

Agenda

Meeting: Safety and Security Panel

Date: Monday 2 December 2024

Time: 13:30

**Place: Conference Rooms 1 & 2,
Palestra, 197 Blackfriars Road,
London, SE1 8NJ**

Members

Zoë Billingham CBE (Chair)
Omid Shiraji (Vice-Chair)
Seb Dance

Mark Phillips
Peter Strachan

Copies of the papers and any attachments are available on [tfl.gov.uk How We Are Governed](https://tfl.gov.uk/How-We-Are-Governed).

This meeting will be open to the public, except for where exempt information is being discussed as noted on the agenda. There is access for disabled people and induction loops are available. A guide for the press and public on attending and reporting meetings of local government bodies, including the use of film, photography, social media and other means is available on www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/Openness-in-Meetings.pdf.

This meeting will be open to the public and webcast live on [TfL YouTube channel](https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCtfl), except for where exempt information is being discussed as noted on the agenda.

Further Information

If you have questions, would like further information about the meeting or require special facilities please contact: James Varley, Secretariat Officer jamesvarley@tfl.gov.uk

For media enquiries please contact the TfL Press Office; telephone: 0343 222 4141; email: PressOffice@tfl.gov.uk

Andrea Clarke, General Counsel
Friday 22 November 2024

**Agenda
Safety and Security Panel
Monday 2 December 2024**

1 Apologies for Absence and Chair's Announcements

2 Declarations of Interests

General Counsel

Members are reminded that any interests in a matter under discussion must be declared at the start of the meeting, or at the commencement of the item of business.

Members must not take part in any discussion or decision on such a matter and, depending on the nature of the interest, may be asked to leave the room during the discussion.

3 Minutes of the Final Meeting of the Safety, Sustainability and Human Resources Panel held on 4 September 2024 (Pages 1 - 8)

General Counsel

The Panel is asked to approve the minutes of the final meeting of the Safety, Sustainability and Human Resources Panel held on 4 September 2024 and authorise the Chair to sign them.

4 Matters Arising and Actions List (Pages 9 - 12)

General Counsel

The Panel is asked to note the updated actions list.

5 Safety, Health and Security Report - Quarter 2 2024/25 (Pages 13 - 38)

Chief Safety, Health and Environment Officer and Chief Operating Officer

The Panel is asked to note the report.

6 Trends in Safety and Key Improvement Activity (Pages 39 - 54)

Chief Safety, Health and Environment Officer

The Panel is asked to note the paper.

7 Update on the TfL Cyber Security Incident (Pages 55 - 60)

Commissioner

The Panel is asked to note the paper.

8 Trends in Security and Key Improvement Activity (Pages 61 - 76)

Chief Operating Officer

The Panel is asked to note the paper.

9 Risk and Assurance Report Quarter 2 2024/25 (Pages 77 - 88)

Director of Risk and Assurance

The Panel is asked to note the report and the exempt supplementary information on Part 2 of the agenda.

10 Members' Suggestions for Future Discussion Items (Pages 89 - 92)

General Counsel

The Panel is asked to note the forward plan and is invited to raise any suggestions for future discussion items.

11 Any Other business the Chair Considers Urgent

The Chair will state the reason for urgency of any item taken.

12 Date of Next Meeting

Wednesday 12 February at 10.00am.

13 Exclusion of Press and Public

The Panel is recommended to agree to exclude the press and public from the meeting, in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 7 of Schedule 12A to the Local Government Act 1972 (as amended), in order to consider the following items of business.

14 Update on the TfL Cyber Security Incident (Pages 93 - 98)

Exempt supplementary information relating to the item on Part 1 of the agenda.

15 Risk and Assurance Report Quarter 2 2024/25 (Pages 99 - 102)

Exempt supplementary information relating to the item on Part 1 of the agenda.

Transport for London

Minutes of the Safety, Sustainability and Human Resources Panel

**Conference Rooms 1 and 2, Ground Floor, Palestra
197 Blackfriars Road, London, SE1 8NJ
10.30am, Wednesday 4 September 2024**

Members

Dr Lynn Sloman MBE (Chair)
Dr Nina Skorupska CBE (Vice Chair)
Dr Mee Ling Ng OBE
Mark Phillips
Marie Pye

Executive Committee

Andrea Clarke	General Counsel
Claire Mann	Chief Operating Officer
Lilli Matson	Chief Safety, Health and Environment Officer

Staff

Christina Calderato	Director of Strategy
Claire Lefort	Legal Manager
Patricia Obinna	Director of Diversity and Inclusion
Lisa Jane Risk	Head of Operations, Places for London
Mike Shirbon	Head of Quality, Safety and Security Assurance
Kate Whitehouse	Chief of Staff, Chief People Office
James Varley	Secretariat Officer

Also in attendance

Zoë Billingham CBE	Board Member from 9 September 2024
Ho-Kit Lam	TfL Youth Panel Main Representative

34/09/24 Apologies for Absence and Chair's Announcements

Apologies for absence had been received from Kay Carberry CBE and Bronwen Handyside. The meeting was quorate. Fiona Brunskill and Lorraine Humphrey were unable to attend and were represented by Kate Whitehouse and Mike Shirbon respectively.

The Chair welcomed those present to the meeting and introduced Zoë Billingham CBE who would be joining the Board on 9 September 2024 and had been appointed as the Chair of the Safety and Security Panel.

This was the final meeting of the Safety, Sustainability and Human Resources Panel, following the Board approval of a revised decision-making structure at its meeting on 24 July 2024. The work within the remit of the Panel would be split among the new Safety and Security Panel, the Customer, Sustainability and Operations Panel, and the People and Remuneration Committee. Sustainability issues would also be further mainstreamed in the work of the Audit and Assurance Committee, the Finance Committee, the Land

and Property Committee and the Programmes and Investment Committee. These changes would take effect from 9 September 2024.

In addition to this being the last meeting of the Panel, this was also the last meeting for Dr Lynn Sloman MBE, Dr Nina Skorupska CBE, Kay Carberry CBE, Bronwen Handyside and Dr Mee Ling Ng OBE, as they would be standing down from the Board on 8 September at the end of their terms of office.

The Chair and Panel Members expressed their thanks to the officers present for their contribution to the work of the Panel and requested that their thanks also be passed onto their staff who had supported and contributed to the Panel.

Lilli Matson and Andrea Clarke, on behalf of TfL colleagues, thanked the Panel Members for their work on the Panel and the support and challenge that formed the constructive relationship that had allowed the Panel to work so effectively.

The Chair reminded the Panel that the order of the agenda was being rotated across the three main themes of the Panel's work, with the strategic items taken first. The order of the agenda for this meeting was sustainability, people and then safety items.

The Chair reminded those present that safety was paramount at TfL and encouraged Members to raise any safety issues during discussions on a relevant item or with the appropriate member of the Executive Committee after the meeting.

35/09/24 Declarations of Interests

Members confirmed that their declarations of interests, as published on [tfl.gov.uk](https://www.tfl.gov.uk), were up to date and there were no interests to declare that related specifically to items on the agenda.

36/09/24 Minutes of the Meeting of the Panel held on 16 May 2024

The minutes of the meeting of the Panel held on 16 May 2024 were approved as a correct record, and the Chair was authorised to sign them.

37/09/24 Matters Arising and Actions List

Andrea Clarke introduced the item, which set out progress against actions agreed at previous meetings of the Panel.

The Panel noted the updated Actions List.

38/09/24 London-wide Ultra Low Emission Zone - Six Months Report

Christina Calderato introduced the item, which provided a summary of the key findings from the recently published London-wide Ultra Low Emission Zone (ULEZ) six months monitoring report.

The ULEZ was introduced in response to the health impacts of poor air quality, which had contributed towards 4,000 premature deaths in London in 2019, with outer London and older people being significantly affected.

The Six Months Report was published on 25 July 2024 and included data up to the end of February 2024. Reporting on the vehicle scrappage scheme took place separately. The scheme was due to close shortly and so far, £186m had been committed and 54,000 applications received.

Compliance levels of cars and vans had increased since the introduction of the London-wide ULEZ to 97.1 per cent and 88.9 per cent respectively. The gap between compliance levels in inner and outer London had effectively been closed, meaning the benefits of high levels of compliance benefitted the whole city.

NOx and PM2.5 emissions has also seen reductions against what would have been expected without the ULEZ expansion.

The impact of the expansion and scrappage schemes on modal shift and the types of vehicles now being purchased was yet to be fully understood, as it would take time for the data to be available and analysed. This could also be used to inform future activities to maintain a trajectory of improvement.

The health benefits of the ULEZ expansion were the main driver of the scheme. The Panel suggested tracking health data, looking at how the scheme contributed to compliance with World Health Organisation targets and providing comparisons with other world cities. **[Action: Christina Calderato]**

The Panel noted the paper.

39/09/24 Action on Inclusion – 12 Months On

Patricia Obinna introduced the item, which provided an update on the delivery of the priorities identified for the first year of implementation in the Action on Inclusion Strategy and next steps.

The strategy had been launched on 28 June 2023, with the first year being the time to build foundations, and to launch products tools and resources for colleagues. The opportunity was also taken to reflect on implementation as there was feedback from colleagues in Operations to show that the message had not landed consistently across TfL. This was thought to be driven by factors such as not all colleagues in Operations having similar levels of access to email communication and rostering opportunities to release people for class-based work. The format of the approach would be reviewed and amended if appropriate and tested to measure effectiveness.

Work was taking place to develop effective channels of communication for Operational colleagues that would complement the cascade process used by Area Managers and Centurion Managers (line managers with 100 or more staff). Discussions were also taking place to consider other interventions. Highlighting success in improvements in inclusion would assist with driving the message across the organisation.

Leadership was a key part of success of the strategy, with leaders demonstrating clear decision-making and acting on information and issues raised.

The Chair suggested that annual updates to the People and Remuneration Committee should be provided by the Chief Operating Officer and Chief Capital Officer to highlight progress within their directorates. **[Action: Patricia Obinna/Fiona Brunskill]**

The Panel was given assurances that the strategy was being embedded effectively in Places for London, which was also looking at how the strategy applied to its tenants and customers.

Consideration was also being given to how TfL could influence its suppliers and contractors. It was acknowledged that the desire to increase inclusiveness existed in these organisations.

The Panel suggested the introduction of exit interviews for leavers from under-represented groups with protected characteristics to understand if there were any underlying factors influencing their decision to leave.

Activities were taking place within the graduate and apprenticeship programmes to target recruitment to encourage applications from underrepresented groups.

The Panel noted the paper.

40/09/24 Enterprise Risk Update - Attraction, Retention, Wellbeing and Health of our Employees (ER02)

Kate Whitehouse introduced the item, which set out activities to manage risk in relation to TfL being unable to continue to attract and retain colleagues with the skills and expertise required or to prioritise wellbeing, that could result in TfL being unable to deliver effectively for London in the future.

Higher levels of staff turnover had been seen in areas that contained critical or scarce skillsets. Mitigations were being developed and implemented to address the risk and the overall risk rating had moved from Requires Improvement to Adequately Controlled.

A recent meeting of the Programmes and Investment Committee had been informed of the impact on programmes from shortages of skilled staff. The Strategic Workforce Plan would look at such roles and future needs. A scientific approach to understanding what roles were genuinely critical and hard to fill was being used to refine and understand the magnitude of the issue. The People and Remuneration Committee would receive an update on the progress of the Plan at a future meeting. **[Action: Fiona Brunskill]**

Retaining key skills was acknowledged to be a challenge and the Panel sought assurances that officers would engage at Government level to give the matter a sufficiently high profile.

The Panel asked if elements of the employee value proposition still held value, such as travel concessions which were of lower importance and perceived value with the widespread use of hybrid working. The flexible working offer had been further refined and a quicker decision-making process had been introduced for temporary changes to help address the needs of colleagues.

Outreach activities to young people included the Innovate TfL competition, STEM learning volunteer, and Enjoyment to Employment delivered by the London Transport Museum, all of which put sustainability at the forefront of the offer to young people.

The Panel noted the paper and the exempt supplementary information on Part 2 of the agenda.

41/09/24 Safety, Health and Environment Report - Quarter 1 2024/25

Lilli Matson read the following statement at the meeting:

On behalf of TfL, I would like to issue a point of clarification and a make a sincere apology to the family of Melissa Burr. Melissa was tragically killed at Victoria bus station on 10 August 2021. In the Quarterly Safety, Health and Environment report which was reported to the Safety, Sustainability and Human Resources Panel on 24 May 2023, we made an error in describing the circumstances in which Melissa died. The error was that it stated that Melissa walked between two buses, but this was incorrect. This wording was erroneously based on preliminary information that had been obtained at the time the incident initially occurred, and prior to any investigation having been carried out. It did not fully reflect the circumstances and should not have been used. Following the outcome of the investigation, it is clear that Melissa had not been walking between two buses and was using the crossing. None of the tragic events that took place on that day were in any part due to the fault or actions of Melissa.

We know that the inaccurate reporting of what happened to Melissa has caused deep distress to Melissa's mother and family, and on behalf of myself and TfL, we are truly sorry. We have contacted Melissa's mother and apologised to her for the error in reporting and we have corrected the inaccurate description in the original report. We will be updating the Quarterly Safety report with revised wording which we have shared with Melissa's mother.

We have also taken steps to ensure that this doesn't happen again going forward. Once again, we are truly sorry for the error and the subsequent distress and pain that this has caused to Melissa's family. I will be sharing this apology with all Board Members, including the Mayor of London as Chair of TfL.

Dr Lynn Sloman MBE, as Chair and on behalf of the Panel, also expressed regret that incorrect information on the incident had been published and recognised that the consequences for the family of anyone who was killed or seriously injured on the transport network were far reaching. The Panel thanked the family of Melissa Burr for drawing this matter to its attention. This would help TfL in the way it dealt with such matters in the future.

Lilli Matson then introduced the item, which provided key information and trends Reported in Quarter 1 of 2024/25 (1 April to 22 June 2024), including performance against Scorecard targets.

TfL was on track for reducing the number of people killed or seriously injured in road traffic collisions and customers killed or seriously injured. The number of people killed or seriously injured in road traffic collisions in or by a London Bus was reducing although not at its target level. The number of colleagues killed or seriously injured was above target.

Minutes of the meeting of the Safety, Sustainability and Human Resources Panel, 4 September 2024 5

On road safety, a reduction in the number of people killed or seriously injured on London's roads had been seen compared to Quarter 1 of 2023/24 and work was continuing to reduce this further.

The quarter had also seen a reduction in the rate of customer injuries, with figures being six per cent lower than the same quarter on 2023/24.

Performance in the Capital directorate remained consistent with previous quarters, with six injuries, none of which were serious.

On workplace violence and aggression, 2,363 incidents were reported across all modes, which was 139 lower compared to Quarter 1 of 2023/24. The Work-related Violence and Aggression Strategy and introduction of body worn cameras was having an impact.

Musculoskeletal conditions and mental health remained the two main causes of long-term absence. The Wellbeing Plan would contain benchmarking data on staff sickness as well as mitigations and activities to reduce rates.

The Ultra Low Emission Zone had expanded in August 2023 and benefits were being seen. The target for the introduction of zero-emission buses of 1,400 by March 2024 had been exceeded and there were now in excess of 1,600 vehicles on London' roads.

A report on Inequalities on Road Danger was published in June 2023. The report was used to inform road safety programmes and monitor their impacts. An annual overview of collisions also took place to understand the geography and communities affected.

There was a pattern of significant growth in cycling. While this had seen an increase in absolute numbers of serious injuries, the risk per journey had come down year-on-year and there had also been a fall in fatal injuries. There was a link between these reductions and the introduction of safer cycling infrastructure. TfL had a view of where there was potential for growth in cycling and used this to plan investment. The Safety and Security Panel would be kept up to date on safety performance and the active travel agenda.

