

# Agenda

Meeting: Safety and Security Panel

Date: Wednesday 12 February 2025

Time: 10:00

# Place: Conference Rooms 1 & 2 -Palestra, 197 Blackfriars Road, London, SE1 8NJ

#### Members

Zoë Billingham CBE (Chair) Omid Shiraji (Vice-Chair) Seb Dance Mark Phillips Peter Strachan

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This meeting will be open to the public and webcast live on <u>TfL YouTube channel</u>, except for where exempt information is being discussed as noted on the agenda.

#### **Further Information**

If you have questions, would like further information about the meeting or require special facilities please contact: James Varley, Secretariat Officer: <u>jamesvarley@tfl.gov.uk</u>

For media enquiries please contact the TfL Press Office; telephone: 0343 222 4141; email: <u>PressOffice@tfl.gov.uk</u>

Andrea Clarke, General Counsel Tuesday 4 February 2025

# **1** Apologies for Absence and Chair's Announcements

#### 2 Declarations of Interests

**General Counsel** 

Members are reminded that any interests in a matter under discussion must be declared at the start of the meeting, or at the commencement of the item of business.

Members must not take part in any discussion or decision on such a matter and, depending on the nature of the interest, may be asked to leave the room during the discussion.

3 Minutes of the Meeting of the Safety and Security Panel held on 2 December 2024 (Pages 1 - 8)

**General Counsel** 

The Panel is asked to approve the minutes of the meeting of the Safety and Security Panel held on 2 December 2024 and authorise the Chair to sign them.

4 Matters Arising and Actions List (Pages 9 - 12)

General Counsel

The Panel is asked to note the report.

5 Rail Customer Safety Update (Pages 13 - 22)

Chief Safety, Health and Environment Officer

The Panel is asked to note the paper.

# 6 2024 Crime and Antisocial Behaviour Update (Pages 23 - 46)

Chief Operating Officer

The Panel is asked to note the paper.

# 7 Safeguarding Customers at TfL (Pages 47 - 52)

Chief Operating Officer

The Panel is asked to note the paper.

# 8 Enterprise Risk Update - Significant Security Incident including Cyber Security (ER04) (Pages 53 - 58)

Chief Safety, Health and Environment Officer / Chief Operating Officer

The Panel is asked to note the report and the exempt supplementary information on Part 2 of the agenda.

# 9 Safety, Health and Security Report Quarter 3 2024/25 (Pages 59 - 100)

Chief Safety, Health and Environment Officer and Chief Operating Officer

The Panel is asked to note the report.

#### **10** Risk and Assurance Report Quarter 3 2024/25 (Pages 101 - 112)

Director of Risk and Assurance

The Panel is asked to note the report and the exempt supplementary information on Part 2 of the agenda.

#### **11** Members' Suggestions for Future Discussion Items (Pages 113 - 116)

**General Counsel** 

The Panel is asked to note the forward plan and is invited to raise any suggestions for future discussion items.

# 12 Any Other business the Chair Considers Urgent

The Chair will state the reason for urgency of any item taken.

#### 13 Date of Next Meeting

Monday 19 May 2025 at 10.00am

## 14 Exclusion of Press and Public

The Panel is recommended to agree to exclude the press and public from the meeting, in accordance with paragraph XX of Schedule 12A to the Local Government Act 1972 (as amended), in order to consider the following items of business.

15 Enterprise Risk Update - Significant Security Incident including Cyber Security (ER04) (Pages 117 - 134)

Exempt supplementary information relating to the item on Part 1 of the agenda.

**16 Risk and Assurance Report Quarter 3 2024/25** (Pages 135 - 136)

Exempt supplementary information relating to the item on Part 1 of the agenda.

# Agenda Item 3

# **Transport for London**

# Minutes of the Safety and Security Panel

# Conference Rooms 1 and 2, Ground Floor, Palestra 197 Blackfriars Road, London, SE1 8NJ 1.30pm, Monday 2 December 2024

#### Members

Zoë Billingham CBE (Chair) Omid Shiraji (Vice Chair) Seb Dance Peter Strachan

#### **Executive Committee**

Andy Lord Andrea Clarke Claire Mann Lilli Matson Commissioner General Counsel Chief Operating Officer Chief Safety, Health and Environment Officer

#### Staff

Jules Gascoigne Siwan Hayward Lorraine Humphrey Claire Lefort Stuart Reid James Varley Shashi Verma Chief Information Security Officer Director of Security, Policing and Enforcement Director of Risk and Assurance Legal Manager Head of Insights and Direction Secretariat Officer Chief Technology Officer

# 01/12/24 Apologies for Absence and Chair's Announcements

An apology for absence had been received from Mark Phillips. The meeting was quorate.

The Chair welcomed those present to the first meeting of the Safety and Security Panel, whose purpose was to provide strategic oversight to improve TfL's safety and security culture.

Officers in regular attendance at the meeting would include Andy Lord, Andrea Clarke, Claire Mann, Lilli Matson, Siwan Hayward, Stuart Harvey, Lorraine Humphrey and Mike Shirbon.

The meeting was broadcast live to TfL's YouTube channel, except for the discussion of the information on Part 2 of the agenda which was exempt from publication, to ensure the public and press could observe the proceedings.

The Chair reminded those present that safety was paramount at TfL and encouraged Members to raise any safety issues during discussions of the relevant item or with the appropriate member of the Executive Committee after the meeting.

# 02/12/24 Declarations of Interests

Members confirmed that their declarations of interests, as published on tfl.gov.uk, were up to date and there were no interests to declare that related specifically to items on the agenda.

There had been one recent update to Members' declarations: Peter Strachan's term as Chair of the North East Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust had concluded with effect from 29 November 2024.

### 03/12/24 Minutes of the Final Meeting of the Safety, Sustainability and Human Resources Panel held on 4 September 2024

It was confirmed that Mark Phillips, who had attended the meeting on 4 September 2024, was content with the accuracy of the minutes of the meeting.

The minutes of the meeting of the Safety, Sustainability and Human Resources Panel held on 4 September 2024 were approved as a correct record, and the Chair was authorised to sign them.

# 04/12/24 Matters Arising and Actions List

Andrea Clarke introduced the item, which set out progress against an action from the final meeting of the Safety, Sustainability and Human Resources Panel.

The Panel noted the updated Actions List.

# 05/12/24 Safety, Health and Security Report – Quarter 2 2024/25

Lilli Matson and Siwan Hayward introduced the item, which provided key information and trends reported in Quarter 2 of 2024/25 (23 June to 14 September 2024), including performance against Scorecard targets.

The Panel acknowledged that safety was paramount, and it was neither inevitable nor acceptable that anyone should be killed or seriously injured when travelling in London, nor when working for TfL. TfL took a zero-tolerance approach to this, as every death or serious injury had an impact on the individuals involved but also their families and friends and anyone who witnessed an incident.

Board Members were committed to ensuring the safety of customers and colleagues. This Panel would provide stewardship and challenge to the Executive to ensure that action was being taken to address key risks, prevent harm and ensure that anyone impacted was treated with the utmost care and compassion.

Andy Lord informed the Panel that he welcomed the establishment of the Panel and its focus on safety and security. Any fatality on the TfL network was one too many and TfL recognised what a profound impact that the death of a person had on those around them. Our condolences and thoughts were always with all of those people who had tragically lost their lives or suffered a serious injury on the transport network.

Minutes of the meeting of the Safety and Security Panel, 2 December 2024

Fundamentally the transport network was safe, and TfL was not complacent and continued to focus on the Vision Zero action plan which had the target of ensuring nobody was killed or seriously injured across London's transport network by 2041. TfL would always ensure there was an appropriate response to any incident and that those affected were treated with compassion and care.

The opportunity to discuss security was welcomed, noting that some discussions may have to take place in closed session.

The report looked at performance on the TfL network and the wider road network, 95 per cent of which was managed by the London boroughs. The recent cyber security incident had impacted access to data for the report.

The colleague serious injury rate was tracking at a similar level to Quarter 2 of 2023/24. Most injuries were caused by slips, trips and falls. Activities to mitigate risk were set out in the Colleague Safety Plan which had been launched in September 2024.

Customer safety had seen improvement, with the rate of customers killed or seriously injured being seven per cent lower than in Quarter 2 of 2023/24. Platform train interface (PTI) incidents remained a focus, with the PTI safety plan being implemented to manage risk. A lot of innovative work was taking place around reducing PTI risk. The Panel would be given further information on mitigation activities for PTI incidents and in relation to incidents on escalators. [Action: Lilli Matson]

Tragically, there had been two fatalities on the London Underground network in the quarter and our thoughts and condolences are with the family and friends of those who had died.

Road safety performance was slightly above target in the quarter although lower overall than the same quarter for 2023/24. The Communications team had been engaged to look at how TfL's bus safety activity could be promoted to customers and the wider public.

While bus safety performance remained within target, tragically a fatal collision between a bus and a child had occurred in the quarter. An investigation into the incident was underway and our thoughts and condolences are with the family and friends.

Mental health and musculoskeletal conditions were the main drivers of colleague absence. The Occupational Health team was delivering ways of improving wellbeing.

The provision of security related data from the Metropolitan Police Service had been impacted by its need to stabilise its reporting platform and accordingly, the quarterly report only used data drawn from TfL's own system. It was proposed that the next report to the Panel would be used as an opportunity to bring the reporting up to date as all the relevant information would be available.

During Quarter 2, there were 2,106 incidents of workplace violence and aggression (WVA) reported across all modes. It was fundamental to TfL that all colleagues felt protected at work and action was taken to eradicate WVA for all those who were directly employed by TfL and those working for its contractors. A significant amount of work had taken place to encourage reporting and there was confidence that data was robust and gave a stable picture of what was actually happening. The vast majority of WVA was aggression and verbal abuse, with around 10 per cent of incidents motivated by hate.

Minutes of the meeting of the Safety and Security Panel, 2 December 2024

Around 15 per cent was physical and could result in injury to staff. Recent evidence showed that mitigations such as training and the use of body worn cameras had resulted in a downward trend in physical assaults. Tragic incidents in which a customer had been seriously injured or killed were rare and appropriate action was taken in response. The Panel noted that there had been a recent decrease in the rate of staff willing to support police investigations. This was a concern and was thought to reflect, at least in part, wider lack of confidence in policing. The WVA team provided support for staff attending court and the use of body worn camera evidence helped reduce the need for staff to attend court.

The reporting data was robust and manual records were maintained but some validation may be required on lower-level incident reporting. It was thought that the recent cyber security incident had a dampening effect on some reporting, and this would be better understood over time. Longer data sets would be included in future reporting and greater clarity would be provided on mitigating actions and their expected and reported impacts and outcomes. Further detail on the prioritisation of risks, perhaps through a dashboard, would also be provided together with detail on the number of passenger journeys for context. [Action: Lilli Matson]

#### The Panel noted the report.

# 06/12/24 Trends in Safety and Key Improvement Activity

Lilli Matson and Stuart Reid introduced the item, which provided an overview of trends in safety performance and key activity to maintain and improve safety outcomes in London.

TfL was working to achieve the Vision Zero targets set out in the Mayor's Transport Strategy: eliminating deaths and serious injuries from London's transport system by 2041.

In colleague safety, the overall trend was downwards, with most incidents being slips, trips and falls. There were signs of the trend levelling off and this was being monitored. Colleague safety applied to all people working 'under the roundel' which meant directly employed staff and those employed by contractors.

In customer safety, the level of risk was relatively static and unchanging. The rate of customer injuries had decreased overall recently, however increases had been seen on the rail and bus networks.

On roads, progress was being made in reducing those killed and seriously injured rates. London was ahead of the national trend although the rate of improvement was slowing down. Bus safety was trending downwards and it was acknowledged that there was further work to be done in this area.

A number of improvement activities were taking place including strengthening safety systems, targeting key risks, improved investigations, strengthening safety culture, introducing new safe track access procedures, the bus safety programme, the platform train interface safety plan and promotion of escalator safety. As 95 per cent of the road network was outside of TfL control, a safe systems approach was used alongside close working with London boroughs. TfL looked beyond the transport industry for learning and experience in safety matters, such as drawing from the retail industry for escalator safety.

The Panel requested that updates on safety activities should show the impacts of specific actions. [Action: Lilli Matson]

TfL was impacted by broader societal issues such as increases in rough sleeping. Staff had received training to recognise vulnerable people and links had been forged with local authorities and outreach agencies to allow staff to respond when they came upon people using the network for shelter. Staff were also trained in suicide prevention and each year their actions saved many lives. Overall, the aspiration was for the roundel to be seen as representing a place of safety and safeguarding. Further detail on safeguarding activities would be provided in a future report to the Panel. [Action: Siwan Hayward]

#### The Panel noted the paper.

# 07/12/24 Update on the TfL Cyber Security Incident

Andy Lord, Shashi Verma and Jules Gascoigne introduced the item, which provided an update on the cyber security incident that commenced on 31 August 2024.

The incident was subject to an ongoing criminal investigation and TfL was working closely with the National Crime Agency (NCA) and the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) who had provided support and had been complimentary about TfL's handling of the situation. TfL apologised to those impacted by the incident such as customers affected by delays to issuing concessionary cards and refunds. Lessons learnt reviews would be taking place and would be used internally and also shared with other organisations.

TfL was notified of the intrusion to its information technology systems on 1 September 2024 and responded to the incident immediately, rebuilding the Active Directory and commencing the password reset process for TfL accounts. The password reset process was challenging and required staff to attend TfL sites in person to complete the process.

The disruption to TfL's systems was the result of the activities to mitigate risk rather than arising from the intrusion into the system. This affected customers and colleagues. Customer data had been lost and contact had been made with those customers who had been offered protection in line with guidance from the Information Commissioner's Office. Security systems were replaced and the recovery followed an internal process, informed by a priority list of requirements set by TfL.

The rapid response meant that forensic evidence was secured and the attacker had been identified.

The Commissioner thanked customers for their patience and staff for dealing with the disruption and workarounds. Siwan Hayward had been Gold Commander for the first 24 hours before Carl Eddleston, Director of Network Management and Resilience, took over. Both deserved credit for the way they dealt with a very challenging situation and provided support to Shashi Verma and his team.

The Panel welcomed TfL's response to the incident and felt that the work done should be viewed as an exemplar. TfL's transparency in the matter had been noted.

An independent review would take place and was expected to commence imminently, although it may take place in stages as the recovery process continued and in view of the ongoing investigation.

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On behalf of the Panel, the Chair expressed her sincere thanks to Shashi Verma, Jules Gascoigne and the whole team across TfL who had responded to a significant incident in a way that has been exemplary in its openness with the Board and those impacted, without providing competitive advantage to those who sought to damage our systems.

The Panel noted the paper and the exempt supplementary information on Part 2 of the agenda.

# 08/12/24 Trends in Security and Key Improvement Activity

Claire Mann and Siwan Hayward introduced the item, which provided an update on Security Strategy and highlighted security improvement programmes.

As an organisation, TfL recognised that it was still maturing in terms of the way it embedded security. Good security meant protecting customers, colleagues, finances, assets, technology, data, services and operations from criminals and hostile actions that caused harm. The aim was for the organisation to be able to focus on 'prevent, deter and delay' of the security risks and also how to respond to incidents.

There was a challenge in terms of getting ahead of the threats to put in place responses and mitigations. Threats were constantly evolving and strong relationships with the police and security services were vital for this. Working closely with stakeholders, community organisations and advocacy groups was also essential.

TfL's vision was to eradicate workplace violence and aggression. Evidence from the rail industry had shown that body worn camera technology had driven a 10 per cent reduction on violence and aggression and a similar level of reduction was expected on the TfL network. Other interventions such as conflict management and use of enforcement officers helped protect colleagues.

