

Transport for London

Safety and Sustainability Panel

Subject: Key Findings from Internal Audit Reports

Date: 19 March 2014

1 Purpose

- 1.1 The purpose of this paper is to inform the Panel about Internal Audit Reports related to Safety and Sustainability issued during Quarter 3 2013/14.
- 1.2 The panel is asked to note the paper.

2 Background

- 2.1 Appendix 1 provides a summary of the HSE and Technical audit reports issued during Quarter 3. On completion of each HSE and Technical Audit, an audit report is issued to the 'Client' within the business who commissioned the work and copied to other relevant staff involved in the audit. Where corrective actions or improvement actions are agreed to address issues identified by the audit, these are tracked by the audit team, including review of supporting evidence, in order to confirm that the issues have been properly addressed.
- 2.2 The most significant of the reports issued during Quarter 3 include the following, and in all cases management actions have been agreed to address the findings, and are being taken forward:
 - (i) Asset risk management – there was generally good compliance with the LU standard on asset risk management, but there were weaknesses in communication of recent changes to the Standard and some areas where it would benefit from greater clarity.
 - (ii) Track Maintenance JNP – there were two instances of non-conformance found in relation to review and update of a procedure, and arrangements for monitoring track assets for compliance.
 - (iii) Signal Maintenance Regime – The majority of maintenance works were being carried out as specified. However, four non-conformances were noted in relation to record keeping.
 - (iv) REW (Railway Engineering Workshop) Signalling Overhaul Management – The quality management system that has been operated by REW for a number of years lacked maturity in some areas, and one non-conformance and five business improvement actions were noted.
 - (v) CDM Regulations LU Track Partnership – A lot of work had been done to address issues raised by a previous audit. However, there was still room for further improvement and four business improvement actions were raised.

- (vi) Work related road risk audits – Three audits were carried out of contractors' implementation of TfL requirements to minimise the risk to cyclists from vehicles contracted by them. Whilst the majority of requirements were understood, with some checking and monitoring taking place, there was some scope for improvement.
- (vii) Surface Transport, Incident Reporting and Investigation – A number of areas were noted where there was scope for improvement in the reporting and analysis of incidents.

3 Recommendation

- 3.1 The Panel is asked to note the paper.

4 Contact

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Reference	Report Title	Final Report Issued	Original Objective	Summary of Findings
Rail and Underground				
Delivery of capital investment portfolio and contract management				
13_702	Asset Risk Management	09/10/2013	To assess communication and compliance with revised LU standard on asset risk management.	<p>The overall finding is that most areas are complying with the majority of the requirements of the standard. It was evident that systems exist and are generally effective in managing asset risk as low as is reasonably practicable.</p> <p>Two asset areas in Asset Performance do not have their own local risk and hence are not responsible for the upkeep and day to day maintenance of the asset risk register. However, asset areas (Telecom & IM and Power) are relatively new and Powerlink has recently transitioned to TfL. Action has been agreed to reach compliance by September, 2014.</p> <p>The majority of Sponsors and Asset Risk Register custodians were not aware of changes in the Standard S5044. It was agreed that in the future, consultation and communication will be wider in order to sufficiently engage stakeholders.</p> <p>There were parts of the standard that would benefit from improved clarity including roles and responsibilities and it has been agreed that this will be addressed through periodic review of the standard.</p> <p>There are some discrepancies between the standard and local work instructions. It has been agreed these will be addressed through periodic review of these documents.</p>
13_704	Rolling Stock Maintenance Staff Training	02/10/2013	To determine whether maintenance and technical training arrangements for fleet maintenance staff are effective, robust and meet the requirements in the respective Vehicle Maintenance Instructions (VMI's).	<p>Training for fleet maintenance staff is generally effective, robust and meets the requirements in the VMIs. However, some detailed areas of concern were identified which need addressing.</p> <p>The current repeated failures of the Automatic Train Control (ATC) on the 09 Stock, is being dealt with by the Project Engineers, Invensys Personnel and Depot Engineers. Fault finding training on this unit (ATC) is still in progress, with nobody in the depot besides the two trainers qualified to carry out this operation.</p> <p>There were six Business Improvement Actions raised as a result of this audit.</p>
13_726a	LU Earth Structures Renewal Works Design Management and Co-ordination – London Underground	03/10/2013	To examine the effectiveness of design management and co-ordination processes in ensuring delivery of safe and reliable assets.	<p>The LU Earth Structures design team is specifying earth structures renewal works design requirements to Cementation Skanska (and its lead designer Mott MacDonald) and Clancy Docwra (and its lead designer SKM) in a well controlled manner, using framework agreements, works information and detailed site-specific Conceptual Design Statements (CDSs) that go through an optioneering process and are used to agree target prices.</p> <p>The LU Earth Structures project team is preparing, checking and approving concept designs and detailed designs for the Earth Structures Remedial Works in a well controlled manner.</p> <p>The design change process for earth structures requires review, and an agreed process will be documented and formally issued.</p> <p>Conceptual Design Statements for Earth Structures produced from now will specify the revision status of applicable LU Standards.</p>