The Panel noted the work on the Safety, Health and Environment Cultural Assessments and suggested that consideration would be given to how they would be reported in the new meeting structure.

Progress was being made with the Power Purchase Agreement tender and TfL had recently reaffirmed its commitment to zero emissions.

The Vision Zero Action Plan set out the activities on speed reduction on the TfL Road Network. This involved introduction of 20mph speed limits and a review of other parts of the network that would benefit for a speed limit reduction. The programme was complete in terms of funding and a case was being developed for further reductions and this would be fed into the business planning process. When robust data was available to demonstrate the effectiveness of the speed limits, this would be made available.

The Panel noted the paper.

42/09/24 Our Colleague Quarterly Report

Kate Whitehouse introduced the item, which provided an update on key activities across the Chief People Office for the period June to September 2024, including performance against Scorecard targets.

TfL was slightly ahead of its target for colleague attendance and also in four of the five senior management representativeness measures, with the fifth measure, minority faith, being slightly below target.

A new centralised workplace adjustments process was introduced in April 2024 and it was confirmed that TfL was committed to go beyond its legal responsibilities in terms of its application to colleagues.

The Equalities Impact Assessment tool was launched in July 2024 and had the functionality to allow updates and changes in response to future changes in legislation.

The questions for the annual Viewpoint colleague survey had been prepared and the Board would be given an update on engagement after the survey had closed. Consideration was being given to introducing pulse surveys if necessary.

Work was taking place with the Greater London Authority on the Group Mentoring Programme and, in response to a suggestion from the Panel, Board Members would be invited to participate as mentors. **[Action: Fiona Brunskill]**

The latest cohort of graduates, apprentices and interns would join TfL in the week commencing 9 September 2024. With 326 people, this would be the largest intake to date.

Consultation on the Job Families approach for non-operational areas was commencing with the trade unions. The outcomes of the consultation would be used to inform the consultation approach for operational areas.

The Panel noted the report.

43/09/24 Risk and Assurance Report Quarter 1 2024/25

Mike Shirbon introduced the item, which provided an overview of the status of and changes to Enterprise Risk 1 (ER01) – Inability to deliver safety objectives and obligations, Enterprise Risk 2 (ER02) – Attraction, retention, wellbeing and health of our employees and Enterprise Risk 3 (ER03) – Environment including climate adaptation.

The reporting of these Enterprise Risks would be mapped to the new meeting structure.

The audit report on Impact of extreme weather – Elizabeth line had a conclusion of Requires Improvement, and this had an impact on the overall trend of ER03 audits.

It was noted that the number of overdue actions had halved in the quarter.

All actions relating to the audit of DLR Fire Asset Management had been completed. Members noted that an audit of DLR Risk Management and Project Competencies had a

Requires Improvement conclusion. Claire Mann would review the recent audits to understand if there were any particular issues within KeolisAmey that required action.

[Action: Claire Mann]

The Panel noted the report and the exempt supplementary information on Part 2 of the agenda.

44/09/24 Members' Suggestions for Future Discussion Items

Andrea Clarke introduced the item, which set out the reports and papers from the current Safety, Sustainability and Human Resources Panel forward programme and the relevant Panel or Committee that would consider the items going forward.

The Panel noted the paper.

45/09/24 Any Other Business the Chair Considers Urgent

There was no other urgent business to discuss.

46/09/24 Date of Next Meeting

This was the last meeting of the Safety, Sustainability and Human Resources Panel.

47/09/24 Exclusion of the Press and Public

The Panel agreed to exclude the press and public from the meeting, in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 7 of Schedule 12A to the Local Government Act 1972 (as amended), when it considered the exempt information in relation to the items on: Enterprise Risk Update - Attraction, Retention, Wellbeing and Health of our Employees (ER02); and Risk and Assurance Report Quarter 1 2024/25.

The meeting closed at 12.35pm.

Chair: _____

Date: _____



Safety and Security Panel

Date: 2 December 2024

Item: Matters Arising and Actions List

1 Summary

1.1 This paper informs the Panel of progress against actions agreed at previous meetings.

2 Recommendation

2.1 The Panel is asked to note the report.

List of appendices to this report:

Appendix 1: Actions List

List of Background Papers:

Minutes of previous meetings of the Panel

Contact Officer: Andrea Clarke, General Counsel
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Safety and Security Panel Actions List (to be reported to the meeting on 2 December 2024)

Actions from the final meeting of the Safety, Sustainability and Human Resources Panel held on 4 September 2024 that relate to the remit of the Safety and Security Panel

Minute No.	Description	Action By	Target Date	Status/note
43/09/24	<p>Risk and Assurance Report Quarter 1 2024/25: DLR Audits Claire Mann would review the recent DLR audits to understand if there were any particular issues within KeolisAmey that required action.</p>	Claire Mann	-	<p>Completed. A review has taken place and we did not find any thematic issues or trends that required action. The causes highlighted in the fire audit related to an ineffective procedure which has been addressed. The risk management audit highlighted examples of documents being incomplete.</p>

There are no outstanding actions from previous meetings.

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Safety and Security Panel



Date: 2 December 2024

Item: Safety, Health and Security Report – Quarter 2 2024/25

This paper will be considered in public

1 Summary

1.1 This paper sets out the Safety, Health and Security Report for Quarter 2 of 2024/25 (23 June to 14 September 2024), attached as Appendix 1.

2 Recommendation

2.1 The Panel is asked to note the report.

List of appendices to this report:

Appendix 1: Safety, Health and Security Report Quarter 2 2024/25

List of Background Papers:

None

Contact Officer: Claire Mann, Chief Operating Officer
Email: ClaireMann@tfl.gov.uk

Contact Officer: Lilli Matson, Chief Safety, Health and Environment Officer
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Safety, Health and Security Quarterly report

Quarter 2 2024/25

(23 June 2024 – 14 September 2024)

Safety and Security Panel:
2 December 2024



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Interpreting Our Data

Cyber security incident

Due to the impact of the [cyber security incident](#) at TfL, we are unable to access some of our reporting systems. This means we are currently unable to provide full data for Quarter 2. The data that is available has been provided.

About our data

TfL publishes quarterly safety, health and security data to ensure the most up-to-date understanding of data and performance is available. Please be aware, however, that all data presented in the quarterly reports is provisional and is subject to change due to ongoing data validation, late reporting, and changes to incident information following investigation. Figures reported are correct at the time of reporting, and the date of data extraction is provided.

Safety and Security data notes and caveats

All safety figures presented consist of the number of injured persons. Where an individual has sustained more than one injury in a safety incident or collision this is counted as one injured person, with the most severe injury counted.

Road safety data for the most recent financial year applies factoring to the raw numbers to produce an in-year estimate. The estimates use a factor to account for late reporting (based on historic trends) as well as a factor to account for the expected changes that occur when the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) conduct their severity review quality checks (also based on historical trends), normally four to six months after the collisions occurred. Finalised road safety data for the previous calendar year is published each September after all checks with the police and the Department for Transport have been made. Due to these factors being applied, these provisional estimates may differ slightly from the provisional numbers available on our road safety reduction dashboard.

The safety figures in this report consist of injuries that meet our injury definition and are therefore counted against TfL's scorecard. This means that customer safety data excludes injuries related to pre-existing medical conditions and intentional self-harm. Colleague safety data includes injuries to both permanent employees and contractors/sub-contractors. Road safety data is processed according to the Department for Transport's Stats19 requirements, and therefore excludes certain incidents, for example injuries that occur on private land.

Data on the security of our customers, colleagues and our organisation are derived from a range of sources. Transport crime statistics have been compiled and published by TfL for the last 18 years and provides a longitudinal view of the changing patterns of crime and anti-social behaviour. Crimes and incidents reported to the MPS for London's bus network and to the British Transport Police (BTP) for TfL rail stations and rail modes (London Underground, Elizabeth Line, London Overground, Tram network and the DLR) is brought together by TfL for monitoring our security performance and for decision-support in the tasking and deployment of operational officers, police and other resources.

All crime and antisocial behaviour incident data and offences are recorded and published in line with Home Office counting rules and published in line with the Code of Practice for Statistics set by the Office for National Statistics. We rely on data from the MPS and BTP as our primary source of insight in to transport security.

Bus-related crime data is extracted from the MPS crime reporting system, using a query that extracts bus-related incidents (on a bus, at a bus station or bus stop). As part of the query, it searches on words such as bus, bus stop etc. For this reason, it may include some crimes that did not occur on the network. Checks of the data have showed it to be over 90 per cent accurate. TfL's definition of bus-related crime is any incident reported at a bus stop, bus station, on a bus or an incident that was initiated on a bus-journey. Bus-related crime data is a sub-set of overall crime in London and is included in the crime statistics published by the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime and the Home Office for London.

Since the beginning of this financial year, TfL has not been in receipt of reliable and verified crime data from the MPS because of problems arising from the transfer of data to the CONNECT system and the feeds of data between MPS and TfL. Therefore, this report does not contain any data on customer security and only a limited snapshot of data on colleague security derived from TfL's own incident report system. This will be rectified in future reports.

Other published data

Road safety data is published on TfL's road safety data [webpage](#). This includes: finalised annual data, a road safety data dashboard updated monthly with provisional data, record-level collision extracts, and FAQs and guidance to our data.

Bus safety [data](#) reported by bus operators is published quarterly on TfL's bus safety data webpage. This includes: a bus safety dashboard, a CSV file with details of all bus injuries and a list of all bus fatalities.

London Underground safety data is provided to the Office of Rail and Road and published in their annual rail safety [national statistics report](#).

Safety, Health and Security Quarterly Report

Introduction

This Safety, Health and Security Quarterly Report summarises our performance in Quarter 2 of 2024/25, identifies strategic trends, and describes progress in delivering our strategic Safety, Health and Security (SHE) programmes. The data referenced covers the period from 23 June to 14 September 2024, unless otherwise specified.

We continue to focus on strengthening risk management, tackling areas of highest risk in relation to actual or potential injury and our customers' and colleagues' health and security.

Customer safety

Up to the end of Period 5 (ending 17 August 2024), which is the latest available data, there has been a seven per cent decrease in customer fatalities and serious injuries compared to financial year 2023/24. We are not able to extract data after Period 5 however there were two customer fatalities in the latter part of Quarter 2, both on the London Underground. The majority of customer fatalities and serious injuries are slip, trip and fall incidents. As in previous years, the majority of customer fatalities and serious injuries up to Period 5 occurred on London Underground and Buses. However, in the latest financial year, up to the end of Period 5, 11 per cent of customer fatalities and serious injuries are on London Overground (eight customers), compared to three per cent up to the same point last financial year (two customers).

Colleague safety

Up to the end of Period 5, the number of colleague fatalities and serious injuries was similar to the previous financial year (eight this year compared to seven last year). Although not yet in our data systems, we are aware of three additional colleague serious injuries that have occurred since, two resulting from slips, trips or falls and one from a bus collision. There have been no colleague fatalities in financial year 2024/25. Sixty-five per cent of colleague serious injuries in 2024/25 have been due to slip, trip and fall incidents. This is an increased proportion compared to the 56 per cent of serious injuries in financial year 2023/24 as a whole.

Road safety

There were 942 deaths and serious injuries recorded in Quarter 2, slightly above our target, however, the number of people killed is lower in Quarter 2 this year (22) than last year (25) and lower for the year so far (35) than at this point last year (48). Pedal cyclist and motorcyclist deaths and serious injuries have increased in the year to date, however, there has been a reduction in pedestrian and private hire vehicle occupant deaths and serious injuries compared to last year.

Bus Safety

Quarter 2 has seen more people killed or seriously injured on a bus or in a collision involving a bus (60) than in the same quarter of the previous year (58) but is below the target that was set for this financial year. Quarter 1 this year (1 April to 22 June 2024) was lower than the same quarter last year and therefore for the year to date the number of people killed or seriously injured on a bus or in a collision involving a bus is lower than last year (125 vs 129).

There are now more than 1,700 buses that meet the Bus Safety Standard (the standard depends on the year that they entered service). Further information on the fleet and breakdown of numbers is provided in this report.

Colleague Health

Sickness absence is a TfL scorecard measure and this year we have an attendance target of 94.25 per cent. At the end of Period 5 the actual level stood at 93.96 per cent. Our reporting into the Rail Safety and Standards Board Health and Wellbeing dashboard indicates that, compared to train operating companies, TfL tends to have higher levels of absence. In common with organisations across the UK most of our absence is as a result of mental health and musculoskeletal (MSK) conditions.

Security

In addition to the absence of verified crime statistics for security, during Quarter 2 we experienced a significant cyber security incident, which continues to limit access to some of our internal data systems.

Work-Related Violence and Aggression (WVA)

In 2023/24 we saw a five per cent increase in the total number of reported WVA incidents (including physical/threat/verbal and gesture abuse) compared with 2022/23, an additional 489 incidents, from 10,004 incidents in 2022/23 to 10,613 incidents in 2023/24. While the increase in part reflects efforts to increase reporting, it also reflects national and London-wide trends for violence, as well as trends in violence against frontline workers. Physical incidents (reported by all frontline colleagues working under the roundel) increased by twenty-one per cent compared with 2022/23, an additional 271 reported incidents, from 1,419 incidents in 2022/23 to 1,690 incidents in 2023/24. Sixteen per cent of total WVA incidents were physical (with and without injury) compared with 14 per cent in 2022/23.

This financial year we are targeting a 10 per cent reduction in physical incidents against TfL directly employed staff in TfL Operations – reducing from 957 incidents reported in 2023/24 to a target of 861 incidents in 2024/25 (a reduction of 96 incidents). A number of measures we put in place last year and are continuing this year, including making body-worn cameras essential kit for all frontline customer facing teams will support positive progress towards this target. For Quarter 1 we were on track with a reduction in reported physical incidents compared to Quarter 1 2023/24.


Colleague Safety



Up to the end of Period 5, the latest available data, shows the number of colleague fatalities and serious injuries was similar to the previous financial year (eight colleague fatalities and serious injuries this year compared to seven last year).

Figure 1: Cumulative Colleague Deaths and Serious Injuries to the end of P5

Please note there is only one colleague fatality in the time period presented in the chart (in financial year 2023/24).



Although not yet in our data systems, we are aware of three additional colleague serious injuries that have occurred since Period 5, two resulting from slips, trips or falls and one from a bus collision. There have been no colleague fatalities in financial year 2024/25. Sixty-five per cent of colleague serious injuries in 2024/25 have been due to slip, trip and fall incidents. This is an increased proportion compared to the 56 per cent of serious injuries in financial year 2023/24 as a whole.

Improvement Activity

TfL Colleague Safety Plan launch

We have launched our new Colleague Safety Plan. This plan is for all colleagues and guides us towards our goal to get everyone home safe and healthy every day, and towards our 2030 safety and health ambition that no colleague is killed or seriously injured while at work. The document guides us towards our safety goals and ambitions by:

- making accountabilities for safety clear;
- signposting our colleagues to the right tools, such as our SHE Management System; and
- promoting a just and fair culture – where everybody feels able to speak up, share mistakes, and learn from them.

The plan outlines the role all staff play in making TfL a safe place to work. To help land the key messages, we have also produced a one-page summary to allow focus on the safety fundamentals and how everyone plays a role in putting safety at the heart of everything we do.

Effective Project Delivery

On the Piccadilly Line Upgrade Programme, a weekend blockade was completed between Arnos Grove and Cockfosters which included track replacement works as well as enabling activity for the future depot upgrade for the new fleet of Piccadilly trains, the first of which has now arrived in London. A significant amount of work was completed during the blockade, enabled by a comprehensive planning process, with no lost time injuries reported.

