accelerator can only be depressed once the brake has been pumped twice). This data is supplemented by further psychological research, driver training and assessment of options for vehicle design that may help to reduce the risk.
- 5.27 Phase 2 of the BSS is in development which will set out requirements for new buses in 2027, 2030 and 2033, based on the evidence from investigations, research and engagement with bus manufacturers, their tier one suppliers, bus operators, bus drivers, Unite and other stakeholders.
- 5.28 This iterative approach aims to ensure buses are as safe as possible now, while also working to continually improve standards as technology becomes available and respond to issues that we see on the network affecting safety. For example, responding to new road user modes (e.g. e-scooters), available monitoring technology or responding to changing demographics of those injured.

#### Post-collision support and investigation

- 5.29 We have outlined the importance of investigations above. Where required, we also drill down further ensuring any proposed measures will be effective at solving the problem without unintended consequences (e.g., research into braking and acceleration to ensure that AEB aiming to avoid a bus hitting a pedestrian does not result in unnecessary harsh braking that may seriously injure or kill a passenger).

- 5.30 Supporting victims of incidents post collision and their next of kin is an essential element of our response to incidents. Victims of collisions and their families are directed to support services Brake and RoadPeace – funded by TfL and the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime to provide specialist support for victims of road collisions – and the Sarah Hope Line.
- 5.31 We are committed to improving how we engage directly with those affected by fatalities or life-changing injuries, and our new approach has seen the Director of Buses writing, through Family Liaison Officers, to families following recent incidents. This includes offering condolences, signposting to support and the opportunity to speak with the Director. These changes help support our culture of openness and transparency, improving our ability to learn from incidents and address any issues identified, reducing the likelihood of future incidents.

#### Ensuring quality of operations

- 5.32 The safe day to day running of our bus operation is paramount to meeting required safety standards. Bus operators must comply with all health and safety legislation or be subject to statutory investigation by the regulator where there is any non-compliance. We are highly proactive in our approach to monitoring and assessing compliance among our operators. Regular monitoring of engineering and driving standards supports consistent high standards, with instances of poor performance addressed and tracked with operators.
- 5.33 Operators are also subject to regular assurance visits which consider a number of issues including their compliance with legal requirements such as driver hours limits, their health and safety structure, employee processes and communications, meeting medical and fatigue risk management standards, and tracking and closing of actions. We work to support an open and collaborative culture with operators around serious incidents, aiming to create an environment where we learn from each other’s experiences.

## **6 Summary and Next Steps**

- 6.1 We have a clearly defined, evidence-led Bus Safety Programme to deliver our strategy, which builds on a day-to-day commitment to run a safe service. We have made lots of progress focusing within the bus operation, with the work on the vehicle through the BSS, engaging with drivers and in relationships with operators, and more recently working to improve bus station safety. We need to continue strengthening our bus operations measures, but now also widen our focus to Vision Zero to align work beyond bus operations. This includes continuing to reduce speeds and improve speed compliance, educating and messaging to other road users about risks in the road system and around buses specifically, diving deeper into how we better protect those waiting at and/or travelling from and to bus stops, shelters, and stations, through infrastructure improvements and behavioural campaigns.

6.2 Looking ahead to 2025/26, we expect to deliver:

- (a) trials and evaluations of solutions from our Bus Safety Innovation Challenge to reduce customer slips, trips and falls as mentioned in section 5.17, which will inform priorities for wider roll out;
- (b) all zero-emission buses coming into service meet the 2024 BSS (except for active AEB as we ensure this is working effectively in 'shadow' mode before switching to 'live');
- (c) introducing ISA to more buses in the fleet to build on the nearly 60 per cent of buses currently fitted with the technology;
- (d) continuing at pace the rollout of a new design to the front end of buses to reduce the impact of a collision with vulnerable road users, included in new buses entering the fleet; and
- (e) continuing to work to make bus stations safer and delivering our prioritised programme for 2025/26 with a target of completing a further seven bus station layout improvements.

**List of appendices to this report:**

None

**List of Background Papers:**

None

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## Safety and Security Panel



**Date:** 19 May 2025

**Item:** Protecting London's Transport Network Against Terrorism

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### **This paper will be considered in public**

## **1 Summary**

- 1.1 In this 20th anniversary year of the terrorist attacks on 7 July 2005, we are remembering all those who died or were injured, their families and all those affected.
- 1.2 This paper sets out the approach that TfL is taking to address the threats to our organisation and minimise the risk from acts of terrorism to our staff, customers, and infrastructure.
- 1.3 A paper is included on Part 2 of the agenda which contains supplementary information that is exempt from publication by virtue of paragraphs 3 and 7 of Schedule 12A of the Local Government Act 1972 in that it contains information relating to the financial or business affairs of TfL and information relating to any action taken or to be taken in connection with the prevention, investigation or prosecution of crime. Any discussion of that exempt information must take place after the press and public have been excluded from the meeting.

## **2 Recommendation**

- 2.1 **The Panel is asked to note the paper and the exempt supplementary information on Part 2 of the agenda.**

## **3 Background**

- 3.1 We are an operator and owner of Critical National Infrastructure, and provide essential transport services, which if attacked, poses a risk to the societal, economic and security functioning of London and beyond. In the UK, terrorism is defined as the threat or use of violence or damage to property to further a political, religious, racial, or ideological cause. We aim to protect our organisation, our customers, our assets and our workforce from groups or individuals who engage with terrorism.
- 3.2 The threat from terrorism to cause serious harm including loss of life and serious damage to our transport services is constant, complex, evolving and enduring. The motivations and methods used have changed over time. We adapt to the changing threat landscape, consider the implications to our organisation and London, and act to strengthen our defences against the threat.
- 3.3 The national threat level from terrorism is determined by the security services based on the analysis of information and data from a wide range of sources.

- 3.4 There are five levels of threat considered by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre and their current assessment is at Substantial – an attack is likely. The threat levels are: Low – an attack is highly unlikely; Moderate – an attack is possible but not likely; Substantial – an attack is likely; Severe – an attack is highly likely; and Critical – an attack is highly likely in the near future.

## **4 Changing Nature of the Threat**

- 4.1 In the period from 1970 to 1999, the main threat from terrorism arose from the actions of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) where various campaigns caused loss of life, serious injury and serious economic damage across the UK, including attacks on the transport network in London.
- 4.2 The attack on the Twin Towers in New York in 2001 signalled a significant change in attack methodology on countries in the west. Suicide bombers inspired by Islamist terrorist organisations conspired to cause mass human casualties. On 7 July 2005, suicide bombers attacked London's transport network, targeting commuters travelling during the morning rush hour. The attack took place on three London Underground (LU) trains and on a London bus killing 52 people and injuring over 770 others. Two weeks later, another attack was attempted on three LU trains and on a bus, but the devices failed to detonate.
- 4.3 In the 20 years since, the threat from terrorism and politically motivated violent crime has further evolved, with a rise of right-wing extremism and anti-government movements in the UK and the spread of conspiracy theories and disinformation through social media.
- 4.4 In 2017 there were a series of terror attacks in the UK characterised by the 'self-initiated' terrorist, where individuals or small groups operated independently rather than planned and co-ordinated by terrorist networks. The method of attack also shifted, using household objects and items to create terror. TfL was targeted with the use of improvised explosive devices at Parsons Green station. Hostile vehicle and marauding bladed attacks took place on the road network at Westminster Bridge and London Bridge and a vehicle was used as a method of attack near Finsbury Park Mosque. A timeline of these events is provided in Appendix 1.
- 4.5 As the threat landscape changes, the government continually reviews and updates the law and evolves its guidance and regulation of railway operations and other critical national infrastructure, which is also shown in Appendix 1.
- 4.6 The police and security services continue to actively seek to identify, deter and disrupt terrorist activities and in recent years, there have been numerous arrests of people either planning to carry out acts or supporting those plans. There were 248 terrorism related arrests in 2024 which is the highest since 2019, including suspects at the late stages of planning an attack.

## **5 Our Response and Readiness**

### **Overall approach**

- 5.1 Regardless of the motivations of attackers, our role at TfL is to protect our customers, workforce, and critical assets. We must maintain high levels of vigilance against hostile attacks, including cyber-based attacks. We recognise counter-terrorism strategies need to adapt to the evolving nature of the threat.
- 5.2 We take a risk-based approach. We identify existing and emerging security risks and seek to reduce our vulnerability to all forms of terrorism. We continually review and monitor our Enterprise Risk 04 (ER04) which is described as failure to prevent, identify, prepare for, respond to, and minimise impact of a significant security incident which could have major and adverse effect on our operations, finances, people, customers, reputation, data and assets, as well as those of our suppliers.
- 5.3 We receive regular threat briefings from our policing and security partners. We consider the implications for our organisation, assess our current activities and controls, and make decisions on any changes required.
- 5.4 We operate a layered security approach to terrorism where we implement multiple, overlapping security measures to deter and delay attackers, making it more difficult for them to succeed. Each layer may have unintended weaknesses, but with all the layers together, we reduce our vulnerability to an attack. These layers include our partnership working with the police and security services, complying with government regulation and guidance, building awareness and action from the public as well as TfL colleagues.
- 5.5 In 2017 Lord Harris of Haringey, at the request of the Mayor, published a report into London's readiness for terrorist attacks. The Mayor then commissioned Lord Harris to undertake a new review in 2021, recognising the changing nature of the threat of terrorism facing the capital. The second report, published in 2022, recognised substantial progress had been made over the five-year period since the first review. There were several recommendations to address specific areas of vulnerability around strengthening our protective measures against a marauding terrorist attack, increasing our collaboration and sharing of information with our policing and security service partners and strengthening our security culture and communications across the transport network for colleagues, tenants and customers. TfL responded to all the recommendations that were made in relation to its areas of control.

### **Protecting our Rail Network**

- 5.6 The Land Transport Security team in the Department for Transport (DfT) is responsible for setting policy in relation to counter-terrorist security and regulates security on the rail network in the UK. Currently, there are three separate sets of DfT regulations relevant to TfL services: London Underground Security Programme, National Rail Security Programme and Docklands Light Railway Security Programme. We also operate under the Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018, which focus on cyber security measures for our operating systems.

- 5.7 These regulations are regularly reviewed, in line with the changing threat landscape, by the DfT in consultation with TfL and frequent updates are issued which are acted on.
- 5.8 We undergo regular testing by DfT inspectors to ensure continued compliance with regulation and learning. We also have security improvement programmes that consider the changing threat, identify potential vulnerabilities, and create proportionate mitigations to tackle those areas which are outlined in Appendix 2.
- 5.9 We stay ahead of changes in legislation and regulation, where possible, to strengthen our defences and to be well prepared. In the pipeline for 2025 with security implications are the new Light Rail Security Programme DfT regulations which will apply to LU, DLR and Trams; updates to the Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018 and the Cyber Security and Resilience Bill.

### **Protecting our Bus and Road Network**

- 5.10 The DfT provides Bus and Coach Security recommended best practice, which has been developed to support and promote the bus and coach industry in devising and maintaining a range of best practice security measures to protect against extreme acts of violence. We follow this guidance and mirror best practice from the existing regulatory frameworks which is reviewed on an ongoing basis. We are currently collaborating with the DfT on a further update to the Bus and Coach Security guidance due to be launched later this year.
- 5.11 We have a bus security improvement programme in place to strengthen our counter-terrorism security, including testing the effectiveness of measures and communications that seek to reassure our passengers and staff to increase public confidence in using bus and coach services.
- 5.12 The Manchester Arena Inquiry and London Bridge Inquest called for the introduction of legislation and guidance to protect the public. The Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Act 2025, which received Royal Assent on 3 April 2025 is intended to improve protective security and organisational preparedness across the UK. We have established further internal processes, including protective security assessments to address predictably crowded spaces. In liaison with our policing and security service partners, advice and recommendations are made on our streets design and street furniture that are proportionate to the identified threats and vulnerabilities.
- 5.13 We also work in partnership with our local authority colleagues on the continued protection of the bridges for which TfL is the highway authority which includes London Bridge and Westminster Bridge.

### **Our Customers and Colleagues**

- 5.14 Keeping the public informed and safe is critical. We deliver targeted messaging campaigns with the aim of reassuring our customers, deterring hostile activity, and encouraging reporting of suspicious activity.
- 5.15 We deliver the DfT 'See it. Say it. Sorted.' campaign across our network which supports other security measures we have in place, reinforces security

awareness, and encourages vigilance and reporting from our colleagues and customers to help keep the transport network safe and act as a deterrent from those with hostile intent. It is displayed on poster sites across the TfL network, in the Metro, public address announcements and online in a way that ensures the security messages are prominent across our network alongside our other messaging.

- 5.16 All TfL colleagues share a responsibility for security. We have a Security Culture improvement programme, also outlined in Appendix 2 and continually seek to enhance how we train and engage all colleagues to create a strong security culture where we are knowledgeable, vigilant, curious and active in protecting and responding to extreme random acts of violence.
- 5.17 We have adopted many changes to the way TfL operational colleagues are trained, including policies and protocols to be followed, with increased visibility and interaction with our customers and the emergency response procedures to be followed.

### **Responding to an incident**

- 5.18 We continue to review and strengthen how we manage incidents, coordinating all resilience activities across TfL to ensure that the organisation is well-prepared to anticipate, plan for, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism.
- 5.19 We operate a command structure to ensure a clear chain of command and effective decision making in relation to an incident and follow a Significant Incident Procedure (SIP) with our policing, emergency service and security service partners. The SIP complements the TfL control centres' existing, well-established command and control procedures that have been tried and tested over the years and have been implemented in line with industry best practice and learning from past incident inquiries.
- 5.20 We take part in multi-agency testing of our preparedness for an attack, the learnings of which form part of future security threat risk reducing activity.
- 5.21 We are concluding a significant investment in strengthening security at LU stations under our Station Security Technology Integration Programme. One key element has been innovation in how we use technology to support our response to critical incidents. Critical Incident Management (CIM) prepares LU for active critical incident response and represents a pioneering shift in how we respond to emergencies. CIM enables us to act quickly, remotely unlocking gates, delivering urgent public announcements, and guiding passengers to safety.

## **6 Our Partnerships**

- 6.1 Protecting from the threat of terrorism requires a proactive and collaborative approach, where we work in partnership with the police, security services, government, and other London stakeholders to understand, prevent and mitigating terrorist activities and ensures that counter-terrorism strategies remain effective, collaborative, and responsive to the new challenges faced.

- 6.2 We have enhanced how we collaborate and share information with the police and security agencies to optimise the security benefits, supporting investigations and apprehend offenders.
- 6.3 The UK's counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST, launched in 2003 (last refreshed in 2023) is based on four key themes: prevent, pursue, protect, and prepare. As members of the board which considers the strategy, we collaborate to prevent an attack, disrupt an attack, strengthen our protection against attack, and if an attack occurs, minimise its impact and recover.
- 6.4 We also work closely with National Counter Terrorism Security Office a unit that sits within Metropolitan Police Service's Counter Terrorism Policing team, who aim to strengthen the UK's protection against a terrorist attack and should the worst happen, minimise the impact of an attack.