Tacking fare evasion was fundamental to how safe the network felt for customers and a target rate of 1.5 per cent or less had been set for 2030. Different interventions were trialled to understand what worked well. Benchmarking took place with other metros to understand where London sat in comparison to other cities. Recent campaigns had highlighted the fact that fare evasion was not a victimless crime but took money from TfL that could be used to invest in the transport network.

Ending violence against women and girls was a well established workstream. While it was a widespread crime, people were able to use the transport network as it offered anonymity and crowding to facilitate offending behaviours. TfL encouraged reporting and had seen a 36 per cent increase in reporting of sexual offences and harassment, with the majority of cases being harassment. A recent survey had taken place to gain insight into how fear of harassment affected behaviour and patronage of the network. TfL publicised the behaviours that were not tolerated on the network and also promoted positive behaviours from bystanders to reduce harassment.

TfL was updating its policies in terms of prosecuting crimes and to make sure offenders and the nature of the offence were dealt with in an appropriate manner. The sanctions available could be influenced by discussions with Government and the police. The Panel welcomed the focus on ending violence against women and girls and requested consideration be given to how violence against women and girls was reported back to the Panel, highlighting priorities and trends.

#### [Action: Claire Mann/Siwan Hayward]

#### The Panel noted the paper.

## 09/12/24 Risk and Assurance Report Quarter 2 2024/25

Lorraine Humphrey introduced the item, which provided an overview of the status of and changes to Enterprise Risk 01 (ER01) – Inability to deliver safety objectives and obligations, and Enterprise Risk 04 (ER04) – Significant security incident including cyber security. It also summarised the findings from the associated assurance activity of these risks based on second line of defence audit work by the Quality, Safety and Security Assurance (QSSA) team and third line of assurance work by the Internal Audit team within TfL's Risk and Assurance Directorate.

ER04 would be presented to the Panel in February 2025 and ER01 would be presented to the first meeting of the 2025/26 meeting cycle.

The Audit Plan was agreed at the meeting of the Audit and Assurance Committee held on 18 September 2024 and, at the request of the Committee, retained flexibility to include reviews related to the recent cyber security incident.

Internal Audit issued one audit against ER01 which was rated as 'requires improvement' and three against ER04 which were all rated as 'requires improvement'. Three second line QSSA audits were delivered in the quarter against ER01, one was rated 'requires improvement, one 'adequately controlled' and the other was not rated. There were no QSSA audits against ER04. One QSSA audit against ER01 had been deferred for valid business reasons.

All audit actions related to ER04 audits were less than 30 days overdue and were expected to be closed out shortly. Four actions related to ER01 audits were overdue by more than 100 days and close out dates were in place for these.

The Panel noted the paper and the exempt supplementary information on Part 2 of the agenda.

#### **10/12/24** Members' Suggestions for Future Discussion Items

Andrea Clarke introduced the item. No additional suggestions were raised for future discussion items on the forward plan, other than those already noted during the meeting.

The Panel noted the forward plan.

# 11/12/24 Any Other Business the Chair Considers Urgent

There was no other urgent business to discuss.

# 12/12/24 Date of Next Meeting

The next scheduled meeting of the Panel would be held on Wednesday 12 February 2025 at 10.00am.

## 13/12/24 Exclusion of the Press and Public

The Panel agreed to exclude the press and public from the meeting, in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 7 of Schedule 12A to the Local Government Act 1972 (as amended), when it considered the exempt information in relation to the items on: Update on the TfL Cyber Security Incident; and Risk and Assurance Report Quarter 2 2024/25.

The meeting closed at 4.00pm.

Chair: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

# Agenda Item 4

Safety and Security Panel



Date: 12 February 2025

Item: Actions List

#### 1 Summary

- 1.1 This paper informs the Panel of progress against actions agreed at previous meetings.
- 2 Recommendation
- 2.1 The Panel is asked to note the report.

#### List of appendices to this report:

Appendix 1: Actions List

#### List of Background Papers:

Minutes of previous meetings of the Panel

Contact Officer:Andrea Clarke, General CounselEmail:AndreaClarke@tfl.gov.uk

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# Safety and Security Panel Actions List (to be reported to the meeting on 12 February 2025)

Actions from the meeting held on 2 December 2024

Minute No.	Description	Action By	Target Date	Status/note
05/12/24 (1)	Safety, Health and Security Report – Quarter 2 2024/25: Platform Train Interface (PTI) activities The Panel would be given further information on mitigation activities for PTI incidents and in relation to incidents on escalators.	Lilli Matson	February 2025	<b>Completed.</b> Members will receive a briefing on PTI incident management, which will remain a focus of the Panel. The Rail Customer Safety Update paper on the agenda includes further information on PTI risk management. Information on current escalator trials is included in the Quarter 3 (Q3) report on the agenda. Further information will be provided to subsequent meetings.
05/12/24 (1)	Safety, Health and Security Report – Quarter 2 2024/25: Risk prioritisation Further detail on the prioritisation of risks, perhaps through a dashboard, would also be provided together with detail on the number of passenger journeys for context.	Lilli Matson	February 2025	<b>Completed.</b> Information has been included in the Q3 report on the agenda and will be included in future reports.
06/12/24	Trends in Safety and Key Improvement Activity: Impact of actions The Panel requested that updates on safety activities should show the impacts of specific actions.	Lilli Matson	February 2025	<b>Completed.</b> This information is included in the Q3 report on the agenda and will be included in specific papers as required.

Minute No.	Description	Action By	Target Date	Status/note
06/12/24	Trends in Safety and Key Improvement Activity: Safeguarding activities Further detail on safeguarding activities would be provided in a future report to the Panel.	Siwan Hayward	February 2025	<b>Completed.</b> A paper on safeguarding at TfL is included on the agenda for this meeting.
08/12/24	Trends in Security and Key Improvement Activity The Panel requested consideration be given to how violence against women and girls was reported back to the Panel, highlighting priorities and trends.	Claire Mann / Siwan Hayward	November 2025	<b>Completed.</b> Item on Forward Plan.

There are no outstanding actions from previous meetings of the Safety, Sustainability and Human Resources Panel, within the remit of this Panel.

# Agenda Item 5

Safety and Security Panel



Date: 12 February 2025

Item: Rail Customer Safety Update

# This paper will be considered in public

# 1 Summary

- 1.1 This paper sets out the current status in relation to performance and achieving our targets for customer safety on rail modes (London Underground (LU), London Overground (LO), Docklands Light Railway (DLR), London Trams and the Elizabeth line). It follows the paper entitled "Trends in Safety and Key Improvement Activity", presented to the Panel in December 2024, and focuses particularly on safety of our rail customers.
- 1.2 It identifies that while the LU safety record compares favourably to other operators, we will need to do more to reduce risk to customers if we are to meet our ambitious safety targets. The paper identifies the most significant causes of customer injury and the actions we are taking to reduce risk.

#### 2 Recommendation

2.1 The Panel is asked to note the paper.

#### 3 Background

- 3.1 The Mayor's Transport Strategy Policy 11 establishes the goal of eliminating death and serious injury from London's transport networks by 2041. Our internal TfL Strategy for Safety sets out the interim target to halve customer deaths and serious injuries by 2030. This is against a baseline of 2022/23 performance, when the TfL strategy was adopted.
- 3.2 Since we adopted the current serious injury definition aligned to the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 2013 (RIDDOR) definitions in 2020/21, performance shows that the rate of deaths and serious injuries for customers using our rail modes has fallen slightly since the coronavirus pandemic and remains broadly stable, as shown in Figure 1.





Figure 1: Rate of deaths and serious injuries per million passengers

3.3 We have introduced a range of measures, described in detail in the paper entitled "Trends in Safety and Key Improvement Activity", presented to the meeting of the Panel on 2 December 2024, to strengthen our management of risks to customers and colleagues. Nevertheless, over the last four years, the generally consistent risk rate has meant that, as rail customer numbers have grown as part of the recovery from the pandemic, the absolute number of customers killed or seriously injured has grown in proportion as shown in Figure 2.



# Figure 2: Absolute numbers of deaths and serious injuries on TfL rail services

3.4 The great majority of the incidents that are included within the 'killed and seriously injured' category are serious injuries, not fatalities. While direct comparisons of serious injuries prior to 2020 are not possible due to the alignment of serious injury definition with industry standard RIDDOR classification at that time, customer fatalities from financial year 2018/19 have been provided in Table 1 to give a longer time series (this excludes incidents where people deliberately take their own life).

Financial Year	Rail modes
2018/19	2
2019/20	2
2020/21	4
2021/22	2
2022/23	3
2023/24	7

#### Table 1: Customer fatalities since 2018/19

- 3.5 Every single death is a tragedy, and we are determined to eventually eliminate the number that occur, in line with our Vision Zero ambition. Nevertheless, the total number is small when compared to the overall number of passenger journeys and so trends must be interpreted with caution. Since 2018/19 rail customer fatalities per year have ranged from two to seven per annum, in the context of over 1.7 billion customer journey stages (in 2023/24, <u>Travel in London 2024 Trends in public transport demand and operational performance (tfl.gov.uk)</u>).
- 3.6 As is evident from Figure 2 above, the majority of rail customer injuries on TfL modes take place on LU, reflecting the high numbers of users of LU services. However, the overall injury rate on LU is comparable to that of mainline services at a national level and the rate of more severe injuries is notably lower. The passenger injury rate for LU in 2023/24 was 3.44 injuries (of any severity) per million journeys (against a total of over 1.18 billion journeys in 2023/24). Comparison to data published by the Office of Rail and Road (ORR), the regulator for rail services, shows that for mainline services the injury rate was 3.88 injuries per million journeys in the same period.
- 3.7 It is also possible to look at comparative data for the more significant injuries between LU and the mainline network. The ORR uses an injury classification of 'Severe Hospital', defined as 'An injury to any non-workforce (or workforce offduty) which occurs on or in connection with the transport system, resulting in that person being taken from the site of the accident to a hospital for treatment, in respect of that injury.' (Rail Safety, April 2023 to March 2024 (orr.gov.uk)).
- 3.8 When normalised to a rate per million passenger journeys, analysis of injury data in 2023/24 indicates that there are 0.03 Severe Hospital injuries per million journeys on LU compared to 0.74 on mainline rail. For fatalities the equivalent rates are 0.0017 and 0.0043 respectively. In real terms on LU these rates mean that, in 2023/24, one Severe Hospital injury occurred for approximately every 33.7 million journeys and one fatality for approximately every 590 million journeys.
- 3.9 Nevertheless, while comparative performance between LU and mainline rail may be favourable, our ambition is to eliminate deaths and serious injuries and therefore the relatively stable rate of incidents on our rail services presents us with a significant challenge. To close the gap between current performance and our ambition to eliminate the incidents of people killed or seriously injured, while also encouraging increases in rail journeys, we need to focus on reducing the risk of death or serious injury per journey. This demands we focus on the greatest risks and most common incident types.

#### **Incident Types and Risk Areas**

- 3.10 The most common causes of deaths and serious injuries, and where they occur, have remained consistent as shown in Figure 3. Incidents on stairs and escalators, while customers are boarding or alighting trains (the platform train interface (PTI)) and unauthorised access to the track account for most incidents. The proportion of incidents of each type has remained stable, with an average of 77 per cent of most serious incidents involving a slip, trip or fall. Most serious or fatal slip, trip and fall incidents occur while changing levels on escalators (39 per cent) or stairs (38 per cent).
- 3.11 Fourteen percent per cent of the most serious incidents have occurred at the PTI across the last four years. Incidents at the PTI can take different forms and can include falls while boarding or alighting, door entrapments, falls from the platform onto the track and customers being struck by trains as they pass along the platform.



Figure 3: Proportions of Incident Type

- 3.12 When looking at the potential for an incident to result in fatal injury, in the last four years on our rail networks (total 16: of which 14 were on LU, one on LO, and one on Tram), the incident types of greatest note are those involving the PTI, which account for 38 per cent of fatalities, and unauthorised track access (31 per cent), followed by 25 per cent involving slips, trips and falls, mostly on stairs and escalators.
- 3.13 We can gain high level insight from contributory factor information captured alongside casualty records in our incident reporting system, noting that individual incident records may be subjective based on the views of the colleague entering or reading the report. Following an incident, we carry out our own detailed investigations to give further insight into the reasons for customer fatalities, as well as working with national agencies (the ORR, the Rail Accident Investigation Branch), should they undertake investigations.

3.14 Where contributory factors have been entered, many relate to some form of customer behaviour. In order to ensure that customers can travel safely on our network, we need to ensure that we create safe environments in which they can do so, as well as seeking to influence their behaviour.

#### Summary of Evidence

- 3.15 The ways in which people get hurt and where they get hurt have not changed in recent years, so we need to maintain a continual and sustained focus on these issues in order to reduce risks and close the absolute gap between current level of deaths and serious injuries and our strategic goals.
- 3.16 From our benchmarking work, we know we are not alone in facing these challenges. Slips, trips and falls, PTI and customer behaviour are the top incident types for other rail operations nationally and internationally. It is a shared challenge, and not easy or quick to fix. Where relevant we continue to collaborate with industry partners to identify best practice and new approaches, for example having set up a cross-industry working group on escalator safety.

# 4 Taking Action to Reduce Risk

- 4.1 Our experience of making progress on Vision Zero for roads is that, to drive consistent year on year improvement, we need to do more in a safe system framework. We will look at all aspects to manage and reduce risk, specifically focusing on the risk of customers being killed or seriously injured while travelling on the rail network.
- 4.2 Adapting the roads safe system framework into a rail customer context means that we will deliver:
  - (a) **Safe places**: safely designed and well-maintained stations, platforms and infrastructure;
  - (b) **Safe vehicles**: safely designed and maintained rail vehicles with new technologies retrofitted where viable;
  - (c) Safe operations: safer and clearer operating procedures, rules, compliance, assurance, contract management, training, innovation and technologies;
  - (d) **Safe behaviours**: empowering staff and influencing customer behaviour to manage risk and keep everybody on our network safe; and
  - (e) **Post-incident response:** learning when things go wrong through effective investigation, corporate learning, sharing public data and research and offering the appropriate support for incident victims.
- 4.3 Applying this programmatic and systematic approach will allow us to drive and deliver actions which we believe will reduce the number of customers who are killed or seriously injured on our rail services.

#### Platform Train Interface

- 4.4 In the first instance, we have developed a focused plan to reduce risk at the PTI. This has been prioritised because of the high representation of PTI incidents in the most serious, or fatal, injuries. As noted above, incidents at the PTI can take several different forms and no single intervention will respond to every type of incident, so our plan aims to take a systemic approach to improving safety at the PTI.
- 4.5 Our PTI plan identifies that 50 per cent of customer injuries (of all severities) happen at 12 per cent of our rail stations, while the other 50 per cent are spread widely across the rest of the network. For locations with higher numbers of injury the best long-term solutions are likely to be physical changes to platforms to prevent incidents occurring, where engineering analysis indicates that this possible. A number of these are underway, but capital costs are often significant, and will therefore take time.
- 4.6 Location specific mitigation will not be effective in dealing with some risks such as falls on track because incident data tells us that these incidents can occur at any location across the network. To reduce the risk of customers being killed or seriously injured in these incidents cost-effective mitigations are needed that can be rolled out across the full range of stations on our network. The PTI plan identifies CCTV and/or sensor-based solutions as an opportunity that meets these criteria. These technologies would be paired with an operational response to react to an incident occurring before a passenger is harmed. These types of solutions are already in operational use across the world e.g. a CCTV based solution is used by SMRT in Singapore, and have been trialled on our own network at Custom House station on the DLR. The CCTV-based concept has also been proven at Willesden Green station as part of the "LU Smart Operations" project.
- 4.7 Further work is needed to test these solutions in other operational environments and implement a robust operational response before we can be confident in being able to roll them out more widely.
- 4.8 Consequently our planned interventions are based around our opportunities to mitigate risk by preventing incidents, where possible, detecting them if they occur and ensuring the right operational responses take place once detected.
- **4.9** The plan will continue to evolve as we learn more about addressing this issue but at the time of writing includes the interventions described below.