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13_726b	LU Earth Structures Renewal Works Design Management and Co-ordination - Cementation Skanska / Mott MacDonald	04/10/2013	To examine the effectiveness of design management and co-ordination processes in ensuring delivery of safe and reliable assets.	<p>Cementation Skanska and MMD are complying with LU requirements in a well controlled manner The design change control process for earth structures will be reviewed, and an agreed process will be documented and formally issued.</p> <p>Conceptual Design Statements for Earth Structures produced from now on will specify the revision status of applicable LU Standards.</p> <p>LU is to ensure that works information packages include copies of referenced documents, and that any links provided can be accessed.</p>
13_726c	LU Earth Structures Renewal Works Design Management and Co-ordination - Clancy Docwra / Sinclair Knight Merz	04/10/2013	To examine the effectiveness of design management and co-ordination processes in ensuring delivery of safe and reliable assets	<p>Clancy Docwra and SKM are complying with LU requirements in a well controlled manner Conceptual Design Statements for Earth Structures produced from now on will specify the revision status of applicable LU Standards.</p> <p>SKM is to supply competency assessment records, broadly similar to those described in LU Works Instruction W0789-A1, to support the entries in the SKM geotechnical competency matrix.</p>
13_820	Supplier Audit - Xylem Flow Control Ltd	10/10/2013	This audit was carried out to assess the compliance and overall effectiveness of Xylem Flow Control Ltd's Quality Management System and procedures regarding design, manufacture and assembly.	<p>Xylem are ISO9001:2008 certified and have a fully comprehensive and documented management system in place. This is generally well managed with some minor issues identified during the audit.</p> <p>The introduction of new products, and changes to existing products, are controlled and monitored.</p> <p>The calibration of devices used in the manufacturing and testing processes is not effectively controlled. Xylem's audit plan does not consider specific audits for areas of risk to the business. A new schedule is being developed to include audits of these areas. In addition, actions from internal audits are not being closed on time. The audit process is being strengthened by training two additional internal auditors.</p> <p>Other areas, including customer complaints, management of subcontractors and incoming product and product assembly are being controlled effectively.</p> <p>There was one Non-Conformance and three Observations identified as a result of this audit.</p>
13_790	Train Division's Overhaul and Assembly Processes	18/11/2013	Assess whether refurbishment of Rolling Stock is being undertaken in accordance with quality processes to ensure it is fit for purpose	<p>The audit sampled Trains Division's (TD's) compliance to its systems and processes for overhauling train bogies and components, ensuring that product specifications and operational requirements are met.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Products being overhauled by the TD undergo well defined processes and controls that are being adhered to. The risk of component failure whilst in operation within the London Underground network that could result in safety or reliability performance issues is therefore minimised. • Within each dismantling, refitting and assembly line; training and competency records for shop floor staff were seen to be suitably filed, complete and with the relevant approvals. • Suitable documentation (work instructions, certificates and forms) for product realisation (overhaul processes) were in place at office and shop floor levels and were found to be systematically followed and completed. • The audit sampled 100% of all tools, gauges and equipment that require calibration and these were found to be within appropriate next 'due dates' for calibration and controlled centrally with adequate systems. A Good Practice was noted on calibration control. • Minor updates are required for some documents. <p>There were five Observations and two Good Practices as a result of this audit.</p>