**List of appendices to this report:**

Appendix 1: Timeline

Appendix 2: Security Improvement Programmes

A paper containing exempt supplementary information is included on Part 2 of the agenda

**List of Background Papers:**

None

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## Appendix 1: Timeline

Year	2000	2001	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Incident					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>7/7 Four suicide bomb attacks on trains at Aldgate, Edgware Road, Russell Square, and on a bus near Tavistock Square</li> <li>21/7 Improvised explosive devices (IED) failed to detonate properly at four London Underground stations</li> </ul>		
Control	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Terrorism Act introduced, establishing new offences and powers to combat terrorism</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The National Counter Terrorism Security Office established as a government agency with the responsibility for counter terrorism advice</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>UK government's counter-terrorism strategy, known as CONTEST established</li> <li>London Underground Security Programme introduced to regulate security on LU operations</li> <li>DfT introduced security vulnerabilities outside railway stations guidance</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>National Rail Security Programme introduced to regulate heavy rail (now including London Overground &amp; Elizabeth Line)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Coroner's inquest, included specific items for TfL</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Docklands Light Railway (DLR) Security Programme introduced to regulate DLR network security</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure formed as the government authority for protective security advice</li> </ul>

Year	2012	2016	2017	2019	2022	2023	2025
Incident		<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>20/10 IED is discovered on a train at North Greenwich Station made safe by police</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>22/3 Hostile vehicle and marauding bladed attack at Westminster Bridge</li><li>22/5 Manchester Arena attack-suicide bombing</li><li>3/6 Hostile vehicle and marauding bladed attack at London Bridge</li><li>19/6 Hostile vehicle attack near Finsbury Park Mosque</li><li>15/9 IED failed to detonate properly on a train at Parsons Green Underground Station</li></ul>				
Control	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>DfT Bus and Coach Security recommended best practice</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>National Cyber Security Centre formed as the UK's technical authority for cyber security</li><li>Lord Harris 1st review of London's preparedness for terrorist attacks commissioned by the Mayor of London</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>TfL acted on Manchester Arena inquiry recommendations</li><li>DfT introduced reducing security vulnerabilities at rail, bus and coach stations guidance</li></ul>	Counter Terrorism and Border Security Act added new offences to the 2000 Terrorism Act	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Lord Harris 2nd review recognising London's improved preparedness for terrorist attacks</li><li>Government's Resilience Framework launched</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>National Protective Security Authority established to help businesses and organisations defend themselves against national security threats</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Introduction of the Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill</li><li>Light Rail Security Programme due to be introduced later this year to regulate light rail security</li><li>TfL collaborating with DfT on a further update to the Bus and Coach security best practice</li></ul>

## Appendix 2: Security Improvement Programmes

Theme	Programme	Purpose
<b>Work together to be safe and secure</b>	<b>Command and Control (Resilience and Events)</b>	Align and develop resilience activity across TfL business areas; increase our testing and exercising regime for key risk areas
	<b>London Underground Security Programme</b>	Create and update guidance/standards/rule book entries to provide governance to ensure compliance with regulations
	<b>Head Office Buildings Security</b>	Protect head office occupants from harm and disruption
	<b>TfL Security Risk Management – Local Security Action Plans</b>	Identification of security vulnerabilities across all unregulated TfL areas with specialists providing recommendations for mitigation
	<b>Bus Security Programme</b>	Deliver the Bus Security Programme to ensure mitigation of security and crime risks
	<b>Piers and River Security Programme</b>	Improve existing pier security arrangements

Theme	Programme	Purpose
<b>Protect our Organisation</b>	<b>Cyber Security Improvement Programme</b>	To improve TfL's cyber security maturity and embed a three lines of defence model
	<b>Infrastructure Security Working Group</b>	Pan-TfL working group establishing consistency of approach towards the physical security of our infrastructure
	<b>Visual Surveillance Systems</b>	A single approach for renewals, maintenance and trials of new technology considering all operational and security related uses of CCTV
	<b>Security Culture, Comms and Engagement</b>	Build a culture of how we all behave and respond in a security conscious way and where customers have confidence to travel
	<b>Security Governance</b>	Embed security governance into the TfL value chain

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## Safety and Security Panel



**Date:** 19 May 2025

**Item:** Safety, Health and Environment Cultural Programme Update

**This paper will be considered in public**

### **1 Summary**

- 1.1 This paper provides the Panel with an update on the Safety, Health and Environment (SHE) Culture Programme and assessment, an overview of key themes and findings, recommendations following assessment and the next steps for the SHE Culture Programme.

### **2 Recommendation**

- 2.1 The Panel is asked to note the paper.

### **3 Background and Context**

- 3.1 SHE culture is a critical enabler for enhancing safety performance and outcomes, elevating colleague health and wellbeing and advancing our collective commitment to be a strong, green heartbeat for London.
- 3.2 It is widely acknowledged that strong SHE leadership combined with supporting and building a mature, open SHE culture is the bedrock for good SHE performance. This is often assessed by a range of maturity measures and tools, such as employee engagement surveys, the Office of Rail and Road's Risk Management Maturity Model (RM3) and the Health and Safety Laboratory's Safety Climate Tool.
- 3.3 The SHE Culture Programme contributes to a more proactive safety culture that empowers teams to raise safety concerns before things go wrong, encourages the reporting of near misses, and learns lessons quickly.
- 3.4 The SHE Culture Programme was developed through reviewing academic research, best practice outlined by regulators and benchmarking across comparable organisations. It consists of four workstreams:
  - (a) SHE Culture Measurement;
  - (b) SHE Leadership;
  - (c) Learning Organisation; and
  - (d) Just and Fair.

- 3.5 The SHE Culture Measurement workstream provides a means for TfL to measure its SHE cultural maturity, that is bespoke and fit for TfL's needs and complex delivery model, which enables teams to better understand their SHE culture and to identify where improvements can be made.
- 3.6 TfL's SHE cultural maturity baseline has been determined by completing a series of localised SHE culture assessments across TfL, with the results consolidated to provide an indication of the organisation's level of SHE cultural maturity.
- 3.7 The SHE culture assessment has now been made available to 9,600 colleagues to date, with an average completion rate of 52 per cent. There has been a predominant focus on TfL's Operations and Capital teams.

## **4 Findings from the SHE Cultural Maturity Baseline**

- 4.1 The overall findings from the SHE culture assessments indicate that TfL is in a positive place with regards to its SHE culture, with benchmarking suggesting that organisations such as National Highways and Network Rail are at a similar level of cultural maturity. However, for TfL to continue its journey towards Vision Zero, of which culture is a critical enabler, focus should be placed on building upon its cultural strengths and improving upon the weaknesses.
- 4.2 The SHE culture maturity model measures what colleagues know, feel and do on a scale. The scale ranges from Level 1 ('Minimum'), describing a culture where only the bare minimum is done to ensure legal compliance, through to Level 5 ('Enlightened'), where there is constant self-reflection and proactivity, and a drive to continuously improve SHE.
- 4.3 TfL's overall SHE cultural maturity baseline, which consolidates the results from all assessments completed to date, gives a score of 3.31. This indicates a 'structured' approach to SHE, where colleagues:
  - Know: the importance of systems, audits and requirements to meet numbers;
  - Feel: a growing confidence of knowing 'how it works'; and
  - Do: gather and analyse data on SHE, but the effectiveness is not always proven.
- 4.4 Within the assessment of SHE, safety has the highest level of maturity at 3.45, followed by health and wellbeing at 3.31 and environment at 3.20.
- 4.5 Of the SHE culture assessments' cultural dimensions, areas of strength include:
  - (a) 'Responsibility';
  - (b) 'How we Manage'; and
  - (c) 'How we Lead',
 with improvement areas identified as:
  - (a) 'Our Mindset';
  - (b) 'Development of our People'; and

(c) 'How we Learn and Improve'.

- 4.6 An analysis of the key themes from TfL's SHE cultural maturity baseline indicates the following.
- 4.7 SHE leadership is one of TfL's cultural strengths, with leaders and managers typically seen to prioritise SHE and take responsibility for it. The baseline identified scope for improvements regarding demonstrating genuine care for SHE, as well as strengthening middle management's understanding of their SHE accountabilities and responsibilities.
- 4.8 Colleague responsibility has been identified as another of TfL's cultural strengths, with colleagues across the organisation feeling highly responsible for SHE and wanting to make a difference. The baseline identified scope for improvements around increasing colleague participation in SHE improvement activities, fostering greater two-way communication, and consistently establishing use of the SHE Management System in ways of working.
- 4.9 The majority of colleagues see incidents as learning opportunities and there is little evidence that TfL has a blame culture, however colleagues feel lessons are often not shared outside of individual teams, and that they do not always get a response when raising SHE concerns through formal or informal channels.
- 4.10 Development and training have consistently been one of the lowest scoring areas, with feedback suggesting an inconsistent approach. Feedback also cited a general lack of classroom-based hearts and minds SHE training, and an overriding feeling that training is there as a mark of compliance rather than building engagement and skills.
- 4.11 Demographic and working information, which was also collected as part of the assessment, reveals that there are few discernible differences in SHE cultural maturity across the different groups with protected characteristics. One notable finding is that colleagues with a health condition or disability report lower scores than those without, which is consistent with findings from other staff engagement surveys that have taken place.

## **5 Viewpoint Results**

- 5.1 Viewpoint, TfL's all colleague engagement survey, was refreshed this year and open to all TfL colleagues to engage with between January and February 2025. The survey moved to an in-house delivery model and the question-set was refreshed, with the establishment of a new Safety and Security engagement theme containing five questions. The intention of the SHE Culture Programme is to use the results within this engagement theme to monitor the progress of TfL's SHE culture, as a form of pulse survey, to supplement the findings of the SHE culture assessment.
- 5.2 Early findings from the 2025 survey indicates that Safety and Security is the second highest scoring engagement theme at 74 per cent, behind Inclusion, and the highest score in many areas of the business. Highlights include that 77 per cent of colleagues feel safe at work, while 83 per cent feel safe reporting concerns.

- 5.3 TfL's business areas are to identify where improvements can be made through the establishment of improvement plans based on the Viewpoint results and their annual SHE improvement plan activities. Open text questions were asked, allowing colleagues to make specific comments around safety, with the data due to be released in the coming months for further analysis.

## **6 Next Steps**

- 6.1 TfL is now shifting its focus on utilising the findings from the assessment and embedding tangible improvements.
- 6.2 Each business area is reviewing their localised SHE culture report if they have completed the assessment, or the TfL-wide SHE culture report if they have not, to identify and implement action to drive improvements to SHE culture and performance in their own area of responsibility.
- 6.3 The SHE Culture Programme has now completed the baseline measurement and will shift its focus towards evolving and embedding existing toolkits and initiatives to support the action above, which includes:
- (a) the development of a self-service culture assessment tool, enabling business areas to undertake either the full SHE culture assessment, or specific questions as a pulse survey, on demand and without further third party support. The tool will be available to all business areas to support further completion of the SHE culture maturity assessment across the organisation and we anticipate that this local ownership will further improve response-rates where business areas choose to undertake further surveys;
  - (b) the implementation of the SHE observations system, allowing our colleagues to raise SHE concerns and get feedback on that concern, with transparent tracking from concern to the solution;
  - (c) further strengthening leadership engagement through targeted training, the further embedding of the SHE leadership engagement tours, with a greater focus on consistent reporting and the quality of engagement;
  - (d) the further utilisation of the Just and Fair decision support tool in go-look-sees and combining with the new investigation process. The Just and Fair decision support tool helps managers to understand actions and behaviours when human action and/or behaviour has been identified as a root cause or contributory factor to an incident, ensuring that structured consideration is given to organisational systems and processes rather than assuming that the individual is at fault;
  - (e) continued targeted benchmarking, with similar and market leading organisations, with sharing of best practice and horizon scanning; and
- further collaboration with TfL's supply chain on SHE culture, to share best practice and lessons learnt to promote continuous improvement across TfL's whole remit.

- 6.4 This will be further supported by the continuing development of wider SHE initiatives, such as the SHE Management System improvements, the new incident management and risk assessment systems, the continued embedding of the digital assurance system and the development of the SHE@TfL training course.
- 6.5 The SHE Culture Programme will continue to work with the Diversity and Inclusion team to further understand any correlations with wider engagement surveys, to understand practical measures to improve safety for groups with protected characteristics.
- 6.6 The SHE Culture Programme will continue to offer regular updates to the Panel on the development of TfL's SHE culture through the analysis of specific Viewpoint questions, the results of by-demand pulse surveys, and workstream milestones. We intend to repeat the maturity assessment exercise, using the Cultural Maturity Model, in the future to determine what level of progress has been made.

**List of appendices to this report:**

None

**List of background papers:**

Safety, Health, Wellbeing and Environment (SHE) Culture Programme paper, Safety, Sustainability and Human Resources Panel 15 November 2023

Safety, Health, Wellbeing and Environment Culture Programme paper, Safety, Sustainability and Human Resources Panel 16 May 2024

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## Safety and Security Panel



**Date:** 19 May 2025

**Item:** Enterprise Risk Update – Failure to Prevent a Significant Safety Incident or Deliver Safety Obligations (ER01)

**This paper will be considered in public**

### **1 Summary**

- 1.1 This paper provides the Panel with an update on Enterprise Risk 01 – Failure to prevent a significant safety incident or deliver safety obligations (ER01) and sets out the background and rationale for resetting our approach to this risk.
- 1.2 Since the last update to the Safety, Sustainability and Human Resources Panel in November 2023, the scope of this risk has been amended. Consequently, the working group reviewing ER01 have assessed the risk against its new definition and the overall risk score has reduced from High to Medium, reflecting a lower likelihood of ER01 materialising following its change in scope. The overall control effectiveness rating remains Requires Improvement pending evidence of the effectiveness of recent changes to controls managing the risk of ER01.
- 1.3 A paper is included on Part 2 of the agenda which contains supplementary information that is exempt from publication by virtue of paragraph 3 of Schedule 12A of the Local Government Act 1972 in that it contains information relating to the financial or business affairs of TfL. Any discussion of that exempt information must take place after the press and public have been excluded from the meeting.

### **2 Recommendation**

- 2.1 **The Panel is asked to note the paper and the exempt supplementary information on Part 2 of the agenda.**

### **3 Background and Context**

- 3.1 ER01 has been amended to focus on the risk of TfL failing to prevent or effectively respond to significant safety incidents, reflecting the overall importance we place on running a safe and compliant transport network. ER01 therefore no longer assesses the risk of TfL failing to meet its ambitious Vision Zero policy targets, which go significantly beyond our legal accountabilities, as their inclusion was distorting the assessment of safety as an Enterprise Risk. We do, however, remain absolutely committed to meeting our Vision Zero policy goals and these are assessed and tracked through our safety governance processes and will be discussed at future meetings of this Panel.
- 3.2 The change in focus has led to updates to its description, Responsible Managers, causes, consequences and Risk Appetite Statement, details of which are included

in the paper on Part 2 of the agenda. This change in scope is also the primary reason for the risk's Overall Risk Score decreasing from High to Medium.