#### Safe Places

- 4.10 **PTI platform improvements:** We have identified stations where falls between the train and the platform are most common and are developing projects to make boarding and alighting safer for our customers:
  - this year, our plans to move the stopping mark to shift opening doors away from the curved part of the platform at Baker Street will move into a detailed design phase ahead of delivery;

- (b) we will also progress our plans to move the stones on the edge of platforms to reduce the gap between the train and the platform at Waterloo, Farringdon and Embankment; and
- (c) we will further look at the feasibility of installing passive gap fillers to reduce the size of the gap at Embankment and Leytonstone.
- 4.11 **Piccadilly line platform adjustments:** The introduction of new rolling stock on the Piccadilly line creates an opportunity to make platform adjustments at stations ahead of the arrival of the new trains.

#### Safe Vehicles

4.12 **Piccadilly line upgrades:** We are introducing new Piccadilly line trains with safety improvements including in-cab CCTV and sensitive edge and obstacle detection technology, which are an upgrade on the existing fleet. We will monitor the effectiveness of these measures to identify lessons and opportunities from the use of this technology.

#### Safe Operations

#### 4.13 PTI technology improvements and innovations:

- (a) We are reviewing new technological and innovative solutions to test the opportunity for improving our ability to detect PTI incidents and alert colleagues with the intention to launch trials of relevant technology on our network later this year. This follows a successful trial at Custom House DLR station and includes plans to install an obstacle detection system at DLR Pudding Mill Lane station to alert our colleagues in the event of a person falling on the track.
- (b) We will continue to roll out improved cameras on the Jubilee line, giving train operators a better view of customers boarding and alighting the train. We also continue to review the quality of camera images across the network.
- 4.14 **Working with our partners:** We have committed to host a 'PTI Industry Summit' in 2025, bringing together the operators, third parties and partners that collectively run our rail network. These partners are each accountable for managing PTI with the same regulatory and risk management principles as TfL and we recognise that there are opportunities to share, learn and deliver together.

#### Safe Behaviours

- 4.15 **Empowering our frontline colleagues:** We will help our colleagues play a significant role in reducing PTI incidents in the locations they know and understand:
  - (a) we will be incorporating PTI safety risks in training resources, reviewing how PTI incidents are captured and reported. We have already introduced competence assessment training focussed on lessons learnt from recent incidents and investigations; and

(b) we are raising awareness of PTI safety risks with train operators and reducing the risk of cognitive underload whereby automation and technology can contribute to fatigue and may affect operator vigilance.

#### 4.16 Influencing customer behaviours:

- (a) We continue to implement, and evaluate the effectiveness of, our interventions and campaigns around intoxication, inattention and rushing as well as routine operational customer communications around minding the gap and not attempting to board or leave trains while the doors are closing.
- (b) We carry out research and analysis to understand how our diverse customer base behaves and interacts in different times and locations to support our planning of behavioural interventions.

#### **Post-incident response**

#### 4.17 Learning and supporting victims:

- (a) As described in the Trends in Safety and Key Improvement Activity paper in December 2024, the Sarah Hope Line provides support to people that have been affected by incidents on our network.
- (b) Our frontline colleagues are trained to support people involved in incidents on our network and are regularly commended for looking after customers.
- (c) We work closely with our regulators, operators and other stakeholders to thoroughly investigate serious incidents on our network and ensure that lessons are learnt and shared. In 2024, we took steps to strengthen our capacity and processes around investigation of the most serious incidents and will see this implemented over the coming year.
- (d) We have independently reviewed our governance and processes around investigation of the most serious incidents and from March 2025 will use a new Corrective Actions Review Group, composed of nominated Directors, to review actions taken as a result of investigations and ensure that they have been effective in preventing reoccurrence.

#### Other Risks

- 4.18 As set out in the Trends in Safety and Key Improvement Activity paper, we have already taken action to improve safety on escalators as well as continuing customer safety campaigns around stairs. This includes technology trials, leading a wider industry discussion on escalator design, deploying staff at key locations and testing automated customer announcements.
- 4.19 Our next step will be to conduct a review to identify other interventions that may be trialled to further reduce the risk of slips, trips and falls at stairs and escalators. This work will be taking place in 2025.

#### List of appendices to this report:

None

#### List of Background Papers:

Trends in Safety and Key Improvement Activity, Safety and Security Panel, 2 December 2024

Contact Officer:Stuart Reid, Head of Analysis and DirectionEmail:StuartReid@tfl.gov.uk

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# Agenda Item 6

Safety and Security Panel



Date: 12 February 2025

Item: 2024 Crime and Antisocial Behaviour Update

# This paper will be considered in public

# 1 Summary

1.1 This paper provides a high-level overview of recent crime and antisocial behaviour trends on our public transport network. Where possible, it compares them with London-wide and national trends.

#### 2 Recommendation

2.1 **The Panel is asked to note the paper.** 

# 3 Background

- 3.1 Due to the cyber security incident we experienced last year and the Metropolitan Police Service's (MPS) upgrade to its new crime recording system, Connect, this report only covers data and information from 1 January 2024 to 30 August 2024.
- 3.2 The report brings together data from the MPS for the bus network, the British Transport Police (BTP) for London Underground (LU), the Elizabeth line, London Overground, DLR and Trams, as well as our own data.
- 3.3 The data reported here summarises criminal offences committed against our customers, our colleagues and our infrastructure that have been reported to the police. It builds on the long-term reporting of the crime rate for London's public transport that we have had in place for the past 20 years.
- 3.4 More detailed information on crime against our colleagues in the form of workrelated violence and aggression – is included in the Safety, Health and Security Quarterly Report, elsewhere on the agenda for this meeting. However, incidents reported to the police will be included within the transport crime statistics.
- 3.5 This paper illustrates that the risk of being a victim of crime on London's public transport remains low, with just over 13 crimes for every million passenger journeys made. The rate of crime is broadly stable compared with the same period last year. We have set ourselves an ambitious target to reduce the risk of being a victim of crime to fewer than nine crimes for every million journeys by the end of 2030.
- 3.6 We have a strong foundation of safety and security measures in place to keep all of our staff, customers and infrastructure safe and secure. This includes significant investment in dedicated policing for London's roads and public transport; hundreds of enforcement officers working for us and our operators; an

extensive network of CCTV and body worn video cameras; TfL/police control rooms operating 24/7 to help prevent and manage incidents; communications campaigns; and education and behaviour change initiatives. In 2023, London TravelWatch scored us as one of the top transport organisations for safety and security, along with Network Rail and LNER.

#### 4 Crime and Antisocial Behaviour

- 4.1 Overall, the volume of crime on our public transport network and the risk of anyone being a victim of, or witness to, crime remains low. Millions of journeys are made every day, with most going without incident.
- 4.2 Transport crime statistics for 2024 (January-August) showed increases in some crime types and on some modes compared with the same eight-month period in 2023. These increases in crime should be seen in the context of efforts to improve confidence, and make it easier, to report incidents, as well as London-wide and national increases. We are not complacent and are focused on driving down priority crime levels and the risk of being a victim when travelling on our network. Crime statistics are set out in Appendix 1.
- 4.3 Our focus, alongside our transport policing partners, has been to drive down the highest harm offences such as sexual harassment and other sexual offences, serious violence, hate crime and work-related violence and aggression, while working to prevent crime and take a problem-solving approach to antisocial behaviour, and the types of behaviour that deter people from travelling and travelling more often.
- 4.4 There were 31,648 offences across our public transport network over the eightmonth period. This is a 6.8 per cent increase in the volume of crime (compared with the same period the previous year), an additional 3,524 offences. Almost 90 per cent of crime on our network occurs on the bus and Tube networks, which reflects the size and passenger volumes of these networks. Passenger numbers have grown by 2.8 per cent this year when compared with the previous year. Overall, the increase in the volume of crime is being driven by an increase in reporting of theft of passenger property (predominantly pickpocketing).
- 4.5 Crime trends on our public transport network largely reflect that of London-wide crime. MPS crime data for London was up 2.6 per cent between January and August 2024 compared with the same period in 2023. Theft was the highest volume crime.
- 4.6 The rate of crime was 13.3 crimes per million passenger journeys (CPMPJ), up from 12.8 CPMPJ for the same period last year. Across the National Rail network, the crime rate is approximately 27 CPMPJ.
- 4.7 LU had the highest rate of crime at 20.7 CPMPJ. This was followed by Trams at 11.3 CPMPJ, but on Trams the overall volume of crime reported was very low (131 offences in total for the period).
- 4.8 The crime categories that saw the greatest percentage increase between January and August 2024 compared with the previous year were theft (6.2 per cent), violence (2.5 per cent) and public order (1.8 per cent). Theft remains the highest

volume crime on our public transport network, with 14,704 theft offences between January 2024 and August 2024. This is up by 885 offences.

- 4.9 Busy, crowded public spaces attract thieves, and the transport network can be a target-rich environment. Theft of passenger property includes offences such as pickpocketing when trains and stations are busy or theft snatch where people may have their belongings snatched while waiting for a bus.
- 4.10 Tackling robbery is a key priority for us and our policing partners, and significant effort has been focused on reversing the rising trend in robbery that was emerging in 2023. Robbery levels were down by seven per cent (2,070 to 1,919 offences) in 2024 (January to August) compared to the previous year. The level of operational activity includes thorough investigation of all robbery offences, targeting and management of offenders, problem-solving and joint operations to create a hostile environment for offenders. Crime data from the BTP showed that robbery on LU has fallen by 8.5 per cent (515 offences in 2023 and 471 in the same period in 2024).
- 4.11 We deploy over 200 Transport Support and Enforcement Operations Officers (TSEs) working across rail, LU and the bus network and a core part of their role is to deal with crime, antisocial behaviour and rule breaking that makes our customers feel unsafe. Our officers are accredited by the police and have the powers and training to physically intervene and remove people from our network or refuse entry, where needed. They are trained and work to diffuse situations, using their powers to physically intervene and remove people from our network only as a last resort. They are uniformed and their presence acts as a deterrent to antisocial behaviour and crime. In 2024, TSEs provided advice and guidance to 10,854 members of the public and dealt with 5,375 breaches of our byelaws across the rail and LU network.
- 4.12 Customer confidence to use our network is reduced more by unwelcome and antisocial behaviour than the fear of being a victim of crime. The most common concerning behaviour recorded in our Customer Pulse survey is being worried about drunken passengers or passengers drinking alcohol. These concerns are addressed by our own enforcement officers across the network who have a direct impact on customers and colleague confidence. In 2024 our enforcement officers dealt with 4,116 customers who were carrying an open container of alcohol on our network, consuming alcohol or being intoxicated on the network. They dealt with a further 38 incidents as breaches of our byelaws involving alcohol.
- 4.13 Deployment of our officers and our police partners is intelligence-led. The data and feedback we receive from frontline colleagues and customers about safety and security concerns is a vital source of insight and data that informs decisions on deployment and taskings. Our enforcement officers target hotspots, take a problem-solving approach and regularly work alongside police partners.
- 4.14 We will continue to work closely with our police partners and operators to reduce crime and antisocial behaviour across our transport network. Our focus for crime prevention and reduction, in collaboration with the BTP and the MPS, will continue to be on the greatest threats, risk and harms, including:

- (a) safeguarding children and adults of the risk from harm and exploitation when using or seeking refuge on our network;
- (b) ending violence against women and girls, including sexual offences and harassment;
- (c) tackling hate crime and reassuring those that feel vulnerable to victimisation;
- (d) tackling serious violence, robbery and keeping knives off the network; and
- (e) preventing work-related violence and aggression.
- 4.15 We, and our operators, are expanding our own enforcement capability which will complement policing, provide greater visibility and reassurance to our customers and colleagues and increase our capacity to deal with antisocial behaviour that impacts on customer confidence. We are investing in improvements to our CCTV infrastructure and running several technology trials to support policing and enforcement efforts to prevent crime. We will continue to work with stakeholders to improve our approach and develop sustainable solutions to crime and antisocial behaviour problems.

#### List of appendices to this report:

Appendix 1: Crime and Antisocial Behaviour statistics

#### List of Background Papers:

None

Contact Officer:Siwan Hayward, Director of Security, Policing and EnforcementEmail:Siwanhayward@tfl.gov.uk

# Crime & Antisocial Behaviour Update January 2025

Author: CPOS Performance


Please note that the time parameters for this report are the months of January to August.

Where 'this year' is referenced, the dates in use are January 2024 – August 2024. Where 'the previous year' is referenced, the dates in use are January 2023 – August 2023.

It is not currently possible to provide accurate figures past August. This is due to data issues related to MPS crime recording systems and the impact of the TfL cyber incident. We are however in the final stages of restoring the data required and aim to have this resolved by the next iteration of this report.

# TfL Public Transport vs. London-Wide Crime

# The below chart shows how crime has trended on TfL public transport vs. London wide.




# Key takeaways:

- Crime trends on TfL's public transport network largely reflect that of Londonwide crime, with a sharp fall during the pandemic followed by a recovery back to similar volumes seen before. In the most recent calendar year, London-wide crime steadily rose, whereas crime on TfL's public transport has steadily decreased.
- Crime on TfL's public transport network during this year is 6.8% higher than during the previous year. Passenger demand has grown by 2.8% this year when compared with the previous year.
- Crime across London (MPS) this year is
   2.6% higher than during the previous year.

Please note that the 'MPS (London Wide)' will also include offences which have occurred on London Buses. Data from the City of London Police is not included. Services included in the TfL Public Transport total include London Underground, Buses, Elizabeth Line, London Overground, Trams, Docklands Light Railway & Cable Car.


# TfL Public Transport vs. London-Wide Crime



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Source for London-wide data: https://data.london.gov.uk/dataset/mps-monthly-crime-dahboard-data

# TfL Public Transport vs. Nationwide Crime




#### A strong, green heartbeat for London

Source for Nationwide data: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/67177912e319b9lef09e37ea/prc-pfa-mar2013-onwards-tables-241024.ods

# Pan-modal crime <u>volume</u> – at a glance


Pan-modal, there have been **31,648** offences recorded this year. This is **6.8%** higher than during the previous year where there were **29,625** offences recorded. LU and buses account for the majority of transport crime, reflecting the size of networks and ridership.



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### Pan-modal crime <u>rate</u> – at a glance

Pan-modal crime rate this year is **13.3** cpmpj (crimes per million passenger journeys). This is slight increase (by +0.5cpmpj) on the rate of **12.8** cpmpj during the previous year.