Reference	Report Title	Final Report Issued	Original Objective	Summary of Findings
Disruption to quality of service				
13_806	Track Maintenance - JNP	23/09/2013	To establish the level of compliance across JNP in accordance with the Track Maintenance Regime P-165 and the London Underground Standard for Track Inspection and Maintenance S1158.	<p>Track asset inspection and maintenance activities are being scheduled in accordance with intervals determined by London Underground standards.</p> <p>Annual risk assessments for track inspection frequencies are being maintained on the risk containment database. The Track Patrolling Frequencies and Supplementary Measures Procedure which defines the steps to establish the frequencies has not been reviewed and updated since June 2005.</p> <p>It could not be demonstrated that the JNP Asset Management System is effectively monitored to ensure track assets remain compliant or that Temporary Approved Non-compliances had been raised to control risk. The Jubilee and Piccadilly lines have a backlog of inspection and maintenance work orders relating to depot works that are overdue. Independent assurance reviews and surveillance activities are being carried out to programme.</p> <p>The Track Maintenance Regime requires updating to reflect changes to the organisation, responsibilities and associated processes and procedures.</p> <p>There are examples of unexplained overdue work orders generated by Maximo This may, in part, be linked to cases of duplicate work orders being raised for the same activity.</p> <p>There were two Non-Conformances, one Business Improvement Action and five Observations raised as a result of this audit.</p>
13_807	Edgware/Stratford Materials Control	23/09/2013	To assess the compliance and overall effectiveness of the Quality Management System for materials control at Edgware and Stratford track stores.	<p>Maximo is now the single source for the ordering and issuing of materials. The latest revision of Maximo will include control of the issuing and returning of plant equipment.</p> <p>Maximo procedures are followed. Other stores processes, including the use of stores documentation, are not formalised through the use of work instructions and / or process flow diagrams.</p> <p>Housekeeping is to a high standard. Good Practices were identified in the use of a vis-board to aid material location and the grouping of similar parts in common areas of the stores.</p> <p>There is no forum for communication between the stores and the Maximo team to give the stores employees a voice in revisions to Maximo.</p> <p>Stock counting and the control of minimum stock levels are to become part of the logistics vis-board and plans are in place to achieve this. Stock counting has been enhanced by tasking each track store to stock count five part numbers per day.</p> <p>There were two Business Improvement Actions, three Good Practices and three Observations identified as a result of this audit.</p>
13_729	LU Management of Defects Raised by Patrollers	28/10/2013	To confirm that all defects that are raised by the patrollers are being reviewed appropriately and input into the Ellipse system with the correct quality	<p>Two areas of non-conformance were identified:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • When dealing with failure/malfunction of the Hand Held device, Patrollers in Metropolitan/H&C Lines record the outcome of inspections on obsolete forms. • The Work Bank/Track Patrol Walkout Report in the Ellipse system is not a true reflection of the condition of the asset. Defects raised in Ellipse sometimes do not appear on the Track Patrol Walkout Report.

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			threshold and associated timescale.	
13_743	Asbestos Management – Powerlink	06/11/2013	To assess PowerLink processes for ensuring asbestos registers are maintained in accordance with legislation, and to prevent harm. Also to examine PowerLink processes for management of waste management records in accordance with legislation and to minimise environmental risks.	<p>The key findings from the audit were:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The company (former Powerlink) meets the requirements stipulated in current asbestos legislation. • There is an adequate system of procedures and documents derived from legislation to satisfactorily identify and manage Asbestos Containing Materials (ACMs). • Suitable management controls are in place to prevent asbestos exposure to employees, contractors and the public. • All personnel working for or on behalf of LU are provided with suitable and sufficient information and appropriate training. • The process for reporting asbestos is clearly understood and followed by all employees. • Only licensed contractors are used for removal or treatment of ACM and the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) is formally notified. • A notice of restriction due to asbestos is displayed at all sites. • Asbestos register and site surveys are available at each respective site displayed in a prominent position and are also held electronically on the former Powerlink database. • Occupational Health and Human Resources retain the Asbestos Exposure Report Form for a period of no less than 40 years.
13_731	Signal Maintenance Regime	05/12/2013	Confirm that planned maintenance activities including Routine Change have been undertaken and records are in place to demonstrate compliance with the 2012 / 2013 Signal Maintenance Regime	<p>The audit focused on the Central Line (Leyton Maintenance Depot) and SSL South (Earl's Court offices). The key findings, which included four non-conformances and eight observations, were:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The majority of the planned preventative maintenance, routine change, annual certification and corrective maintenance were being carried out as specified. • Some of the recorded maintenance frequencies in the Ellipse database contradict the specification in the signal maintenance regime. • The specified test forms in the signal maintenance regime were not being used and populated on completion of the maintenance tasks. • The Multicore Cables test results were not being kept up to date on the Central Line • There was no evidence of the devised maintenance regime and maintenance record for Code Sweep and Test Track on the Central Line. • There was no evidence of the 20 year routine change records for Depot and selected siding points, on the SSL South.
13_761	Load Change Applications	19/11/2013	Confirm compliance with the Load Change Application Requirements for Electrical, Compressed Air and other services, and that management of Load Change Applications is effective in controlling risk.	<p>The findings of the audit, which included four non-conformances, two business improvement actions and five observations, were:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All the areas audited followed the instructions and guidance necessary. Records and databases are kept up-to-date. • Opportunities for improvement were identified with the Category 1 Standard (S1100) which would benefit from review to take into account recent changes and current working practices. • The LU Category 1 Standard (S1100) does not set any requirements for the competence of those involved with the application process and the level of competence of applicants within each contractor's organisation is not defined. • Some Load Change Application forms sent to the Load Applications Engineers were not completed correctly. • It was not clear what remedial measures should be taken where there is a load application change (connection/disconnection) that was not approved or that staff were not made aware of. • Applicants do not submit Traction Load Change Applications at least 4 years prior to the implementation/connection dates as stated in the standard.