SHE Culture Programme

In Quarter 2, over 1,000 colleagues took part in the SHE Culture Assessment process across the Central line (Trains, Service Control and Customer Operations Leadership team), SHE directorate and the London Transport Museum.

As of Quarter 2, the assessment has been sent to 9,551 colleagues across the business and has a completion rate of 51 per cent. Nine improvement plans have been published, covering five business areas.

Safety Observations pilot

We are exploring ways to improve colleague opportunities to report safety concerns, and a project is underway to create a culture where all colleagues feel empowered to make SHE observations.

The Digital Assurance app SafetyCulture, which already has over 8,000 users across the organisation, has an 'Issues' feature allowing concerns to be raised. A pilot of this feature is currently taking place with the Compliance, Policing, Operations and Security (CPOS) directorate from September to November 2024. This will indicate whether the feature can be scaled to the rest of the organisation, with findings due to be shared with the Safety Executive Committee sub-group in early 2025.

SHE Leadership Engagement

There were 129 SHE Leadership Engagement Tours completed in Quarter 2 across TfL. The tours aim to increase leadership visibility and improve engagement on SHE.

CIRAS Reports Issued

CIRAS is the confidential safety hotline for transport. There have been four CIRAS reports raised in Quarter 2, all relating to colleague safety and welfare. Each of these reports have been directly responded to within the required deadline, with appropriate actions taken to rectify concerns.

Significant Incidents

At Ruislip Underground station, a cable was struck during One Person Operation CCTV works. The cable was towards the tail end of the platform and at a depth of approximately 100mm. It was initially thought to be a high voltage cable before it was identified as a feeder cable. Work

was immediately stopped and there were no injuries caused and no disruption to the service. Lessons learnt have been identified following investigation.

Incidents of violence, aggression and vandalism associated with the Ultra Low Emission Zone have continued in Quarter 2. This has included faeces, paint and food being thrown at operatives, verbal and physical abuse, attempts to block works and damage to cameras. We continue to work with our supply chain, the MPS and the wider Greater London Authority Group to identify ways of reducing these incidents.



Customer Safety

Customer Safety performance

Between 23 June and 17 August 2024, there were a total of 25 customer serious injuries. Although we do not have access to our data systems, via manual tracking of incidents we are aware of two customer fatalities that occurred in Q2, both on London Underground. The modes recording serious injuries were one on Santander Cycles, four each on the Elizabeth line and London Overground, five on Buses and 11 on London Underground.

Serious Injuries

The greatest contributors to customer serious injuries in Periods 4 and 5 were slips, trips and falls at 59 per cent and 63 per cent in the respective periods. This was followed by passenger train (in car) and struck by/against object.

Fatalities

There were no bus customer fatalities in Q2, however, sadly, in Quarter 2, there were two customer fatalities on the London Underground network:

On 10 September, a customer died after a fall on a staircase at Clapham Common station.

On 13 September, a customer was fatally injured after falling onto the track at Stratford Tube station.

Our thoughts remain with the families and friends of those who died.

Table 1: Customers killed or seriously injured (KSIs) per week in Quarter 2 by mode

Data sources: IE2 and IRIS, TfL's safety incident reporting systems – up to 17 August 2024.

Note: this table includes KSI numbers for customer injuries only. Instances where other road users have been fatally or seriously injured in a collision with a bus are included in the road user safety section.

Customer KSIs per week (Up to 17 August 2024, week 8 of Q2). Please note: full data for Q2 from our systems is not available													
Mode	Measure	Week Number											
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Buses	KSIs	3		2									
	of which fatalities												
Santander Cycles	KSIs			1									
	of which fatalities												
Elizabeth line	KSIs			1	1	1		1					
	of which fatalities												
London Overground	KSIs	2		1				1					
	of which fatalities												
London Underground	KSIs	3	1	2		1		2	2				
	of which fatalities												

Improvement Activity

Continuing to improve customer safety when boarding or alighting our trains

We want every journey taken by our customers to be a safe one. While we operate a safe railway today, we have ambitions to become even safer for our customers.

We know that the safety risk to our customers is higher when they are boarding or alighting our trains – which we refer to as the Platform Train Interface (PTI). This is why we have created a pan-TfL approach to PTI improvements. This brings together all existing relevant workstreams from across TfL and follows an evidence-based approach using Quantified Risk Assessments, Incident Data and recommendations from Formal Investigations. As a result, we know:

- the most high-risk incident types that happen;
- the most prevalent incident types that happen;
- the most important locations to target;
- the contributory factors that need to be addressed; and
- can create solutions to tackle these main factors.

This work brought together many areas of TfL, including TfL Rail (all modes), SHE directorate, Engineering, Customer Experience and TfL Innovation to formulate a number of different workstreams to reduce risk at the PTI. The workstreams that are being taken forward include:

- infrastructure changes at target locations, including reducing the size of the gap between the train and the platform to prevent incidents occurring in the first place;

- trials of new detection and alert technologies to ensure the appropriate action can be taken when an event occurs; and
- people-centric controls, including train operator awareness and vigilance and the impact of automatic trains on concentration, influencing customer behaviours that sometimes may contribute to incidents occurring, e.g. distraction and concentration, and ensuring that station colleagues and train operators are equipped to understand risk at the PTI, their role in managing this risk and are able to respond appropriately if incidents do occur.

This work will be overseen by a TfL PTI Steering Group, chaired by the Director of Rail and Sponsored Services, to ensure that we have the focus and direction needed to keep progressing with this and ensure we meet our 2030 and 2041 customer safety goals.



Road User Safety


Road safety performance

Measure	Q2 Target	Q2 Actual
People killed or seriously injured in road traffic collisions	911	942
People killed or seriously injured in road traffic collisions on or in a collision involving a London Bus	69	60

Data sources: police reported road traffic collisions resulting in personal injury (STATS19), early fatal notifications from the police.

Date of extraction: 09/10/2024

Figure 2: Scorecard measure: People killed or seriously Injured (KSIs) in road traffic collisions



Quarter 2 has seen more people killed or seriously injured on London’s roads than in the same quarter of the previous year and has exceeded the Quarter 2 target that was set for this financial year. Within that however, the number of people killed is lower in Quarter 2 this year (22) than last year (25) and lower for the year so far (35) than at this point last year (48). Pedal cyclist and motorcyclist deaths and serious injuries have increased year to date, however, there has been a reduction in pedestrian and private hire vehicle occupant deaths and serious injuries compared to this point last year.

Involvement in collisions that result in death or serious injury is in line with 2023/24, when 80 per cent of fatalities and serious injuries were sustained by people walking, cycling, or motorcycling and 60 per cent of fatal and serious injuries involved a collision with a car.

Improvement Activity

Safe Speeds

We continue to introduce lower speed limits on more of the TfL Road Network and now have 20mph limits on a total of 264km of our roads.

In July, August, and September 2024, we reinstalled banners mounted on lamp columns across corridors delivered in March 2024 to help maintain driver awareness of the new 20mph speed limit. The banners will remain in place for six to nine months, before being reinstalled on other 20mph corridors to enhance driver awareness of the speed limit.

Where we can provide a safety benefit, we are also making reductions in the speed limits on higher speed roads, for example we have lowered the speed limit on 3.8km of A406 North Circular Road in Enfield and Waltham Forest. The new 40mph speed limit came into operation in July 2024.

Safe Streets

Design and construction work is continuing on more than 40 schemes at various locations across London where we have identified road safety concerns.

A new pedestrian crossing was introduced on the A23 close to the junction with St Saviours Road in August 2024. Construction of schemes is scheduled at Redcliffe Gardens in Kensington and Chelsea from 8 November 2024 and construction at King's Cross Road junction with Pentonville Road in Camden and A20 Amersham Road junction with Parkfield Road in Lewisham from the end of January 2025.

Public consultation on the Safer Junctions scheme at Hogarth roundabout in Hounslow concluded on 12 September 2024. We will review the responses to the consultation and plan to release our report outlining next steps on the project by the end of Quarter 3 2024/25 (15 September to 7 December 2024).

Public consultation concluded on 14 August on walking and cycling improvements between Finsbury Park and Nag's Head and responses are being reviewed. This scheme was introduced on an experimental basis as part of the Cycleway 50 works. This included the Safer Junctions locations of Holloway Road/Tollington Road/Camden Road and Holloway Road/Parkhurst Road/Seven Sisters Road.

Safe Behaviours

Our Speed marketing campaign re-launched in Quarter 2 and will run through Quarter 3 on radio and digital audio and paid social media, including an upweight of activity during Road Safety Week (17 to 23 November). The campaign has already reached over seven million people on paid social, exceeding its target of six million.

Safe Vehicles

From 28 October, any heavy goods vehicle entering and operating in London rated below three stars on the Direct Vision Standard scale must have fitted the Progressive Safe System (PSS) or have been granted a grace period allowing operators until 4 May 2025 to become compliant.

Recognising that an estimated 216,000 vehicles will need to be made compliant by road hauliers, we have worked closely with the road freight sector since September 2023 to monitor and understand operator readiness for the new requirements. Together with the Walking and Cycling Commissioner, we have discussed how to best help industry to make their vehicles compliant ahead of the launch. Applications for safety permits that incorporate the new PSS have been open from 24 June 2024.

Additionally, before it came into force, the upcoming change in requirement had been regularly communicated through a variety of channels, including weekly calls with industry representative groups and a multichannel marketing campaign which included out-of-home advertising placements, trade press magazines, paid search and emails communications to existing permit holders.

Bus Safety

Quarter 2 has seen more people killed or seriously injured on a bus or in a collision involving a bus (60) than in the same quarter of the previous year (58) but is below the target that was set for this financial year. Quarter 1 this year was lower than the same quarter last year and therefore for the year to date the number of people killed or seriously injured on a bus or in a collision involving a bus is lower than last year (125 vs 129).

The number of people killed in a bus or in a collision involving a bus in Quarter 2 this year (one) is the same as last year (one) and the same for the year so far (two) than at this point last year (two). The fatal collision occurred on 3 August when a child was struck by a bus on London Road (A207), Bexleyheath and died later at hospital. Our thoughts remain with the families and friends of the child who died.

Figure 3: Scorecard measure: People killed or seriously injured in road traffic collisions on or in a collision involving a London Bus





Figure 4: Long term fatality trends: progress towards MTS 2030 target



The Mayor’s Transport Strategy target is for no-one to be killed in or in a collision involving a bus by 2030. In 2023 there were six people killed in collisions involving buses that met Government criteria for road safety reporting and no-one killed on a bus. This was a reduction from nine fatalities on or in a collision involving a bus in 2022.

So far this calendar year, 2024, there have been seven people killed in collisions involving London buses up to the 14 September 2024 (five pedestrians, one bus passenger and one cyclist). Note that these numbers are provisional and still subject to further validation.

Safe Vehicles

Bus Safety Strategy

More than 1,700 buses now meet the Bus Safety Standard (the standard depends on the year that they entered service). This includes the following safety features fitted to the London bus fleet: Intelligent Speed Assistance, which uses a digital speed limit map to help the driver comply with the speed limit by restricting the top speed of the vehicle 1,705 buses fitted from new and 2,975 older buses retro-fitted, which brings it to a total of 4,680 buses.

An Acoustic Vehicle Alerting System, which alerts vulnerable road users to quiet-running buses was fitted into 1,507 new buses. There are 164 older buses which are about to be retro-fitted (not required for hybrid or diesel buses).

Camera Monitoring Systems, which replace external wing mirrors to improve drivers' indirect vision and eradicate the risk of mirror strikes were fitted into 1,616 new buses, while 238 older buses were retro-fitted. This brings it to a total 1,854 buses.

These numbers will continue to increase as new buses enter the fleet and as the retrofit programme gathers pace to realise further safety benefits.

We are continuing our wide-ranging research and innovation programme across areas such as pedal application error, customer injuries and driver fatigue. On the latter, we have now installed fatigue detection technology on 350 vehicles as part of a project which will help TfL to understand fatigue risk in bus operations by route and vehicle type, location, day and time, roster and operator. As more vehicles are fitted with the technology, driver alerts will be activated and then management interventions applied. This will help us to understand the causes of fatigue, including rostering and the most effective management interventions.

You can find the Bus Safety Strategy on our website here: <https://content.tfl.gov.uk/bus-safety-strategy.pdf>.



Sickness absence

Mental health and MSK conditions continue to be the main causes of colleague absence. This is in line with the national picture.

In Quarter 2 the most common reasons for referral to Occupational Health (OH) were lower limb and back pain, with stress forming the third most common reason. However neurological and cardiovascular diseases also feature in the top 10 reasons for referral to OH and this highlights the importance of our employee health checks in reducing future risk of cardiovascular disease.

Improvement Activity

We have established a wellbeing pilot in some business areas where absence is higher than average to try to identify reasons for this and to look at what wellbeing and support interventions may be of benefit. OH and employee relations specialists are working closely with the local managers to understand reasons for absence and to support them.

On 11 September 2024 we launched the start of an initiative with the pilot track teams. Our MSK provider, Vita Health Group (VHG) and the OH and Wellbeing team met with track managers to get a better understanding of the MSK problems which colleagues experience and to start to identify interventions to benefit them. As a result of this workshop VHG and OH will be going on site on a night shift to meet track colleagues and to undertake a detailed analysis of their job roles.


For Customer Operations, absence as a result of exposure to traumatic events is a risk. In response to this we have enhanced training for our Trauma Support Group (TSG) colleagues – peer supporters who can be called on for support at times of trauma crises.

We have increased the network of available TSG colleagues from 130 to 200 and offered all of them both internal and external training; approximately 40 new TSGs completed both parts of the training over the last two months.

We are also starting to develop our Trauma Risk Management (TRiM) approach to managing those traumatic events which we are sadly unable to avoid. TRiM is a trauma-focused peer support system designed to help people who have experienced a traumatic, or potentially traumatic, event. TRiM Practitioners are non-medical personnel who have undergone specific training allowing them to understand the effects that traumatic events can have upon people. They are not counsellors or therapists but understand confidentiality and are able to listen and offer practical advice and assistance.

TRiM originated in the UK Armed Forces and the model is based on 'active monitoring'. This means keeping a watchful eye on individuals who have been exposed to a traumatic event. So far 10 TRiM managers have gone through training and just over the last month, two individual trauma risk assessments and one group trauma incident briefing took place, showing the need for the service. All interventions were well received, with one of the individuals affected returning to work following the assessment.

Figure 5: Top causes of long- and short-term absence in Quarter 2 2024/25





Work-related Violence and Aggression (WVA)

Please note that due to the cyber incident impacting TfL systems, our reported figures for Quarter 2 are currently incomplete.

Volume of WVA incidents in Quarter 2

During Quarter 2, there were 2,106 incidents of WVA reported across all modes.

In Quarter 1, 2,363 incidents were reported, 139 lower than Quarter 1 2023/24. In Quarter 2, from the data available, there were 953 incidents of WVA reported by staff working on the London Underground network (45 per cent of all reported incidents), 902 incidents of WVA reported by staff working on the bus network (43 per cent of all reported incidents) and 251 incidents were reported by staff from all other modes (CPOS, Streets, Elizabeth line, London Overground, DLR and London Trams and capital delivery).

Progress against the WVA Scorecard Target

During Quarter 2 there were 192 physical incidents reported by a TfL directly employed member of staff, a better performance than the 10 per cent reduction target for the year, (noting the risk of discrepancies in the data). During Quarter 1 there were 197 physical incidents reported by TfL directly employed staff, again lower than the 10 per cent reduction target compared to the same quarter last year.


Insight into WVA triggers

In Quarter 2, 348 of all reported WVA incidents were classified as physical assaults, with a similar figure reported for Q1. Revenue related matters continue to be the most prominent trigger for WVA, with 44 per cent of incidents resulting from some form of ticket dispute between staff and customers. In Quarter 2, 221 reported WVA incidents incorporated some element of hate, 10 per cent of total WVA reported. Ninety-two per cent of these incidents were race-related, with the remaining faith-related or homophobic. There was a small increase in hate-related reports following the rioting witnessed throughout the UK in early August.