<u>Note</u>: Due to the recent cyber incident at TfL, it has been necessary to use 'non-confirmed' passenger figures for the week of 25 August 2024 – 31 August 2024

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## Pan-modal Crime Summary

#### Crime summary

- Pan-modal, there have been <u>31,648</u> offences recorded this year. This is 6.8% higher than during the previous year where there were <u>29,625</u> offences recorded.
- The crime rate per million passenger journeys this year is <u>13.3</u> compared with <u>12.8</u> during the previous year.
- Passenger demand is up by 2.8% when comparing this year to the previous year.
- Across the network, hate crime has increased by 27.8% with 1,982 offences committed this year compared with 1,551 during the previous year. The increase in hate crime reflects increases seen in antisemitism and Islamophobia which spiked following the attack on Israel and the war in Gaza. Levels have reduced but remain higher than were before the war

	Jan 2023 – A	ug 2023	Jan 2024 - Ai	ug 2024	
Mode	Volume	Rate	Volume	Rate	
London Underground	14,399	18.9	16,288	20.7	
Buses	12,085	9.9	11,965	9.6	
Elizabeth Line	1,078	8.2	1,435	9.7	
London Overground	1,222	10.6	1,297	10.7	
Docklands Light Railway	626	9.5	530	8.2	
Trams	215	15.5	131	11.3	
Cable Car			2	-	

#### Passenger perception

The most recent TfL Customer Pulse survey (Q2 – September 2024) showed:

- 34% of respondents felt worried on public transport in the past three months and 6% of Londoners were completely or temporarily deterred from using public transport due to a worrying incident.
- Most worrying incidents occurred on the London Underground (35%) and Bus (30%) networks.
- The most cited worrying incidents on the London Underground network were drunken passengers / passengers drinking alcohol (14%), lack of a police / staff presence (14%), threatening behaviour / language of others (including fighting) (12%) and seeing someone begging (12%). On the Bus network, the most cited worrying incidents were threatening behaviour / language of others (including fighting) (21%), drunken passengers / passengers drinking alcohol (17%), busy environment / overcrowding (16%) and youth / school-related antisocial behaviour (12%).

### Pan-modal Crime Summary

#### Crime Summary

- By volume, the category of crime with the biggest increase was theft of passenger property which has saw a 6.4% rise of (885 additional offences) when compared with the previous year.
- By percentage, the category of crime with the highest increase was criminal damage (I7.2% more crimes increase) compared with previous year.

	Jan – Aug 2023	Jan – Aug 2024
Theft of passenger property	13,819	14,704
Violence	5,321	5,833
Public order	3,774	4,301
Criminal damage	1,672	1,959
Robbery	2,070	1,919
Sexual	1,173	1,246
All other offences	1,095	946
Cycle theft	301	305
Motor vehicle theft	249	304
Offensive weapons	151	131
Total notifiable offences	29,625	31,648

## London Underground Crime Summary

#### Crime summary

- Recorded crime this year on the London Underground is 13.1% higher than the previous year.
- The crime rate per million passenger journeys is 20.7 compared with 18.9 during the previous year.
- Robbery which had been increasing in recent years saw a decrease of 8.5% compared with previous year which reflects the significant policing effort on reducing robbery.
- Hate crime has increased by 28.5% from 687 hate offences last year compared with 883 this year.

Jannary	Jan – Aug 2023	Jan – Aug 2024
Theft of passenger property	7,316	8,278
Violence	1,998	2,408
Public order	1,818	2,056
Criminal damage	930	1,276
All other offences	839	728
Sexual	564	628
Robbery	515	47
Motor vehicle theft	190	232
Cycle theft	142	135
Offensive weapons	87	76
Total notifiable offences	14,399	16,288

 Reports of sexual offences have increased by II.3% when compared with the previous year. The increase reflects efforts to make it easier to report and encourage reporting including TfL and BTP sexual harassment campaigns.

#### Theft & Robbery Violence Sexual Offences • Reports of theft increased by I3.1% • Reports of violence increased by 20.5% when compared with the previous when compared with the previous year. year. Robbery has fallen by -8.5%. The majority of offences were violence without injury. Most theft offences were recorded as having occurred 'On Train' (60.0%), with Offences were spread across the week, the most affected day being on with 68.4% occurring Monday - Friday and Saturday (20.6%). Throughout the entire 31.6% on Saturday – Sunday. week, the peak time of offending is between the PM peak (I6:00hrs - During the weekday, most offences were 20:00hrs). Offences between this time committed during the afternoon / evening accounted for 31.7% of the total. peak (from 4pm), with offences on the weekend continuing into the early hours of Saturday / Sunday (night tube).

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## London Underground (On Train / Station Split)

### Split Line / Other 3% 0% 0%

Crimes across London Underground are closely split, with 50% of offences (8,191) occurring 'On Train' and 47% (7,680) occurring at the station.

Top stations and lines can be seen in the columns, right.

The remaining offences are mostly recorded against 'Line/Other' (416 offences, 3%). I offence does not have a location linked.

#### <u>'On Train' crimes</u>

Of the 8,191 offences committed 'On Train', the most affected line was the central line, which saw 1,419 offences (17.3% of total). The Central Line is one of the longest and busiest LU lines.The table below shows the full break the way offences % Rep

full breaktinewn.	Offences	% Rep
Central Line	1,419	17.3%
Northern Line	1,320	16.1%
Piccadilly Line	1,128	13.8%
Victoria Line	1,097	13.4%
Jubilee Line	1,036	12.6%
District Line	928	11.3%
Circle, H&C Line	454	5.5%
Metropolitan Line	436	5.3%
Bakerloo Line	370	4.5%
Waterloo & City Line	3	0.0%

#### Where crime types are concerned, most offences committed on train were categorised as 'theft of passenger property' (60.7% - 4,969 offences), followed by public order (13.0% - 1,065 offences) and graffiti (9.3% - 763 offences).

#### 'Station' crimes

Of the 7,680 offences committed at a station, the most affected stations were busy interchange stations. The top 5 stations were:

### Kings Cross St Pancras

- 359 offences (4.7% of total)

#### **Oxford Circus**

- 281 offences (3.7% of total)

Tottenham Court Road – 272 offences (3.5% of total)

#### Stratford

- 237 offences (3.1% of total)

### Finsbury Park

- 205 offences (2.7% of total)

Where crime types are concerned, most offences committed were categorised as 'theft of passenger property' (41.9% - 3,221 offences), followed by violence (21.3% -1,635 offences) and public order (12.7% - 976 offences).

Please note that offences which occur on train between two stations will be categorised as occurring on the Line of the victim's destination station, as designated by which line organisationally manages that station. E.g. a crime that occurred between Camden Town (Northern Line) and Victoria (Victoria Line) will be reported as occurring on the Victoria Line

## **Bus-related crime Summary**

#### Crime summary

- This year bus-related crime is -1.0% lower than the previous year\*, with the biggest reduction being in the 'theft of passenger property' category.
- The definition of bus related crime is crime committed at a bus stop, on a bus or initiated on a bus.
- The crime rate per million passenger journeys is 9.6 compared with 9.9 during the previous year.
- Hate crime saw an increase of 29.0% from 62I offences last year to 80I offences this year.

	Jan – Aug 2023	Jan – Aug 2024
Theft of passenger property	5,635	5,395
Violence	2,650	2,670
Public order	1,375	1,566
Robbery	1,362	1,290
Sexual	490	489
Criminal damage	428	427
All other offences	72	69
Offensive weapons	35	29
Motor vehicle theft	38	24
Cycle theft	0	6
Total notifiable offences	12,085	11,965

#### <u>Violence</u>

- Violence offences remained relatively stable compared with last year (0.8% increase 20 additional offences). The borough with the highest number of offences was Ealing, with I58 offences recorded this year representing 5.9% of the total. This was followed by Lambeth with I25 offences recorded representing 4.7% of the total and Westminster at I20 offences, 4.5% of the total.
- Robbery offences fell by -5.3% compared with the previous year. The borough that saw the highest number of robbery offences was
  Lambeth, with 95 offences recorded this year representing 7.4% of the total. This was followed by Croydon with 88 offences recorded
   – representing 6.8% of the total and Southwark with 80 offences recorded representing 6.2% of the total.
- Reports of theft of passenger property have decreased, with -240 less offences when comparing with the previous year (-4.3%). The borough with the highest level of offences is Westminster, which saw 665 offences this year (12.3% of the total). This is considerably above the second highest, Southwark, which saw 440 offences (8.1% of the total). The borough in 3<sup>rd</sup> place was Lambeth, which saw 363 offences (6.7%).



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## Elizabeth Line Crime Summary

#### Crime summary

- Recorded crime during this year on the Elizabeth Line is 33.1% higher than during the previous year.
- The crime rate per million passenger journeys is 9.7 compared with 8.2 during the previous year.
- Hate crime has increased by 49.4% from 83 hate offences last year to 124 this year.

	Jan – Aug 2023	Jan – Aug 2024
Theft of passenger property	334	505
Violence	243	317
Public order	204	280
All other offences	73	68
Cycle theft	68	64
Sexual	44	55
Criminal damage	47	53
Motor vehicle theft	14	43
Robbery	44	36
Offensive weapons	7	14
Total notifiable offences	1,078	1,435

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#### Crimes of note

- The category with the biggest rise is theft of passenger property, where I7I additional offences were recorded this year (51.2% rise). This was followed by public order, where an additional 76 offences were recorded (37.3% rise) and finally, violence, where an additional 74 offences were recorded (30.5% rise).
- <u>Theft of passenger property</u> Most theft offences were committed on train (60.2% 304 offences), 38.6% 195 were committed at a station and 1.2% 6 were committed lineside / other.
- <u>Public order</u> Most incidents of public order were committed during the afternoon / into the evening. 56.1% 157 offences were committed on train, 43.6% 122 offences were committed at a station and 0.4% I offence was committed lineside/other.
- <u>Violence</u> Most violence offences were committed following the afternoon peak, into the evening (from 4pm to midnight). 54.6% 173 offences were committed at a station, 43.2% 137 offences were committed on train and 2.2% 7 offences were committed lineside/other.



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## London Overground Crime Summary

#### Crime summary

- Recorded crime this year on the London Overground was 6.1% higher than during the previous year.
- The crime rate per million passenger journeys is 10.7 compared with 10.6 during the previous year.
- Hate crime has increased by 15.8% from 101 hate offences during this previous year to 117 this year.

	Jan – Aug 2023	Jan – Aug 2024
Theft of passenger property	280	341
Violence	242	288
Public order	254	258
Criminal damage	198	156
Cycle theft	72	86
Robbery	51	72
Sexual	42	46
All other offences	66	43
Motor vehicle theft	5	4
Offensive weapons	12	3
Total notifiable offences	1,222	1,297

#### Crimes of note

- The crime group with the largest volume rise was theft of passenger property where there were 61 more offences (21.8% increase) during this year when compared with the previous year. Criminal damage saw a reduction with -42 fewer offences (a decrease of 21.2%). There has been a slight increase in the number of sexual offences committed, with 4 additional offences (9.5% increase).
- <u>Theft of passenger property</u> Most (72.1%) theft offences occurred during the working week (Mon Fri) with the remaining 27.9% offences occurring on the weekend. Where timings are concerned, most offences occurred during the afternoon peak and evening (with offences between 5pm 9pm accounting for 34.6% of the total).
- <u>Violence</u> Violence has also seen an increase in offending (46 additional offences). Offending is spread throughout the afternoon / evening, with 47.6% of offending occurring between 4pm and 9pm.

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## **Docklands Light Railway Summary**

Bockando Eight Raithay ban	, indiana y	Jan – Aug 2023	Jan – Aug 2024	
Crime summary	Theft of passenger property	233	169	
<ul> <li>Recorded crime this year on the Docklands Light Railway was -15.3% lower than the</li> </ul>	Violence	115	115	
previous year.	Public order	94	107	
• The crime rate per million passenger journeys was 8.2 compared with 9.5 during the	Robbery	33	34	
previous year.	Criminal damage	53	32	
• Hate crime increased by 4.7% from 43 hate offences during the previous year to 45 this	All other offences	43	29	
year.	Sexual	26	22	
	Cycle theft	17	14	
	Offensive weapons	10	7	
	Motor vehicle theft	2	1	
	Total notifiable offences	626	530	

#### Crimes of note

- Whilst the Docklands Light Railway has seen a decrease in almost all offence groups, public order saw an increase of 13 offences when compared with the previous year.
- Of the I07 public order offences committed this year, 63 of them have been on train with the remaining 44 at a station. The station with the most offences was Canary Wharf, with 5 offences.


## **Trams Crime Summary**

			Jan – Aug 2024
Crime summary	Violence	73	35
<ul> <li>Recorded crime during this year on the Trams was -39.1% lower than previous year.</li> </ul>	Public order	29	34
• The crime rate per million passenger journeys was II.3 compared with I5.5 during the	Robbery	65	16
previous year.	Theft of passenger property	21	16
• Hate crime decreased by -25.0% from 16 hate offences last year to 12 this year.	Criminal damage	16	15
	All other offences	2	7
	Sexual	7	6
	Offensive weapons	0	2
	Cycle theft	2	0
	Motor vehicle theft	0	0
	Total notifiable offences	215	131

#### Crimes of note

- While Trams saw a decrease in almost all offence groups, public order saw an increase of 5 offences when compared with the previous year and offensive weapons increased by 2 offences.
- Of the public order offences, 23 offences were committed on train and II at a station.


### Improving customer confidence – all modes



In the last three months, have you ever felt worried about your personal security when using public transport in London? Public transport users in the last few A strong, green heartbeat for London months: Q2 24/25=967. SAFETY\_04: Has this worrying incident put you off using this mode of transport again?: Public transport users in the last few months: Q2 24/25=967. SAFETY 03. What mode of transport were you using (or planning to use) when you (last) experienced this worrying incident? Base: Respondents who have experienced a worrying incident in the last 3 months: Q2 24/25=334. SAFETY\_02. What was the most recent worrying incident you experienced when using public transport in London? Base: All who have experienced a worrying incident: O2 24/25=334

### Improving customer confidence – all modes

The majority of Londoners who say they have been put off using public transport by a worrying incident say the deterrence was temporary



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SAFETY\_04: Has this worrying incident put you off using this mode of transport again?

Base: All respondents that have used public transport in the last few months Q4 (Pl2) 20/21=749, QI (P2) 21/22=788 Q2 (P6) 21/22=843 Q3 (P9) 21/22=828, Q4 (Pl2) 21/22=883, QI (P2) 22/23=880, Q2 (P6) 22/23=937, Q3 (P9) 22/23=925, Q3 (P12) 22/23=930, QI 23/24=950, Q2 (P6) 23/24=956, Q3 (P9) 23/34=992, Q4 (P12) 23/24=986, QI 24/25=948, Q2 24/25=967

## Improving customer confidence – LU / Buses

e experienced we make a incident on env

Threatening behaviour, overcrowding and youth antisocial behaviour were more frequently experienced on Buses, however lack of police and staff presence was more likely to be associated with LU. Women were more likely to report threatening behaviour and passengers pushing and shoving

Type of worrying incident experienced when using public transport in London

	P6/Q2 2024/25	% of those experier pul	iced wor plic trans		lent on any		
	Drunken	passengers / passengers drinking alcohol					17%
	Threatening behaviou	ır / language of others (including fighting)				13%	
		Busy environment / overcrowding			10%		
σ		Seeing someone begging			9%		
Page 45	Υοι	ith / school-related anti-social behaviour			8%		
45	Ра	ssengers pushing and shoving each other			8%		
		Lack of a police / staff presence			8%		
		Being a victim of hate crime		5%			
Being a	victim of crime (other	than hate or unwanted sexual behaviour)		5%			
		Witnessing someone committing a crime		4%			
		Seeing someone sleeping rough		4%			
		Threat of terror attacks/ terrorism	29	%			
	Beir	g a victim of unwanted sexual behaviour	22	%			
	Seeing gr	affiti / vandalism / other criminal damage	<b>I%</b>				
		Other		3%			

#### % of those experienced worrying incident on

0

16%

16%

11%

7%

6%

12%

7%

5%

6%

4%

3%

2%

3%

4%

ERGROUND	BUSES	Ň	
14%	17%	15%	
12%	21%	10%	
4%	16%	10%	
12%	6%	12%	
7%	12%	11%	
8%	8%	5%	
14%	3%	10%	
8%	3%	6%	
4%	4%	3%	
7%	1%	5%	
3%	4%	6%	
1%	1%	3%	
2%	1%	1%	
-	1%	2%	
3%	2%	1%	

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SAFETY\_02. What was the most recent worrying incident you experienced when using public transport in London? Base: All who have experienced more than once worrying incident: Q2 24/25 = 334. London Underground = 105. London Bus = 112. Male = 151. Female = 178 Note: Blue highlights indicate incidents experienced by at least 10 per cent of sub-group

### **Further information**

Please contact CPOS Performance (CPOSPerformance@tfl.gov.uk) if you require any further information.