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				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Connection agreements completed by utility providers after installation of a new supply are not sent to the Distribution Network Operator (DNO) to complete tariff details, capacity and authorisation. • Some applicants for major works (projects) do not send required information within four weeks of any physical modification onsite to Systems Capacity or Distribution Network Operator (DNO).
13_797	Tunnel Survey Work	05/12/2013	<p>Confirm tunnel monitoring is taking place and actions recorded from monitoring being followed and assurance is being provided.</p>	<p>The audit focused on the tunnel monitoring programme, assurance activities, standards and processes and any associated remedial activities. The key findings, which included four observations, were:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tunnel inspections and monitoring programmes across the JNP network are being effectively managed by both the Operations and Projects directorates. • Where identified, the Engineering Review Panel is effective at managing solutions to mitigate risks due to anomalies found as a result of tunnel inspections and monitoring on the JNP network. • Good progress is being made to replace the concrete tunnel linings on the Jubilee line between Baker Street and Bond Street with cast iron panel sections. • There is no formal process in place to ensure that the tunnel inspection programme is communicated to the JNP Civil Asset Engineer. • The TfL work instruction team are planned to commence work with the Civils asset team to formally document all working procedures. • The introduction of Maximo 7.5 will greatly improve the communication of inspection and risk mitigation across the Operations and Projects directorates.
13_813	Emergency Response Unit	05/12/2013	<p>To determine whether the processes and procedures used by the Emergency Response Unit (ERU) are effective in ensuring consistency across its four operational units.</p> <p>Also, to determine whether the recommendations made following the formal investigation into the New Cross derailment incident in September 2012 have been fully implemented and are effective.</p>	<p>The findings of the audit, which included two business improvement actions and five observations, were:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clear and effectively managed processes and procedures are in place at all four ERU locations ensuring a good consistency of well maintained working practices. • All recommendations made following the New Cross derailment incident in September 2012 have been implemented and are being effectively managed. The ERU have worked closely with the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) ensuring that progress made has been communicated to all parties. • There is no process for self auditing the work instructions and procedures at the ERU. • There are clear channels of communication in place across all four ERU locations ensuring that risks associated with ERU activities are highlighted and effectively managed prior to incident rectification. • The TfL Management System work instruction team are working with the ERU to review and document all working practices. • Risk assessments for all activities are in place. They are being reviewed to document them in the TfL format. • The use of log books is being trialled at the ERU to demonstrate the type of call-outs attended by ERU operational staff.
13_844	REW's Signalling Overhaul Management	21/11/2013	<p>Assess REW's Management System including Control Processes for Signalling Overhaul products</p>	<p>REW operates a quality management system that has been in place for a number of years. It was found that the quality management system lacks maturity in some of the areas audited due to the reasons listed below</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The provision of a clearly defined written procedure would improve the rigour and effectiveness of the current training and competence process which is currently fragmented and includes some incomplete records. • Relay workshop processes and process controls used on the relay refurbishment shop floor do not meet with the documented requirements. The banning of some chemicals in work environments and cost saving exercises account for a number of the discrepancies. • Senior management could make better use of management information to help understand the business more clearly and build closer links between the quality management system and the