- 3.3 This review of ER01 has involved going back to first principles, considering how likely the risk is to materialise and how effectively we are mitigating against it.

## **4 Current Status**

### **Overall Risk Assessment**

- 4.1 ER01 is described as the 'Failure to prevent, or effectively respond to, an incident resulting in multiple casualties causing significant harm to customers or colleagues, disruption to service, operational and capital spend, regulatory action leading to fines', with relevant senior leaders across Operations, Capital and Safety, Health and Environment named as Responsible Managers for the risk.
- 4.2 The key potential causes if the risk were to materialise include unsafe asset design or asset failure, inadequate rules or safe systems, lack of compliance and assurance oversight, and poor safety culture, and span the breadth of TfL's activities including rail services, on-street operations, and construction and engineering activities. Key potential consequences include multiple deaths or injuries and regulatory action.
- 4.3 The probability of ER01 materialising is assessed to be Very Low (lowered from High) following the change in scope and consideration of the effectiveness of mitigations and injury and risk model data. The impact of ER01 remains Very High, since by definition it involves multiple casualties and/or regulatory action. Therefore, the overall risk score is assessed as Medium. The target overall risk score for ER01 is also assessed as Medium, reflecting that the risk probability is already in the lowest possible Enterprise Risk category and that the consequences will always be very serious.

### **Controls and Actions**

- 4.4 Using the Safe System framework, a hierarchy of controls for ER01 has been identified, which result in: safe places; safe infrastructure; safe operations; (safe behaviours; and effective post-incident response and learning.
- 4.5 Six fundamental areas of control are identified in this framework as being critical to managing the risk of ER01. Individual controls have been identified in each of these six areas, which cover specific mitigation activities.
- 4.6 The hierarchy of controls for ER01 covers the following six areas:
- (a) assets are designed and maintained to required safety standards – with specific controls covering asset design and construction, and asset condition and fault rectification;
  - (b) directly operated services are delivered in compliance with operational rulebooks and procedures – with specific controls covering rules and operating procedures, and preparedness and recovery planning;

- (c) all our contracts with contracted service operators and our wider supply chain must be delivered in accordance with safety requirements set out in contracts, and contracts used to supervise and assure that these standards are being met – with a specific control on supplier and concessionaire management;
  - (d) an effective regime of first, second and third line assurance – with specific controls covering different levels;
  - (e) we must have a positive safety culture across all parts and throughout all levels of TfL – with specific controls covering safety culture and leadership, communication and consultation, competence and training, and effective governance and action tracking; and
  - (f) we work continuously to learn from the past and improve our safety systems to reduce risk – with specific controls covering performance management and tracking, investigations and lessons learnt, and targeting of known key risks.
- 4.7 The top three specific controls identified as the key mitigations focus on the areas of asset condition monitoring and management, safety culture and leadership, and effective first line assurance.
- 4.8 The design and operational effectiveness of each individual control has been assessed, considering recent milestones in the delivery of risk management workstreams, as well as changes implemented following the 2024 independent review of TfL's safety governance and decision making. The overall control effectiveness of ER01 continues to be rated as Requires Improvement, recognising that recent improvements have been made but that further evidence is required to confirm the effectiveness of these changes.
- 4.9 Actions have been identified to improve the effectiveness of controls currently assessed as either ineffective or partially effective. Key improvement actions for ER01 are in the areas of asset condition and maintenance, assurance and compliance, and safety leadership.
- 4.10 Full details of identified controls and corresponding improvement actions for ER01, including owners, effectiveness ratings and action due dates, are set out in the Appendix to the paper on Part 2 of the agenda.

#### **List of appendices to this report:**

None

A paper containing exempt supplementary information is included on Part 2 of the agenda

#### **List of Background Papers:**

None

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## Safety and Security Panel



**Date:** 19 May 2025

**Item:** Safety, Health and Security Report – Quarter 4 2024/25

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**This paper will be considered in public**

### **1 Summary**

- 1.1 This paper sets out the Safety, Health and Security Report for Quarter 4 of 2024/25 (8 December 2024 to 31 March 2025), attached as Appendix 1.

### **2 Recommendation**

- 2.1 The Panel is asked to note the report.

#### **List of appendices to this report:**

Appendix 1: Safety, Health and Security Report Quarter 4 2024/25

#### **List of Background Papers:**

None

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# Safety, Health and Security Quarterly Report

## Quarter 4 2024/25

(8 December 2024 – 31 March 2025)

Safety and Security Panel:  
19 May 2025



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## Interpreting our data

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### About our data

We publish quarterly safety, health and security data to ensure the most up-to-date understanding of data and performance is available. However, all data presented in the quarterly reports is provisional and subject to change due to ongoing data validation, late reporting, and changes to incident information following investigation. Figures reported are correct at the time of reporting, and the date of data extraction is provided.

### Safety and Security data notes and caveats

All safety figures presented consist of the number of injured persons. Where an individual has sustained more than one injury in a safety incident or collision this is counted as one injured person, with the most severe injury counted.

Road safety data for the most recent financial year applies factoring to the raw numbers to produce an in-year estimate. The estimates use a factor to account for late reporting (based on historical trends) as well as a factor to account for the expected changes that occur when the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) conduct their severity review quality checks (also based on historical trends), usually four to six months after the collisions occurred. Finalised road safety data for the previous calendar year is published each September after all checks with the police and the Department for Transport have been made. Due to these factors being applied, these provisional estimates may differ slightly from the provisional numbers available on our road safety reduction dashboard.

The safety figures in this report consist of injuries that meet our injury definition and are therefore counted against our scorecard. This means that customer safety data excludes injuries related to pre-existing medical conditions and suspected or confirmed intentional self-harm. Colleague safety data includes injuries to both permanent employees and contractors/sub-contractors. Road safety data is processed according to the Department for Transport's STATS19 requirements, and therefore excludes certain incidents, such as injuries that occur on private land.

Data on the security of our customers, colleagues and our organisation are derived from a range of sources. Transport crime statistics have been compiled and published by us for the last 18 years and provide a longitudinal view of the changing patterns of crime and antisocial behaviour. We bring together crimes and incidents reported to the MPS for London's bus network and to the British Transport Police (BTP) for our London Underground and rail modes (Elizabeth line, London Overground, DLR and Tram network) for monitoring our security performance and supporting decision-making in the tasking and deployment of operational officers, police and other resources.

All crime and antisocial behaviour incident data and offences are recorded and published in line with Home Office counting rules and the Code of Practice for Statistics set by the Office for Statistics Regulation. We rely on data from the MPS and BTP as our primary source of insight into transport security.

Bus-related crime data is extracted from the MPS crime reporting system, using a query that extracts bus-related incidents (on a bus, at a bus station or bus stop). As part of the query, it completes searches on words such as bus, bus stop etc. For this reason, it may include some crimes that did not occur on the network. Checks of the data have shown it to be over 90 per cent

accurate. Our definition of bus-related crime is any incident reported at a bus stop, bus station, on a bus or an incident that was initiated on a bus journey. Bus-related crime data is a sub-set of overall crime in London and is included in the crime statistics published for London by the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC) and the Home Office.

Since the beginning of this financial year, we have not been in receipt of reliable and verified crime data from the MPS because of problems arising from the transfer of data to the CONNECT system and the feeds of data between us and the MPS. Therefore, this report does not contain any data on customer security and only a limited snapshot of data on colleague security derived from our own incident report system. This will be rectified in future reports.

### **Other published data**

You can find an extract of the customer and colleague safety data published in this report in Excel format at this webpage: [Safety, health & environment - Transport for London](#).

Road safety data is published on our road safety data [webpage](#). This includes finalised annual data, a road safety data dashboard updated monthly with provisional data, record-level collision extracts, and FAQs and guidance to our data.

Bus safety [data](#) reported by bus operators is published quarterly on our bus safety data webpage. This includes: a bus safety dashboard, a CSV file with details of all bus injuries and a list of all bus fatalities.

London Underground safety data is provided to the Office of Rail and Road and published in their annual rail safety [national statistics report](#).

## Introduction

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This report summarises our safety, security and health performance in Quarter 4 of 2024/25. It identifies strategic trends and drivers and describes progress in delivering our improvement programmes in these important priority work areas. The data referenced covers the period from 8 December 2024 to 31 March 2025, unless otherwise specified.

In Quarter 4 we did not meet our customer safety target; but did meet our floor target\*. The aggregate figures for 2024/25 indicated we did not meet our annual target – primarily driven by a rise in serious injuries during Quarter 3. This highlights the need for continued focus to prevent future incidents occurring and reduce their severity. Our commitment to safety remains our priority. We implemented several safety measures during this quarter, including prohibiting non-folding e-bikes from most services to mitigate fire risk. The bus customer injury workstream has been strengthened, focusing on reducing slips, trips and falls through various trials and initiatives.

Regarding colleague safety performance: in Quarter 4 we recorded nine serious colleague injuries, exceeding the target of five or fewer. This brings the total for the year, surpassing the annual target, to 28 serious injuries and one fatality\*, tragically our colleague who died after being attacked whilst working on the Elizabeth line. Most serious injuries were due to slips, trips and falls, while other injuries included assaults, finger entrapments, and vehicle collisions. The number of serious injuries has increased compared to previous years, and the majority of incidents have taken place on London Underground.

In Quarter 4, there were 328 safety, health, environment (SHE) Leadership Engagement Tours completed, which significantly increased our leadership visibility and engagement across TfL. These tours are designed to enhance safety, health and environmental practices by fostering direct interaction between leadership and frontline staff.

We are committed to preventing violence against our colleagues and supporting those affected. Therefore, conflict management training has been mandated for frontline staff at locations with the highest risks.

In relation to colleague health, the sickness rate in Quarter 4 was 6.2 per cent with mental health issues being the most prevalent cause. The sickness rate shows a downward trend over this quarter. Initiatives to address stress and mental health challenges have been implemented and, in the quarter, we finalised our colleague Wellbeing plan, launched on 8 April.

Despite efforts to improve road safety, Quarter 4 saw an increase in road traffic collisions resulting in deaths and serious injuries (the highest Quarter 4 figures since 2018/19). This included a notable number of fatal collisions involving pedestrians, although overall this year-to-date the number of deaths and serious injuries to pedestrians is lower than last year 2023/24.

The number of people killed or seriously injured on or by a bus in London during Quarter 4 was higher than the target and higher than Quarter 4 in 2023/24. However, for the full financial year (2024/25) bus safety performance has been on target. Bus safety initiatives are continuing to try to reduce bus related injuries and fatalities, with a focus on improving bus design and driver behaviour. The bus customer injury workstream has been strengthened, focusing on reducing slips, trips and falls through various trials and initiatives.

\*A clarification and factual correction was made to this data after initial publication.

We are dedicated to enhancing safety and security across our network, protecting customers and colleagues and striving towards our long-term safety goal: Vision Zero.

# Customer

## Safety

Keeping our customers safe is our priority. In Quarter 4, provisional data indicates that we failed to meet our Quarter 4 standard target (59), however we met our Quarter 4 floor target (62).

The total number of customers killed or seriously injured in 2024/25 is 215, including ten fatalities, which is above our target of 194, primarily due to a spike in customer serious injuries in Quarter 3.

Measure	Q4 Target	Q4 Actual
Customers killed or seriously injured	59	61 (including 4 fatalities)

These incidents remind us just how important it is to stay focused on safety at every level, and we are committed to doing all we can to prevent future tragedies.

## Customer Safety performance

**Data sources:** IE2 and IRIS, TfL's safety incident reporting systems, date extracted: 30/04/2025

The data provided in this section is available in our data annex document in a series of data tables which also includes a modal breakdown.

### Fatalities

Four customer fatalities sadly occurred on the TfL network in Quarter 4:

- On 11 December 2024, a customer sustained a head injury while descending stairs at Island Gardens DLR station. The customer sadly died in hospital approximately five weeks later.
- On 28 December 2024, a customer who was on board a bus fell as it moved away from a bus stop on Finchley Road. The customer sadly died in hospital approximately one week later.
- On 14 January 2025, a customer fell while on a tram as it negotiated Reeves Corner in central Croydon. Sadly, the customer died in hospital on 8 March.
- On 28 March 2025, a customer fell on the track at Ickenham station and was struck by an arriving train.

### Serious Injuries

This quarter there have been 57 serious injuries suffered by our customers across our network. Of these, 23 occurred on a bus, 19 on London Underground, seven on the Elizabeth line, three on London Overground, and the remainder spread across smaller modes. This is one more injury than in the same quarter during the last financial year (56).

## Trends and drivers

In 2024/25 we have, sadly, recorded 215 customer deaths and serious injuries (ten fatalities, 205 serious injuries), which is a five per cent increase compared to the same point in financial year 2023/24 (eight fatalities, 196 serious injuries). This increase is primarily driven by the higher number of serious injuries in Quarter 3 compared to financial year 2023/24. The majority of these serious injuries continue to be as a result of slips, trips and falls (70 per cent).

The long-term trend section below includes rates of injuries per million passenger journeys to allow for comparison over time accounting for changes in passenger numbers. The passenger journey data used to calculate this is available on London's data [store](#). This data is currently only available up to the end of Quarter 1 2024/25 (1 April to 22 June 2024). The methodology for calculating injury rates has been refined since the Quarter 3 report to include only injuries that occurred on modes for which passenger numbers are published. As passenger numbers are published for all the largest modes the impact of this methodology change is minimal, but small changes may be seen in the figures published between Quarter 3 and 4.

### Fatality long-term trends

At the end of this financial year there have been 10 customer fatalities recorded, which is an increase compared to the previous financial year (eight). Seven of the fatalities so far during this financial year have occurred on London Underground, with the others occurring on DLR, Trams and a bus. This is a similar pattern to 2023/24. However, this differs to the three financial years prior, in which roughly half of customer fatalities took place on London Underground each year.

Six of the fatalities were members of the public who were sadly hit by a train after they had either fallen or walked onto the track. There is an increasing trend of this type of incident and we are reviewing our approach to safeguarding vulnerable customers. The remaining fatalities were customers who suffered head injuries: a bus passenger who fell as the bus moved away from a bus stop, a London Underground customer who fell on station steps, and a DLR passenger who fell on stairs leading to the platform.

Historically, customer fatalities have ranged between zero and five customer fatalities per quarter, with the majority of fatalities since 2017/18 occurring on London Underground (53 per cent of fatalities) or buses (41 per cent of fatalities).

**Figure 1: Public transport customer fatalities on the TfL network since 2017/18, by financial**




quarter

The rate of fatalities (Figure 2 below) per million passengers has been broadly similar since Quarter 1 of financial year 2017/18, with the exception of a rise in 2020/21 where the calculation of rates was influenced by the low passenger numbers during that period due to the coronavirus pandemic.