Safety and Security Panel

TRANSPORT FOR LONDON EVERY JOURNEY MATTERS

Date: 12 February 2025

Item: Safeguarding Customers at TfL

#### This paper will be considered in public

#### 1 Summary

- 1.1 Safeguarding children and adults at risk from harm is a priority for us. Our TfL Strategy sets out our commitment to enhance our safeguarding response to protect our most vulnerable customers, identifying and mitigating risks. This includes: how we deal with the behaviour and safe travel of young people; reduce the risk of suicide and support customers in mental health crises; tackle rough sleeping; and reduce harm through exploitation.
- 1.2 As an organisation we are very proud of the work we do on safeguarding and vulnerability. We commit to providing updates to the Panel on all aspects of our safeguarding work for the purposes of scrutiny but to also recognise the outstanding contributions of teams and colleagues across our organisation to protect vulnerable people who are travelling or seeking refuge on our network.
- 1.3 This paper focuses on our activity to safeguard those people sleeping rough on our services and infrastructure, and the work we do to prevent suicide on our transport network by way of illustrating our safeguarding approach. We will bring a further update to the Panel at a future meeting providing a deep dive into safeguarding children and young people as they travel, and on our work contributing to the prevention of child sexual exploitation.

#### 2 Recommendation

2.1 The Panel is asked to note the paper.

#### 3 Background

- 3.1 Our safeguarding work is broad and covers a wide range of issues and risks. Despite not having a statutory safeguarding duty in most cases, we recognise the opportunities and the important role we can play in reducing harm to children and adults at risk and reducing vulnerability (because of circumstance or presence of an offender) more broadly.
- 3.2 Our Compliance, Policing, Operations and Security (CPOS) Directorate, under the leadership of the Chief Operating Officer, is the organisational lead for customer safeguarding with a small, dedicated team of safeguarding specialists. Colleague safeguarding is led and managed through the Chief People team. CPOS is responsible for developing our strategic response to customer safeguarding risks across the organisation as well as coordinating and delivering tactical interventions. However, our safeguarding activity goes far beyond this

team. Everyday our frontline colleagues are spotting and responding to vulnerability in the moment, connecting vulnerable people with the support they need and showing compassion.

- 3.3 We take a structured approach to our safeguarding activity by using data and evidence to identify and understand risks, and work with partners to respond to them. We have an internal safeguarding forum with representation from across our operational business areas and specialist police input to help manage our strategic safeguarding risks, as well as sharing knowledge, industry expertise, and insight from our own analysis and academic research. We plan to involve more external partners in the forum moving forward.
- 3.4 This approach is coupled with extensive engagement, training and support for our frontline colleagues to help ensure that they are skilled, equipped and confident to identify vulnerability and to act.
- 3.5 We were accredited under the Department for Transport's Safeguarding on Rail scheme in 2023 for our approach to managing safeguarding risks on London Underground. This approach is mirrored across all our modes.

#### 4 Rough sleeping

- 4.1 Rough sleeping is a complex, prevalent, and increasing issue which impacts our transport network and our infrastructure. Rough sleeping by its very nature is dangerous. Rough sleepers are highly vulnerable, often with complex physical and mental health conditions. People sleeping rough are more likely to be victims of crime and almost 17 times more likely to have been victims of violence (compared to the general public), as shown in data from the Office for National Statistics. They are also more vulnerable to criminal exploitation.
- 4.2 We do not receive any government funding or resources to deal with homelessness but we recognise the contribution we can make to safeguarding people who are rough sleeping or seeking refuge on our network and infrastructure to ensure that our network is safe and efficient for all. We work closely with the Greater London Authority (GLA), local authorities, the London Navigator Team (which provides 'through-care casework' supporting people from the street, through emergency or temporary accommodation placements in to settled housing) and outreach services to try to connect people with support. The police may need to be involved in some cases where there is associated crime (including threatening behaviour towards our staff) and antisocial behaviour. In some cases, after all other options available to us have been exhausted, we may need to consider enforcement action to remove the rough sleepers from the site.
- 4.3 Our rough sleeping coordinator reviews and analyses reports from transport staff and customers, works with partners to assess and respond to the risks and helps to connect rough sleepers with support. It is challenging and time-consuming work. Rough sleepers – especially those who sleep on our network – are sometimes reluctant to engage with outreach services or have complex needs which means that they are unable or unwilling to accept the support available to them. It takes time for outreach to build rapport and be able to help them off the streets.

- 4.4 Our coordinator managed over 20 complex, deeply entrenched rough sleeping locations over the last year. In these cases, we were and continue to be dependent on the cooperation and support of the local authority and outreach services. We host multiagency meetings to agree an approach and coordinate activity with partners, including those with statutory responsibility for homelessness or who provide support services. We have built excellent relationships with some boroughs, particularly Westminster City Council (WCC), where we are working together to address some very difficult rough sleeping issues and safeguard the rough sleepers.
- 4.5 One example was the encampment on Park Lane central reservation which posed significant health and safety risks for the rough sleepers, residents and road users. As the highway authority for Park Lane, we worked with partners to connect rough sleepers with accommodation and support but despite our best efforts and extensive outreach engagement over many months we had to apply and enforce a possession order, which was action taken as a last resort. We have removed the large unauthorised encampment from this location, but unfortunately, it continues to be an area of concern as a small number of rough sleepers have returned. WCC has offered support, including accommodation. We are managing the situation with WCC, outreach services, the GLA and the police.
- 4.6 We actively encourage all our frontline customer teams to report rough sleepers. Reporting through staff apps and StreetLink enables our coordinator to identify locations for additional outreach support and gives the best chance of connecting them with support and accommodation. Every report is acted upon. In 2023/24 our London Underground staff reported 2,543 rough sleepers (a four per cent decrease compared to 2022/23) and our bus drivers reported 9,234 rough sleepers (a 23 per cent increase compared to 2022/23). This was against a backdrop of the highest number of rough sleepers reported in London over the last 10 years.
- 4.7 The profile of people sleeping rough on the transport network is broadly consistent with London-wide data, with the majority being male and around half being UK nationals. Around half also had support needs relating to mental health, around 30 per cent had a need relating to drugs, and a similar proportion had a need relating to alcohol. Given the impact of rough sleeping on our transport network and infrastructure, we continue to work with the GLA to support efforts to deliver on the Mayor's commitment to end rough sleeping in London by 2030, which includes a new Mayor's Rough Sleeping Plan of Action.
- 4.8 Last year we launched our new online training course, available to all frontline colleagues, reminding them of the importance of reporting those they see rough sleeping, and how we use that information to assist those individuals. We continue to promote this training. In parallel to this we are trying to make it easier for colleagues to report issues including reporting apps and easy links to StreetLink reporting. We introduced a new reporting system for bus station staff which has been fully operational since October 2024. This has helped to streamline reporting of rough sleeping among other issues such as aggressive begging and antisocial behaviour, ensuring a more timely and efficient response.

- 4.9 Our most recent Customer Pulse survey data (Quarter 3 2024/25) showed that six per cent of customers were worried by a begging incident and five per cent were worried by rough sleeping. Our data for reported incidents is showing that begging, a separate issue but often conflated with rough sleeping, is also increasing. In 2023/24, our London Underground colleagues reported 1,546 incidents of begging (a four per cent increase compared to 2022/23). 4.3 per cent of work-related violence and aggression incidents had begging or rough sleeping as a contributory factor. We deal with begging as a separate issue and focus our efforts on aggressive and organised begging which has links to work-related violence to renew our approach to take account of the increased risk in these areas.
- 4.10 As rough sleeping is not an issue specific to transport or to London, we will continue to liaise with other transport providers and authorities (both nationally and internationally) to learn from each other and to refine our approach. Our involvement in UITP, the International Association of Public Transport's rough sleeping group is an important part of this.

#### 5 Suicide Prevention

- 5.1 Suicide prevention is an integral part of our safeguarding activity. Tragically, 22 people have committed suicide on London Underground and a further 15 people have attempted suicide this year (January December 2024).
- 5.2 Our thoughts are with the families and friends of people who have died or been injured when attempting to end their lives on our network. The impacts are also felt by our colleagues who are witness to these traumatic events and related actions such as attendance at inquests. We are committed to doing all we can to prevent suicide on our roads and transport networks, support people in mental health crisis who are at risk of harm and to support our colleagues who are impacted by these tragic events.
- 5.3 Experienced safeguarding practitioners led on the development and coordination of our pan-TfL suicide prevention programme. This was initially established in 2017 for London Underground but has been expanded to include all modes including roads and rivers. In line with the Department of Health and Social Care's Suicide Prevention Strategy for England and Wales, our programme covers:
  - (a) training to all our staff where the aim is to enable the tools, confidence, and knowledge on how to intervene and what to do. This includes spotting vulnerability signs and behaviours, tailored to our operational environment, and equipping staff with response tactics to support the individual concerned. We have worked closely with mental health experts to develop this material, and all training is delivered by a qualified mental health practitioner. We recognise our colleagues are our most useful tool and best method of intervention as our 'active bystanders'. Alongside the Gateway training offered to our frontline staff, the Suicide Prevention Lead is now qualified to deliver Suicide Prevention training packages via the charity Every Life Matters. This will complement our standard approach at locations where we have seen ongoing presentations;

- (b) we work closely with the British Transport Police (BTP) Harm Reduction team which supports vulnerable people who have shown signs of intentional self-harm on the rail network on multiple occasions. The BTP provides targeted support to those who need it most, encouraging active engagement with mental health services and prevention of suicide on the railway;
- (c) our Safeguarding team record all incidents where a suicidal intention was shown. The team works with partners to understand any root causes, patterns and learnings to further improve our approach and mitigate further risk. We use this information to develop our collaboration and partnerships, ensuring suitable escalation plans are in place, developed with local stations. We analyse our data to explore trends which helps assist us to focus our attention on emerging patterns;
- (d) a periodic meeting was established in 2024 enabling all our modes to share approaches to suicide prevention and establish a common framework. We work with Network Rail, Highways England and train operating companies to share information and approaches to managing incidents of suicide and continuously improve our training and supporting materials to reflect this. We are also increasing our work with boroughs and are now attending London Borough Mental Health and Suicide Prevention Working Groups in six borough locations;
- (e) the Suicide Prevention team directly contact each station where an incident occurs. The aim of our contact is to offer a station visit with the Area Manager and staff who may have been affected by the incident. We signpost internal and external resources available to staff to ensure this information is readily available to all station staff. When reaching out to the station staff, we ensure we provide a reminder about the Gateway training and offer a refresher course to help rebuild confidence in the topic;
- (f) we recognise the fundamental need to be supported by greater internal communications presence. We have already started promotion of our training with a "new year's resolution pledge" regarding individuals signing up to complete suicide prevention training. We aim to share the excellent interventions our staff are doing, such as by arranging blogs to go on our intranet, Platform, or sharing more about the Suicide Prevention team and the work planned in 2025 by promoting this in our internal 'On the Move' magazine. NHS Thrive London and various suicide and mental health charities provide us with materials for stations and engagement tools with the communities we serve and customers using the network; and
- (g) we are working with universities to conduct an ethnographic review. This is an independent review of our programme compared to academic theory and best practice, and will enable us to challenge our current approach and update our materials if required. We are also beginning a project which focuses on a 'Sensory Review' of locations, which will investigate further into the specific look, feel and atmosphere of a station to further understand how this may impact a customer who is feeling distressed.

- 5.4 The Office for National Statistics published data for 2023 registrations that showed increasing suicide rates for England and Wales the highest seen since 1999. London had the lowest rates for any region. Males accounted for most of the suicide and attempted suicide victims on our network which is consistent with the national profile. Historically we have seen a lower age profile, with approximately half of victims aged between 20 and 39 where the national profile is 45-49 for males and 50-54 for women.
- 5.5 Representatives from across our operational business come together every four weeks to share insight and learning within a common framework for managing risk. We also take this approach with external partners such as the London and Thames Water Safety Partnership and Highways England for our road network improvement programme. Critical to the success of our programme are our partnerships with NHS Thrive London and several other suicide and mental health charities. We are strengthening our partnership working with local authorities and are now attending London Borough Mental Health and Suicide Prevention Working Groups for repeat locations.
- 5.6 In December, London River Services reached an important milestone of training 400 colleagues in river safety which covered how to throw life rings or throw lines, where to throw, who to call should you see someone in the Thames (999 ask for coastguard) and what to do should you rescue someone from the water. This is another great example of training colleagues so they are skilled and confident to assist people in need.
- 5.7 Our customer-facing colleagues are supporting the millions of customers using our services every day. Some of these customers are highly vulnerable and may be in mental health crisis. The quick-thinking actions of our colleagues can prevent harm and save a life. Between April December 2024, our colleagues have intervened in 318 situations where we believe the individual was in crisis, vulnerable and at risk of harm. Colleagues are rightly recognised for their actions through Lifesaver and Safeguarding Awards. We are in the process of setting up a new award ceremony to properly recognise and honour our amazing colleagues who go above and beyond to safeguard our most vulnerable customers in what can be very difficult and traumatic circumstances.
- 5.8 Reporting on suicide trends sensibly and sensitively is imperative. External reporting, including our reporting, should align with <u>Samaritans' media guidelines</u> on the reporting of suicide because of the potentially damaging consequences of irresponsible reporting. If anyone is affected by the themes in this paper and is struggling to cope, please call Samaritans for free on 116 123 (UK and the Republic of Ireland) or contact other sources of support, such as those listed on the <u>NHS help for suicidal thoughts web page</u>. Support is available 24 hours a day, every day of the year.

List of appendices to this report: None

List of Background Papers:

None

Contact Officer:Siwan Hayward, Director of Security, Policing and EnforcementEmail:Siwanhayward@tfl.gov.uk

### Agenda Item 8

Safety and Security Panel



Date: 12 February 2025

Item: Enterprise Risk Update – Significant Security Incident including Cyber Security (ER04)

#### This paper will be considered in public

#### 1 Summary

- 1.1 This paper provides an update of Enterprise Risk 04 (ER04) the risk of a significant security incident (including cyber security) and seeks feedback on whether it is accurately defined within the current threat environment and the preventative and corrective controls and actions in place to reduce this risk.
- 1.2 The risk is described as failure to prevent, identify, prepare for, respond to, and minimise impact of a significant security incident which could have major and adverse effect on us and our suppliers' operations, finances, people, customers, reputation, data and assets.
- 1.3 A paper is included on Part 2 of the agenda which contains supplementary information that is exempt from publication by virtue of paragraphs 3 and 7 of Schedule 12A of the Local Government Act 1972 in that it contains information relating to the financial and business affairs of TfL and information relating to any action taken or to be taken in connection with the prevention, investigation or prosecution of crime. Any discussion of that exempt information must take place after the press and public have been excluded from this meeting.