Reference	Report Title	Final Report Issued	Original Objective	Summary of Findings
				financial aspects of the business. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Traceability of product throughout the signals refurbishment process was adequately controlled, although after installation on the network traceability is lost making the efficient recall of installed relay units difficult. • Other areas, including document and change control, nonconforming product, and purchasing/ goods-in were adequately controlled.
13_845	Casualty Lifting Activity at Neasden Depot.	14/11/2013	Assess whether the train maintenance staff are adequately trained and competent to undertake casualty lifting activities on the "S" stock.	The key findings of the audit were: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All the maintenance staff "Fleet Introduction Team" involved with the casualty lifting activities were found to be adequately trained and competent to carry out casualty lifting maintenance work on the "S" tube stock. • Health & Safety requirements and legislations are complied with. • Risks to the Health & Safety of the maintenance staff, with regards to casualty lifting operation, the use of lifting equipment, tools and gauges are effectively managed. • Casualty lifting activities are being carried out in accordance with the approved work instructions applicable to the "S" tube stock. • The people leading the casualty lifting operation were adequately trained and competent to lead the operation. • The casualty lifting certificate for one member of the "Fleet Introduction Team" has expired.
Major Incident - External				
13_835	Change Control of Safety Risks-LU Access Transformation Programme	25/09/2013	To assess the extent to which operational safety risks resulting from planned changes to operational systems and processes are systematically identified, assessed and controlled.	Overall, the Access Transformation Programme is following the framework for risk management provided by Pathway and is systematically identifying and mitigating operational safety risk effectively. <p>There are defined roles and responsibilities for managing risk. For less advanced workstreams some responsibilities still need to be embedded.</p> <p>Internal resources and competence are sufficient to ensure risk is managed. Embedded specialist services have been provided and contractors procured to provide short term risk assessment studies.</p> <p>Risks are identified and recorded systematically with relevant and realistic mitigations in place and owned. Go/No go criteria are considered, but the decision making regarding this could be made more consistent and explicit within Change Assurance Plans. There are arrangements to ensure risks are kept under review throughout the change process. These are not consistently described in Change Assurance Plans.</p> <p>There is a process for closure of operational risks. A more efficient way of doing this has been agreed as an output of the audit. Clarity can also be strengthened regarding how evidence is retained and by whom.</p> <p>An assessment of the evidence against the Railway Safety Maturity Model suggests the following maturity ratings out of 5:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Worker Involvement and Internal Co-operation 4 - Record Keeping and Document Control 3 - Workload Planning 4 - Change Management 4.
13_741	Construction (Design Management) Regulations - LU Track Partnership	18/09/2013	To assess the effectiveness of allocation of roles and responsibilities and	A previous audit identified concerns over provision of pre-construction information, clarity of responsibilities, incomplete documentation and robustness of site monitoring.

Reference	Report Title	Final Report Issued	Original Objective	Summary of Findings
			communication of information	<p>The audit found that the Project Execution Plan, CDM Competency assessments and Verification Activity Plan had now been produced and met the requirements of the Project Management Framework (PMF).</p> <p>The issue of Monthly site audits had also been addressed with focused and detailed topic specific audits now being undertaken.</p> <p>However, it was noted that although Track Partnership (TP) had put in considerable time and effort to address the issues identified with regards the provision of preconstruction information and CDM roles and responsibilities additional work was still required. This resulted in Business Improvement Actions being raised, as follows:-</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There should be an interface and consultation with regards to collation of pre-construction information between the Drainage Design Manager and the Information Manager. • Where information was collated or created by the TP, this should be passed to LU for inclusion in the Health and Safety File and CAI for future use. • The role and activities undertaken by the Drainage Design Manager with regards to surveys etc. needs clarification and detailing within project documentation. • The role of Information Manager did not appear on the project RACI chart or CDM Competence Matrix.
13_837	Work Related Road Risk - Bond Street Project – Costain Laing O'Rourke (CoLoR)	31/10/2013	To assess contractor's implementation of TfL contractual requirements to minimise the risk to cyclists from vehicles contracted by them	<p>The audit found that CoLoR's project team understood the majority of the TfL requirements and were undertaking some checks and monitoring to ensure contractors arriving on site met the Freight Operator Recognition Scheme (FORS) Bronze accreditation requirements.</p> <p>Evidence had not been sought that contractors checked drivers' licences with the DVLA at regular intervals. Reliance is placed on the contractor being FORS accredited but this is not a requirement of Bronze accreditation.</p> <p>Evidence had also not been sought that drivers satisfactorily completed the elearning 'Work Related Road Safety' module every 12 months.</p> <p>The Project Team held FORS Accreditation Certificates for all relevant contractors and monitors the FORS web database for continued accreditation. There were some discrepancies however, as the database is only updated 4 weekly.</p> <p>CoLoR has a system in place to receive certificates confirming that the Safe Urban Driving Driver Training has been completed and to monitor those drivers attending site. However the training attendance register on the FORS web site does not include dates of training and is only updated 4 weekly.</p>
13_838	Work Related Road Risk - Tottenham Court Road – Taylor Woodrow Bam Nuttall (TWBN)	05/11/2013	To assess contractor's implementation of TfL contractual requirements to minimise the risk to cyclists from vehicles contracted by them	<p>The audit found that the TWBN Logistics and Security Manager understood the majority of the TfL requirements and was undertaking some checks and monitoring to ensure contractors arriving on site met the Freight Operator Recognition Scheme (FORS) Bronze accreditation requirements.</p> <p>Evidence had not been sought that contractors checked drivers' licences with the DVLA at regular intervals. Reliance is placed on the contractor being FORS accredited but this is not a requirement of Bronze accreditation.</p> <p>Evidence had also not been sought that drivers satisfactorily completed the elearning 'Work Related Road Safety' module every 12 months.</p> <p>The Logistics and Security Manager held FORS Accreditation Certificates for all relevant contractors and</p>