Work-related Violence and Aggression (WVA) performance

Figure 6: Police recorded work-related violence with injury offence from April 2022 to July 2024

This table shows the overall trend in violence with injury offences recorded by the Police against TfL transport colleagues. Note data from MPS is missing since January 2024 for bus related WVA.




Solved rate for WVA offences investigated by the police

Between March 2023 and February 2024 (figures are reported six months in arrears from the latest data, to allow time for progression through the criminal justice process), the solved rate across rail modes for work-related violence, sexual and public order recorded offences was 17 per cent, comparable to the previous 12 months. The solved rate for violence, sexual and public order across all rail modes where the victim was not TfL transport staff was eight per cent across the same time-period.

Work-related crime solved rates were higher for violence offences (23 per cent), followed by sexual offences (17 per cent) and public order (10 per cent).

Figure 7: Solved rate for WVA offences investigated by the police from May 2020 to February 2024

(Please note: This is done six months in arrears to allow for criminal investigations to progress).




Staff willing to support police investigations

The percentage of staff willing to support a police investigation between March 2023 and February 2024 (on rail modes only) was 69 per cent for violence, sexual and public order recorded offences, three per cent lower compared to the previous 12-month period.

There are many reasons that victims choose not to support an investigation including their confidence in the judicial system and the likelihood of a successful outcome. We are working to better understand the reasons so we can address them and support our colleagues through the judicial process.

Figure 8: Percentage of Staff Willing to Support Police Investigations from May 2020 to February 2024 (all violence and public order offences)

(Please note: This is done six months in arrears to allow for criminal investigations to progress).



Improvement Activity

Communications

In July, as racist and Islamophobic hate and criminal activity spread across the UK and was expected to affect London, we worked closely with our policing partners to ensure our staff were, and felt, safe. We communicated our zero-tolerance approach to abuse, updated staff and trade unions on our work with the police and issued advice and guidance on what to do to stay safe and in the event of an incident.

On 19 August we launched an external marketing campaign to tackle WVA. The campaign, *Abuse Has Consequences*, adopts a firm, direct tone emphasising that anyone who abuses our staff will face consequences. The campaign aims to reassure staff that we will support them and push for the strongest penalties, and challenge perpetrators by focusing on the certainty of getting caught.

Training

Our new conflict management training course is providing essential knowledge and skills for 2,000 customer-facing operational colleagues working in high-risk locations for violence and aggression. It launched in March, and in July we reached a significant milestone, training our 1,000th colleague.

Safety and Security Panel



Date: 2 December 2024

Item: Trends in Safety and Key Improvement Activity

This paper will be considered in public

1 Summary

- 1.1 This paper provides the Panel with an overview of trends in safety performance and key activity to maintain and improve safety outcomes in London.
- 1.2 Its purpose is to provide a basis for future performance discussions and to invite comment on additional action that we can take to improve safety performance.
- 1.3 Our vision is for everyone to be able to travel in safety in London. We have set out significant, and extremely challenging, targets to improve safety for our colleagues, our customers and London's road users.
- 1.4 Our approach to achieving safety improvements combines strengthening and continuously improving our core safety systems and developing targeted interventions to address the most significant risks.
- 1.5 For London's road users we work in partnership with London's boroughs and other stakeholders to implement a programme of systemic improvements. This includes a specific focussed programme on bus safety, which covers both the operation of the bus service and improvements at bus stations.
- 1.6 Overall our approach is resulting in measurable safety improvements over time, however it is clear that we need to continue to make significant progress if we are to meet our targets. This will require continued focus, investment and, in some cases, innovation as we attempt to address issues that are known challenges to the wider transport industry.

2 Recommendation

- 2.1 **The Panel is asked to note the paper.**

3 Our Safety Strategy

- 3.1 Our safety and security priority is to get everyone home safe and healthy, every day, so that everyone is, and feels, safe and secure.
- 3.2 As the strategic transport authority for London, we are working to achieve the Vision Zero targets set out in the Mayor's Transport Strategy Policy 3 and Policy 11: eliminating deaths and serious injuries from London's transport system by 2041.

- 3.3 This is a highly ambitious objective which applies to road users across London, customers of our public transport services and our colleagues (including contractors delivering TfL services). The Vision Zero objective is an absolute numerical target that goes beyond our specific legal safety accountabilities as the highway authority for the TfL Road Network and as a transport operator and infrastructure maintainer, where our safety obligations are to manage risk to a level as low as reasonably practicable.
- 3.4 The Safety chapter of the TfL Strategy is focussed on three strategic priorities:
- (a) **Work together to be safe and secure** – enable our colleagues to do the right thing by ensuring we have the right tools, clear accountabilities and a culture that enables everyone to speak up, learn lessons and improve the way we manage safety and health;
 - (b) **Keep everyone safe when travelling** – progress towards Vision Zero by providing safe and healthy streets and public transport for all our customers; and
 - (c) **Protect our organisation** – effectively maintain our assets, provide healthy and safe workplaces and support our colleagues and our supply chain to manage our key safety and health risks.
- 3.5 The Vision Zero policy target is reflected in the targets in our TfL Strategy that by 2030:
- (a) no colleague (including contractors delivering TfL services) should be killed or seriously injured;
 - (b) the number of customers killed or seriously injured on our network be halved (2022/23 baseline);
 - (c) deaths and serious injuries on London’s roads should be reduced by 70 per cent (2010-14 baseline); and
 - (d) nobody should die on, or in collision with, a London bus.
- 3.6 Most of the networks we operate on both roads and public transport were built many years ago and pre-date design standards embodying a ‘Vision Zero mindset’. Many of the challenges we face are common to equivalent networks in the UK and globally. This means that our precise path to our 2030 and 2041 goals must remain flexible as we continue to innovate and develop new approaches.
- 3.7 We have a range of ways of delivering services, which confer different safety accountabilities on us. For example, for London Underground, we operate the services directly, whereas for London Trams we maintain the track and vehicles, but do not employ the drivers or operate the services. Our bus services are fully contracted to operators who provide the vehicles and drivers to meet our service specification.
- 3.8 These different delivery models result in different ways of delivering safety outcomes, depending on whether we are directly accountable or are driving

improved performance through the way we contract and assure services provided by others.

4 Performance

Colleague Safety

- 4.1 Our colleague injury reporting includes those directly employed by TfL as well as contractors or suppliers delivering TfL services. The incidence of a colleague being killed while at work is thankfully extremely rare, and serious injuries have been decreasing each financial year following a peak of 29 in financial year 2021/22 as set out in chart 1 of Appendix 1. For colleagues, the majority of serious injuries recorded are a result of slips, trips and falls (65 per cent in 2024/25 to date). Since financial year 2020/21 there has been one colleague fatality (in 2023/24): a contractor was fatally injured by a vehicle while putting up posters in a bus shelter on the A4020 Uxbridge Road.
- 4.2 In the last financial year (2023/24) there were 17 colleague serious injuries, and the one death described above, a decrease from 23 serious injuries in the previous year. This is a positive improvement in terms of serious injuries but will need to be sustained year on year to meet our 2030 target. This year there have been 11 serious injuries to colleagues to date.

Customer injuries

- 4.3 Our customer injury reporting includes all members of the public who are injured using our services or on our estate. We exclude from our customer injury reporting those injuries that result from assaults or deliberate acts of self-harm but do include those injured as a result of unauthorised access to the track.
- 4.4 All customer injury numbers of all severities showed a slight declining yearly trend until financial year 2020/21 as shown in Chart 2 in Appendix 1 when there was a sharp decrease related to the impacts of the coronavirus pandemic on the public transport network. Since then, customer injury numbers have increased in line with passenger numbers as customers returned to public transport post-pandemic. In financial year 2023/24, customer injuries were at similar levels to those seen in financial year 2019/20.
- 4.5 Since financial year 2020/21 there have been 24 customer fatalities: seven in 2020/21, four in 2021/22, five in 2022/23, and eight in 2023/24. Fourteen of these customer fatalities were on the London Underground, and eight were on buses. Bus data in this section covers those customers aboard buses and has exclusions such as medical incidents and intentional self-harm, people injured in collisions with buses are included in the road risk section below.
- 4.6 Figures for the number of serious injuries are available from financial year 2020/21 when TfL's definition of a serious injury was updated in line with Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations (RIDDOR) reporting criteria. Customer numbers have recovered following the pandemic, consequently customer deaths and serious injuries have increased in line, as shown in chart 3 in Appendix 1, as risk per journey has remained broadly

the same. However financial year 2023/24 saw an eight per cent decrease compared to the previous year, primarily as a result of a reduction in injuries to bus customers. We will need to maintain this level of year on year improvement if we are to achieve our 2030 target.

Road Risk and Bus Safety

- 4.7 Transport for London is the highway authority for just under five per cent of London's roads, with London boroughs being responsible for the remainder. We continue to see declining numbers of deaths and serious injuries recorded on London's streets. We report road safety for calendar years and according to standards set out by Government, based on police data.
- 4.8 The most recent complete year of published data is 2023, which saw the fewest people killed (95) on London's roads outside of pandemic-affected years (2020, 2021) a 30 per cent reduction on our 2010-14 baseline compared to a 7 per cent reduction in fatalities nationally over the same period. There were 3,710 people killed or seriously injured, the lowest on record outside of pandemic-affected years, a 24 per cent reduction on the 2010-14 baseline compared to a 13 per cent reduction nationally.
- 4.9 Collisions involving London buses on in 2023 which met government road safety reporting criteria resulted in six people sadly being killed, all of whom were pedestrians (see chart 6 of appendix). This number is four fewer (40 per cent) people killed than the 2010-14 baseline, against our 2030 target of zero fatalities. Overall deaths and serious injuries on, or in collision with, a bus on public roads had decreased by 31 per cent by the end of 2023 compared to our 2010-14 baseline (see chart 7 of appendix). Additionally, two collisions that did not meet Government criteria for inclusion in our road safety reporting resulted in fatalities. These additional collisions are included in the bus fatalities information published on the TfL website. We are making a number of improvements to our bus stations to improve safety, which are described below in 7.15

5 Improvement Activity – Independent Scrutiny

- 5.1 Executive teams across TfL managing the Investment Programme have for many years benefitted from the input and scrutiny provided by the Independent Investment Programme Advisory Group (IIPAG). That model has in recent years also been used to support the executive teams that supported the delivery of the Crossrail project (once TfL took over responsibility for its governance) and most recently the Places for London team. IIPAG members attend and contribute to meetings of the Programmes and Investment Committee and the Land and Property Committee (and previously to the former Elizabeth Line Committee). Recruitment for additional specialist resource on safety assurance to form a IIPAG Safety sub-group is underway. This sub-group will have clear terms of reference to ensure clarity of the respective roles and responsibilities of TfL teams and the sub-group members. The IIPAG Safety sub-group would also attend meetings of this Panel.
- 5.2 Consideration is also being given on appointing an external special adviser to this Panel to provide independent advice and support on safety and security matters.

6 Improvement Activity – Colleagues and Customers

- 6.1 Our approach to managing risks to colleagues and customers is based on a combination of strengthening our underlying risk management and safety systems and targeted activity to focus on key sources of risk.
- 6.2 Key sources of risk are identified through a combination of incident analysis and quantitative risk assessment which enables us to identify the risk of high consequence, but low frequency, events.

Safety Systems Improvement

- 6.3 Since 2020 we have introduced a number of system improvements to strengthen our ability to effectively manage safety. This includes actions taken since 2023 in response to the Sandilands sentencing. System enhancements are summarised below.
- 6.4 We upgraded the TfL Safety, Health and Environment Management System (SHEMS) to a new digital platform accessed via a SharePoint site. Continuing work is planned for 2025/26 to further increase the accessibility and navigability of SHEMS.
- 6.5 We have documented the specific legal safety accountabilities of senior leaders in the business.
- 6.6 We have completely updated the London Underground Rule Book, simplifying and consolidating rules from 24 books into nine. This also included digitising all of the content into an app which will be launched once cyber-security restrictions are lifted.
- 6.7 We have developed and embedded improved tools by which local managers can conduct (first line) assurance such as Planned General Inspections and topic-specific checks. Our digital assurance app allows checks to be quickly and easily carried out and enables us to begin analysing assurance data more systematically.
- 6.8 We are currently updating our incident data systems, bringing all customer modes into a single system to enable a more reliable comparison of risks and performance across TfL modes. We intend to complete migration in 2025.
- 6.9 For the most serious incidents we carry out formal investigations. Since the beginning of 2024 we have enhanced this process. This included appointing two dedicated full-time investigators, strengthening the process around the assurance of action delivery, ensuring that lessons learnt are widely communicated across the business and developing automated action-tracking tools. Further updates to this process will be completed in 2025.

Safety Culture Improvement

- 6.10 We have implemented a programme to support the business in understanding and improving its safety, health and environment (SHE) culture. Underpinning the programme has been the development of a culture maturity measurement

framework and survey that has been made available to around 10,000 colleagues in order to baseline our current level of maturity.

- 6.11 We are supporting managers across TfL to be visible leaders for safety, health and the environment via a package of training, digital tools for logging actions from Leadership Engagement Tours and feedback tools for management teams to assist them in regularly and visibly role-modelling the importance of safety to the teams that they manage.
- 6.12 We have released a new tool and training on the subject of “Just and Fair”. This recognises that things sometimes go wrong but that we need to create a safe environment in which colleagues can be honest about mistakes. The Just and Fair tool helps identify where organisational or systemic factors need to be addressed to prevent reoccurrence.
- 6.13 Further development is under way to ensure we get the best value from our subscription to CIRAS, who offer an independent confidential reporting service. We are working to give wider visibility to concerns raised through CIRAS, track the delivery of actions and include CIRAS reports in governance and management information.
- 6.14 In early 2024 we started the SHE Observations project, which aims to improve our colleagues’ opportunities to report safety concerns (and to recognise good safety practices). A pilot of a SHE observations reporting tool commenced in September 2024.

Supplier Management

- 6.15 In 2022 as part of a wider procurement framework upgrade, the way SHE was considered in procurement was reviewed and upgraded so that it is assessed at an earlier stage in the procurement process and assurance can be sought at each stage of the procurement process.

Supporting People Affected By Safety Incidents

- 6.16 Although this paper is describing our activity at an aggregate and ‘systems’ level, we are very aware that every incident involving a colleague or customer involves human beings who can be directly affected, sometimes in the long-term. For TfL customers, we launched the Sarah Hope Line in 2016: a dedicated part of our customer services contact centre available to people affected by incidents on our public transport services, who can signpost people to appropriate sources of support and assistance. We continue to promote this service to people affected by incidents. Since 2019, 449 people have made use of the Sarah Hope Line. We are also enhancing support for those people involved in the most serious road collisions, information is provided in 7.4, below.
- 6.17 For TfL colleagues who may be affected by incidents we have a comprehensive occupational health service.

Targeting key risk areas

- 6.18 The measures described above are intended to strengthen our ability to support safety outcomes at every level. In addition to this, we have identified known areas of higher risk and have developed targeted programmes to address directly.

Safe Track Access

- 6.19 A higher risk activity involves our colleagues when they need to access the track to carry out essential maintenance or in response to an incident. We have clear rules for our colleagues, whether they access the track while trains are running, or during the periods of time when trains are not running and the traction current has been switched off. Recent initiatives have aimed to enhance rules and colleague competence and to provide better information and support for track workers:

Rules and Competence

- (a) we introduced a new, simplified rulebook procedure and bespoke training for staff that may need to access the track during traffic hours. Over 2,000 colleagues attended training in the new approach prior to its go-live in April 2024. We will shortly be piloting this approach for our maintenance colleagues;
- (b) work to improve operational communication between maintenance teams and Service Control teams;
- (c) enhancements to competence management for track access; and
- (d) letting a new contract for supply of track protection roles.