#### 2 Recommendation

2.1 The Panel is asked to note the paper and the exempt supplementary information on Part 2 of the agenda.

#### 3 Current Status

3.1 We are an operator and owner of critical national infrastructure and play a key role in the safety and security of London. We recognise that the threat from intentional criminal acts to harm Transport for London (TfL) and London is constant, evolving and increasingly significant in an unstable world. The insight from our colleagues in the Police and Security Services is that cyber crime, organised crime, sabotage, extortion, extreme violence, disorder and espionage, terrorism and the hostile actions of nation states are becoming increasingly indistinguishable. Because of the fluid and dynamic nature of the threats that we and London face, we adopt a holistic and risk-based approach to assessing and improving security. Our aim is to protect our organisation, our data and finances, our customers, our assets and our workforce from hostile and deliberate criminal actions that seek to cause harm.

- 3.2 We identify existing and emerging security risks and seek to reduce our vulnerability to all forms of terrorism and ideologically motivated violent crime, nation state hostile acts, extortion (through cyber-attacks), organised financial crime such as fraud and blackmail, bribery and corruption, espionage, sabotage, activism and industrial scale theft. Our systematic approach to protective security contributes to our sustainability and that of London.
- 3.3 Since the last update to the Audit and Assurance Committee in November 2023 we have continued to develop ER04 through a series of workshops with our internal security specialists, business lead owners and external experts' briefings on the current threat landscape. From February 2025, we will provide annual updates to the Safety and Security Panel.
- 3.4 ER04 has been developed to take a holistic approach to the security threats we face. ER04 defines a significant security incident as the impact on our operations, assets, customers, people, finances and reputation caused from an incident of terrorism, extortion, sabotage, espionage, activism or serious fraud and financial crime.
- 3.5 The scale and nature of the impact is a combination of a failure to sufficiently identify and understand the threats we face, or to recognise our vulnerabilities and seek to protect them, to deter, detect, deny, delay and defend against such criminal activity. At Level 0, the causes fall within five broad categories: terrorism, sabotage, espionage, serious financial crime (including extortion) and activism.
- 3.6 The key sources we draw on to understand our risk include the current national terrorism threat level, UK and London national risk register, and insight from the Police, Security Services, National Protective Security Authority and the National Cyber Security Centre.
- 3.7 We have in place several preventative and corrective controls and actions that we regularly review, refine and monitor progress against. We currently have 17 Security Improvement Programmes (see Appendix 1) underway across our organisation to reduce our vulnerability and better protect our customers, colleagues and organisation from criminal, malicious and hostile actions.
- 3.8 In September 2024, we experienced a high-impact cyber incident. We responded rapidly and a detailed investigation is ongoing, in coordination with the National Crime Agency, National Cyber Security Centre and expert partners. We have identified that some personal data was accessed and have reported that to the Information Commissioner's Office. We contacted customers at risk to offer support. An independent review is underway overseen by the Chair of the Audit and Assurance Committee and the Chair and Vice Chair of the Panel on behalf of the Board. We will address the learnings, recommendations and improvements identified from the reports of our incident response partners, as well as the independent review of the incident as appropriate, and adjust our mitigations accordingly.
- 3.9 Our corporate Security Governance programme has brought about greater oversight of our security risk management. Regular reporting has been established on security matters to the Executive Security Group which brings

together representatives from all business areas to enable proportionate and effective decision making.

- 3.10 We stay ahead of changes in legislation and regulation to strengthen our defences and to be well prepared for compliance. In the pipeline for 2025 with security implications are the updates to the Light Rail Security Programme regulations; the introduction of Martyn's Law (Terrorism Protection of Premises Bill); updates to the Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018; the Cyber Security and Resilience Bill; updates to Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023; and the Procurement Act 2023.
- 3.11 We recognise that everyone at TfL has a role to play in security and we have a proactive plan to increase awareness, understanding and competence through clear and active people leadership, policy, training, briefings and communications.
- 3.12 ER04 provides oversight of the risk, causes, consequences and controls in place to manage it. Detail of this work is presented in the paper on Part 2 of the agenda.

#### List of appendices to this report:

Appendix 1: Security Improvement Programmes 2024/25

A paper containing exempt supplemental information is included on Part 2 of the agenda

#### List of Background Papers:

None

Contact Officer:Siwan Hayward OBE, Director of Security, Policing and EnforcementEmail:Siwan.Hayward@tfl.gov.uk

Theme	Programme	Purpose
	Command and Control (Resilience and Events)	Align and develop resilience activity across TfL business areas; increase our testing and exercising regime for key risk areas
	London Underground Security Programme	Create and update guidance/standards/rule book entries to provide governance to ensure compliance with government regulations
Work together to be safe and	Head Office Buildings Security	Protect head office occupants from harm and disruption
secure	TfL Security Risk Management – Local Security Action Plans	Identification of security vulnerabilities across all unregulated TfL areas with specialists providing recommendations for mitigation
	Bus Security Programme	Deliver the Bus Security Programme to ensure mitigation of security and crime risks
	Piers Security Programme	Improve existing pier security arrangements
	Workplace Violence and Aggression strategy	Eliminate work related violence and aggression by preventing incidents and supporting those that experience it
Keep everyone safe when travelling	Ending Violence Against Women Girls Programme	Support victims and improve safety for women and girls in public spaces
	Policing partnerships and joint crime prevention activity	Review of funded policing arrangements to reduce crime, deliver improved security outcomes and better value for money

#### Appendix 1 – Security Improvement Programmes 2024/25

Theme	Programme	Purpose
Protect our Organisation	Cyber Security Improvement Programme	To improve TfL's cyber security maturity and embed a three lines of defence model
	Sensitive Information	Improvement in TfL's ability to control access to and distribution of sensitive information held in M365.
	Revenue Protection	Optimising the Revenue Operating Model to support Revenue Protection and tackle ticket fraud and reduce workplace violence and aggression linked to fare evasion. Reducing the level of fare evasion taking place across TfL network
	Counter Fraud and Corruption	To prevent and deter fraud and corruption, detect offenders, and pursue disciplinary action / criminal prosecution. To continue to make TfL a hostile environment for fraudsters.
	Infrastructure Security Working Group	Pan-TfL working group establishing consistency of approach towards the physical security of our infrastructure
	Visual Surveillance Systems	A single approach for renewals, maintenance and trials of new technology considering all operational and security related uses of CCTV
	Security Culture, Comms and Engagement	Build a culture of how we all behave and respond in a security conscious way and where customers have confidence to travel
	Security Governance	Embed security governance into the TfL value chain

#### Appendix 1 – Security Improvement Programmes 2024/25 (continued)

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### Agenda Item 9

Safety and Security Panel



Date: 12 February 2025

Item: Safety, Health and Security Report – Quarter 3 2024/25

#### This paper will be considered in public

#### 1 Summary

1.1 This paper sets out the Safety, Health and Security Report for Quarter 3 of 2024/25 (15 September to 7 December 2024), attached as Appendix 1.

#### 2 Recommendation

2.1 The Panel is asked to note the report.

#### List of appendices to this report:

Appendix 1: Safety, Health and Security Report Quarter 3 2024/25

#### List of Background Papers:

None

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Appendix I

### Safety, Health and Security Quarterly Report

### Quarter 3 2024/25 (15 September - 7 December 2024)

Safety and Security Panel: 12 February 2025



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### Interpreting our data

#### Cyber security incident

We regained access to our safety reporting systems during the first part of Quarter 4 following the pro-active steps we took to protect our systems as a result of the <u>cyber security incident</u> at Transport for London (TfL) in September 2024. This means we can now provide up-to-date customer and colleague safety data in this report. Data has been reviewed and is deemed suitable to provide in this report, but Quarter 3 data is still subject to further review and validation, and therefore is provisional and should be interpreted with caution.

This is the first report that includes bus safety data since the cyber incident. Other published data on our bus safety <u>page</u> will be updated once further data validation is complete.

#### About our data

We publish quarterly safety, health and security data to ensure the most up-to-date understanding of data and performance is available. However, all data presented in the quarterly reports is provisional and subject to change due to ongoing data validation, late reporting, and changes to incident information following investigation. Figures reported are correct at the time of reporting, and the date of data extraction is provided.

#### Safety and Security data notes and caveats

All safety figures presented consist of the number of injured persons. Where an individual has sustained more than one injury in a safety incident or collision this is counted as one injured person, with the most severe injury counted.

Road safety data for the most recent financial year applies factoring to the raw numbers to produce an in-year estimate. The estimates use a factor to account for late reporting (based on historical trends) as well as a factor to account for the expected changes that occur when the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) conduct their severity review quality checks (also based on historical trends), usually four to six months after the collisions occurred. Finalised road safety data for the previous calendar year is published each September after all checks with the police and the Department for Transport have been made. Due to these factors being applied, these provisional estimates may differ slightly from the provisional numbers available on our road safety reduction dashboard.

The safety figures in this report consist of injuries that meet our injury definition and are therefore counted against our scorecard. This means that customer safety data excludes injuries related to pre-existing medical conditions and suspected or confirmed intentional self-harm. Colleague safety data includes injuries to both permanent employees and contractors/sub-contractors. Road safety data is processed according to the Department for Transport's STATS19 requirements, and therefore excludes certain incidents, such as injuries that occur on private land.

Data on the security of our customers, colleagues and our organisation are derived from a range of sources. Transport crime statistics have been compiled and published by us for the last eighteen years and provide a longitudinal view of the changing patterns of crime and antisocial behaviour. We bring together crimes and incidents reported to the MPS for London's bus network and to the British Transport Police (BTP) for our rail stations and rail modes (London Underground, Elizabeth

line, London Overground, Tram network and the DLR) for monitoring our security performance and supporting decision-making in the tasking and deployment of operational officers, police and other resources.

All crime and antisocial behaviour incident data and offences are recorded and published in line with Home Office counting rules and the Code of Practice for Statistics set by the Office for Statistics Regulation. We rely on data from the MPS and BTP as our primary source of insight into transport security.

Bus-related crime data is extracted from the MPS crime reporting system, using a query that extracts bus-related incidents (on a bus, at a bus station or bus stop). As part of the query, it completes searches on words such as bus, bus stop etc. For this reason, it may include some crimes that did not occur on the network. Checks of the data have showed it to be over 90 per cent accurate. Our definition of bus-related crime is any incident reported at a bus stop, bus station, on a bus or an incident that was initiated on a bus journey. Bus-related crime data is a subset of overall crime in London and is included in the crime statistics published for London by the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime and the Home Office.

Since the beginning of this financial year, we have not been in receipt of reliable and verified crime data from the MPS because of problems arising from the transfer of data to the CONNECT system and the feeds of data between us and the MPS. Therefore, this report does not contain any data on customer security and only a limited snapshot of data on colleague security derived from our own incident report system. This will be rectified in future reports.

#### Other published data

Road safety data is published on our road safety data <u>webpage</u>. This includes finalised annual data, a road safety data dashboard updated monthly with provisional data, record-level collision extracts, and FAQs and guidance to our data.

Bus safety <u>data</u> reported by bus operators is published quarterly on our bus safety data webpage. This includes: a bus safety dashboard, a CSV file with details of all bus injuries and a list of all bus fatalities.

London Underground safety data is provided to the Office of Rail and Road and published in their annual rail safety <u>national statistics report</u>.

### Introduction

This Safety, Health and Security Quarterly Report summarises our performance in Quarter 3 of 2024/25, identifies strategic trends, and describes progress in delivering our strategic Safety, Health and Security programmes. The data referenced covers the period from 15 September to 7 December 2024, unless otherwise specified.

Quarter 3 has been challenging and while we have made progress in delivering safety initiatives, we have not met all of our ambitious safety targets in the quarter. Some safety incidents in Quarter 3 have not been in line with previous trends and we will be closely monitoring to determine whether they are anomalous or indicate the emergence of new trends.

Regarding customer safety, over a longer time period the absolute number of all-injury incidents has fallen and the rate of serious injuries per million journeys has also reduced. However, this year 2024/25 we have seen an increase in the number of customer fatalities, predominantly on London Underground, with people being on the track the most common incident type. We are conducting investigations to identify what further lessons can be learnt and have committed to testing new technologies that can detect when people access the tracks. Since the end of the quarter, we have received the Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) report into the tragic death of a customer who died after falling onto the tracks at Stratford station in December 2023. We welcome the recommendations from the RAIB's independent investigation into this incident, which align with the findings of our own internal investigation, and work has already begun, to implement them.

There has been continued pressure on colleague safety performance, including the appalling incident at Ilford station on 4 December 2024 that led to the tragic death of one of our colleagues.

While serious injuries to colleagues are broadly comparable with those in other years since 2020 (with last year's low number appearing to be an exception), the longer-term all-injury trend for colleagues is downward. The causes of colleague injuries vary but slips, trips and falls and workplace violence and aggression (WVA) both play prominent roles, highlighting the importance of our WVA programme described in this report.

On the roads, this quarter saw a notable number of fatal collisions involving pedestrians, although overall this year-to-date the number of deaths and serious injuries to pedestrians is lower than last year.

More positively, we achieved our safety target for reducing deaths and serious injuries involving a London bus, and this continues a positive trend in the year-to-date and a continued improvement on last year's performance.

In response to these challenges to meet our targets continually to reduce risk to all our customers, colleagues and road users, we have taken action to strengthen our safety systems and to target specific sources of risk. More detail on some trends, incidents and improvement activity is provided in the report, below, and in the body of this report.

### Customer



#### Safety

#### Cyber incident update

Following the pro-active steps we took to protect our systems as a result of the <u>cyber security</u> <u>incident</u> in September, we have regained access to our safety reporting systems, which means we can now provide up-to-date customer safety data. Data has been reviewed and is deemed suitable to provide in this report, but please note that Quarter 3 data is still subject to further review and validation, is provisional and should be interpreted with caution.

Keeping our customers safe is our top priority. In Quarter 3 provisional data indicates that we did not meet our Quarter 3 target, although prior to Quarter 3 we were broadly in line with performance in previous years.

Measure	Q3 Target	Q3 Actual
Customers killed or seriously injured	45	68 (1)

These incidents remind us just how important it is to stay focused on safety at every level, and we are committed to doing all we can to prevent future tragedies.

#### Fatalities

On 4 November, a customer was, very sadly, found fatally injured at Chalk Farm station. We are conducting an internal investigation and will fully support any investigation, including sharing our findings, to external authorities as required. Our thoughts remain with the families and friends of those who died.

#### Serious Injuries

This quarter there have been 67 serious injuries suffered by our customers across our network. Of these, 38 occurred on London Underground, 28 on a bus and one on the Elizabeth line. This is a 39 per cent increase from the same period during the last financial year.

#### Trends and key drivers

So far this year we have sadly recorded 159 customer deaths and serious injuries (six fatalities, 153 serious injuries), which is a 12 per cent increase compared to the same point in financial year 2023/24 (three fatalities, 139 serious injuries). This increase is driven by the higher number of serious injuries in Quarter 3 compared to financial year 2023/24. The majority of these serious injuries continue to be as a result of slips, trips and falls (71 per cent).

The long-term trend section below includes rates of injuries per million passenger journeys to allow for comparison over time accounting for changes in passenger numbers. The passenger

journey data used to calculate this is available on London's data <u>store</u>. This data is currently only available up to the end of Quarter I 2024/25 (I April to 22 June 2024).


#### Fatality long term trends

This financial year to the end of Quarter 3, there have been six customer fatalities recorded, which is an increase compared to the previous financial year (three up to the end of Quarter 3). All of the fatalities so far during this financial year have occurred on London Underground. This is a similar pattern to 2023/24. However, this differs to the three financial years prior, in which London Underground accounted for roughly half of customer fatalities each year.

All but one of the fatalities were members of the public who had fallen or walked onto track and were subsequently hit by a train. The remaining fatality was an individual who fell on station steps and suffered a head injury.


Historically, customer fatalities have ranged between zero and five customer fatalities per quarter, with the majority of fatalities since 2017/18 occurring on London Underground (54 per cent of fatalities) or buses (42 per cent of fatalities).