In Quarter 1 of the financial year, the rate of fatalities per million passengers was 0.004, which represents one fatality for every 276 million passengers.


**Figure 2: Public transport customer fatalities per million passenger journeys on the TfL network since 2017/18, by financial quarter**



### Serious injury long term trends

In the financial year 2024/25, there were 205 customer serious injuries, which is a five per cent increase compared to the previous financial year (196). The majority of serious injuries this financial year occurred on London Underground and buses (44 per cent and 40 per cent respectively), with the remaining serious injuries on Elizabeth line, London Overground, Cycle Hire, and other smaller modes.


**Figure 3: Public transport customer serious injuries on the TfL network since 2020/21, by financial quarter**



Slips, trips and falls continue to be a main cause of serious injuries on our network, accounting for 70 per cent of customer serious injuries. Those serious injuries occurring on our stairs and escalators account for the majority of these.

The rate of serious injuries per million passengers has been decreasing since 2020/21 (Figure 4 below). In Quarter 1, the rate of serious injuries per million passengers was 0.05, which represents one serious injury for every 21 million passengers. Please note, comparable serious injury trends are only available from 2020 when we adopted the serious injury definition set out in the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 2013 (RIDDOR). This is also largely consistent with STATS19, the system used for road collision and casualty statistics by the police.

**Figure 4: Public transport customer serious injuries per million passenger journeys on the TfL network since 2020/21, by financial quarter**




### All injury long term trends

In 2024/25, there were 8,485 customer injuries, which is a four per cent decrease compared to the previous financial year (8,875). The majority of customer injuries this financial year occurred on buses (48 per cent), with a further 42 per cent on London Underground. This is slightly lower than previous years as buses typically make up 50-60 per cent of all customer injuries.


Looking at trends since financial year 2017/18, customer injuries have gradually increased since the coronavirus pandemic, returning to slightly lower than pre-pandemic figures. This increase since 2020/21 has been driven by an increase in passenger numbers in this period, rather than changes in risk.

Figure 5: Public transport customer injuries on the TfL network since 2017/18, by period



The rate of injuries per million passengers has remained stable since 2017/18 (Figure 6 below). In Quarter 1, the rate of injuries per million passengers was 2.4, which represents one injury for every 415,000 passengers.

**Figure 6: Public transport customer injuries per million passenger journeys on the TfL network since 2017/18, by financial quarter**



## Improvement Activity

We continue to work to improve our safety performance across our network. Aiming to eliminate all deaths and serious injuries from London's transport network by 2041, we have recently launched our Platform Train Interface Plan, strengthened our bus customer injury workstream and are developing an approach to further improve our safety performance on our stairs and escalators.

## Safety ban of non-folded e-bikes on the TfL network

Following a recommendation from the London Fire Brigade in 2024, we have been reviewing the risks and controls in place across our network regarding the carriage of e-bikes on our services. After concluding this review, we prohibited all non-folding e-bikes from most TfL services (including London Underground, London Overground, DLR, Elizabeth line and IFS Cloud Cable Car) from Monday 31 March 2025 to ensure the safety of customers and staff.

While the majority of e-bikes are safe, there have been a small number of incidents where non-folding e-bikes have caught fire on the transport system in London. This includes a recent incident at Rayners Lane station when an e-bike caught fire on the platform, resulting in a significant fire and extensive and prolonged smoke.

The ban includes all non-folding e-bikes, including standard cycles that have been converted to e-bikes using conversion kits. Our analysis indicates that cycles that have been adapted using electronic conversion kits pose a greater fire risk than purpose-built e-bikes, yet they can be hard to differentiate.

We recognise the importance of lawful e-bikes and lawful e-scooters for London, now and in the future, and will keep these changes under review pending any future measures to improve e-bike safety standards by the Government. We will continue to work with the Government and London Fire Brigade on this issue.

### **Bus Customer Injury Workstream**

We have strengthened our bus customer injury workstream, focusing on slips, trips and falls in response to these incident types resulting in serious and fatal injuries. Our customer injury Bus Safety Innovation Challenge will see sensor-initiated safety messaging trialled on two bus routes this summer, as well as trialling a seat counter display indicating the availability of seating on the upper deck this winter. The trial of the original Routemaster 'Ding Ding' sound to indicate the bus is about to depart will be rolled out in May 2025 on two bus routes, with the aim of encouraging customers to hold on or find a seat before the bus departs. The trial of 'hold the handrail' posters in the stairwell is to be evaluated to determine whether the messaging is effective in changing customer behaviour. All trials mentioned above will be evaluated using CCTV analysis comparing a baseline with the trial period to see if the desired behaviour changes have taken place.

### **Escalator risk across our network**

We continue our work to reduce the number of incidents on escalators and improve escalator safety through a combination of engineering solutions, research and influencing customer behaviour. In particular, two escalators at London Bridge have been fitted with trip switches to reduce the potential consequences in the event of an entrapment occurring.

We continue to work with our escalator suppliers and are looking to extend this work further across escalators at our rail stations that suffer the highest numbers of entrapment incidents.

Furthermore, we have updated the specification for new escalators and across London Underground. This will mean that when any escalators are replaced, they will be installed with trip switches. Our new escalators that will be installed at Cutty Sark DLR station will also have such devices fitted.

## **Customer**



### **Security**

It is important for us to keep our customers safe when using our entire network of services. We have key workstreams within the focus areas of safeguarding our customers, fare evasion, and crime and antisocial behaviour.

### **Safeguarding our customers**

#### **Rough Sleeping**

Rough sleeping is a complex, prevalent and increasing issue which impacts our transport network and our infrastructure. People sleeping rough are highly vulnerable, often with complex physical and mental health conditions.

People sleeping rough are more likely to be victims of crime and almost 17 times more likely to have been victims of violence (compared to the general public), as shown in data from the Office for National Statistics. They are also more vulnerable to criminal exploitation.

We do not receive any Government funding or resources to deal with homelessness, but we recognise the contribution we can make to safeguarding people who are rough sleeping or seeking refuge on our network and infrastructure to ensure that our network is safe and efficient for all.

We work closely with the Greater London Authority, local authorities, the London Navigator Team (led by St Mungo's), which provides 'through-care casework' supporting people from the street, through emergency or temporary accommodation placements into settled housing) and outreach services to try to connect people with support. The police may need to be involved in some cases where there is associated crime (including threatening behaviour towards our staff) and antisocial behaviour. In some cases, after all other options available to us have been exhausted, we may need to consider enforcement action to remove the rough sleepers from the site.

In Quarter 4, London Underground staff reported 444 rough sleepers (a 32 per cent decrease compared to Quarter 4 2023/24) and our bus drivers reported 3,229 (a 29 per cent increase compared to Quarter 4 2023/24).

We actively encourage all our frontline customer teams to report rough sleepers. Reporting through staff apps and Streetlink enables our safeguarding team to identify locations for additional outreach support and gives the best chance of connecting those rough sleeping with support and accommodation. Every report is acted upon. Our safeguarding team actively works to build good working relationships with outreach agencies across London so those rough sleeping on our network are connected to the best support.

## **Suicide Prevention**

Suicide prevention is an integral part of our safeguarding activity.

Our thoughts are with the families and friends of people who have died or been injured when attempting to end their lives on our network. The impacts are also felt by our colleagues who witness these traumatic events and subsequently attend inquests. We are committed to doing all we can to prevent suicide on our roads and transport networks, support people in mental health crisis who are at risk of harm and to support our colleagues who are impacted by these tragic events.

Experienced safeguarding practitioners led on the development and coordination of our pan-TfL suicide prevention programme. This was initially established in 2017 for London Underground but has been expanded to include all modes including roads and rivers.

The TfL safeguarding team awarded 25 Lifesaver Awards and 10 Safeguarding Awards in January to March 2025. Lifesaver awards recognise employees who demonstrate exceptional intervention in customer crises, such as lifesaving first aid. Safeguarding Awards recognise employee actions that ensure the safety of customers on the network.

## Fare Evasion

Fare evasion takes away vital revenue from us and denies Londoners investment in a safe, frequent, and reliable transport service. We are taking a bold, target-driven and agile approach to tackling fare evasion and aim to reduce fare evasion to a rate of under 1.5 per cent by 2030. Tackling fare evasion has business-wide impacts, as it not only impacts our finances but also the confidence and safety of our frontline teams and fare paying customers.


## Key Trends

The fare evasion rates collectively across bus, rail and trams are averaging 3.4 per cent between Quarter 1 to Quarter 3 2024/25 against a target of being below 3.3 per cent. Due to time taken to collate survey data, Quarter 4 data is currently unavailable.

Fare evasion results for Quarter 1 to 3 2024/25 show a reduction from 3.9 to 3.8 per cent in comparison to the same period last year.

Quarterly comparative results are displayed in the tables and charts below.

**Figure 7: Fare evasion results for Quarter 1 to 3 2024/25**




FE Rates 2024/25	Q1	Q2	Q3	Target	Average
London Underground	5.1%	4.5%	4.5%	4.1%	4.7%
Buses	2.4%	2.4%	2.9%	2.1%	2.6%
London Overground	3.3%	3.2%	3.4%	3.5%	3.3%
DLR	3.9%	4.5%	4.8%	3.8%	4.4%
Elizabeth line	3.2%	3.3%	3.3%	3.4%	3.3%
Trams	7.2%	7.1%	7.8%	6.9%	7.3%
Operations Total	3.4%	3.3%	3.6%	3.3%	3.4%

## Improvement Activity

Our strategic approach to revenue protection has multiple elements but at its core is the fundamental work of our frontline revenue protection teams. We have officers dedicated to revenue protection on every mode, and we are committed to strengthening their productivity, performance, and impact of our revenue protection teams, guided by a fair and respectful approach to enforcement that prioritises fairness and ensures responses are appropriate to the situation.

Below is the fare evasion trajectory for TfL and per mode showing our aims for each financial year by 2030.

**Figure 8: Fare evasion trajectory to 2030**



Enforcement teams are key to our 2030 targets and this year to date have issued more than 63,000 penalty fares and reported more than 18,000 passengers to the Investigation Appeals and Prosecutions team for possible prosecution.

This year insight and analysis have focused on alignment and expansion of offender behaviour categories.

**Accidental** – fare evaders inadvertently fare evade or do not pay the correct fare by incorrectly tapping, using multiple cards during their journey, or misunderstanding the ticketing and/or transport system.

**Opportunistic** – fare evaders usually intend on paying their fare but will take advantage of access through open gates or non-gated areas when possible.

**Calculated** – fare evaders exploit the system through fraudulent use of means of travel by using concession passes they are not permitted to use, zonal avoidance and attempting to exploit loopholes in contactless ticketing.

**Chronic** – fare evaders deliberately avoid paying their fare through breaching the system by forcing, crawling under, climbing over barriers and double gating fare paying passengers.

We have increased on-train checks with enforcement teams using revenue inspection devices. Offenders who have not tapped using contactless payment cards can be issued a revenue inspection charge, penalty fare or reported for possible prosecution.

## Crime and Antisocial Behaviour

Overall, the volume of crime on our public transport network and the risk of anyone being a victim of, or witness to, crime remains low. Millions of journeys are made every day, with most going without incident.

The data below is from April 2024 to March 2025 and the previous year comparison also covers the same period.


Overall our crime rate per million passenger journeys has increased in 2024/25 to 13.4 in comparison to 12.6 in 2023/24. Our crime volume has also increased in 2024/25 to 47,964 in comparison to 46,202 in 2023/24.

Transport crime statistics showed increases in some crime types and on some modes compared with the same period in 2023/24. These increases in crime should be seen in the context of efforts to improve confidence, and make it easier to report incidents, as well as London-wide and national increases.

## Key Trends

Figure 9: Crime volumes for all modes 2022-25

### Crime Volume for: All Modes



There were 47,964 offences across our public transport network in 2024/25. This is a 3.8 per cent increase in the volume of crime (compared with the same period the previous year), an additional

1,762 offences. On our network 89.1 per cent of crime occurs on the bus and Tube networks, which reflects the size and passenger volumes of these networks.

Theft remains the highest volume crime on our public transport network, with 22,816 theft offences in 2024/25. This is up by 1,170 offences from 2023/24.

## **Improvement Activity**

Tackling robbery is a key priority for us and our policing partners, and significant effort has been focused on reversing the rising trend in robbery that was emerging in 2023. Robbery levels were down by 16.9 per cent in 2024/25 with 2,510 offences compared to 3,021 in 2023/24. The level of operational activity includes thorough investigation of all robbery offences, targeting and management of offenders, problem-solving and joint operations to create a hostile environment for offenders.

We continue to deploy over 200 Transport Support and Enforcement Operations Officers (TSEs) working across rail, London Underground and the bus network and a core part of their role is to deal with crime, antisocial behaviour and rule breaking that makes our customers feel unsafe. They are uniformed and their presence acts as a deterrent to antisocial behaviour and crime. In 2024/25, TSEs provided advice and guidance to 9,711 members of the public and dealt with 5,925 breaches of our byelaws across the rail and London Underground network.

We will continue to work closely with our police partners and operators to reduce crime and antisocial behaviour across our transport network. Our focus for crime prevention and reduction, in collaboration with the BTP and the MPS, has been to drive down the highest harm offences such as sexual harassment and other sexual offences, serious violence, hate crime and work-related violence and aggression, while working to prevent crime and take a problem-solving approach to antisocial behaviour, and the types of behaviour that deter people from travelling and travelling more often.

# Colleague



## Safety

As an organisation, we work hard to ensure the safety of all our colleagues – whether employed by TfL or a company carrying out work on our behalf. The scorecard below shows the number of our colleagues killed or seriously injured while working for us or on our behalf and indicates that we did not meet our target in the quarter.

Measure	Q4 Target	Q4 Actual
Colleagues killed or seriously injured	5	9 (0 fatalities)

## Colleague Safety performance

**Data sources:** IE2 and IRIS, TfL's safety incident reporting systems, date extracted: 30/04/2025

The data provided in this section is available in our data annex document in a series of data tables which also includes a modal breakdown.

Regrettably, there were nine colleagues seriously injured during Quarter 4, up from seven reported in Quarter 3. As a result, 28 colleagues have been seriously injured this year and one colleague tragically killed because of an assault, exceeding the annual target of 17 or fewer.

## Trends and drivers

### Fatality long term trends

Since financial year 2017/18 there have been four colleague fatalities. Two occurred in 2019 when a contractor died while working on a travelator and a bus driver was killed in a collision. In October 2023 a contractor was hit and killed by a car while working at a bus shelter. Tragically, the latest fatality occurred in Quarter 3 of 2024/25 following the assault on an MTR Elizabeth Line colleague. There were no colleague fatalities in Quarter 4.

### Serious injuries

Of the serious injuries reported during Quarter 4, six were TfL employees and three were members of contracted staff. Six of the injuries occurred in London Underground with two in buses, and one in the Capital business area. Slips, trips and falls were the most common type of injury, with environmental conditions identified as common contributory factor. Other types of serious injury included assault, finger entrapment and vehicle collision.