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				<p>monitors the FORS web database for continued accreditation. There were some discrepancies however, as the database is only updated 4 weekly.</p> <p>TWBN has a system in place to review certificates confirming that the Safe Urban Driving Driver Training has been completed when drivers attend site. However, the training attendance register on the FORS web site does not include dates of training and is only updated 4 weekly.</p>
13_839	Work Related Road Risk - Victoria Station Upgrade - Taylor Woodrow Bam Nuttall (TWBN)	05/11/2013	To assess contractor's implementation of TfL contractual requirements to minimise the risk to cyclists from vehicles contracted by them	<p>The audit found that the TWBN project team understood the majority of the TfL requirements and were undertaking some checks and monitoring to ensure contractors arriving on site met the Freight Operator Recognition Scheme (FORS) Bronze accreditation requirements.</p> <p>TfL requires that a number of items of safety equipment must be present on a vehicle. The checklist used by TWBN at Victoria Station Upgrade Project did not cover all the requirements. There was also no reference to, or the facility to record that, where safety equipment was present on the vehicle it was also operational and fulfilled its intended function.</p> <p>Evidence had not been sought that contractors checked drivers' licences with the DVLA at regular intervals. Reliance is placed on the contractor being FORS accredited but this is not a requirement of Bronze accreditation.</p> <p>Evidence had also not been sought that drivers satisfactorily completed the elearning 'Work Related Road Safety' module every 12 months.</p> <p>The Transport Manager held FORS Accreditation Certificates for all relevant contractors and monitors the FORS web database for continued accreditation. There were some discrepancies, as the database is only updated 4 weekly</p> <p>TWBN has a system in place to receive certificates confirming that the Safe Urban Driving Driver Training has been completed and to monitor those drivers attending site. However, the training attendance register on the FORS web site does not include dates of training and is only updated 4 weekly</p>
13_734	Total Package Services (TPS) - Suppliers Assurance of Workmanship and Materials	29/10/2013	To provide evidence that companies responsible to deliver buildings and civils reactive maintenance and minor project works, under the LU Total Package Services (TPS) Lot 3A and Lot 3B contract, are self assuring.	<p>For each of the four contractors the audit found that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Procedures are embedded to identify and record materials specified by the client. This includes responsibility for materials procurement, management and use. • Process documentation is used to instruct site supervisory and operative staff of client requirements; the materials required and its use, installation or build method criteria. • Records are maintained of site employee competences including SPC licence. Materials procurement and stores management regimes were in place including procedures for materials issue to site prior to work commencing. <p>Each principal contractor was able to trace materials supplied to a site and job order. The management of evidence differs between contractors. The best involved comprehensive photo evidence and electronic records accessible to authorised LU representatives.</p> <p>Each principal contractor is using a formal process to record work completion and sign off agreement evidence acceptable to LU TPS 3A and 3B management. Not all TPS contractors had established robust processes to check and report progress of each shift or individual task.</p> <p>Audit at some active works sites has identified assurance weakness relating to material selection, its installation and the works completed management processes used by TPS Project and contractors.</p>