Information and Support

- (a) for colleagues who have to access the track after trains have stopped running we have installed clearer signage for those colleagues accessing the track, and we have a clear programme of work, which includes:
 - (i) roll out of devices which will inform our colleagues if the traction current is on before accessing the track; and
 - (ii) an app for track colleagues to ensure current and last train status is available to them live.

Platform Train Interface (PTI)

- 6.20 We know that the safety risk to our customers is higher at the platform train interface, where around 14 per cent of customer deaths or serious injuries occur. We are taking action to make boarding and alighting from our trains safer for everyone.
- 6.21 This includes exploring a range of interventions to keep our customers safer when they are boarding and alighting our trains based on the principle of preventing incidents where possible, detecting them when they do occur and ensuring staff are equipped to respond to mitigate the consequences.

6.22 Examples of activity in the plan include:

- (a) making physical changes at higher risk locations;
- (b) testing platform wall shelves at a number of locations to mitigate the consequences if someone does step into the gap;
- (c) testing passive gap-fillers to reduce the gap between the train and the platform edge and evaluating their potential;
- (d) campaigns to influence customer behaviour;
- (e) testing platform edge strip detectors to alert drivers via monitors at the headwall;
- (f) upgrading camera equipment to give train operators a better view of the platforms, which means they can help ensure our customers remain safe; and
- (g) testing the viability of automated detection through CCTV cameras and other technologies of PTI incidents.

6.23 Our PTI approach will be reviewed regularly to allow TfL to remain at the forefront of action to keep customers safe. We are mindful that we are attempting to address an issue for which the rail industry in the UK has no complete solution, so we are also putting out calls to the market for other innovative approaches that may be suitable for us to test.

Escalators

6.24 Slips, trips and falls account for 77 per cent of rail customer deaths and serious injuries and 39 per cent of these occur on escalators. These include incidents in which customers suffer falls and also a number of incidents in which customers, including children, have trapped shoes.

6.25 Escalator safety is an issue that is common to the wider transport industry. As part of our response to this we have held two industry-wide workshops including escalator manufacturers and other transport operators, in sections like rail and aviation. As well as exploring engineering options to improve escalator safety, we have taken a number of immediate operational measures to improve customer safety including increasing customer communications during the school holiday with associated safety messages being reinforced by station colleagues when they see adults travelling with children.

6.26 We are also trialling and evaluating a number of additional interventions including trip switches which will stop an escalator in the event of a customer's shoe becoming trapped and automated 'enunciators' that detect the approach of customers and give out safety messages.

7 Improvement Activity – Road Risk and Bus

- 7.1 TfL is the highway authority for only around five per cent of London's streets. Consequently, reducing risk on London's roads is a partnership between TfL, London boroughs, the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), City of London police and other stakeholders and emergency services.
- 7.2 Our approach to Vision Zero follows the Safe Systems framework set out in our [Vision Zero Action Plan](#) and [Progress Report](#). This recognises that people will inevitably make errors when using the streets and therefore the overall system needs to be forgiving of those errors. The safe system framework is based around safe speeds, safe street design, safe vehicle design, safe behaviour and post collision investigation and care for victims.
- 7.3 Examples of completed actions to date include:
- (a) over 260km of TfL roads operating at lower speed limits;
 - (b) 18 of the 33 London boroughs (including the City of London) implementing a 20mph default limit;
 - (c) 45 Safer Junctions completed on TfL roads;
 - (d) over 100 Low Traffic Neighbourhoods;
 - (e) over 400km of Cycleway network;
 - (f) over 650 school streets across London;
 - (g) over 800,000 Notices of Intended Prosecution issued for speed and red-light offences in 2023; and
 - (h) Direct Vision Standard, halving the number of fatal collisions with vision as a factor and Phase 2 launched in October 2024.
- 7.4 In the aftermath of a road traffic collision, lives of victims, their families and loved ones are devastated, but most were not getting the support they need and deserve. In November 2023, in partnership with the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime and the MPS, we launched a pilot project to provide enhanced support for people who had been victims of the most serious road traffic collisions in London.
- 7.5 The pilot implemented a direct referral from the MPS's Serious Collision Investigation Unit (SCIU) into the support service. This means that families dealing with the aftermath of the most serious crashes do not have to navigate care pathways themselves or negotiate their own access to support. The MPS referral is then picked up by Brake, to provide a dedicated London team of Brake caseworkers that offer face-to-face trauma-informed emotional and practical support in the immediate aftermath, and longer-term aftercare by RoadPeace through support groups, befriending and a resilience-building programme.

- 7.6 To date, 160 people have been referred into the service for support since the pilot service launched – in the region of a 60 per cent uplift on the number of people supported by Brake and RoadPeace in London in the previous year before the pilot was introduced (between November 2022 to November 2023), which demonstrates that the direct referral has led to a step-change in access to support.
- 7.7 We have extended the pilot by 12 months to November 2025 to maximise learnings, comprehensively evaluate the service and referral process, and use this to feed into our future strategy.
- 7.8 In the aftermath of an incident, we frequently do not have access to the names or contact information of people involved. However, in 2024 we developed new protocols and agreements with the MPS's SCIU to help us make contact with families where a road traffic collision involved a TfL public transport service (i.e. bus, tram) to send our condolences, apologies and the contact details of a Director who can speak to those affected should they wish to do so. We have also been working with some families who have been affected by tragedies on our services to explore further ways in which we can offer them our support. Brake also record whether a TfL service was involved when they receive the SCIU referral into the pilot service, and where liaison with the Sarah Hope Line is appropriate, a mechanism for communication and close working between the two services is in place.

Bus Safety

- 7.9 The Bus Safety Programme was established in 2016, with a refreshed [Bus safety strategy](#) published in 2023.
- 7.10 The Bus Safety Standard (BSS) is a central part of the Bus Safety Programme. The BSS requires the use of safer vehicles through specifying in operating contracts the safety requirements that new buses entering service in London must meet, both ahead of, and in addition to, regulatory requirements.
- 7.11 The first safety requirements for new buses were specified in 2019, with subsequent requirements in 2021 and 2024. These measures include, for example Intelligent Speed Assistance (ISA) to support drivers in complying with speed limits, Acoustic Vehicle Alerting System (AVAS) for quiet-running buses which were introduced two years ahead of the regulatory requirements and have exceeded these requirements through the development of an Urban Bus Sound, replacing wing mirrors with camera systems to improve field of view and reduce risk of strikes, as well as changes to bus interior design to improve the safety of bus occupants.
- 7.12 More recent requirements introduced into our standard in 2024 include changes to the front end of the bus to reduce the consequences of a collision with vulnerable road users. Over 1,600 buses meet the BSS (depending on the year they entered service), and this number is growing as new buses enter the fleet. Alongside this we are retrofitting features to existing buses including ISA, AVAS and camera monitor systems that improve a driver's field of view and do not require protruding wing mirrors.

7.13 We do not directly employ bus drivers, however our Bus Safety Programme works closely with bus operating companies to support safe driving. Measures to support bus drivers to operate safely within London include programmes to trial fatigue detection technology, bespoke 'Destination Zero' training that uses virtual reality to improve hazard perception and working with bus operators to improve welfare facilities for bus drivers.

Bus Stations

7.14 Bus stations are operational environments which present significant challenges as they combine the movement of large vehicles with significant flows of pedestrians. They are also by design permeable spaces that are integrated into the surrounding street environment.

7.15 Following a number of tragic safety incidents, including customer fatalities, we have conducted a review of bus station layouts and arrangements at bus stations that we operate; this is a commitment that was made to the HSE in March 2023, in response to a Notice of Contravention following the incident at Victoria bus station in August 2021. An annualised programme is now in place and targeted interventions are planned this financial year with design work under way to develop a prioritised programme of projects for future years. We have recently reopened Kingston Cromwell Road bus station following completion of works and permanent layout improvements have either commenced or are scheduled for implementation this financial year at the bus stations at Walthamstow, Edgware, London Bridge, Hounslow, Harrow on the Hill, Hammersmith, and Stratford Regional bus stations. The programme for next year is in development.

8 Challenges and Emerging Risks

8.1 While we are making gradual progress towards our targets, we will need to accelerate if we are to achieve the ambitious targets set out in the Mayor's Transport Strategy and in our TfL Strategy. In doing so we will need to focus on continuously strengthening the strong foundation of our safety management systems while continuing to innovate and respond flexibly to challenges and emerging risks. Known issues include:

- (a) limits to capital budgets, meaning we need to continue to target asset maintenance to maintain safety but have limited current opportunity for widespread changes to infrastructure;
- (b) the challenges of effectively influencing public behaviour, both on streets and our public transport networks;
- (c) the opportunities that new technologies may offer to improve our detection and operational management of safety incidents; and
- (d) continued changes in travel patterns in London, meaning that the balance of modes and the emergence of new modes, such as new classes of electric road vehicle, will continue to affect risk levels.

List of appendices to this report:

Appendix 1: Data Appendix

List of Background Papers:

Safety Risk Management on TfL Services - Following the Sandilands Tram Overturning Sentencing, Safety, Sustainability and Human Resources Panel, November 2023

Safety Risk Management on TfL Services, Safety, Sustainability and Human Resources Panel, May 2024


Contact Officer: Lilli Matson, Chief Safety, Health and Environment Officer
Email: LilliMatson@tfl.gov.uk

Appendix 1 - Data Appendix

Colleague safety

Chart 1: Annual colleague deaths and serious injuries, by financial year and business area

(source: TfL safety incident reporting systems, extracted April 2024)



Customer safety trends

Chart 2: Annual customer injuries all severities, by financial year

(source: TfL safety incident reporting systems, extracted April 2024)



Chart 3: Annual customer deaths and serious injuries, by financial year and mode




Table 1: Annual customer deaths and serious injuries, by financial year and mode

Mode	Measure	Financial Year			
		2020-21	2021-22	2022-23	2023-24
Buses	Serious injuries & fatalities	52	101	90	56
	of which fatalities only	3	2	2	1
London Underground	Serious injuries & fatalities	38	75	110	124
	of which fatalities only	4	2	2	6
Other modes	Serious injuries & fatalities	17	16	21	23
	of which fatalities only			1	1
Total	Serious injuries & fatalities	107	192	221	203
	of which fatalities only	7	4	5	8

Chart 4: Annual number of casualties by mode, serious injuries

(source: [casualties in greater London 2023](#), table 6 of [data Appendix](#))




Chart 5: Annual number of casualties by mode, fatalities

(source: [casualties in greater London 2023](#), table 5 of [data Appendix](#))




Chart 6: Annual number of bus-involved fatalities by mode

(source: [casualties in greater London 2023](#), table 3 of [data Appendix](#))





Chart 7: Annual number of bus-involved casualties by mode, deaths and serious injuries (on or by a bus)

(source: [casualties in greater London 2023](#), table 4 of [data Appendix](#))



Safety and Security Panel



Date: 2 December 2024

Item: Update on the TfL Cyber Security Incident

This paper will be considered in public

1 Summary

- 1.1 This paper provides an update on the cyber security incident that commenced on 31 August 2024. TfL is continuing to recover from this incident and restore all systems in a secure and managed way and there continue to be temporary impacts to some customers. Further updates will be provided in due course.
- 1.2 A paper is included on Part 2 of the agenda, which contains exempt supplementary information. The information is exempt by virtue of paragraphs 3 and 7 of Schedule 12A of the Local Government Act 1972 in that it contains information relating to the financial affairs of a person or authority and to any action taken or to be taken in connection with the prevention, investigation or prosecution of crime. Any discussion of that exempt information must take place after the press and public have been excluded from the meeting.

2 Recommendation

- 2.1 **The Panel is asked to note the paper and the exempt supplementary information on Part 2 of the agenda.**

3 Cyber Security incidents in the public sector

- 3.1 There has been a rise in successful cyber incidents against the UK public sector which can be attributed to several factors that expose these organisations to heightened risks. The primary types of attacks experienced have been ransomware, phishing, and distributed denial-of-service attacks.
- 3.2 These incidents not only target the vast personal and financial data held by public entities but also disrupt essential services, posing serious risks to public safety and national security. Attackers, including organised crime, state-sponsored groups, and activists, see the public sector as a valuable target for both financial gain and political leverage.
- 3.3 The threat landscape moves at significant pace with financially motivated cyber incidents being the fastest growing form of crime globally and nation states expanding online espionage and offensive technology.
- 3.4 It is very challenging for any organisation, including TfL, to keep pace with cyber security risk due to the rapidly increasing sophistication and asymmetric

nature of the threat. We work to ensure available resources are used as effectively as possible in response to what we assess as the most likely threats.

- 3.5 Additionally, many public sector entities have yet to adopt robust zero-trust architectures, which is considered best practice in modern security, leading to unrestricted lateral movement within IT networks once attackers breach initial defences. Zero trust architectures assume that all external connections are hostile and verify each access attempt. Significant investment is required to migrate legacy technology systems to modern security practices. These factors, combined with inadequate cyber security training and a lack of segmented access controls, allow cybercriminals to exploit human error and system weaknesses in many organisations, underscoring the need for enhanced resilience strategies.

4 Background and update on latest position

- 4.1 On 31 August 2024, TfL was subject to a sophisticated cyber incident on our Information Technology Systems, resulting in the need to reduce access to the network and systems to minimise and contain the threat. Over the subsequent days and weeks, we took decisive action to contain the incident and recover control of the environment.
- 4.2 We are continuing to work with partners to conduct a thorough investigation into the incident. We have worked closely with the National Crime Agency (NCA) and the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) throughout this process and continue to do so; we have also notified the Information Commissioner's Office. The NCSC has a regulatory role, including advice and oversight on critical national infrastructure and support us with monitoring threats. The NCA have jurisdiction over and special units for cyber crime. The NCA has confirmed that there has been one arrest to-date in relation to this incident.
- 4.3 The cyber incident did not disrupt our core operations. With the exception of a short disruption to Dial-a-Ride services due to interruptions in being able to take bookings all other operations carried on as normal. The Underground, rail services, buses, tram, DLR, road traffic signals and operations all carried on as normal. Some disruptions to customer services occurred due to our defensive actions and are explained below.
- 4.4 Our investigations identified that certain customer data had been accessed. This includes some customer names and contact details, including email addresses and home addresses where provided, and in some cases Oyster card refund data. We contacted around 5,000 customers whose bank account details were accessed as a precautionary measure, to offer them support and guidance. Our investigations to date do not show evidence that credit card data was accessed although further probes continue with our partners. For context, we see over 120,000 new credit cards used on our system every day and over a four-week period the number of cards used exceeds 13 million.