### Serious injury long term trends

In 2024/25, there have been a total of 28 serious colleague injuries, which is the highest number recorded since 2021/22. Of these, 11 have occurred on London Underground, five on buses, three in Streets and Network Operations and the remaining nine spread across smaller transport modes,

office staff and colleagues responsible for upkeep and maintenance of the TfL network. While the overall number of serious injuries has increased, there have only been two serious injuries reported in the work delivered by the Chief Capital Office since 2021/22, up to the end of Quarter 4, despite the significant number of projects delivered. We are evaluating the underlying conditions behind this performance and will share lessons across the organisation.

Slips, trips and falls continue to be the most common type of injury and in 2024/25 we have seen an increase in non-operational colleagues being seriously injured due to slips, trips and falls. There has also been an increase in the number of serious workplace violence and aggression incidents, with crime-related injuries, which these are a part of, now accounting for around 30 per cent of all injuries.

**Figure 10: Colleague serious injuries since 2020/21, by financial quarter**




Looking at serious injury trends, the rise in colleague serious injuries this year brings figures to a level similar to those in financial year 2021/22 and 2022/23, suggesting the unusually good performance in 2023/24 was an outlier. Since 2020/21 numbers have been relatively stable with the exception of 2023/24 where colleague serious injuries were particularly low. Please note, comparable serious injury trends are only available from 2020 when TfL's definition for reporting serious injuries changed.

### All injury long term trends

In 2024/25 there were 1,621 colleague injuries, this is a five per cent decrease compared to the previous financial year (1,714). The majority of colleague injuries this financial year occurred on London Underground (58 per cent). Since 2018/19 London Underground has made up between 51 - 59 per cent of colleague serious injuries.

**Figure 11: Colleague injuries since 2017/18, by financial quarter**



Looking at trends since financial year 2017/18, colleague injuries have fallen steadily. This trend is driven by a decrease in injuries on buses and other smaller transport modes.

## Improvement Activity

### SHE Leadership Engagement Tours

There were 328 SHE Leadership Engagement Tours completed in Quarter 4 across TfL. This is an increase from 108 in Quarter 3, with 912 tours in total completed during 2024/25. The number of tours is growing year on year as teams across TfL increase levels of leadership visibility and engagement on safety, health, and the environment.

### SHE Culture Assessment

Over 10,000 colleagues have now been given the opportunity to take part in the SHE Culture Assessment process, which helps teams to measure and improve their safety, health and environment culture. This quarter, a baseline analysis of TfL's SHE culture was completed, using the responses collated to date. The findings are now being used to drive cultural improvements across TfL and are presented in a separate paper elsewhere on the agenda for this meeting.

### Safe Track Access App

We have begun testing a new app, which has been designed to ensure that colleagues accessing the track know when traction current is turned off and trains have stopped running. This will replace existing measures and further reduce risk of human error.

### TfL Capital and Suppliers

Within TfL Capital, there are regular opportunities to engage with our suppliers to share good practices and celebrate the benefits they bring to our projects. Capital hosts Quarterly "Keeping In Touch" events to share information for mutual benefit. Recently this included the topics of the

Capital Safety, Health, and Environment Strategy, near miss reporting processes, our zero-emission vehicles policy and the importance of SHE Leadership Engagement Tours. The event also included a presentation from our contractor Morgan Sindall on their “Healthy Hearts and Minds” initiative to improve the health and wellbeing of their workforce.

On 20 February 2025, we hosted our second annual Zero Harm Conference and Supplier Awards Ceremony at County Hall. This was a full day event which recognised suppliers’ achievements in the following categories, with the winners voted as:

- **Outstanding Carbon Reduction 2024 Initiative:** Morgan Sindall with Low Carbon Steel at Surrey Quays
- **Outstanding Environmental 2024 Initiative:** Tarmac Kier Joint Venture with Joe Strummer Subway Rain Gardens
- **Outstanding Safety 2024 Initiative:** AD Comms with Cable Avoidance Tool Scanning (Avoidance/Identification of Buried Services) Safety, Training & Competency
- **Outstanding Health 2024 Initiative:** Morgan Sindall with Occupational Health Hazards and Control at DLR Beckton Depot Expansion – Former Gas Works

The ceremony was “disrupted” by incognito actors who dramatised the second half of the event with a gripping depiction of different aspects of what may happen if safety is not managed, things go badly wrong, and prosecution follows. All the attendees were fully engaged by the realistic scenarios played out before them, and in the discussion groups. It was a day where everyone went away having seen the excellent work showcased by the suppliers, with the sobering reminder of why Zero Harm will always be our main imperative. This approach is part of our wider effort to drive engagement on safety across all our workforce and supply chain.



# Colleague


## Health

Our colleagues' health and wellbeing are integral to our vision as an organisation. This includes supporting colleagues who may be experiencing long-term conditions as well as helping them deal with everyday challenges like back pain, stress, or other health concerns which can affect wellbeing, productivity and attendance. The Occupational Health and Wellbeing team and employee relations specialists are working closely with local managers to understand reasons for absence and seeking the best way to support them.

### Sickness absence performance

The top causes of long- and short-term absence in Quarter 4 are displayed below. These align with the national picture and longer-term trends within TfL (below).


**Figure 12: Causes of long and short-term absence**



## Trends and drivers

### Quarter 4 2024/25

Figure 13: Quarter 4 sickness rate trend



In Quarter 4, the overall sickness rate is 6.2 per cent, with an attendance rate of 93.6 per cent, accounting for nearly 99,810 sick days and 1.61 million planned days. Long-term sickness days are significantly higher at 66,370 compared to short-term sickness days at 33,440. The average spell duration is 11.84 days.

The sickness rate shows a downward trend over consecutive weeks in late 2024/25, from 6.7 per cent to as low as 5.8 per cent towards the end of the year.

Mental health issues, particularly stress, are the most prevalent illness types, contributing to 23,060 sick days. Other significant categories include musculoskeletal problems (19,920 sick days) and coughs and colds (13,340 sick days). Short-term spells predominantly fall under the "coughs and colds" category, contributing to 32.5 per cent of short-term sickness days, whereas mental health issues lead long-term sickness, accounting for 28.9 per cent of long-term sickness days.

## Improvement Activity

After the health check programme identified stress and mental health as a particular challenge within a team our Health and Wellbeing Specialist ran several Mental Health Masterclass workshops positioned towards people leaders. This three-hour session covered line manager legal responsibilities, tips when engaging in wellbeing conversations while introducing the stress management standards and relevant signposting tools for support. This session was attended by managers, senior managers and the relevant Director. After the session, managers reported feeling increased confidence in supporting colleagues who were experiencing stress.

## Wellbeing Plan

During this quarter we finalised "Wellbeing for all": our colleague wellbeing plan 2025-2030". The plan centres around three pillars: Pillar one: evidence-led targeted interventions; Pillar two: wellbeing is everyone's responsibility; and Pillar three: one wellbeing voice. The plan seeks to build on existing work. Alongside Action on Inclusion, it is a key enabler of our colleague roadmap ambitions and it was launched on 8 April.



# Colleague

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## Security

### Work-related Violence and Aggression (WVA)

Every colleague working under the TfL roundel has the right to work without fear of being assaulted, abused, or threatened and it should never be accepted as 'part of the job'. We are committed to preventing the causes of violence and aggression against our people and providing the best support to those who experience it, pushing for the strongest possible judicial outcomes.

#### Killing of our colleague

On Friday 6 December 2024 one of our colleagues tragically died in hospital after being seriously assaulted by a member of the public at Ilford station. He had worked for MTR Elizabeth Line as a customer service assistant and had been a dedicated member of railway staff for over 24 years. Our thoughts and sympathy remain with his family, friends and colleagues.

A person has been charged with murder, affray and possession of an offensive weapon and the trial will begin on 21 July 2025. Enhanced enforcement activity has continued to take place at Ilford station to provide reassurance to our colleagues and our customers.

### WVA performance

#### Physical Incidents on directly employed TfL colleagues

Our scorecard measure tracks the number of physical incidents against directly employed TfL colleagues and includes a stretch target of a 10 per cent reduction compared to last year. Due to the serious nature of physical incidents which are often reported to the police, and as the measure is relevant to directly employed colleagues only, we are confident of the robustness of these figures during the cyber incident.

- The total number of physical incidents reported this year is 836. This is 25 fewer than the 10 per cent target figure of 861 and represents a 12.6 per cent reduction from the 2023/24 total of 957 incidents (a reduction of 121 incidents)
- The reduction in physical assaults started at the beginning of the year, before the cyber incident - between Periods 1 to 5 we had seen a 14 per cent reduction in physical incidents
- If you exclude Periods 6-9 from our annual analysis (when reporting systems were mainly unavailable) physical assaults in the combined rest of the year have reduced by 12 per cent compared to 2023/24.

## Quarter 4 reporting of all WVA incidents


Alongside physical incidents on TfL colleagues we also measure and work to prevent threats and verbal and gesture abuse on all staff who work under the roundel.

Due to the cyber incident impacting TfL systems in autumn, our reported figures for all WVA across the year are currently incomplete. Since the cyber incident we are unable to access direct reports by bus drivers through our 'code red' system. We believe the cyber incident has also influenced the reporting patterns of WVA by London Underground staff and in particular the reporting of 'lower level' WVA offences (threats and verbal/gesture abuse). Although the system used to report these is now accessible, it appears to be being under-used compared to before the cyber incident. We will be focusing on reporting during 2025/26 in our employee communications campaigns.

Due to the above, although we have included the figures for last year, we cannot at this point confidently draw comparisons or analyse potential reasons for any differences with previous quarters or last year.

**Figure 14: Police recorded work-related violence with injury offence from December 2022 to December 2024**

This graph shows the overall trend in violence with injury offences recorded by the police against TfL transport colleagues. Data from the MPS has been missing since January 2024 for bus related WVA. We expect to have a regular feed of MPS WVA data from April 2025.



## Trends and drivers

During Quarter 4 there were 1,768 reported incidents of WVA (physical, threat and verbal and gesture abuse) captured from across all our transport modes (including colleagues who work for our operators).

Of these, 939 incidents were reported by colleagues working on the London Underground network (53 per cent of all reported incidents). There were 1,338 reported incidents by London Underground staff during Quarter 4 of last year. Since the cyber incident, the number of reported threat and verbal and gesture abuse incidents has reduced by 45 per cent. We believe much of the difference in these figures is due to changes in colleague reporting patterns.

There were 497 incidents of WVA reported by colleagues working on the bus network (28 per cent of all reported incidents). Last year in Quarter 4, 1,401 incidents were reported by staff on the bus network. The difference in these figures is due to the current unavailability of reports made by bus drivers directly to our control room. We are receiving reports made at bus garages or to the police.

There were 332 incidents reported in the quarter by colleagues from all other modes (Compliance, Policing, Operations and Security, Streets, Elizabeth line, London Overground, DLR and London Trams and Capital Delivery). Last year in Quarter 4, 322 incidents were reported by staff on these modes. We are confident in this figure as they are made via systems unaffected by the cyber incident.

### **Insight into WVA triggers**

In Quarter 4, 422 of all reported WVA incidents were classified as physical assaults. This is 42 fewer than reported in Quarter 4 last year.

The percentage of incidents triggered by antisocial or aggressive customer behaviour or a negative reaction to customer engagement continues to rise. This increased from 43 per cent in Quarter 3 to 45 per cent in Quarter 4. Revenue related matters such as ticket disputes triggered 37 per cent of incidents in Quarter 4, a reduction of five per cent from Quarter 3.


There were 11 per cent of WVA incidents in Quarter 4 involving some element of hate. This proportion has decreased from 12 per cent in Quarter 3. Of these 201 incidents in Quarter 4, 91 per cent were race-related, with the remaining being faith-related or homophobic. The percentage of incidents involving a customer believed to be intoxicated increased to 9.3 per cent in Quarter 4, from 7.4 per cent in Quarter 3.

### **Solved rate for WVA offences investigated by the police**

Between October 2023 and September 2024 (figures are reported six months in arrears from the latest data, to allow time for progression through the criminal justice process), the solved rate across rail modes for work-related violence, sexual and public order recorded offences was 21 per cent, which is four per cent higher than the previous 12 months.

**Figure 15: Solved rate for WVA offences investigated by the police from October 2022 to September 2024**

(This is done six months in arrears to allow for criminal investigations to progress).




## Colleagues willing to support police investigations

The percentage of colleagues willing to support a police investigation between October 2023 and September 2024 (on rail modes only) was 71 per cent for violence, sexual and public order recorded offences, one per cent lower compared to the previous 12-month period.

There are many reasons that victims choose not to support an investigation, including their confidence in the judicial system and the likelihood of a successful outcome. We are working to better understand the reasons so we can address them and support our colleagues through the judicial process.

**Figure 16: Percentage of Colleagues Willing to Support Police Investigations from October 2022 to September 2024 (all violence and public order offences)**

(This is done six months in arrears to allow for criminal investigations to progress).



## Improvement Activity

### Conflict management training

In 2024, we mandated conflict management training for frontline operational colleagues working at the top 25 locations most at risk for WVA across all modes.

This action was taken as a response to the growing need for consistent and high-quality training that would equip our frontline teams with the skills and knowledge to safely defuse conflict situations. At the end of March, over 2,400 frontline operational colleagues have been trained across London Underground, Bus Operations and River Services. Feedback from attendees has been overwhelmingly positive.

We have agreed that this programme should continue and, over the next two years, be provided to the remaining 3,300 London Underground customer operational colleagues who did not receive in the one year hotspot programme.

### Body Worn Video Cameras as Essential Kit

On 31 January, it marked one year since we made body worn video (BWV) cameras essential kit for our customer facing, frontline colleagues. To support staff and managers and to maintain momentum with this activity, in Quarter 4 we have:

- Launched an Individual BWV Usage Dashboard – to help local managers track individual usage of BWV cameras
- Included a BWV Observations Metric in our London Underground customer experience mystery shopper exercise, providing a snapshot of camera visibility on the ground
- Launched our annual BWV battery refresh – begun on all BWV cameras to ensure they are working correctly.



# Road safety

One of our key priorities is working with London boroughs and the MPS to make London’s roads safer for everyone. We therefore have a scorecard measure that shows the number of people killed or seriously injured on London’s roads against an ambitious target aligned to our Vision Zero objective.

Measure	Q4 Target	Q4 Actual
People killed or seriously injured in road traffic collisions	979	1,096 (including 27 fatalities)

**Data sources:** police reported road traffic collisions resulting in personal injury (STATS19), early fatal notifications from the police.

**Date of extraction:** 10/04/2025

More information on TfL’s road safety data and initiatives can be found on the TfL website <https://tfl.gov.uk/corporate/publications-and-reports/road-safety> including the interactive Road Danger Reduction dashboard which has London injury collision data from January 2017 to November 2024 [Road Reduction Dashboard](#).