Figure 1: Public transport customer fatalities since 2017/18, by financial quarter



The rate of fatalities (Figure 2 below) per million passengers has been broadly similar since Quarter I of financial year 2017/18, with the exception of a rise in 2020/21 where the calculation of rates was influenced by the low passenger numbers during that period due to the coronavirus pandemic. In Quarter I of the latest financial year, the rate of fatalities per million passengers was 0.004, which represents one fatality for every 276 million passengers.

Figure 2: Public transport customer fatalities per million passenger journeys since 2017/18, by financial quarter



#### Serious injury long term trends

In the financial year to the end of Quarter 3, there have been 153 customer serious injuries, which is a 10 per cent increase compared to the previous financial year (139 up to the end of Quarter 3). The majority of serious injuries this financial year occurred on London Underground and buses (46 per cent and 41 per cent respectively), with the remaining serious injuries on Cycle Hire, Elizabeth line and London Overground.





Figure 3: Public transport customer serious injuries since 2020/21, by financial quarter

Slips, trips and falls continue to be a main cause of serious injuries on our network, accounting for 71 per cent of customer serious injuries. Those serious injuries occurring on our stairs and escalators account for the majority of these.

The rate of serious injuries per million passengers has been decreasing since 2020/21 (Figure 4 below). In Quarter 1, the rate of serious injuries per million passengers was 0.05, which represents one serious injury for every 19 million passengers. Please note, comparable serious injury trends are only available from 2020 when our definition for reporting serious injuries changed.

Figure 4: Public transport customer serious injuries per million passenger journeys since 2020/21, by financial quarter



#### All injury long term trends

In the financial year to the end of Quarter 3, there have been 6,019 customer injuries, which is a six per cent decrease compared to the previous financial year (6,411 up to the end of Quarter 3). The majority of customer injuries this financial year occurred on buses (48 per cent), with a further 41 per cent on London Underground. This is slightly lower than previous years as buses typically make up 50-60 per cent of all customer injuries,

Looking at trends since financial year 2017/18, customer injuries have gradually increased since the coronavirus pandemic, returning to slightly lower than pre-pandemic figures. This increase since 2020/21 has been driven by an increase in passenger numbers in this period.




Figure 5: Public transport customer injuries since 2017/18, by financial quarter

The rate of injuries per million passengers has remained stable since 2017/18 (Figure 6 below). In Quarter 1, the rate of injuries per million passengers was 2.4, which represents one injury for every 415,000 passengers.




Figure 6: Public transport customer injuries per million passenger journeys since 2017/18, by financial quarter

We continue to work to improve our safety performance across our network. Aiming to eliminate all deaths and serious injuries from London's transport network by 2041, we have recently launched our Platform Train Interface (PTI) Plan as outlined in the Improvement Activity section, below, and are developing an approach to further improve our safety performance on our stairs and escalators.

#### Spotlight on Independent Safety Review

In June 2024, as part of our ongoing work to continuously improve safety performance, we commissioned an independent advisor to review safety governance within our organisation. This consisted of two parts:

- a) Our Safety Governance and Decision Making; and
- b) Review of our Formal Investigation Report process

The overall finding of the review was that our current safety performance is good when benchmarked against other UK transport providers and the general trend is one of continuing improvement. However, we need to sustain, and in some cases accelerate, this improvement if we are to meet our own ambitious safety targets.

The reports identified broad, systemic themes aligned to the overarching goal of ensuring we are a safe organisation which learns from our mistakes and continuously improves. This incorporates the desire to build our focus on safety from the bottom up within our entire business, in addition to our strategic plans.

The reports made 22 specific recommendations, 10 in part A and 12 in part B. We have interpreted the recommendations in six core themes:

- a) Making compliance with safety requirements easy: both through ensuring accountabilities are clear and ensuring our Safety, Health and Environment (SHE) Management System is easy to use;
- b) Checking and assuring that we and our delivery partners are compliant with safety expectations in line with our goal, and not tolerating non-compliance;
- c) Ensuring we spot trends and events before safety incidents occur, using leading indicators to their full potential;
- d) Learning from events that do occur and sharing this knowledge across our business (and industry, where appropriate) through rigorous investigations and effective actions with lasting impact;
- e) Taking action in an agile manner and being willing to 'fail fast', with a focus on finding innovative ways to deliver actions and meet our goals and corporate targets we will prioritise actions rigorously on the most important issues; and
- f) Sustaining action, learning from assurance and ensuring the change is embedded and not forgotten over time across the institution, preventing 'fix and forget'.

In response to the 22 specific recommendations of the reports, we have identified appropriate actions with the aim of improving our safety governance, the rigour of our investigation processes and ensuring we 'fix, learn and continue to deliver'. The reports, recommendations, actions and action alignment to the core themes will be published on our website.

#### Replacing our Risk Assessment systems

We have begun work to replace our SHE risk assessment system database in which we input, store, and review many of our customer and workplace risk assessments. The new system will become the platform for routine SHE risk assessments already contained within existing systems and will also become a repository to capture other risk assessments that are stored locally. This work brings a significant opportunity for strategic improvements to how we define and group; rationalise the number of and consolidate; structure; and ultimately improve the quality of our risk management activity through effective utilisation of our SHE risk assessments.

#### Improvements to our Formal Investigation Processes

The review described in the Spotlight above found that our investigation process and its governance are broadly aligned with good practice as described in industry standards albeit with scope for enhancement through the adoption of some specific elements of good practice. Benchmarking took place with organisations in the nuclear and aviation sectors, and with the RAIB and the Air Accidents Investigation Branch. The results of the review provided us with 12 recommendations which will ensure best practice in line with industry standards, in particular introducing renewed processes enhancing investigation governance and more effective assurance of recommendations and associated actions.

The overall benefits will include greater clarity around accountability, responsibility, governance and investigation categorisation, incident categorisation and decision making to ensure an incident is investigated at the appropriate level. Additionally, accountability and oversight of these investigations will be held at the right levels within the business. A robust process for governance and assurance of recommendations from investigations will further improve our effort to prevent recurrence. New processes are being introduced from January 2025.

#### Walthamstow Bus Station

On 8 November, Walthamstow bus station was closed for an estimated six weeks for essential works to improve pedestrian safety and accessibility. This includes converting the temporary signals that have been in place since May to a permanent solution; shortening the crossing distance at pedestrian crossings; providing new lighting and CCTV; updating the carriageway, road markings and signage; and installing Sustainable urban Drainage Systems (SuDS). These works are in response to a Notice of Contravention issued on 28 March 2024 to TfL by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) following its investigation into the tragic death of a pedestrian at Walthamstow bus station on 15 December 2023. To minimise disruption to customers, other renewal works will also be taking place during the closure of the bus station that include resurfacing the carriageway, as well as Thames Water installing a new mains connection. The bus station reopened on 20 December 2024 as planned.

#### Changes to Elizabeth line's safety management documentation

The Elizabeth line's SHE team are working to align the safety management documentation of the Elizabeth line with the rest of TfL and continue to shape the documentation to ensure it stays relevant for the operations it delivers.

This work will ensure such SHE information and documentation is accessible to all Elizabeth line concessionaires, contractors and other key stakeholders involved in the operation and maintenance of the line. As a result, all the key documentation will be consistent when compared to other TfL rail operations and can easily be located when needed.

The next stage of the improvement process is the redraft of the Elizabeth Line Rule Book. This is a long-term project of nine separate strands that involves redrafting the Rule Book and introduces new ways of working across the Elizabeth line operations and communicating the changes to all relevant colleagues, contractors and other key stakeholders.

#### TfL Platform Train Interface

We finalised our PTI Plan in October 2024. This brings together all workstreams taking place across TfL to reduce risk at the PTI. A TfL PTI Steering Group, which is Director-chaired, has been set up with representation from all our rail modes as well as Engineering, SHE, Customer Experience and Asset Strategy teams to ensure:

- 1. the delivery of the TfL PTI Plan and necessary adaptation and development of the Plan to ensure that we meet our 2030 and 2041 customer safety goals;
- 2. leadership and direction is provided to teams across our organisation on PTI related activities, in particular potential approaches which would improve safety at the PTI;
- 3. support and/or direction is sought from the TfL Operations Leadership team, and other TfL teams where required to deliver the TfL PTI Plan; and
- 4. that the rail modes share experiences, learning and good practice.


There are several initiatives underway across our organisation. This work is designed to bring all these together to ensure that we have a clear and joined up approach across TfL. More detail is provided in the Rail Customer Safety Update paper elsewhere on the agenda.

#### **Escalator Entrapments**

The trial of a trip switch which stops an escalator in the event of a foot entrapment is ongoing at South Kensington station. This is designed to reduce the potential consequences of an entrapment incident in the event one occurs. At the time of writing, we have had no entrapment incidents which would trigger activation of the trip switch and no issues identified so it is planned for the pilot to be extended to a further five stations to continue assessing the feasibility of this technology. We have funding in place and continue to work with our escalator suppliers on this.

## Customer





Due to the cyber incident and data issues with the MPS, data on crime and antisocial behaviour for Quarter 3 2024/25 cannot be provided.

The latest data available at the time of this report is up until August 2024 and is provided in a separate paper.

Once reliable and accurate data becomes available, we will report on crime and antisocial behaviour every quarter.



# Colleague

## Safety

#### Cyber incident update

Following the pro-active steps we took to protect our systems as a result of the <u>cyber security</u> <u>incident</u> at TfL, we have regained access to our safety reporting systems, which means we can now provide up-to-date colleague safety data. Data has been reviewed and is deemed suitable to provide in this report, but please note that Quarter 3 data is still subject to further review and validation, is provisional and should be interpreted with caution.

As an organisation, we work hard to ensure the safety of all our colleagues – whether employed by TfL or a company completing work on our behalf. The scorecard below shows the number of our colleagues killed or seriously injured while working for us or on our behalf and indicates that we did not meet our target in the quarter.

Measure	Q3 Target	Q3 Actual
Colleagues killed or seriously injured	4	8 (1)

#### Colleague Safety performance

**Data sources:** IE2 and IRIS, TfL's safety incident reporting systems, date extracted: 15 January 2024

We are sorry to report that a colleague was tragically killed in Quarter 3 as a result of an assault. More detail is provided within the Colleague Security section below. This means that the annual scorecard metric for colleague safety has been automatically failed for the year 2024/25.

Unfortunately, there were seven colleagues seriously injured during Quarter 3, up from three reported during Quarter 2. In total, there have been 18 colleague serious injuries and one death this year, exceeding the annual target of 17 or less.

#### Trends and drivers

Of the deaths and serious injuries reported during Quarter 3, four TfL employees and four members of contracted staff were injured. The injuries occurred across Network Management; Customer and Strategy; London Underground; Buses; Compliance, Policing, Operations and Security (CPOS); and the Elizabeth line teams.

Three of the injuries were categorised as slips, trips or falls, where risk management and poor housekeeping were identified as root causes. The other five injuries, including the fatality on the Elizabeth line, were attributable to violence and aggression, a trend that has risen significantly over recent years. Further information on how this is being managed is covered in the Workplace Violence and Aggression section of this report.

#### Fatality long term trends

Since financial year 2017/18 there have been four colleague fatalities, all of which have involved contracted staff. Two occurred in 2019 when a sub-contractor engineer died while working on a travelator and a bus driver was killed in a collision. In October 2023 a contractor was hit and killed by a car while working at a bus shelter. Sadly, the latest fatality occurred in Quarter 3 of this year.

#### Serious injury long term trends

In the financial year so far, there have been 18 colleague serious injuries, this is an increase compared to the previous financial year (14 up to the end of Quarter 3). London Underground (five) and buses (three) make up some of these serious injuries, with the remaining 10 spread across smaller transport modes, office staff, and colleagues responsible for upkeep and maintenance of the TfL network. This differs from previous years as colleagues working on transport modes have typically made up the majority of serious injuries.





Figure 7: Colleague serious injuries since 2020/21, by financial quarter

Looking at serious injury trends, the rise in colleague serious injuries this year brings figures to a level similar to those in financial year 2021/22 and 2022/23. Since 2020/21 numbers have been relatively stable with the exception of 2023/24 where colleague serious injuries were particularly low. Comparable serious injury trends are only available from 2020 when TfL's definition for reporting serious injuries changed.

#### All injury long term trends

In the financial year so far, there have been 1,161 colleague injuries, this is a seven per cent decrease compared to the previous financial year (1,243 up to the end of Quarter 3). The majority of colleague injuries this financial year occurred on London Underground (57 per cent). Since 2018/19 London Underground has made up between 51-59 per cent of colleague serious injuries.

Figure 8: Colleague serious injuries since 2017/18, by financial quarter



Looking at trends since financial year 2017/18, colleague injuries have fallen steadily. This trend is driven by a decrease in injuries on buses and other smaller transport modes.

#### Improvement Activity

#### SHE Leadership Engagement Tours

There were 220 SHE Leadership Engagement Tours completed in Quarter 3 across TfL. This is an increase from 129 in Quarter 2. The tours aim to increase leadership visibility and improve engagement on SHE.

#### Capital Keeping in Touch Event

As part of our engagement programme with our Capital supply chain to support our goal to get everyone home safe and healthy every day, a Keeping in Touch (KIT) session was held virtually with our external suppliers on 2 December 2024.

The KIT facilitated sharing of good SHE practices with 27 of our key suppliers. Topics discussed included the Capital Safety, Health, and Environment Strategy, near miss reporting processes, our zero-emission vehicles policy and the importance of leadership engagement tours. The event also included a presentation from our contractor Morgan Sindall on their "Healthy Hearts and Minds" initiative to improve the health and wellbeing of their workforce. The next KIT event is scheduled to take place in March 2025.

# Changes introduced following the TfL Safety Culture Assessment within Rail for London Infrastructure (RfLI)

Following the implementation and results of the TfL's SHE Culture Assessment, the RfLI team have implemented a culture initiative called PACCT. This stands for:

- Prioritise Prioritise safety, always
- Awareness Be aware and alert

- Communication Communicate effectively
- Competence work with competence
- Teamwork look out for each other

PACCT has been rolled out across RfLI Infrastructure and Operations teams in December and into 2025 and we look forward to seeing the impact it will have. The SHE Culture Maturity Measurement framework can be used to quantify progress over time.

#### Significant Incidents

#### Fatalities

**4 December 2024, Ilford station:** We are sorry to report that a colleague was tragically killed in Quarter 3 as a result of an assault. More detail is provided within the Colleague Security section below.

#### Seriously Injured

**I5 September 2024, Crystal Palace bus station:** A colleague, who was undertaking speed gun checks of vehicles at the bus station, sustained a fractured wrist.

**10 October 2024, Palestra:** A colleague tripped over furniture and fell in one of the head office buildings sustaining injury in the form of bruising to their left hip, thigh and leg.

**17 October 2024, Green Park station:** A colleague was assaulted by two members of the public, resulting in our colleague requiring treatment for a broken finger and hand.

**4 November 2024, London Transport Museum:** A colleague from our cleaning supplier was injured while cleaning the floor on the ground floor of the museum.

**5 November 2024, A1 Upper Street:** Two colleagues were injured when a member of the public pushed down pedestrian barriers enclosing a work site.

**24 November 2024, Charing Cross Underground station:** An engineer entering Charing Cross station via steps slipped and fell on liquid waste, fracturing their leg. The incident took place on Westminster City Council property during engineering hours, where cleaning had not taken place during the day.

In addition to the KSIs listed, it is important to highlight that there have been a number of other incidents reported this quarter that have involved violence and aggression from members of the public towards our colleagues.

#### Other significant incidents

**12 October, Gloucester Road:** A colleague working on the track fell and injured their leg. The incident is being followed up by the local management team.