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13_836	Maintenance of Northern Line Electrical Track Equipment	08/11/2013	To assess the compliance and overall effectiveness of the processes for maintaining Electrical Track Equipment (ETE) assets, including depot shore supplies, on the Northern line.	<p>The scheduling and tracking of the Northern line ETE maintenance is being effectively managed. A Temporary Approved Non-Compliance process is not in place for ETE assets that do not meet the Minimum Acceptable Criteria when tested.</p> <p>ETE assets are being tested every three months. For most assets this exceeds the required test frequency. A process is in place for the risk assessment of non-compliant tests.</p> <p>The competency of maintenance staff is controlled and subcontractors carrying out the ETE maintenance are being managed.</p> <p>Compliance with the maintenance regime is being communicated via weekly e-mail updates and a monthly asset maintenance tracker.</p> <p>Trend analysis of the test reports and remedial maintenance reports is not being carried out to identify potential issues and eliminate recurring test failures.</p>
13_823	Supplier Assurance Review - Sarginsons Industries Limited (SIL)	31/10/2013	Supplier Assurance Assessment on SIL who supply LU with rail vehicle gear pan assemblies.	<p>SIL are working in compliance with a Management System that is registered with Lloyd's and assessed by a UKAS accredited assessor. The company:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Has embedded satisfactory procedures and processes to managed client order, specification requirements and management of sub-contract services. • Has satisfactory procedures for specification change management. • Has a satisfactory product inspection and test capability, supported by adequate quality records that include product and materials traceability. • Is based in adequate foundry and office buildings and site that provides secure storage for pattern equipment and cast product.
13_723	Powerlink Management of Contractors	17/10/2013	To assess Powerlink processes to ensure the selection of competent contractors, effective monitoring of the delivery of contracted services, and adequate site supervision/management.	<p>The audit found that control and management of contractors by the O&M Support Manager was adequate. As part of the audit, it was confirmed that a key supplier is accredited with ISO 9001: 2008 Quality Management Systems Certificate providing assurance of adherence to Quality Standards.</p>
13_739	Communications and Electrical Safety Management	25/11/2013	Assess whether the Safety risks in Communications and Electrical are being systematically managed.	<p>The audit, which used elements of the ORR's Railway Safety Maturity Model as a benchmark, identified four non conformances, three business improvement actions, five observations and one good practice. Key points included the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Management and operatives recognise and understand the requirement for risk assessments and safe systems of work. Suitable Working Instructions and method statements are used to manage the risks. 50% of work activities have not been risk assessed, partly due to insufficient numbers of trained risk assessors. Progress is being made to risk assess all outstanding activity tasks. • Most significant risks and their controls arising from workplace risk assessments were not on notice boards or included in local inductions as required by the Management Handbooks. • There was no evidence that the legislative requirement to produce scaffold/tower inspection reports prior to use is being met. • Actions from various sources are not tracked in a coordinated and systematic way.

Reference	Report Title	Final Report Issued	Original Objective	Summary of Findings
Surface Transport				
Major Incident - External				
13_738	Incident Reporting and Investigation	15/10/2013	To assess the arrangements for reporting and investigating incidents across Surface Transport so that recurrence is prevented and to support a culture of continual improvement	<p>The key findings from the audit were:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Surface Transport is assessed as being at RM3 Level 2 (Managed) with an aspect of Level 3 (Standardised). To advance to Level 3 (Standardised) would require root cause analysis of incidents and near misses to be reported. • Very few near misses are reported and not being investigated where required by the standards. All accidents are investigated. • There was a lack of awareness of the requirement to securely store information and evidence from an incident that has the potential to lead to a civil or legal claim. • Root cause analysis was not widely used across the modes. The root cause analysis needs to be completed for all levels of incidents, including minor incidents, to help prevent recurrence. • The Incident Reporting Information System (IRIS) is not accessible for all five of the audited transport modes within Surface Transport. This leads to a lack of efficiency with modes using local databases. • The incident forms that are used are not consistent. The information required by IRIS is not covered in all areas and not mode specific. • The standards do not reflect the current organisation. • A project is underway to compile a TfL Management System which will include Incident Reporting and Investigation for Surface Transport. This is to be completed in phase three of the project. • Local processes have been produced and are followed for the escalation of investigations. • Immediate findings are addressed as soon as reasonably practicable for all incidents and these issues are solved.