## Road safety performance

Sadly 1,096 people were killed or seriously injured in road traffic collisions in London in Quarter 4. This was uncharacteristically high, the highest number of people killed or seriously injured on London’s roads for a Quarter 4 since 2018/19, resulting in a red rating. Previous Quarter 4s had been showing a year-on-year improvement (fewer people killed or seriously injured) since the pandemic. The trend observed this year may partially be explained by the unusually good weather we have had, which normally results in a rise in activity on London’s roads, particularly of people walking, cycling and motorcycling, who are most vulnerable to be being killed or seriously injured.

For the full financial year (2024/25) there were 3,802 people killed or seriously injured on London’s roads (provisional). This is a four per cent increase on the previous year (3,670 in 2023/24). However, reportable deaths on London’s roads in 2024/25 were 98, compared to 105 in 2023/24.

Figure 17: Scorecard measure: People killed or seriously injured (KSIs) in road traffic collisions





Figure 18: Long term KSI trends: progress towards MTS 2030 target



## Trends and drivers

Quarter 4 data for 2024/25 is currently provisional, and therefore subject to change. As such, many of the circumstances of the collisions are yet to be finalised while the police complete their investigations (e.g. contributing factors such as speeding, exact locations and mapping of these to the road network etc).

### Fatalities overview

In Quarter 4, 27 people tragically lost their lives on London's roads, which is lower than Quarter 4 last year (33) and in 2021/22 (35) but higher than Quarter 4 2022/23 (23). This was again dominated by deaths to people walking (16), as per previous Quarter 4s, but lower than the 20 people walking that died in Quarter 4 last year. Looking at the full financial year figures, 98 people have been killed this financial year, which is lower than last year (105 in 2023/24) and much lower than pre-pandemic (124 in 2019/20).

There has been a sustained reduction in the number of people killed on the roads post-pandemic (2022, 2023 and 2024) compared to pre-pandemic (2017, 2018 and 2019), particularly for people walking and motorcycling. We attribute this in part to lower speed limits, the Direct Vision Standard, among other road safety interventions, and changes to travel patterns.

### Serious injuries overview

There were 1,069 people seriously injured in Quarter 4, which is the highest for any Quarter 4 since 2018/19 (1,177). Seventy-nine per cent of people seriously injured were walking, cycling, motorcycling, which is similar to previous years (77 per cent last year and 80 per cent in 2022/23). Quarter 4 saw an increase in serious injuries to people walking and cycling compared to last year (from 332 to 381, and from 214 to 261 respectively) but a slight decrease in people seriously injured while motorcycling.

For serious injuries for the full financial year (3,704), there has been a slight increase on last year (3,565) but a reduction in numbers compared to 2021/22 (3,801) and 2022/23 (3,815). Within this the biggest increase has been in serious injuries to people cycling (from 919 to 1,037), and slight increases in serious injuries to people walking (1,175 to 1,182) and motorcyclists (739 to 783), which are not thought to be a significant trend.

### People walking

Comparing Quarter 4 to last year, fewer people were killed while walking, but more were seriously injured, so overall there has been a 13 per cent increase in the total number of people killed or seriously injured. This means the severity of collisions has decreased this Quarter 4, from one fatality for every 17 serious injuries in Quarter 4 2023/24 to one fatality for every 24 serious injuries this Quarter 4.

This financial year 54 people have been killed while walking, similar to last year (56) but higher than 2022/23 (39), and lower than pre-pandemic (65 in 2019/20), part of a significant and sustained post-pandemic decrease in fatalities.

## People cycling

This financial year nine people have been killed while cycling, more than in previous years (eight in 2023/24, seven in 2022/23, and six in 2021/22).

To the end of Quarter 4, the number of serious injuries to people cycling (1,037) is higher than last year (919) and slightly higher than the previous two years (1,009 in 2022/23 and 1,023 in 2021/22) suggesting that last year was unusually low.

We have seen a significant increase in the number of cycling journeys since the pandemic, suggesting that while the number of people killed or seriously injured while cycling has increased slightly, the overall risk of being killed or seriously injured while cycling continues to decrease post-pandemic. More analysis on the trend in risk will be carried out when up to date journey data becomes available.

## People motorcycling

This financial year, 13 people have been killed while motorcycling, continuing a sustained downward trend (from 34 in 2019/20 to 23 in 2023/24). Compared with before the pandemic, fewer people have been killed while riding larger and heavier bikes with an engine size of over 125cc, whereas fatalities on motorcycles with a smaller engine have remained largely unchanged.

Serious injuries to people motorcycling have increased this year (783) compared to last (739), but 2022/23, 2023/24, and 2024/25 were lower than pre-pandemic figures as part of a longer-term trend. We think this positive trend reflects a reduction in commuting journeys using bigger, heavier bikes on car-dominated high-speed roads, whereas smaller motorcycles continue to be widely used by couriers in the gig economy on lower speed high streets where drivers may already be looking out for people walking and cycling.

## Car occupants

Car occupant serious injuries in Quarter 4 increased slightly compared to the previous Quarter 4 (from 150 to 158) and are also higher than the previous two years in Quarter 4 (136 in 2022/23 and 138 in 2021/22). This will be monitored going forwards to determine whether it is a significant trend or just a normal fluctuation.

For the full financial year the number of car occupants killed or seriously injured (479) is very similar to last year (474) and lower than the two preceding years (520 in 2022/23 and 502 in 2021/22).

## Improvement Activity

On 16 January 2025, we hosted an online workshop with the Urban Transport Group (UTG), the UK's network of transport authorities, to discuss work-related road risk, including initiatives to reduce the number of work-related casualties on urban roads. This was a great opportunity to share with them how our work is progressing in key aspects of road safety policy and implementation where we are actively leading (such as the Fleet Operator Recognition Scheme and the Meal and Grocery Delivery Company Charter) and in doing so discuss synergies and opportunities for future collaboration. Road safety manifests differently in urban areas, so it is important to work with our partners in other cities to share good practice and information and try to amplify the urban voice

when we are talking to Government about what cities need to reduce collisions on urban roads and help make travel safer for everyone.

Members are looking at their own data on work related road risk (or commissioning new data where this does not exist). We hope to set up another session to discuss what UTG members have found and our next steps for collaboration.

### **Safe Speeds**

We remain committed to our Lowering Speed Limits programme in our drive to eliminate fatal and serious injury collisions from London's roads and are expanding the scope of the programme to include a third phase.

In March 2025, we lowered the speed limit to 20mph on A1205 Burdett Road, London Borough of Tower Hamlets, adding a further 1.5km. Since April 2020, we have lowered the speed limit on 189.3km of our roads, of which 169.9km are 20mph.

### **Safe Streets**

Work to deliver an improved crossing on the A23 Streatham High Road in Lambeth at the junction with Gracefield Gardens finished at the end of January. Works at A20 Amersham Road Junction with Parkfield Road in Lewisham were completed between 6 and 8 January. Road safety schemes at Redcliffe Gardens in Kensington and Chelsea and King's Cross Road junction with Pentonville Road in Camden began on 13 January 2025 and were completed in April 2025.

Public engagement on a number of schemes took place between February and March 2025. This included a pedestrian crossing improvement on the A2 Deptford Broadway and a speed limit reduction scheme on the A21 Hastings Road/A232 Croydon Road in Bromley, both due for construction later in 2025.

The consultation to improve junctions in Shoreditch launched on 16 December 2024, marking the achievement of our Vision Zero commitment to consult on 10 further Safer Junction locations by the end of 2024. The consultation closed in early February 2025 and responses are now being considered.

The three new signal-controlled crossings at the junction of Battersea Bridge Road, Prince of Wales Drive and Surrey Lane were commissioned on 5 March with work continuing until autumn 2025. We are also investing more than £87m over the next year across London boroughs and the City of London to make our streets safer, healthier and greener. This is part of our three-year agreement and programme with London boroughs. It will fund projects delivered in partnership with boroughs, who have strong expertise of local roads and transport networks across the capital.

The investment will work to create new cycle routes to strengthen London's growing network of Cycleways, more pedestrian crossings in local neighbourhoods and funding to support School Streets schemes, enabling children and young people to walk and cycle to school safely. The programme will also aim to deliver further projects to tackle road danger across London, including 15 new schemes at some of London's most dangerous junctions and new boroughwide 20mph schemes.

## Safe Vehicles

From 28 October 2024, we strengthened the minimum safety requirements for the world-leading Direct Vision Standard, to reduce the level of risk that heavy goods vehicles (HGVs) can pose to all road users, especially people walking and cycling.

Operators will receive a penalty charge notice of up to £550 if they operate an HGV more than 12 tonnes in Greater London without a minimum three-star Direct Vision Standard rating or without a valid HGV safety permit.

Throughout 2024/25 we continued to work closely with the freight industry in preparation for the implementation of the Progressive Safe System (PSS). However, to give the road haulage industry sufficient time to buy, fit and test any new equipment to be retrofitted to their vehicles to comply with the new requirements, and in order to overcome possible shortages of appointments to fit PSS equipment, we recommended to London Councils' Transport and Environment Committee a further three-month extension up to 5 May 2025 in addition to the existing previously agreed three-month grace period which was due to end on 31 January 2025. The total grace period, as agreed on 18 July, ran for six months from 28 October to 5 May 2025. Between 28 October 2024 up to 31 March 2025, there have been 100,695 PSS permits issued to in scope HGVs.

## Safe Behaviours

We relaunched our powered two-wheelers campaign in January 2025 through social media, roadside outdoor advertising and online videos. The campaign targets both riders and drivers with a unified message to 'watch out for each other'.

The speed campaign relaunched in March 2025 on TV and radio, with new radio scripts being used in the campaign for the first time. This campaign aims to motivate drivers to change their behaviours by showing them that driving even 'a little' over the speed limit can still have devastating consequences.

In February 2025, we hosted our bi-annual Meal and Grocery Delivery Company Road Safety Forum. The event is a great opportunity for industry to come together with us and other stakeholders to discuss road safety, share information and good practice. One of the objectives of the forum is to maintain momentum and hold ourselves and each other to account on the commitments made in the Delivery Company Motorcycle Road Safety Charter we published in 2023 by sharing updates and initiatives. While the charter and the forum are usually focused on motorcycle safety, we decided to dedicate this session to e-bikes which are frequently used by couriers in the Meal and Grocery Delivery industry.

In London, motorcycles make up four per cent of vehicle mileage but account for 22 per cent of fatalities. To address this, we relaunched our motorcycle campaign in January 2025 through social media, outdoor advertising and online videos. The campaign targets both riders and drivers with a unified message to watch out for each other, and ran for 12 weeks.

From 1 December 2024 to 1 January 2025, our policing partners delivered the National Police Chiefs Council's Operation Limit, which is a proactive operation to increase drink and drug testing, and targeted vehicle stops for drivers suspected of being under the influence. As part of Operation Limit, we adopted several high harm and threat corridors, where 259 Traffic Offence Reports were

issued for speeding, and 663 for no insurance. In total, 664 arrests were made for driving under the influence and 216 tickets issued for no insurance.

### **Post Collision Response**

The impact of road traffic collisions can be complex, with far-reaching consequences covering physical and emotional safety, coronial and legal processes and challenges with daily life. The best outcomes for road crash victims are achieved through specialist support delivered by practitioners trained to help in such diverse scenarios. To fill this identified support gap in London, in November 2023 a multi-agency pilot project was launched to support victims, family members and loved ones in the aftermath of road collisions resulting in deaths and life-changing injury. This is co-funded by us and MOPAC.

This pilot scheme has implemented a consent-based direct referral mechanism from the MPS and City of London Police into the service, thus removing the onus from victims having to navigate their own access to support. The service, delivered by Brake and RoadPeace, offers a dedicated London team of caseworkers who provide face-to-face trauma-informed emotional and practical support in the immediate aftermath of an incident and longer-term aftercare via support groups, befriending and a resilience-building programme.

Since its launch, over 200 people have been referred to the service. Positive testimonies from users of the service, captured as part of an independent pilot evaluation, demonstrate the powerful impact the service is having. We published the interim evaluation report in March 2025. We have agreed with MPS and MOPAC to put in place a permanent support service and the procurement for this service was launched in February 2025. A supplier will be appointed in summer 2025, with the pilot continuing to operate until the service goes live in autumn 2025.



## Bus safety

One of our key priorities is making London's buses safer for everyone. Therefore, we have a safety scorecard metric that is specific to injuries related to collisions involving London buses, which forms a subset of the overall road safety metric.

Bus safety is an integral part of our Customer, Colleague and Road Safety story. However, we have a bespoke bus safety programme of improvements, so this section of the report aims to bring these elements together to demonstrate our joined-up approach to safety.

Measure	Q4 Target	Q4 Actual
People killed or seriously injured in road traffic collisions in or by a London bus	65	86 (including 7 fatalities)

**Data sources:** police reported road traffic collisions resulting in personal injury (STATS19), early fatal notifications from the police

**Date of extraction:** 10/04/2025

The data used in this section uses police reported road traffic collision data, this can be found on the TfL website <https://tfl.gov.uk/corporate/publications-and-reports/road-safety> including the interactive Road Danger Reduction dashboard which has London injury collision data from January 2017 to November 2024 [Road Reduction Dashboard](#).

### Other data sources:

We also report our operator reported bus safety data which can be found on the TfL website <https://tfl.gov.uk/corporate/publications-and-reports/bus-safety-data> including the interactive Bus Safety dashboard which has London bus collision data from January 2014 to December 2024 [Bus Safety Dashboard](#). The dashboard uses a different data source to the one presented in this section. To understand the differences between our bus safety data see our [bus data guidance](#).

Please note that Quarter 4 data for 2024/25 is currently provisional.

## Bus safety performance

Sadly 86 people were killed or seriously injured in collisions involving London buses in Quarter 4 of 2024/25. This was higher than Quarter 4 last year (80), and Quarter 4 2022/23 (67) but lower than 2021/22 (87). There were seven people tragically killed in collisions involving London buses this quarter, including three in one tragic collision in Hounslow on 31 March when a car drove into a bus. We are committed to reducing this number to zero by 2030.

For the full financial year there were 253 people killed or seriously injured in collisions involving London buses (provisional). This is a five per cent decrease on the previous year (267 in 2023/24). However, of this number, there were 13 reportable deaths involving London buses in 2024/25, compared to 10 in 2023/24.

The HSE carried out an unannounced visit to Walthamstow bus station on 11 March 2025 which led them to serve a Notification of Contravention in relation to observations of bus driver behaviour during that visit. A response has been provided to the HSE and we have urgently communicated with all bus operators reminding them of their safety duties.

## Trends and drivers

### Fatalities overview

Seven people were tragically killed in an incident involving a bus in Quarter 4 this financial year, which is higher than Quarter 4 for each of the last five financial years. , This number consists of four car occupants killed after colliding with buses (three of whom died in a single incident), one bus passenger who died following a fall, one person killed while cycling and one person killed while waiting at a bus stop after being struck by a car which had initially collided with a stationary bus.