- 4.5 As part of the measures implemented to deal with the incident, we took the difficult, but essential, decision to temporarily pause new concession photocard applications while we undertook important security checks. While work continues to restore services, we have now safely brought back online our concession photocard website and started processing new applications. We are working to process all new photocard applications as quickly as possible.
- 4.6 We kept customers informed throughout the cyber incident, and continue to do so. At the outset, we emailed all customers on our database (around seven million) to provide reassurance that the security of our systems and customer data is very important to us, and to advise that we took immediate action to protect our systems. We also provided reassurance that our public transport network was operating normally. We continue to contact customers to provide additional updates. This includes the recent reopening of systems which enable customers to apply/reapply for our various Oyster concessions. There is also up-to-date information on a dedicated page on our website <https://tfl.gov.uk/campaign/cyber-security-incident>.
- 4.7 We have received a number of requests from other organisations keen to learn from our experience and, with the NCA and NCSC, we will provide appropriate briefings on our response and lessons learnt in due course.
- 4.8 To ensure that those who are currently being financially most impacted by the cyber incident are processed as quickly as possible, we were initially phasing applications for concession photocards. We are now accepting new applications for all concession photocards. Once new photocards have been applied for, where possible, credit remaining on expired Zip photocards can be transferred across to new photocards by contacting our customer services team. Customers are also advised to keep a record of any fares that they feel should be refunded.
- 4.9 We are beginning to work through refund requests for some of our customers and are working in a priority order, starting with the oldest cases. We are also, and will continue to, identify exceptional cases from vulnerable customers and those citing hardship and/or high value refunds so that we can resolve those as quickly as possible. We understand that the disruption to refunds and issuance of concessionary cards has caused difficulties to our customers and apologise for this. We are working hard to resolve the backlog.
- 4.10 Once new photocards have been issued, we will provide information on how customers can apply for refunds for any additional travel costs incurred due to not being able to apply for a photocard.
- 4.11 In addition, the security measures we have been taking mean that it was not possible for us to deliver the necessary system changes to enable 47 additional stations outside London to benefit from pay as you go with contactless from 22 September 2024 as previously planned. We are working with the Department for Transport and the Rail Delivery Group to reschedule and have apologised for the delay. Customer information for TfL Go and through our API that feeds external apps was restored in mid-October. This

includes information on step-free access which had been unavailable from 3 September to 15 October 2024.

- 4.12 Systems that feed bus route information into iBus, which then goes on to provide correct live information arrival at bus stops, are now fully functional and data is catching up. We expect all live bus information to be back to normal by end of this month.
- 4.13 During the period of disruption access to many systems required for data reporting has been restricted. As a result, it has not been possible to produce some regular reports or some types of analysis.
- 4.14 Our investigations also show that the Active Directory that holds usernames for anyone who has a login into TfL systems was accessed. All passwords have been reset across TfL. We do not believe our colleagues face enhanced security threats as a result of the access to the Active Directory. Colleagues have been kept informed on the incident and its recovery.
- 4.15 Our work with the NCSC and NCA continues. As the NCA's law enforcement activities are ongoing, there is information we cannot share.
- 4.16 Partners (including the NCSC, NCA and Microsoft) have stated their view that we responded well to the incident and disrupted the attack to some extent, potentially preventing a far worse outcome.

5 Independent Review

- 5.1 Given the nature and scale of the cyber incident, it is appropriate to conduct an independent review to consider the circumstances surrounding the cyber incident and the impact, TfL's response to the incident and whether further improvements are needed to TfL's cybersecurity strategy taking into consideration existing initiatives that are in progress (the Review). Not only is this appropriate from TfL's perspective, it is important to ensure lessons are learnt and shared particularly in the context of TfL's role in managing nationally critical infrastructure. As the cyber incident is ongoing and the subject of a criminal investigation by the NCA, the Review may need to be undertaken in phases with summary reports produced for each phase with a final summary report when all phases are completed.
- 5.2 It is proposed that the Chair of the Audit and Assurance Committee and the Chair and Vice Chair of the Panel agree the appointment of the independent reviewer to be appointed and oversee the Review on behalf of the Board. The Board will continue to be briefed in relation to the cyber incident and the financial implications of the incident will be reported to the Finance Committee. The findings of the Review will be reported to the Board and will include recommendations to strengthen and improve TfL's cybersecurity and incident response.

6 Financial implications

- 6.1 We have offered fraud protection to the 5,000 whose bank details may have been accessed.
- 6.2 Estimated costs from the incident will be reported to the Finance Committee at their next meeting on 18 December 2024.

List of appendices

None

A paper containing exempt supplementary information is included on Part 2 of the agenda

Background Papers

None

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Safety and Security Panel



Date: 2 December 2024

Item: Trends in Security and Key Improvement Activity

This paper will be considered in public

1 Summary

- 1.1 This paper provides an update on our Security Strategy, and highlights of our security improvement programmes:
- (a) eradicating work-related violence and aggression;
 - (b) protecting our organisation from the risk of fare evasion;
 - (c) ending violence against women and girls; and
 - (d) cyber security – details are provided in a separate paper elsewhere on the agenda.

2 Recommendation

- 2.1 **The Panel is asked to note the paper.**

3 Our Security Strategy

- 3.1 Our safety and security priority is to get everyone home safe and healthy, every day, so that everyone is, and feels, safe and secure.
- 3.2 Good security means protecting our customers, colleagues, finances, assets, technology, data, services and operations from criminals and hostile actions that cause harm. The threats we face span from acts of theft, through to trespass and vandalism of our assets, fare evasion and fraud, violence against our customers and colleagues, serious and organised crime and matters of national security such as terrorism, cyber-crime, espionage, sabotage, extortion, corruption, and the threat from hostile states.
- 3.3 Under section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, we have a statutory duty to consider crime and disorder implications in all our activities and do all we reasonably can to prevent it; we also seek to design out opportunities for crime and hostile behaviour. Our ambition is that travelling and working on our network is, and feels, safe and secure. We want to be well protected against anti-social, criminal, malicious and hostile actions. Crime and antisocial behaviour can affect anyone, but it has a disproportionate impact on some of London's most vulnerable communities. Tackling crime and antisocial behaviour supports progression towards a more inclusive London.

- 3.4 The Security Chapter of the TfL Strategy is focussed on three strategic priorities:
- (a) **Work together to be safe and secure** - designing out opportunity for crime and antisocial behaviour, taking a data driven and evidence led approach in partnership with the police and other enforcement and security partners to reduce risk;
 - (b) **Keep everyone safe when travelling** - reducing the risk of being a victim of crime when travelling in London, safeguarding the most vulnerable, tackling sexual harassment, hate crime and serious violence, tackling work-related violence and aggression and providing an inclusive network that feels safe for everyone; and
 - (c) **Protect our organisation** - embedding security into all our activities to reduce our vulnerabilities, increase our capability to respond to incidents and create a culture where we understand and act to protect ourselves and our organisation.
- 3.5 We have identified two key success measures to achieve this by 2030:
- (a) reduce the risk of being a victim of crime on London's public transport by a third from the 2022/23 baseline of 11.5 crimes reported for every million passenger journeys made; and
 - (b) reduce level of fare evasion to 1.5 per cent or less.
- 3.6 We are following a roadmap to guide and evidence our progress against our Security Strategy. This includes a suite of security improvement programmes monitored, reviewed, and assured quarterly. The suite of security improvement programmes covers security plans for all our public transport modes including London Underground, London Trams, Elizabeth line and Bus security programmes, as an example. It also covers organisation-wide programmes ranging from cyber and infrastructure security to specific programmes for our customers and colleagues including tackling WVA and ending violence against women and girls.
- 3.7 The paper includes highlights from a selection of our security improvement programmes.

4 Improving our Corporate Security Maturity

- 4.1 Our Security Governance and Culture programme provides a framework for how we lead, govern, embed, and manage good security and how we improve security consciousness across the organisation. This programme supports risk-based and proportionate decisions-making as we seek to strengthen our security against a backdrop of volatile, changing, and enduring threats that we face. We receive regular threat and horizon scanning briefings from the Security Services and our police partners.

- 4.2 We have identified our most important assets that we need to protect and understand the threats, vulnerabilities, impacts and our level of risk appetite. We have agreed leading and lagging indicators to monitor our progress, identify improvement opportunity and emerging issues, and evidence our improvement.
- 4.3 To drive security accountability at every level of our organisation, ensure compliance with regulation and capture activities to prevent, deter, detect, delay, and respond to the risk of a security incident, we are in the process of embedding security risk management throughout the organisation.
- 4.4 We have a regular testing and exercising programme to assess the effectiveness of our preparedness, making sure colleagues know what to do and act on it. Learning from the Manchester Arena inquiry and other national security incidents, we have shifted from capturing lessons learnt to evidencing how recommendations for change from testing and exercising are embedded.
- 4.5 Our corporate security maturity framework is benchmarked against similar organisations and informed by the National Protective Security Authority.
- 4.6 Our definition of a strong security culture takes a holistic approach to security, integrating physical, people, personnel, and cyber security dimensions. People security is about protecting people by shaping and controlling the environment to promote vigilance and an effective security culture. Personnel security is about procedures which seek to mitigate the risk of workers (insiders) exploiting their legitimate access to an organisation's assets for unauthorised purposes.
- 4.7 Our ambition is for colleagues to be well-informed and understand their responsibilities and be active in their vigilance. Our communications and engagement work seeks to build awareness, alertness, curiosity, and reporting, recognising that good security behaviours build trust and confidence for our customers and London and will result in all of us better protecting our colleagues, customers and organisation. A strong security culture is a core component of delivering Equity in Motion and Action on Inclusion, our customer and colleague diversity and inclusion plans.

4.8 Our colleagues' contribution will be underpinned by clear and accessible policies and processes, guidance and instructions communicating what we need our people to do and why. We are equipping our people leaders with the templates and tool kits to adopt a regular tempo of security messaging encouraging good security behaviours into everyday working practice.

4.9 The following sections of this paper put the spotlight on a selection of our security improvement programmes. In future updates we plan to spotlight all our programmes:

- (a) London Underground security;
- (b) piers and river security;
- (c) bus security;
- (d) security testing and exercising;
- (e) cyber security;
- (d) infrastructure security;
- (e) counter-fraud and corruption;
- (f) revenue protection;
- (g) future of digital and video surveillance systems;
- (h) security governance and culture;
- (i) ending violence against women and girls; and
- (j) eradicating work-related violence and aggression.

Help protect our organisation

- Be proud** by wearing your building pass/ID in TfL buildings – politely challenge anyone who isn't displaying theirs
- Be active** on our network, in our buildings or using our systems – if it doesn't feel right, it probably isn't, report it
- Be cautious** – take a moment to think before clicking links, sending emails or sharing any information
- Be clear** – classify and store information correctly

Search 'security fundamentals' on Platform

Scan to find out more

EVERY JOURNEY MATTERS

5 Our Security Improvement Programmes

Work-related violence and aggression (WVA)

5.1 We view any level of WVA against our colleagues as too high. Our colleagues have the right to work without fear of being assaulted, abused or threatened. Our vision is to eradicate WVA. Our WVA strategy commits us to an organisation-wide approach to eliminating the risk of WVA. Our strategy places a strong emphasis on preventing incidents from occurring in the first place, improving the support we give to our colleagues when they are a victim and continually learning and improving our approach to keeping our people safe. This commitment is a core element of our TfL Strategy.

5.2 Our WVA strategy covers all our colleagues, including those who work directly for TfL, those who work for our operators under the roundel who are

responsible for operating our public transport networks, those who work for our contractors and those we regulate to provide transport services, reflecting the different responsibilities and support we can provide. Significant progress is being made in many important areas. However, our colleagues continue to be subjected to unacceptable levels of violence and aggression while doing their jobs.

- 5.3 This issue is not specific to us or isolated to the transport industry. Many sectors including health, hospitality, retail, and emergency services are also reporting increased levels of WVA towards their staff, and we collaborate with other sectors to learn and improve how we protect our colleagues.

Trends in WVA

- 5.4 Between 1 April and 17 August this financial year, there have been 4,000 incidents of WVA reported to us. This is a 4.5 per cent decrease on the previous year, when, in total, 10,613 (this figure has been updated to reflect data received after April 2024) incidents were reported. Between 2022/23 and 2023/24, we saw a six per cent increase in WVA reports. The internal promotion of the WVA team and strategy have helped encourage reporting of WVA during this time. We believe the reduction to date in 2024/25 is a positive step and a direct result of the work detailed below.
- 5.5 Of the incidents reported up to 17 August 2024: 2,246 (56 per cent) were verbal and gesture abuse; 1,147 (29 per cent) were threats; and 607 (15 per cent) were physical. The number of physical incidents reported has reduced from 16 per cent last year, to 15 per cent this year.
- 5.6 So far this year, 44 per cent of incidents have been reported by colleagues working on the London Underground network; 45 per cent by colleagues working on the bus network; and 11 per cent reported by colleagues working on the Elizabeth line, Rail and Sponsored Services, within our Compliance, Policing, Operations and Security team and by our contracted colleagues. This is very similar to last year's breakdown.
- 5.7 This year, fare evasion and ticket disputes continue to be the most common trigger for WVA, accounting for 43 per cent of all incidents. This is a two per cent decrease from the same period last year.
- 5.8 There have been 357 incidents of WVA between 1 April and 17 August 2024 involving an intoxicated customer. This represents nearly nine per cent of reported WVA incidents. This has decreased by nearly two per cent from this stage last year. The percentage of incidents involving a rough sleeper, or someone begging on our networks, has risen by one per cent.
- 5.9 Ten per cent of all WVA incidents reported this year (405 incidents) appear to have been motivated by hate or hostility towards colleagues' actual or perceived protected characteristics. This is higher than last year's total of approximately eight per cent. We believe that the work we did last year to raise the profile of WVA, encourage reporting and improve confidence to report will have contributed to the increase in reported incidents.

In 2023/24, data from our police partners shows that there were 118 violence with injury offences reported to the police across our rail modes. This is higher than the previous year (which saw 75 offences reported). It is currently not possible to provide a 12-month summary of crimes committed on the bus network due to a change in the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) crime recording system which has impacted the provision of crime data to us. We are working with the MPS to resolve these data issues as quickly as possible.


- 5.10 Between March 2023 and February 2024 (figures are reported six months in arrears to allow time for progression through the criminal justice system), the solved rate across rail modes for work-related violence, sexual and public order recorded offences was 17 per cent. The percentage of colleagues willing to support a police investigation (on rail modes only) was 69 per cent for violence, public order, and sexual recorded offences.

Progress against our WVA Strategy

- 5.11 We have improved the collection and reporting of WVA data which has increased our understanding of the nature and volume of incidents and is providing a strong evidence base for WVA measures.
- 5.12 As part of our commitments within the strategy, our Transport Support and Enforcement Officers (TSEs) play a key role in tackling WVA by dealing with the triggers of WVA and supporting frontline transport colleagues. TSEs are police-accredited enforcement officers who are deployed across the public transport network, with powers and training to deal with antisocial behaviour and rule breaking. We currently have 223 officers in post. Earlier this year we introduced our first TSE night team with a second, 15-strong team being introduced in January 2025.
- 5.13 Body-worn cameras are a proven deterrent against WVA. They reduce the risk of a WVA incident occurring and, if one does, the evidence they provide is more likely to lead to positive judicial outcomes. In January 2024, they became part of 'essential kit' and embedded in our performance standards for our directly employed, customer-facing operational colleagues. These colleagues must now wear a body-worn camera when on duty in a customer-facing environment. This will help protect our people and make our network a safer place for all our customers and colleagues. We will be conducting a post implementation review and an internal audit to provide assurance on the effectiveness of the implementation and key controls for managing their ongoing use. This will help us learn lessons and make any improvements needed to the service and equipment to ensure colleagues continue to use these valuable devices.
- 5.14 In addition to body-worn cameras, we have rolled out nearly 250 additional emergency communication devices (ECDs) with Global Positioning System functionality for colleagues to connect quickly with emergency services if they feel threatened. ECDs are a small and portable keyring device which, when pressed in an emergency, connect directly to an emergency services operator, opening a two-way communication channel. Using advanced real-time data and geolocation technology, they provide all the information needed

to dispatch a priority response, removing the need for colleagues to tell the operator their location, name, and contact details, saving time in emergencies when a rapid response is critical. The information is also usable as evidence in police investigations. The devices have been issued to both non-operational and operational teams, in line with requirements for the public-facing activities they undertake.

- 5.15 Training and guidance for colleagues are an important part of our approach, ensuring that the information reflects best practice in managing risks. We have reviewed and updated a suite of conflict management and de-escalation safety guidance. This includes guidance covering working safe to stay safe, bladed weapons, physical incidents, self-defence and attending court. We have bolstered our classroom training with a new e-learning module.
- 5.16 In March 2024, we launched our new programme of conflict management training for customer-facing operational teams. We have recruited additional trainers to accelerate the delivery of this training which provides essential knowledge and skills including positive interactions to reduce the risks of WVA and de-escalation skills. The 2024 one-year training programme is targeting those most at risk of WVA (up to 2,000 colleagues working in our top 25 WVA hotspots), across London Underground, Bus Operations and River Services, while we work on a TfL-wide long-term approach – including making training available to all colleagues, new starters, and refresher training. To date, 1,700 colleagues have participated in this new training.
- 5.17 On 19 August 2024, we launched a new external communications campaign to tackle WVA. The campaign, Abuse Has Consequences, carries a strong message and warning that anyone who abuses our staff will face consequences. This aims to reassure colleagues that we will support them and that we will push for the strongest penalties, and challenge perpetrators by focusing on the likelihood of getting caught. Campaign activity includes marketing posters in station ticket halls and bus stops (examples of which are included below); a paid social media video; communications to support colleagues; and national and local press coverage at hotspot areas to highlight successful prosecutions and stakeholder engagement.




5.18 We have established a new Bus Operators WVA Steering Group bringing together representatives from our bus operating companies. The steering group will help guide and oversee activity to reduce levels of WVA towards bus colleagues, improve reporting of incidents and post incident support for colleagues who have experienced WVA. As part of this steering group, we have had focused analysis of WVA incident data for bus drivers, provided insight from other teams working to keep bus drivers safe, such as the TSEs, and had discussions around improving reporting of WVA. We share regular information on initiatives and activity relevant to bus operators and their drivers.

5.19 Our train operators do not currently report high levels of WVA however they do face particular WVA risks especially when asking customers to leave trains at the end of service. This winter, we will be launching a new internal campaign encouraging train operators to report all incidents of WVA and make them aware of the support the WVA team provides. We will monitor trends closely to identify and respond to any that emerge.

6 Protecting our organisation from the risk of fare evasion

6.1 Fare evasion takes away vital revenue from us and denies Londoners investment in a safe, frequent, and reliable transport service. We aim to reduce fare evasion to a rate of under 1.5 per cent by 2030. We are taking a bold, target driven and agile approach to tackling fare evasion. Fare evasion not only impacts our finances but also the confidence and safety of our front-line teams and fare paying customers.

6.2 Our end of year (2023/24) rate of fare evasion was 3.8 per cent, a slight decrease on 3.9 per cent in 2022/23. Our most recent quarterly results (Quarter1 2024/25) showed a 3.4 per cent rate across all public transport modes..




6.3 Our strategic approach to revenue protection has multiple elements but at its core is the fundamental work of our frontline revenue protection teams. We have officers dedicated to revenue protection on every mode, and we are


working to strengthen their productivity, performance, and impact, guided by an ethical and proportionate approach to enforcement. Our current intelligence assessment continues to focus revenue protection team activity on the use across rail modes of contactless payment cards (CPC). Each mode has set a target to increase the number of CPC checks on board services and inside stations. On the Elizabeth line alone, there has been a more than 200 per cent increase in the number of CPC checks completed since the start of this year. Last year, our teams conducted over five million checks on CPCs, issuing 343,290 Revenue Inspection Charges, recouping £2.6m to reinvest in our network.

- 6.4 In 2023/24 our revenue protection teams across the network issued over 64,000 penalty fares and submitted over 21,000 reports to our central Investigation, Appeals and Prosecutions team to be reviewed for possible prosecution.
- 6.5 We are in the process of expanding our pan-modal investigation team to pursue persistent fare evaders who leave a digital footprint on our network. During 2023/24, the team investigated 414 passengers on the London Underground network and identified more than £363,000 of avoided fares.
- 6.6 Working with University College London, City University and with the London Interdisciplinary School, we are gaining further insight into attitudes towards fare evasion and behaviour change nudges. We recently launched our customer-facing fare evasion campaign which can now be seen across our network bearing the message 'A Fare Is Less Than A Fine,' and have completed trials of different customer messaging approaches to share and promote enforcement results at our stations. We have also embarked on a new series of social media content using our revenue colleagues to explain the consequences of fare evasion and the role of our enforcement teams.
- 6.7 We continue to develop our approach to benchmarking and are working closely with transport authorities around the world. To support how we benchmark ourselves in a global setting we recently held a fare evasion focussed summit with authorities from Europe and North America. Future calls will cover design, behaviour change, enforcement, technology and emerging trends to benchmark ourselves against. We will work with this new network to include other authorities from the Americas and Europe to obtain further insight.
- 6.8 The below tables (in 6.9 and 6.10) provide an overview of fare evasion rates from cities around the world for comparable Metro and Bus Networks. While time periods for comparison vary it is understood that London has lower rates compared with some cities in the United States. While further benchmarking is required for European cities to form a meaningful comparison, London has been identified as middling compared to other global metro systems.

6.9 The table below shows fare evasion rates in comparable metro networks with London Underground reporting 5.1 per cent, Toronto 6.3 per cent, Washington 13 per cent and New York 14 per cent.



6.10 The table below shows fare evasion rates in comparable bus networks with London buses reporting 2.4 per cent, New York 49 per cent and Washington circa 70 per cent.



6.11 With our long-term aim to reduce fare evasion to below 1.5 per cent by 2030, we will monitor our progress and evaluate our operational approach, trials, and interventions to identify what works. We will seek to continuously review, learn from, and improve how we tackle fare evasion on our network. A key success measure to future interventions is obtaining feedback from our teams and listening to suggestions and ideas to inform future trials.

7 Ending Violence Against Women and Girls

7.1 Violence against women and girls is a serious, prevalent, and preventable issue. It can take many forms. As customers, women and girls are disproportionately affected by sexual offences and harassment while travelling in London by public transport, in taxi and private hire vehicles, walking and cycling. Intersectionality further increases vulnerability and fear of crime. Our

colleagues working on the transport network also experience sexual offences and harassment from customers, as a form of WVA.

- 7.2 Building on a strong foundation of safety and security measures to keep all our customers and colleagues safe, we have a programme of action to tackle violence against women and girls. Tackling violence against women and girls and improving confidence to travel is also a policing priority for the British Transport Police (BTP) and the MPS Roads and Transport Policing Command, reflected in the scale and range of policing and engagement activity they are undertaking in partnership with us.
- 7.3 Our Ending Violence Against Women and Girls programme (EVAWG programme) is informed by research and insight from the lived experiences of women and girls, and active engagement with the Violence against Women and Girls sector, academics, and community-led organisations. It includes over 50 projects covering eight key themes.
- 7.4 Key deliverables and updates from the programme are included below.

Theme 1 – data, analysis and research

- 7.5 We recently concluded an in-depth independent research study to understand the current experiences of women and girls travelling on London's public transport system and how this impacts their confidence to travel. The research, which involved a diverse sample of 3,000 women, girls, and parents of girls, is being used to inform, and help to prioritise interventions as part of our EVAWG programme.
- 7.6 The research showed that women and girls feel safe travelling most of the time. However, concerns about unwanted sexual behaviour, and experience of this behaviour, on journeys involving public transport in London is high. Concerns and experience relate to the entire door-to-door journey, to and from public transport, waiting at a stop or station or on public transport. These experiences impact women and girls' journeys in the moment (adapting their behaviour, changing carriage or mode) yet many still carry on with their journey. Women and girls are not walking around in a perpetual state of high fear and worry as they go around their normal day to day journey. There are moments and scenarios where fears are heightened and these are occasional rather than regular episodes of worry.
- 7.7 The research also showed that concerns about safety and security are impacting the journeys women and girls make or choose not to make. While most women who avoid journeys do so infrequently, of those who are, 23 per cent do so weekly. Improving their confidence to travel should result in more public transport journeys being made, more often. Forty per cent of women (approximately 1.5 million) have been deterred from taking a journey on public transport because of concerns about their safety and security. This is higher for women under the age of 55, those living in inner London and LGBTQ+ women.

- 7.8 Women and girls recognise that a range of initiatives are needed to keep them safe. Visual cues of safety and security are important – the transport network being well-maintained, well-lit, free from graffiti and litter, with active and engaged, uniformed staff being guardians of the network. The absence of these cues has a big impact on how safe or unsafe they feel.
- 7.9 This research has validated the measures and workstreams we have in place in our EVAWG programme. Measures ranked highest by women and girls were those that could help keep them safe in a moment of ‘danger’ but there was recognition that ‘behind the scenes’ prevention work is important. High priorities included:
- (a) policing and enforcement officers, particularly at night;
 - (b) visible, engaged and trained frontline transport staff (at locations and times when they are most needed by women and girls);
 - (c) CCTV and improved lighting (including at bus stops);
 - (d) help points and passenger alarms; and
 - (e) increased mobile connectivity.
- 7.10 None of the initiatives expected by women and girls for them to feel safe are new or difficult to deliver. It is about dialling up and building on what we are doing already or have planned but bringing the perspective and insight of women and girls into the centre of decision-making.

Theme 2 – technology and assets

- 7.11 We are progressing several technology and data actions, which are not only important for improving the safety of women and girls but for all customers and colleagues. The most complex and costly of these is the installation of on-train CCTV on the Central and Piccadilly lines. On-train CCTV on the Central line is being installed as part of a major upgrade programme that will improve on-train communications, lighting, and accessibility across the fleet. The first train with CCTV began running in November 2023. The upgrade programme will be completed in 2029. New Piccadilly line trains planned for introduction from the end of 2025 will also have CCTV.
- 7.12 We also have work underway to improve the functionality and integration of emergency help points into our Rail Control Centre.

Theme 3 – training and behaviour change

- 7.13 Sexual harassment training is being rolled out to all our frontline customer-facing colleagues and enforcement officers to help them respond to reports, support customers and each other and challenge behaviour. Training for our enforcement officers and the Bus Operations team is now complete and training to London Underground customer service colleagues is on track for completion by April 2025. To date, over 50 per cent of London Underground frontline colleagues have attended face to face sessions. In addition, approximately 20 per cent of London’s 25,000 bus drivers have completed the

enhanced Equality and Diversity training, which covers sexual harassment and hate crime scenarios among other issues.

- 7.14 Project Guardian school sessions continue to be an essential part of our activity to tackle sexual offending and harassment on public transport and help raise awareness of sexual offending and harassment, reassuring young people how seriously we take this issue and what we are doing to tackle it and encourage reporting. These sessions are run by the London Transport Museum's Safety and Citizenship team and supported by the MPS and BTP. The sessions now reach over 28,000 year 9 students every year. The feedback from schools and students has been excellent.

Theme 4 – communications and engagement

- 7.15 We have two complementary campaigns focussed on tackling sexual offending and harassment on public transport. The first element, zero tolerance to sexual harassment, was first launched in 2021. It was developed in partnership with the Rail Delivery Group, our transport policing partners, academics and experts in the field of women's safety and sexual violence. The campaign, which includes posters across the network and social media, aims to challenge this behaviour, sending a message to offenders that it is wrong, harmful and will not be tolerated on our services.
- 7.16 The second campaign aims to encourage active bystander intervention. Research shows that bystander intervention can be an effective way of stopping sexual harassment before it happens, as bystanders play a key role in preventing, discouraging, and/or intervening when an act of violence has the potential to occur. Bystanders can also support victims so they do not feel isolated, and they can report incidents to transport staff or the police. Research from London TravelWatch showed that 63 per cent of Londoners wanted to intervene but did not know how. The bystander campaign aims to address that by providing clear and simple steps – distract, report, support – to safely intervene in the moment or after an incident.
- 7.17 These campaigns, alongside other activity to encourage and make it easier for customers to report incidents, have contributed to an increase in reporting. Reports of sexual offences and sexual harassment increased by 36 per cent between 2019/20 and 2023/24 (from 1,975 to 2,672 offences). The most significant increase was seen in reports of sexual harassment offences on London Underground and Rail. This is a result of BTP leading the way for police forces by recording and reporting on sexual harassment offences since 2021 and puts them in good stead for the introduction of the sex-based harassment in public offence due to be introduced later this year.
- 7.18 The increase in reporting was anticipated after both campaign launches and is a positive sign that the campaign is working given that sexual offending and sexual harassment is significantly underreported. Tracking research has not indicated any significant increase in incidents on the network, therefore the increase in number of reports is a positive sign that the campaign is helping to raise awareness of what constitutes sexual harassment and our zero-tolerance approach to any form of abuse on our network.

- 7.19 We are nearing completion of the rollout of signage across our public transport networks (on vehicle and at stations) to give customers advice on what to do in an emergency and how to report crime. Signage at bus stops will be completed later this year.

Theme 5 – strategy, policy and legislation

- 7.20 As part of our EVAWG programme, we made a commitment to review our policies and strengthen our approach to work-related sexual harassment, which disproportionately affects women.
- 7.21 Our work in this area has put us in good stead for a change in legislation brought about by the Worker Protection (Amendment of Equality Act 2010) Act 2023, that puts a legal duty on employers to take reasonable steps to prevent sexual harassment in the workplace. This duty came into effect on 26 October 2024. We have developed guidance and supporting training that covers all our colleagues, recognising that anyone can be a victim or perpetrator of work-related sexual harassment. It covers the:
- (a) commitments we are making to prevent work-related sexual harassment;
 - (b) responsibilities for people leaders who have a duty of care for their staff and an important role to provide a safe and inclusive working environment for their team;
 - (c) support available to colleagues who have been affected by work-related sexual harassment and how they can deal with the matter informally or through formal routes; and
 - (d) role of bystanders e.g., colleagues that are witness to this behaviour and how they can respectfully challenge this behaviour and support colleagues who are experiencing it.
- 7.22 We continue to work with our police partners and Government to prepare for the introduction of the sex-based harassment in public offence that is due to go live later this year. BTP is leading the way in this area, having separately recorded and reported on sexual harassment public order offences since 2021.

Theme 6 – Public realm and service changes

- 7.23 As part of the Mayor’s strategy to end violence against women and girls, we, in partnership with the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC), commissioned “We Made That” to undertake a trial of women’s safety audits in five different types of locations in five different boroughs. Women’s safety audits provide an opportunity to better understand the perceptions and experiences of women, girls and gender diverse people in their use of public spaces and what is needed to make them safer and to feel safer.
- 7.24 Through this project, we, with MOPAC, will be assessing how useful the audit process is in encouraging the participation of women and girls and capturing

their views, to inform the way that organisations plan, design and manage public spaces with their safety in mind.

- 7.25 Five audits were completed as part of the project. We are currently reviewing the findings from the project and considering how the audit process can be embedded into our work and other organisations in how we plan, design and manage public spaces. Findings and recommendations will be shared with the Panel in due course.

Theme 7 – Innovation

- 7.26 We have been working with the Home Office's Accelerated Capability Environment unit which delivers on public safety and security challenges arising from rapidly changing digital and data technologies to explore how new and emerging technology could support the police and our efforts to tackle violence against women and girls on the bus network.
- 7.27 In line with the Mayor's commitments, we are working with the MPS to install and trial the use of specially designed CCTV cameras at 20 bus shelters in London. The first five cameras were installed in March 2024 as part of a technology test. The installation of the remaining 15 cameras was completed in November. The trial will assess the benefits of the cameras for crime prevention and investigation and on women and girls' perceptions of safety and security. The trial will run for one year until November 2025.