Looking at the full financial year, reported data shows that 13 people were killed in incidents involving a bus, which is an increase on the last two financial years (eight and 10 respectively). Our thoughts remain with the families and friends of those who died.

### Serious injuries overview

Seventy-three people were seriously injured in collisions involving London buses in Quarter 4 this year, lower than Quarter 4 last year (75) but higher than Quarter 4 in 2022/23 (66) and lower than Quarter 4 in 2021/22 (87).

For serious injuries for the full financial year (240) there has been a decrease on last year (257) but an increase in numbers compared to 2022/23 (237) and on 2021/22 (231).

### Bus passengers

Comparing Quarter 4 this financial year to last financial year, the number of bus passengers seriously injured is similar (35 for Quarter 4 this financial year compared to 30 for Quarter 4 last financial year), and there was one customer fatality this quarter.

For the full financial year there has been a slight reduction in bus passenger serious injuries from 114 to 111, which is a further reduction on 2022/23 when it was 126. This should be seen in the context of the fact that bus passenger safety was improving steadily pre-pandemic (72 bus passengers seriously injured in 2019/20) but declined in the years immediately after the pandemic.

### People walking

As mentioned above, sadly one person walking was killed at a bus stop when they were hit by a car in Quarter 4 this year. A bus was stationary at the stop at the time and was struck by the car prior to the fatal collision and is therefore classified as 'involved' in our data set. Five people walking have been killed in total this financial year. We are undertaking a review of pedestrian fatalities to identify trends and any learning outcomes or further initiatives which could further reduce the risk.


The number of people walking who were seriously injured in collisions where a bus was recorded as involved in Quarter 4 this year (33) is similar to last year's Quarter 4 (32), but a decrease in the full financial year figures from 92 last year to 80 people this year.

### People cycling

Sadly, this year one person was killed in Quarter 4 in a collision with a bus while cycling. This compares to none in Quarter 4 last year. For the full financial year there have been three people killed in collisions with London buses while cycling, whereas there were none last year.


Serious injuries to cyclists in collisions with London buses was lower in Quarter 4 this year (three) than last year (five), and for the full financial year there has been a decrease this year (23) from last year (25).

**Figure 19: Scorecard measure: People killed or seriously injured in road traffic collisions on or in a collision involving a London bus**



Period	I	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	Total
<b>2023/24</b>														
Fatalities	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	0	2	1	0	2	10
Serious Injuries	20	27	23	24	16	17	19	15	21	18	20	17	20	257
<b>2024/25</b>														
Fatalities	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	2	1	2	0	2	3	13
Serious Injuries	21	21	18	17	13	26	19	14	11	14	17	16	32	239

**Figure 20: Long-term London bus involved fatality trend: progress towards Mayor's Transport Strategy 2030 target**



We are continuing to work with operators to meet the 2030 target of zero fatalities of people on or in collision with a bus.

### Improvement activity

Improvement activities carried out include two incident prevention days, analysis of likely pedestrian behaviours, producing a handbook for drivers for our bus stations reiterating safe behaviours in and around our bus stations. The Bus Safety Programme supports our Vision Zero targets for London buses and follows a Safe Systems Approach – a summary of activity within the safe system pillars is provided below. A quarterly schedule is being produced for future incident prevention days at bus stations.

### Safe Vehicles

We know that improving the safety of London's buses is the most effective way to improve the safety of the bus network and we continue to focus on delivering safer buses through the Bus Safety Standard (BSS). Currently, 1,960 new buses (March 2025 figures) are in the London bus fleet that meet the BSS out of a total of 8,800 buses.

We continue to engage with bus manufacturers on the delivery of advanced emergency braking (AEB), which was a BSS requirement in 2024 but is a challenge for bus manufacturers due to the cost and time needed to meet the requirements in the Bus Vehicle Specification, which aims to ensure AEB systems provide the expected safety benefits. Shadow mode testing (to test the false positive rate) is now underway by one bus manufacturer and three others are due to commence also in 2025. Alongside this, track tests have either been completed or are planned in 2025.

Our work to develop Phase 2 of the BSS, which will set out requirements for new buses in 2027, 2030 and 2033, is continuing. We have undertaken engagement with bus manufacturers on a draft list of measures and have developed a draft roadmap. A programme of research and engagement is underway to inform the development of a final roadmap which will be published in early 2026. This includes recently completed research on driver collision restraints, alcohol interlocks (an ignition interlock device which prevents driving with excess alcohol by requiring the driver to blow into a device to release the ignition), and a draft position paper on the potential of advanced driver assists systems and connected and automated vehicle technology to improve driver safety. Other ongoing and planned research includes a deep dive analysis of bus involved collisions, CCTV Human Machine Interface research, and research into future enhancements to AEB.

The bus driver cab design is a key part of the BSS phase 2, and in February we published [a vision document for the bus driver cab design](#). This sets out our objectives for an inclusive and ergonomic cab design, the support across the bus industry and highlights a range of completed and ongoing research. We held the first national forum for the bus driver cab design on 3 April, which aims to share research, discussion and progress on the new bus cab design with the bus industry across the UK, including other transport authorities, bus operators and bus manufacturers. We have completed the engagement with bus drivers to gather feedback on the current cab design, interviewing 118 bus drivers from nine operators and 11 garages across the UK, covering locations in London, Glasgow, Edinburgh, and Manchester. We have engaged the Royal College of Art (RCA) Intelligent Mobility Design Centre research staff and masters' students to develop new innovative design ideas for the bus driver's cab. As part of this, the RCA have undertaken in-depth bus driver engagement and a driver task analysis. A final event will be held in June 2025 with stakeholders including bus operators and manufacturers to present the findings and design ideas. Alongside this we have commenced research into anthropometry and inclusion of the bus cab.

We continue to progress research into the causes of, and potential solutions to, pedal application error (PAE). This has included a large-scale study involving more than 120 London bus drivers looking at preferred foot positioning in relation to existing pedal positions. The results of this study are currently being assessed alongside the implications for an updated pedal design specification. Other ongoing research includes investigating the possibility of developing an acceleration suppression feature, which would help mitigate the more severe PAE incidents, and looking at psychological and behavioural factors which may be impacting PAE risk. A report summarising recent developments in our understanding of PAE has been [published on the TfL website](#).

## Safe Speeds

There are now 5,180 buses (almost 60 per cent of the fleet) fitted with intelligent speed assistance (ISA), helping drivers to adhere to posted speed limits. This number is continually rising as new vehicles enter the fleet and older vehicles are retrofitted with this technology. ISA is a critical part of the wider BSS as ensuring buses are travelling at a safe speed means that other safety features and technologies will be more effective.

We continue to work with operators to improve speed compliance including on non-ISA buses, such as through speed awareness campaigns and engagement events with drivers at bus garages.

## Safe Behaviours

Through our bus customer injuries workstream we have a range of research and trials underway, including:

- A behavioural audit into slips, trips and falls on buses. A literature review on the topic has been completed by behavioural science company SoMoCo. A report will be published on the TfL website shortly;
- SoMoCo have also been reviewing CCTV incidents from slips, trips and falls and asking bus drivers and other key stakeholders for views and experiences. This will form part of a larger deep dive which will include observing customer behaviour on-board buses and asking customers for views on these incidents and why they occur. This report is being reviewed and will be published on the TfL website in the summer;
- Research into buggy falls on buses by AECOM and SoMoCo. This includes holding focus groups with parents, carrying out a full literature review, incident data analysis, and liaising with London bus operators and public transport authorities worldwide. The report is due in summer 2025 and will inform next steps for choosing solution ideas to trial on London buses, the final report will be published on the TfL website in the summer; and
- Research by transport research specialists on the causes of harsh braking on buses has been completed and the final report will be published on the TfL website shortly. The report shows that some of the causes are related to the driver, particularly in reference to going too fast for conditions, many are caused by other road users, with car drivers cutting in front of the bus being the top cause of harsh braking. There are a number of recommendations arising from the report that we will embed into the Bus Safety Programme.

Our customer injury Bus Safety Innovation Challenge continues to progress well. The planning and development stages of the sensor-initiated safety messaging project are well underway, with the aim to trial on two bus routes in April and May 2025. We have carried out market engagement activities for an upstairs seat counter display on buses and have now selected a supplier to work with to develop this trial over the coming months. This innovation will indicate the availability of seating on the upper deck and will be trialled in 2025 on a Stagecoach route. The trial of the original Routemaster Ding Ding sound to indicate the bus is about to depart is taking place over four weeks from 28 April 2025 on two bus routes.

We are continuing to develop our workstream on bus driver fatigue, health, and wellbeing. This includes:

- Work with Loughborough University to review driver medicals to consider their role in safeguarding driver health and bus safety. Stage two of this project (subject to funding) would offer an enhanced driver medical to a cohort of drivers to identify safety and health benefits; and
- We have installed fatigue detection systems to around 400 buses. Baseline data has been gathered. We are continuing to work with the trade unions and bus operating companies to switch on the technology so that we can gain a better understanding of the causes of fatigue from these systems. This would include information on routes, rosters, geography and time of day.

## Engagement and knowledge sharing

There is much we can learn and share with the wider bus industry to improve bus safety in London. This is particularly helpful when encouraging other public transport authorities in the growing metropolitan bus franchising areas to adopt the BSS, with Transport for Greater Manchester, for example, requiring their new buses in Tranche 3 of their roll-out to meet the standard.

We continue to collaborate nationally and internationally through both the Bus Knowledge Sharing and Incident Network and Women in Bus and Coach. Across the UK and Ireland, there are now more than 50 members of the Bus Knowledge Sharing and Incident Network, which is supported by the Bus Centre of Excellence. We are supporting the planning of the first national Bus Safety Conference which will be held on 19 May.

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**Safety and Security Panel****Date: 19 May 2025****Item: Risk and Assurance Report Quarter 4 2024/25**

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**This paper will be considered in public****1 Summary**

- 1.1 This report provides the Panel with an overview of the status of and changes to Enterprise Risk 01 (ER01) – ‘Failure to prevent a significant safety incident or deliver safety obligations’, and Enterprise Risk 04 (ER04) – ‘Significant security incident including Cyber Security’. ER04 will be split into two level 0 risks: ER04 – ‘Significant security incident’ and Enterprise Risk 11 – ‘Significant cyber security incident’ (ER11). This panel will receive separate updates on assurance work related to ER11 from April 2025.
- 1.2 This report also summarises the findings from the associated assurance activity of these risks based on second line of defence audit work by the Quality, Safety and Security Assurance (QSSA) team and third line of assurance work by the Internal Audit team within TfL’s Risk and Assurance Directorate. The paper covers the work during Quarter 4 of 2024/25 (8 December 2024 to 31 March 2025) (Q4).
- 1.3 A paper is included on Part 2 of the agenda which contains supplementary information that is exempt from publication by virtue of paragraphs 3 and 7 of Schedule 12A of the Local Government Act 1972 in that it contains information relating to the financial or business affairs of TfL and any action taken or to be taken in connection with the prevention, investigation or prosecution of crime. Any discussion of that exempt information must take place after the press and public have been excluded from the meeting.

**2 Recommendation**

- 2.1 **The Panel is asked to note the paper and the exempt supplementary information on Part 2 of the agenda.**

**3 TfL Enterprise Risks**

- 3.1 ER01 has been reviewed, updated and presented to the Executive Committee on 10 April 2025. ER01 risk title has changed from ‘Inability to deliver safety objectives and obligations’ to ‘Failure to prevent a significant safety incident or deliver safety obligations’. A full update on ER01 is included elsewhere on the agenda for this meeting.
- 3.2 Following the cyber incident and previous discussions at the meeting of this Panel on 12 February 2025, a decision has been made to split out the cyber aspects of the risk from ER04 – ‘Significant security incident including cyber security’. A new risk, ER11 – ‘Significant cyber security incident’ is in

development to cover Information Technology and Operational Technology. This will allow for greater focus on mitigations to bring about improvements. ER11 will be reviewed by the Executive Committee in May and then to the 2 September 2025 meeting of this Panel. A workshop has been scheduled to review and update the remaining aspects of ER04 which will come to the 12 November 2025 meeting of this Panel.

- 3.3 We will begin reporting assurance work against the updated risks including ER11 from Quarter 1 of 2025/26.

## **4 Annual Audit Plans**

- 4.1 The annual QSSA and Internal Audit plans contain a series of audits at the second line and third line respectively that address ER01 and ER04 for 2024/25, as of quarter 1 2025/26 this will also include ER11. Audits against other Enterprise Risks are also reported to the applicable Committee or Panel as well as the Audit and Assurance Committee.
- 4.2 The Internal Audit plan for the first half of 2025/26 was approved by the Audit and Assurance Committee on 10 March 2025. The QSSA audit plan has been shared with all risk owners and audit sponsors for consultation in line with our process.

## **5 Work of Note this Quarter**

- 5.1 Appendix 1 provides details of the Internal Audit and QSSA audits undertaken in Q4. Audit reports issued are given a conclusion of 'well controlled', 'adequately controlled', 'requires improvement' or 'poorly controlled'. Individual findings within audit reports are rated as high, medium or low priority. Where audits are shown as completed against ER04 in 2024/25, this refers to the former ER04: 'Significant security incident including Cyber Security'.

### **Internal Audit**

- 5.2 No Internal Audit work was completed against ER01 in Q4. Two Internal Audits were issued against the former ER04: 'Artificial intelligence (AI) (implementation of Microsoft tools with built-in AI)'; and 'London Transport Museum Business Continuity'. Additional information on these is provided in Appendix 1.
- 5.3 Two Internal Audits were in progress at the end of Q4 against the former ER04: 'Effectiveness of Monitoring and Patching of TfL's Supply Chain (Capita)'; and 'Payments Technology Refresh'.

## **Quality, Safety and Security Assurance**

- 5.4 Thirteen second line QSSA audits were delivered in Q4 against ER01 and there were three QSSA audits completed against the former ER04. The three ER04 audits were Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) compliance audits. Audits of 'Woolwich Ferry Safety, Health and Environment (SHE) Compliance' and 'London Underground (LU) Signalling Competence' were concluded as 'adequately controlled' and 'well controlled' respectively. The audit of 'DLR Safety Authorisation (Section 15: Asset Maintenance) Compliance' was concluded as 'requires improvement'. Additional information is provided in Appendix 1.
- 5.5 Ten integrated systems audits were completed in Q4. Integrated Systems Audits assess LU Operations and Asset Performance teams' compliance with a range of risks and management system requirements and are therefore not rated. Additional details are contained in Appendix 1.
- 5.6 All of the above audits have an agreed and tracked action plan in place.
- 5.7 No QSSA audits against ER04 were in progress at the end of Q4. Six QSSA audits against ER01 from the 2024/25 plan were in progress at the end of Q4:
- (a) Rail for London Infrastructure (RfLI) Managing Electricity at Work;
  - (b) RfLI Plumstead Depot SHE Compliance;
  - (c) Competence of Keolis Amey Docklands Maintenance Staff;
  - (d) Managing SHE in our Supply Chain – Sourcing stage;
  - (e) Places for London Constructions (Design and Management) Regulations (CDM) Client Duties; and
  - (f) Trams Managing Electricity at Work.

## **Counter-fraud and Corruption**

- 5.8 The Counter-fraud and Corruption team investigate all allegations of fraud and corruption against TfL involving TfL employees (including non-permanent labour) and third parties (including suppliers, customers and organised criminals). These cases are part of the wider fraud reporting that is submitted to the Audit and Assurance Committee.

## **6 Cancelled and Deferred Work**

- 6.1 Four QSSA audits against ER01 have been deferred to 2025/26 due to staff turnover and one cancelled. These audits were 'Elizabeth Line Service Control Centre SHE Compliance', 'Managing safety related customer complaints' (deferred to align with other assurance activity), 'LU Managing Electricity at Work', 'LU Management of Manual Handling Risk' and an LU Integrated Systems Audit.

- 6.2 Four PCI DSS audits (ER04 related) were cancelled due to either the TfL team no longer taking payments or assurance being provided by the Payments team in Technology and Data.
- 6.3 Seven audits against the former ER04 were deferred to the 2025/26 plan due to staff turnover: 'Strategic Communications Plan', 'Management of TfL Supplier Cyber Security Risk', 'Light Rail Security Programme audits of DLR, Trams and LU' (three audits), 'Identification and Management of Security Risk in TfL Projects' and 'Management of Actions from Local Security Action Plans'. All have been discussed with the audit sponsor and owners of the controls to be audited.

## **7 Performance and Trends**

- 7.1 Performance data is provided in Appendix 2 on progress against the audit plan, audit ratings, rating trends by Enterprise Risk and business unit and progress against actions, with comparisons provided across the last two years.

### **Internal Audit**

- 7.2 Ten ER01 and (former) ER04 internal audits were completed in the last four quarters compared with five in the preceding four quarters. This is due to an increase in the number of ER04 audits identified through our risk-based approach to internal audit planning. A review of findings has highlighted a few instances where governance arrangements need tightening. These include an absence of clearly documented processes, as well as a lack of clarity on roles and responsibilities. We will continue to monitor this going forward.
- 7.3 At the end of Q4 there were 74 open Internal Audit actions against ER01 and former ER04, none of which were overdue. Over the last six periods there has been a slight decrease in the number of actions closed on time, however the number of actions extended remains consistent.

### **Quality, Safety and Security Assurance**

- 7.4 The QSSA team managed to meet the target of 85 per cent of the plan being delivered by year end, this followed the plan being re-baselined mid-year to ensure it was consistent with team resources after staff turnover.
- 7.5 Comparing the number of ER01 and former ER04 QSSA audits for 2023/24 (86 audits) with 2024/25 (76 audits) there has been a reduction in the number of ER04 audits completed by 16 as it has been agreed that they will be undertaken by the Payments team in Technology and Data. The number of ER01 audits has remained relatively consistent and there has been an increase in audits undertaken against other Enterprise Risks, reported to other Committees and Panels.

- 7.6 The greatest difference in distribution of audit conclusion by Chief Officer team across the last two years is the reduction in 'poorly controlled' conclusions from two to none. The proportion of 'requires improvement' conclusions has remained the same but there is a noteworthy movement from 'adequately controlled' to 'well controlled' noted between the two years. The audit plan differs each year so direct comparisons are limited, however, the progress between the two years is encouraging.
- 7.7 A review of data from the Integrated Systems Audits has highlighted the most commonly occurring findings: risk assessment, competence management, fire safety compliance checks, emergency planning, and the effectiveness of local safety assurance checks. These have been discussed with the Operations team to be included in improvement work and is being discussed at the Executive Committee.
- 7.8 Work continues on the close out of management of QSSA actions, particularly overdue actions with management teams and the relevant Chief Officer. At the end of Q4 there were seven overdue actions for ER01 and ER04 out of 103 open actions with four overdue by 100 days or more (all four of which are from the same audit) and three that are between 30-60 days overdue. This compares with 14 actions of 100 days or more for the same time last year. All actions that are overdue by more than 100 days are reported to the Audit and Assurance Committee and are discussed with Chief Officers.

**List of appendices to this report:**

Appendix 1: QSSA and Internal Audits Completed in Q4 against ER01 and ER04

Appendix 2: QSSA and Internal Audit Summary

A paper containing exempt supplementary information is included on Part 2 of the agenda

**List of Background Papers:**

None

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## Appendix 1 – Quality, Safety and Security Assurance Audits Completed in Quarter 4 of 2024/25

### ER01 Failure to prevent a significant safety incident or deliver safety obligations

Chief Officer	Ref.	Audit Title	Objectives	Conclusion	Summary of Findings
<b>Chief Operating Officer</b>	24 772	Docklands Light Railway (DLR) Safety Authorisation (Section 15) Compliance	Assess DLR compliance with Section 15 of the Safety Authorisation - Maintenance of Assets.	Requires Improvement	Several referenced documents in the Safety Authorisation were not available at the time of the audit. Audits and other asset assurance activities described were not consistently planned and undertaken.
<b>Chief Operating Officer</b>	24 808	Woolwich Ferry Safety, Health and Environment (SHE) Compliance	Seek assurance that Woolwich Ferry are suitably managing their SHE risks through compliance with the TfL SHE Management System.	Adequately Controlled	Woolwich Ferry were able to demonstrate SHE risks were being suitably managed in compliance with the SHE Management System. There were a few areas where improvements could be made as identified in the actions.
<b>Chief Operating Officer</b>	24 823 U	London Underground (LU) Signalling Competence Institution of Railway Signal Engineers (IRSE)	Seek assurance that the procedure and associated activities covering Institution of Railway Signal Engineers (IRSE) Licensing within LU Assessing Agency meet the requirements of the awarding body.	Well Controlled	The processes and procedures in place fully meet the requirements of the relevant IRSE Licensing Standard and Procedures.

## Integrated Systems Audits

Chief Officer	Ref.	Audit Title	Objectives	Conclusion	Summary of Findings
Chief Operating Officer	24 784	Turnham Green Area Integrated Systems Audit	Provide assurance that key requirements contained in the management system are being met.	Not Rated	82 per cent conformance rate, 8 Major, 1 minor, 41 compliant
Chief Operating Officer	24 785	High Barnet Area Integrated Systems Audit	Provide assurance that key requirements contained in the management system are being met.	Not Rated	76 per cent conformance rate, 11 major, 1 minor, 39 compliant
Chief Operating Officer	24 787	Stepney Green Area Integrated Systems Audit	Provide assurance that key requirements contained in the management system are being met.	Not Rated	78 per cent conformance rate, 12 major, 0 minor, 43 compliant
Chief Operating Officer	24 788	Canada Water Area Integrated Systems Audit	Provide assurance that key requirements contained in the management system are being met.	Not Rated	72 per cent conformance Rate, 14 major, 1 minor, 38 compliant
Chief Operating Officer	24 789	West Ham Integrated Systems Audit	Provide assurance that key requirements contained in the management system are being met.	Not Rated	51 per cent conformance rate; 25 major, 1 minor, 27 compliant
Chief Operating Officer	24 790	Manor House Area Integrated Systems Audit	Provide assurance that key requirements contained in the management system are being met.	Not Rated	80 per cent conformance rate, 9 major, 2 minor, 43 compliant
Chief Operating Officer	24 792	Seven Sisters Traincrew Integrated Systems Audit	Provide assurance that key requirements contained in the management system are being met.	Not Rated	70 per cent conformance rate, 8 major, 2 minor, 23 compliant
Chief Operating Officer	24 793	Hammersmith Traincrew Integrated Systems Audits	Provide assurance that key requirements contained in the management system are being met.	Not Rated	72 per cent conformance rate, 10 major, 2 minor, 26 compliant

Chief Officer	Ref.	Audit Title	Objectives	Conclusion	Summary of Findings
<b>Chief Operating Officer</b>	24 794	Harrow-On-The-Hill Traincrew Integrated Systems Audit	Provide assurance that key requirements contained in the management system are being met.	Not Rated	28 per cent conformance rate 28 major, 0 minor, 8 compliant
<b>Chief Operating Officer</b>	24 821 U	Greenwich Generating Station Integrated Systems	Provide assurance that key requirements contained in the management system are being met.	Not Rated	83 per cent conformance rate, 4 major, 5 minor, 47 compliant

#### ER04 Significant security incident

Chief Officer	Ref	Audit Title	Objectives	Conclusion	Summary of Findings
<b>Chief Operating Officer</b>	24 746	Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) Compliance Audit: Taxi Private Hire Operator, Driver and Vehicle Licensing	Seek assurance that controls and systems are in place that meet the requirements of the PCI DSS.	Not Rated	The Taxi Private Hire Operator, Driver and Vehicle Licensing submitted their required self-assessment of compliance with the PCI DSS.
<b>Chief Operating Officer</b>	24 778	PCI DSS Compliance Audit: Victoria Coach Station (VCS)	Seek assurance that the VCS is operating in compliance with the requirements of the PCI DSS.	Not Rated	The VCS submitted their required self-assessment of compliance with the PCI DSS.
<b>Chief Customer and Strategy Officer</b>	24 817	PCI DSS Compliance Audit: Lost Property Office (LPO)	Seek assurance that controls and systems are in place that meet the requirements of the PCI DSS.	Not Rated	The LPO submitted their required self-assessment of compliance with the PCI DSS.


## Internal Audit: Draft reports issued in Quarter 4 of 2024/25

### ER04 Significant security incident including cyber security


Chief Officer	Ref	Audit Title	Objectives	Conclusion	Summary of Findings
Chief Customer and Strategy Officer	24 049	Artificial Intelligence (AI) (implementation of Microsoft tools with built-in AI)	Assess and evaluate the adequacy and effectiveness of a selection of key controls in relation to the implementation of corporate tools with AI.	Requires Improvement	The audit found a lack of some technical controls to enforce the requirements of the TfL Generative AI policy
Chief Customer and Strategy Officer	24 051	London Transport Museum (LTM) Business Continuity	Provide assurance on the adequacy of LTM's business continuity process.	Requires Improvement	A comprehensive bottom-up Business Impact Analysis and corresponding business continuity risk identification and assessment exercise has not been done. Additionally, existing incident management plans do not consider all key risks and incident scenarios faced.

# Appendix 2 : Quality Safety Security Assurance Audit Summary


Audit Progress against 2024/25 Plan




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
Action Management (ER01 and ER04) - By Directorate by Overdue Days



### Audit Conclusion Comparison by Chief Officer Team (over 4 quarters) – ER01 and ER04




### Audit Conclusion Comparison by Enterprise Risks (over 4 quarters)



## Internal Audit Summary

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None

### Audit Conclusion Comparison by Chief Officer Team (over 4 quarters) - ER1and ER04

	Q1 - Q4 23/24	Total	Q1 - Q4 24/25	Total
Chief Customer and Strategy Officer	1 1 2 1	5	6	6
Chief Operating Officer			2 1	3
Chief SHE Officer			1	1

### Audit Conclusion Comparison by Enterprise Risk (over 4 quarters)

	Q1 - Q4 23/24	Total	Q1 - Q4 24/25	Total
ER01 Failure to prevent a significant safety incident or deliver safety obligations	1	1	2 1	3
ER04 Significant security incident	1 2 1	4	7	7

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## Safety and Security Panel



**Date:** 19 May 2025

**Item:** Members' Suggestions for Future Discussion Items

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**This paper will be considered in public**

### **1 Summary**

- 1.1 This paper presents the current forward programme for the Panel and explains how this is put together. Members are invited to suggest additional items for future discussion.

### **2 Recommendation**

- 2.1 **The Panel is asked to note the forward programme and is invited to raise any suggestions for future discussion items.**

### **3 Forward Plan Development**

- 3.1 The Board and its Committees and Panels have forward plans. The content of the plans arise from a number of sources:
- (a) Standing items for each meeting: Minutes; Matters Arising and Actions List; and any regular quarterly reports. For this Panel these are the Safety, Health and Security Quarterly Report and the Risk and Assurance Quarterly Report;
  - (b) Regular items that are for review or noting, such as the Safety, Health and Environment Annual Report; and
  - (c) Items requested by Members, which may arise out of actions from previous meetings (including meetings of the Board or other Committees and Panels) and any issues suggested under this agenda item.

### **4 Current Plan**

- 4.1 The current plan is attached as Appendix 1. Like all plans, it is a snapshot in time and items may be added, removed or deferred to a later date.

#### **List of appendices to this report:**

Appendix 1: Safety and Security Panel Forward Plan

#### **List of Background Papers:**

None

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## Safety and Security Panel Forward Plan 2025/26

## Appendix 1

**Membership:** Zoë Billingham CBE (Chair), Omid Shiraji (Vice Chair), Seb Dance, Mark Phillips, and Peter Strachan.

Abbreviations: CCO (Chief Capital Officer), CCSO (Chief Customer and Strategy Officer), CFO (Chief Finance Officer), COO (Chief Operating Officer), CSHEO (Chief Safety, Health and Environment Officer), D (Director), Director of Risk and Assurance (DRA)

2 September 2025		
Vision Zero Road Risk Update	CSHEO	To note
Rail Customer Safety (PTI Plan) Update	CSHEO	To note
Fatigue Programme Update	CSHEO	To note
Lessons Learnt from Grenfell and Actions Required at TfL	Director of TfL Engineering	To note
Safety and Security of Children and Young People Travelling in London	COO	To note
Crime and Anti-social Behaviour Update – High Harm Crimes	COO	To note
Enterprise Risk Update – Significant Cyber Security Incident (ER11)	CCSO	Standing item
Safety, Health and Security Quarterly Report	CSHEO / COO	Standing item
Risk and Assurance Quarterly Report	DRA	Standing item

12 November 2025		
Using Innovation to Improve Safety and Security	CSHEO / COO / CCSO	To note
Colleague Safety – Deep Dive	CSHEO	To note
Vision Zero Action Plan - Road Risk Launch	CSHEO	To note
Protection from Sexual Harassment for Colleagues	COO	To note
Ending Violence Against Women and Girls	COO	To note
Safeguarding Deep Dive	COO	To note
Enterprise Risk Update – Significant Security Incident (ER04)	COO	Standing item

Safety, Health and Security Quarterly Report	CSHEO / COO	Standing item
Risk and Assurance Quarterly Report	DRA	Standing item

9 February 2026		
Customer Safety Update	CSHEO	To note
Update on Our Safety Management Systems	CSHEO	To note
Colleague Health Data Deep Dive	Head of Occupational Health and Wellbeing	To note
Policing Partnerships and Special Services Agreement Performance with MPS and BTP	COO	To note
Safety, Health and Security Quarterly Report	CSHEO / COO	Standing item
Risk and Assurance Quarterly Report	DRA	Standing item

**Guest speakers from organisations such as the Confidential Incident Reporting and Analysis System (CIRAS) and the Office of Rail and Road (ORR) will also be invited to meetings.**

**To programme:**

IIPAG Safety Sub-group Third Line Assurance (DRA)