Theme 8 – delivering justice

- 7.28 Our efforts to tackle violence against women and girls are focussed on sexual offences and harassment given that girls are disproportionately impacted by these offences. Significant effort including large scale communication campaigns has gone into encouraging women and girls to report any unwanted sexual behaviour that makes them feel uncomfortable to the police. These reports can then be investigated and/or help to inform ours and police preventative measures.
- 7.29 Police data shows that the solved rate for sexual offences on public transport is around three times higher than the national average at 10 per cent, even with most offences being stranger offences where the victim and suspect are not known to each other. This is higher for offences where the victim is willing and able to support the police investigation and prosecution. We are working with police to improve outcomes for victims which can include, but is not limited to, criminal justice outcomes.

List of appendices to this report:

None

List of Background Papers:

None

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Safety and Security Panel

Date: 2 December 2024

Item: Risk and Assurance Report Quarter 2 2024/25

This paper will be considered in public

1 Summary

- 1.1 This report provides the Panel with an overview of the status of and changes to Enterprise Risk 01 (ER01) – ‘Inability to deliver safety objectives and obligations’, and Enterprise Risk 04 (ER04) – ‘Significant security incident including cyber security’.
- 1.2 This report also summarises the findings from the associated assurance activity of these risks based on second line of defence audit work by the Quality, Safety and Security Assurance (QSSA) team and third line of assurance work by the Internal Audit team within TfL’s Risk and Assurance Directorate. The paper covers the work during Quarter 2 of 2024/25 (23 June to 14 September 2024) (Q2).
- 1.3 A paper is included on Part 2 of the agenda, which contains supplementary information that is exempt from publication by virtue of paragraph 3 of Schedule 12A of the Local Government Act 1972 in that it contains information relating to the business and financial affairs of TfL that is commercially sensitive and likely to prejudice TfL’s commercial position. Any discussion of that exempt information must take place after the press and public have been excluded from this meeting.

2 Recommendation

- 2.1 **The Panel is asked to note the paper and the exempt supplementary information on Part 2 of the agenda.**

3 TfL Enterprise Risks

- 3.1 In line with the latest rolling 12 month Enterprise Risk schedule for submissions to Committees and Panels, ER04 is scheduled to be reviewed by the TfL Executive Committee on 5 December 2024 and by this Panel on 12 February 2025. ER04 is being updated following the cyber security incident. ER01 will be presented at the 10 April 2025 Executive Committee meeting and the first meeting of this Panel in the 2025/26 financial year.

4 Annual Audit Plans

- 4.1 The annual QSSA and Internal Audit plans contain a series of audits at the second line and third line respectively that address ER01 and ER04. Audits against other Enterprise Risks are also reported to the applicable Committee or Panel as well as the Audit and Assurance Committee.

- 4.2 Internal Audit and QSSA both concluded audit planning last quarter in consultation with key stakeholders across TfL and owners of ER01 and ER04 risks and controls. The Internal Audit plan for the second half of 2024/25 was approved by the Audit and Assurance Committee on 18 September 2024 and will be updated as appropriate to facilitate any additional audits that might be required as a result of the cyber incident. The QSSA audit plan has been shared with all risk owners and audit sponsors for consultation in line with our process.

5 Work of Note this Quarter

- 5.1 Appendix 1 provides details of the Internal Audit and QSSA audits undertaken in Q2. Audit reports issued are given a conclusion of 'well controlled', 'adequately controlled', 'requires improvement' or 'poorly controlled'. Individual findings within audit reports are rated as high, medium or low priority.

Internal Audit

- 5.2 In Q2 Internal Audit issued one audit against ER01 'Bus Safety Programme' which was rated as 'requires improvement'. Three internal audit reports were issued against ER04, 'Ransomware project', 'Business continuity – non operational' and 'Datacentre network refresh', all of which were rated as 'requires improvement'. Additional information is provided in Appendix 1.
- 5.3 One internal audit was in progress at the end of Q2 'Obsolescence of critical hosting software platforms'. This will provide assurance on ER04 and will be reported at the next meeting of this Panel on 12 February 2025.

Quality, Safety and Security Assurance

- 5.4 Three second line QSSA audits were delivered in Q2 against ER01 and there were no QSSA audits against ER04. The three audits were 'Management of Fatigue: Dial-a-Ride' which was rated as 'requires improvement', 'Victoria Coach Station Safety, Health and Environment (SHE) Compliance' which was rated as 'adequately controlled' and 'Hainault Train Crew' Integrated Systems Audit. The Integrated Systems Audits assess London Underground (LU) Operations teams' assesses compliance with a range of risks and management system requirements and are therefore not rated. Further details are contained in Appendix 1.
- 5.5 QSSA did not issue any audits in Q2 that were concluded as 'poorly controlled' and all the above audits have an agreed and tracked action plan in place as set out in Appendix 1.
- 5.6 Eleven QSSA audits from the 2024/25 plan were in progress at the end of Q2 against ER01:
- (a) Elizabeth line Safety Reporting;
 - (b) Emergency Response Unit Integrated System Audit;
 - (c) LU Arsenal Area Integrated Systems Audit;
 - (d) LU Jubilee North Area Integrated Systems Audit;

- (e) LU Mornington Crescent Area Integrated Systems Audit;
- (f) LU Stations and Trains Competence Management System;
- (g) LU Whitechapel Integrated Systems Audit;
- (h) Protection Supplier Audit - 1st in Rail;
- (i) Protection Supplier Audit - Global Media;
- (j) Supplier Audit: Alstom Elizabeth line; and
- (k) TfL Operations Bus Station and Network Traffic Control - SHE Compliance.

5.7 No QSSA audits against ER04 were in progress at the end of Q2.

Counter-Fraud and Corruption

5.8 The Counter-Fraud and Corruption team investigate all allegations of fraud and corruption involving TfL employees, non-permanent labour and third parties (including suppliers, customers and organised criminals). These cases are part of the wider fraud reporting that is submitted to the Audit and Assurance Committee.

6 Cancelled and Deferred Work

6.1 One QSSA audit against ER01 was deferred in Q2 'SHE Governance, Leadership, Culture and Improvement'. This audit was deferred due to a management review taking place at the same time.

7 Performance and Trends

7.1 Performance data is provided in Appendix 2 on progress against the audit plan, audit ratings, rating trends by Enterprise Risk and business unit and progress against actions, with comparisons provided across the last two years.

Internal Audit

7.2 Nine ER01 and ER04 internal audits were completed in the last four quarters compared with five in the preceding four quarters. This is due to an increase in the number of ER04 audits identified through our risk-based approach to internal audit planning.

7.3 At the end of Q2 there were four internal audit actions against ER01 and ER04 that were overdue, all by less than 30 days. Over the last six periods there has been a steady increase in the number of actions closed on time and a reduction in the number of actions extended.

Quality, Safety and Security Assurance

- 7.4 Comparing the number of ER01 and ER04 QSSA audits for Quarter 3 (Q3) of 2022/23 to Q2 2023/24 (70 audits) with Q3 2023/24 to Q2 2024/25 (59 audits) there has been a reduction in the number of audits completed by 16 per cent. The performance in Quarter 1 of 2024/25 and Q2 has been impacted by staff moves and the subsequent recruitment and training of new team members. The distribution of conclusion by Chief Officer team and Enterprise Risk however remains reasonably consistent across the two years.
- 7.5 The distribution of audit conclusions is consistent across the two years. One audit was concluded as 'poorly controlled' in Q3 2022/23 to Q2 2023/24 compared with two in Q3 2023/24 to Q2 2024/25.
- 7.6 Work continues on the close out of management of actions, particularly overdue actions with management teams and the relevant Chief Officer. At the end of Q2 there were 20 overdue actions for ER01 and ER04 out of 57 open actions with 12 overdue by 100 days or more. However, since the end of Q2 this has reduced to four overdue by 100 days or more. All actions that are overdue by more than 100 days are reported to the Audit and Assurance Committee and are discussed with Chief Officers.

List of appendices:

Appendix 1: QSSA and Internal Audits Completed in Q2 against ER01 and ER04

Appendix 2: QSSA and Internal Audit Summary

A paper containing exempt supplementary information is included on Part 2 of the agenda.

Background papers:

None

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Appendix 1 – Quality, Safety and Security Assurance Audits Completed in Quarter 2 of 2024/25

ER01 Inability to deliver safety objectives and obligations

Chief Officer	Ref.	Audit Title	Objectives	Conclusion	Summary of Findings
Chief Operating Officer	24 723	Victoria Coach Station Safety, Health and Environment (SHE) Compliance	To seek assurance that Victoria Coach Station are suitably managing their SHE risks through compliance with TfL SHE Management System	Adequately Controlled	There were a number of areas to strengthen but generally there was evidence that there were suitable controls in place to manage the health and safety of individuals at Victoria Coach Station.
Chief Operating Officer	24 735	Management of Fatigue: Dial-a-Ride	To seek assurance that risks from fatigue are being adequately managed in compliance with TfL Standards	Requires Improvement	Issues have been raised regarding the sufficiency of risk assessments for the management of fatigue controls, this includes the monitoring of community transport subcontractors that undertake work for Dial-a-Ride. Other issues raised relate to the administration of competency assessments, roles and responsibilities, and the tracking of the mandatory 'core' TfL fatigue key performance indicators.

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Integrated Systems Audits

Chief Officer	Ref.	Audit Title	Objectives	Conclusion	Summary of Findings
Chief Operating Officer	24 706	Hainault Traincrew Integrated Systems Audit	To provide assurance that key requirements contained in the Management System are being met	Not Rated	80 per cent conformance: 28 compliant findings; One minor non-compliance; Six major non-compliances.

Internal Audit: Draft reports issued in Quarter 2 of 2024/25

ER01 Inability to deliver safety objectives and obligations

Chief Officer	Ref	Audit Title	Objectives	Conclusion	Summary of Findings
Chief Operating Officer	24 002	Bus Safety Retrofit Programme	Provide assurance on the adequacy and effectiveness of key controls to deliver the Bus Safety Programme	Requires Improvement	Project management arrangements for the Retrofit programme are in the process of being formalised. Risk management arrangements are still developing, there is no formal change control, a gate strategy is yet to be confirmed and project business cases need updating. It was difficult to ascertain programme progress from the reporting provided.


ER4 Significant security incident including cyber security

Chief Officer	Ref	Audit Title	Objectives	Conclusion	Summary of Findings
Chief Customer and Strategy Officer	24 033	Ransomware project	Provide assurance that Technology and Data's cyber vault technology was implemented as planned, and the extent to which it mitigates the ransomware threat to TfL	Requires Improvement	We found that good progress had been made in the delivery of the cyber vault project and associated infrastructure. However, there are still risks and challenges to address.
Chief Operating Officer	24 011	Business Continuity – non operational	Assess the adequacy of controls operating for non-operational business continuity	Requires Improvement	The business continuity Policy and Strategy has yet to be approved and communicated via the Management System. Despite the best efforts of the team, this has led to a lack of compliance across the organisation.
Chief Customer and	24 007	Datacentre network refresh	Assess and evaluate the adequacy of plans to replace out of	Requires Improvement	Risks identified include the failure to define and implement the strategy for the migration of key applications and services from the legacy (old) network

Strategy Officer			support network infrastructure in TfL's third party hosted datacentres		to the new network, the absence of a clearly defined assurance framework, and the skills needed to provide an adequate level of assurance on the work that is delivered and tested by the supplier.
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Appendix 2 : Quality Safety Security Assurance Audit Summary

Audit Progress against Q1 & Q2 2024/25 Plan



Action Management (ER01 & ER04) - By Enterprise Risk by Overdue Days




(Note the number off 100+ overdue actions is now four since the end of Q2)

Action Management (ER01 & ER04)- By Directorate by Overdue Days


Directorate	Overdue Actions	Closed on time (6-period)
Chief Capital Officer		0%
Chief Customer and Strategy Officer		100%
Chief Finance Officer		0%
Chief Operating Officer	6 (0-30 days), 11 (31-60 days), 12 (100+ days)	48%
Chief People Officer		100%
Chief SHE Officer		100%
Crossrail		
General Counsel		

■ 0-30 days
 ■ 31-60 days
 ■ 61-100 days
 ■ 100+ days

Audit Conclusion Comparison by Chief Officer Team (over 4 quarters)




Audit Conclusion Comparison by Enterprise Risk (over 4 quarters)



Internal Audit Summary

All Audit Progress against Q1 & Q2 2024/25 Plan



Action Management (ER01 & ER04) - By Enterprise Risk by Overdue Days

At the end of Q2, there were four actions overdue by 30 days or less within the Chief Operating Officer's team.

All relate to ER01 Inability to deliver safety objectives and obligations.

Audit Conclusion Comparison by Chief Officer Team (over 4 quarters)

	Q3 22/23 - Q2 23/24			Total	Q3 23/24 - Q2 24/25				Total
Chief Customer and Strategy Officer	1	1	1	3	1	4	1	1	7
Chief Operating Officer	1			1	2				2
Chief SHE Officer	1			1					

Audit Conclusion Comparison by Enterprise Risk (over 4 quarters)

	Q3 22/23 - Q2 23/24			Total	Q3 23/24 - Q2 24/25				Total
ER01 Inability to deliver safety objectives and obligations	1			1	1	1			2
ER04 Significant incident including cyber security	1	1	1	4	5	1	1		7

Poorly Controlled
 Requires Improvement
 Adequately Controlled
 Well Controlled
 Not Rated

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Safety and Security Panel



Date: 2 December 2024

Item: Members' Suggestions for Future Discussion Items

This paper will be considered in public

1 Summary

- 1.1 This paper presents the current forward programme for the Panel and explains how this is put together. Members are invited to suggest additional future discussion.

2 Recommendation

- 2.1 **The Panel is asked to note the forward programme and invited to raise any suggestions for future discussion items.**

3 Forward Plan Development

- 3.1 The Board and its Committees and Panels have forward plans. The content of the plans arise from a number of sources:
- (a) Standing items for each meeting: Minutes; Matters Arising and Actions List; and any regular quarterly reports. For this Panel these are the Health, Safety and Security Quarterly Report and the Human Resources Quarterly Report.
 - (b) Regular items which are for review and approval or noting such as the Health, Safety and Environment Annual Report.
 - (c) Items requested by Members: The Deputy Chair of TfL and the Chair of this Panel will regularly review the forward plan and may suggest items. Other items will arise out of actions from previous meetings (including meetings of the Board or other Committees and Panels) and any issues suggested under this agenda item.

4 Current Plan

- 4.1 The current plan is attached as Appendix 1. The plan is being reviewed and will be updated for the next meeting of the Panel.

List of appendices to this report:

Appendix 1: Safety and Security Panel Plan

List of Background Papers:

None

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Safety and Security Panel Forward Planner 2024/25

Appendix 1

Membership: Zoë Billingham CBE (Chair), Omid Shiraji (Vice Chair), Seb Dance, Mark Phillips, and Peter Strachan.

Abbreviations: CCO (Chief Capital Officer), CCSO (Chief Customer and Strategy Officer), CFO (Chief Finance Officer), COO (Chief Operating Officer), CSHEO (Chief Safety, Health and Environment Officer), D (Director), Director of Risk and Assurance (DRA)

12 February 2025		
Safety and Security Quarterly Report	CSHEO / COO	Standing item
Annual Culture Report	CSHEO	To note
Public Transport Safety Update	CSHEO	To note
Customer Safety and Security Update: Crime Statistics	COO	To note
Risk and Assurance Report	DRA	Standing item
Enterprise Risk Update: Significant security incident including cyber security (ER04)	COO	Annual item

[TBC] May 2025		
Safety and Security Quarterly Report	CSHEO	Standing item
Risk and Assurance Report	DRA	Standing item
Enterprise Risk Update – Inability to Deliver Safety Objectives and Obligations (ER01)	CSHEO	Annual item

[TBC] September 2025		
Safety and Security Quarterly Report	CSHEO	Standing item
Risk and Assurance Report	DRA	Standing item

[TBC] November 2025		
Safety and Security Quarterly Report	CSHEO	Standing item
Risk and Assurance Report	DRA	Standing item

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