**8 October, Track between Leyton and Stratford:** Two track operatives crossed the track while the traction current was still on. This incident is being followed up by the local management team.

**6 November, Kentish Town Underground station:** Contractors left an unattended mobile scaffold tower in a cross passageway, which rolled off the platform onto the north bound track. The APD Systems and Infrastructure team have started a local investigation.

# Colleague




## Health


Looking after our colleagues' health and wellbeing is central to our vision as an organisation. This includes supporting colleagues who may be experiencing long-term conditions as well as helping them deal with everyday challenges like back pain, stress, or other health concerns which can affect wellbeing, productivity and attendance. The Occupational Health and Wellbeing team and employee relations specialists are working closely with local managers to understand reasons for absence and seeking the best way to support them.

#### Sickness absence performance

The key to reducing absence percentages is to prevent our colleagues from going off in the first instance. Top causes of long- and short-term absence in Quarter 3 2024/25 are displayed below. These align with the national picture and longer-term trends within TfL (below).



The top three causes of long-term sickness absence are mental health, musculoskeletal (MSK) and accidents/assaults. The general trend of these absence types is broadly unchanged over the last year and there are minor fluctuations in the per cent of each condition someone is off work sick with (shown below).



#### Sickness Rate Trend

Data as of 17/01/25, 09:34

The general trend is broadly unchanged over the last year and there are minor fluctuations in the per cent of each condition someone is off work sick with.

#### Improvement Activity

#### Mental health masterclasses

Our Occupational Health team continues to drive initiatives across the organisation to engender better physical and mental health among colleagues. Mental health was a particular point of focus during December to coincide with winter, which is widely recognised as the time of year that some people find most challenging. Several Mental Health Masterclass sessions were held for people leaders, designed to help build confidence in recognising signs of mental health issues and then providing the right support to their teams. Research has shown that where managers have this training and knowledge, sickness absence in their teams is reduced. This is particularly important bearing in mind that mental health and trauma are in the top three reasons for long-term absence.

#### Wellbeing Colleagues peer support group

In an organisation of our size, it can sometimes be difficult to roll out messaging and advice about both physical and mental health such that it reaches everyone who would benefit most from hearing it. It was in part for that reason that last spring we launched a new peer support group, Wellbeing Colleagues. The colleagues in this group act as advocates and play a key role in helping us disseminate information and advice. Pleasingly the number of colleagues in this support group has now reached 175. They all undergo training periodically and in November they were briefed on supporting colleagues to make healthy nutrition choices.

#### Wellbeing pilot

In September we started a pilot working with some of the teams who have the highest absence. This will identify interventions to help them to improve wellbeing and reduce absence in their teams. For the track teams we have focused initially on MSK health as this is one of their main reasons for absence. Our physiotherapy provider, Vita Health Group, met with the track managers to educate them and dispel myths about MSK problems and emphasised the benefits of early referral for physiotherapy. They then attended two night shifts, again educating the team and teaching them brief warm up exercises which they can do at the start of the shift. We will be looking at further wellbeing initiatives in 2025.

#### Wellbeing plan

We will launch a TfL Wellbeing plan in 2025. This will pull together all the wellbeing initiatives currently available and set out future steps to enable us to develop a healthier working environment and wellbeing culture, to allow everybody to thrive in a way that is important to their own health and wellbeing.

The TfL Wellbeing plan has three main pillars and associated deliverables / actions as outlined below.



# Colleague



## Security

#### Work-related Violence and Aggression (WVA)

Every colleague working under the TfL roundel has the right to work without fear of being assaulted, abused, or threatened and it should never be accepted as 'part of the job'. We are committed to preventing the causes of violence and aggression against our people and providing the best support to those who experience it, pushing for the strongest possible judicial outcomes. This is even more important following the tragedy at llford station.

#### Killing of our colleague

On Friday 6 December 2024 one of our colleagues tragically died in hospital after being seriously assaulted by a member of the public at Ilford station. He had worked for MTR Elizabeth Line as a customer service assistant and had been a dedicated member of railway staff for over 24 years. An individual has been charged with his murder and remanded in custody. Our thoughts and sympathy remain with our their family, friends and colleagues, who have paid tribute to him as a devoted family man, kind, clever, considerate and an inspiring role model to many. No member of staff should be subject to any type of assault on our network, and we are committed to help and support our colleagues and demonstrate that we will not stand for violence of any sort across our network.

After the incident we worked with our policing colleagues to provide coordinated TfL enforcement and police reassurance patrols in the area for our people and our customers. Communications were issued to staff and managers on our sorrow and reassurance on how to stay safe. A plan has been put in place for the area coordinated by the MPS and we are fully supporting the BTP with their investigation.

#### Quarter 3 reporting

Due to the cyber incident impacting TfL systems, our reported figures for Quarter 3 are currently incomplete. Since the cyber incident we are unable to report on WVA incidents on the bus network. We are also unable to fully include reports made by staff working at some of our Sponsored Services, such as the IFS Cloud Cable Car, River Services and the Woolwich Ferry.

We believe the cyber incident has also influenced the reporting patterns of WVA by London Underground staff and in particular the use of the appropriate reporting system, used to report lower level WVA offences. Although this system is now accessible, it appears to be being underused compared to before the cyber incident. We are monitoring this and are considering an engagement campaign to encourage staff to report WVA incidents.

Due to the above, although we have included the figures for last year, we cannot at this point confidently draw comparisons or analyse potential reasons for any differences with previous quarters or last year.

### Work-related Violence and Aggression (WVA) performance


Our scorecard measure tracks the number of physical incidents against directly managed TfL staff and includes a stretch target of a 10 per cent reduction compared to last year. Due to the serious nature of physical incidents which are often reported to the police, and as the measure is relevant to directly employed staff only, we are more confident of the robustness of these figures during the cyber incident.

At the end of Quarter 3 our target for a 10 per cent reduction in physical incidents was 699. There were 653 reported in the quarter, meaning we are currently 25 incidents below our 10 per cent reduction target for the year. However, we are currently assessing how we will record our annual figures, against our target, considering the potential impact of the cyber incident on reporting.

- During Quarter 3, 203 physical incidents were reported by a TfL directly employed member of staff, equal to our 10 per cent reduction target for this quarter
- During Quarter 2, the final total of physical incidents reported by a TfL directly employed member of staff was 213, which matched the 10 per cent reduction target for that quarter
- During Quarter 1, 199 physical incidents were reported by a TfL directly employed member of staff which was 25 below the 10 per cent reduction target for that quarter.

# Figure 9: Police recorded work-related violence with injury offence from December 2022 to December 2024

This graph shows the overall trend in violence with injury offences recorded by the police against TfL transport colleagues. Data from the MPS has been missing since January 2024 for bus related WVA. We expect to have a regular feed of MPS WVA data from April 2025.



#### Trends in WVA

During Quarter 3 there were 995 reported incidents of WVA captured from across all our transport modes. Of these, 640 incidents were reported by staff working on the London Underground network (64 per cent of all reported incidents). There were 1,152 reported incidents by London Underground staff during Quarter 3 of last year.

There were 91 incidents of WVA were reported by staff working on the bus network (nine per cent of all reported incidents). Last year in Quarter 3, 1,103 incidents were reported by staff on the bus network.

There were 264 incidents reported in the quarter by staff from all other modes (CPOS, Streets, Elizabeth line, London Overground, DLR and London Trams and Capital Delivery). Last year in Quarter 3, 277 incidents were reported by staff on these modes.

#### Insight into WVA triggers


In Quarter 3, 302 of all reported WVA incidents were classified as physical assaults. This is a reduction of 46 from Quarter 2, which will largely be accounted for by the current lack of data from staff working on the bus network.

There was a rise in the percentage of incidents triggered by antisocial or aggressive customer behaviour or a negative reaction to customer engagement. This increased from 36 per cent in Quarter 2 to 43 per cent in Quarter 3. Revenue related matters such as ticket disputes triggered 39 per cent in Quarter 3, a reduction of five per cent from Quarter 2.

Twelve per cent of WVA incidents in Quarter 3 involved some element of hate. This proportion has risen from 10.7 per cent in Quarter 2. Of these 123 incidents in Quarter 3, 93 per cent were race-related, with the remaining being faith-related or homophobic. This could be linked to our activity during National Hate Crime Awareness Week (see below) which raised awareness of what hate crimes are and the importance of reporting.

#### Solved rate for WVA offences investigated by the police

Between June 2023 and May 2024 (figures are reported six months in arrears from the latest data, to allow time for progression through the criminal justice process), the solved rate across rail modes for work-related violence, sexual and public order recorded offences was 19 per cent, which is three per cent higher than the previous 12 months. This compares to a solved rate for violence, sexual and public order across all rail modes where the victim was not TfL transport staff of 11 per cent.




**Figure 10: Solved rate for WVA offences investigated by the police from June 2020 to May 2024** (This is done six months in arrears to allow for criminal investigations to progress).

#### Staff willing to support police investigations

The percentage of staff willing to support a police investigation between June 2023 and May 2024 (on rail modes only) was 68 per cent for violence, sexual and public order recorded offences, three per cent lower compared to the previous 12-month period.

There are many reasons that victims choose not to support an investigation including their confidence in the judicial system and the likelihood of a successful outcome. We are working to better understand the reasons so we can address them and support our colleagues through the judicial process.

# Figure 11: Percentage of Staff Willing to Support Police Investigations from June 2022 to May 2024 (all violence and public order offences)



(This is done six months in arrears to allow for criminal investigations to progress).

#### Improvement Activity

#### Adapting to the Cyber Incident

During the cyber incident some operational areas lost access to WVA reporting systems. To ensure the WVA team continued to reach out to offer support to victims we assigned direct contacts for operational managers and linked up with SHE and the police to exchange information on serious assaults to help identify and offer support to victims. Our body worn video cameras remained robust and were not impacted, and staff were still able to check-out a camera and record footage.

#### Awareness Raising

October marked National Hate Crime Awareness Week. In support of this, we ran a staff communications campaign to provide information on what constitutes a hate crime, dispel myths about reporting, highlight the importance of wearing and activating body worn video and reporting every incident internally and to the police. We held hate crime insight sessions for staff to gain further understanding, relay their concerns and have their questions answered. We have issued new guidance for all staff on dealing with hate crime and the support they can expect to receive if it occurs.

Our 4,000 train operators do not currently report high levels of WVA, but they do face particular WVA risks, especially when asking customers to leave trains at the end of service. We have launched a new communications campaign encouraging train operators to report all incidents of WVA and make them aware of the support the WVA team can provide, including liaison with the police and support at court.

#### **Customer Campaigns**

During the festive season, there is an increase in the number of customers that use our network after drinking alcohol and intoxication can be a key trigger for WVA. On average, intoxication causes 10 per cent of WVA incidents over this period. In the build up to this period, we issued guidance to staff and managers on how to safely interact with intoxicated customers. Our public facing media campaign, Abuse Has Consequences, was targeted towards locations where we historically see higher levels of these incidents. Past data was used to identify hotspot locations that are likely to face high levels of WVA during this time and informed the deployment of Transport Support Enforcement Officers to keep our customers and staff safe.

## Roads



## Road safety

One of our key priorities is working with London boroughs and the MPS to make London's roads safer for everyone. We therefore have a scorecard measure that shows the number of people killed or seriously injured on London's roads against an ambitious target aligned to our Vision Zero objective.

While any loss of life is heartbreaking, the longer-term trend demonstrates progress in ensuring that London's roads are safe.

Measure	Q3 Target	Q3 Actual
People killed or seriously injured in road traffic collisions	882	910 (35)


**Data sources:** police reported road traffic collisions resulting in personal injury (STATS19), early fatal notifications from the police.


Date of extraction: 16 December 2024

#### Road safety performance

Quarter 3 has sadly seen more deaths or people seriously injured on London's roads than targeted. However, while it is higher than Quarter 3 last year (866), it is lower than Quarter 3 in 2021/22 (962) and 2022/23 (956) and therefore not abnormal, resulting in it having an Amber rating.

#### Figure 12: Scorecard measure: People killed or seriously injured (KSIs) in road traffic collisions





#### Trends and drivers

Quarter 3 data for 2024/25 is currently unprocessed and provisional, and therefore subject to change. As such, many of the circumstances of the collisions are yet to be finalised while the police complete their investigations (e.g., contributing factors such as speeding, exact locations and mapping of these to the road network etc).

#### Fatalities overview

Thirty-five people tragically lost their lives on London's roads in Quarter 3 this year, which is particularly high, and higher than Quarter 3 for the last five years (24, 24, 18, 25 and 31 respectively), due to an increase in the number of people killed while walking (up from 13 to 24), discussed in further detail below. Looking at the year-to-date figures, 70 people have been killed so far this financial year, the same level as the last two years (72 and 71) and much lower than pre-pandemic (93 in 2019/20).

There has been a sustained reduction in the number of people killed on the roads post-pandemic (2022, 2023 and 2024) compared to pre-pandemic (2017, 2018 and 2019), particularly for people walking and motorcycling. We attribute this to lower speed limits, the Direct Vision Standard, among other road safety interventions, and changes to travel patterns.

#### Serious injuries overview

There were 875 people seriously injured in Quarter 3 this year, more than Quarter 3 last year (842) but fewer than the two preceding years (both 938). In contrast to fatalities the number of people seriously injured while walking has fallen (from 301 to 286) and is lower than Quarter 3 in the

preceding five years except pandemic affected 2020/21 (301, 320, 301, 267 and 331 respectively), discussed in further detail below. The biggest increase in serious injuries was among car occupants (from 80 to 107), but this is lower than the two preceding years (123 in 2022/23 and 120 in 2021/22), suggesting that 2023/24 was unusually low. Smaller increases in pedal cyclist serious injuries (from 210 to 230) and motorcyclists (from 179 to 190) are not thought to be part of a continuing trend and are also lower than preceding years.

For serious injuries year-to-date (2,634) there has been a slight increase on last year (2,586) but a reduction in numbers compared to 2021/22 (2,761) and 2022/23 (2,819). Within this the biggest decrease has been in serious injuries to people walking (from 843 to 795), and the biggest increases in serious injuries to cyclists (705 to 759) and motorcyclists (533 to 582), which is not thought to be a significant trend.

#### People walking

Comparing Quarter 3 this year to last year, worryingly more people were killed while walking, but fewer were seriously injured, so the total number of people killed or seriously injured remained roughly the same (310 at the end of Quarter 3 this year vs 314 last year). This means the severity of collisions has increased, from one fatality for every 24 serious injuries in the preceding two years to one fatality for every 12 serious injuries this year. We will continue to monitor this going forward to determine whether this is an anomaly or an emerging trend.

More people walking were killed by cars in Quarter 3 this year compared to Quarter 3 last year (from five to 13) and vans (from one to four). Two thirds of victims (16 out of 24) were over 60 years old, a similar proportion to previous quarters. Further analysis on the underlying causes will be undertaken once the relevant police investigations have been completed.

Year-to-date, 37 people have been killed while walking, similar to last year (36) but higher than 2022/23 (29), and lower than pre-pandemic (50 in 2019/20), part of a significant and sustained post-pandemic decrease in fatalities.

#### People cycling

Year-to-date, seven people have been killed while cycling, the same as last year (seven) but higher than previous years (five in 2022/23, 2021/22 and 2020/21). We have seen a significant increase in the number of cycling journeys since the pandemic, suggesting that while the number of people killed while cycling has remained similar, the overall risk of being killed while cycling continues to decrease. More analysis on the trend in risk will be carried out when up to date journey data becomes available.

To the end of Quarter 3, the number of serious injuries to people cycling (768) is higher than last year (705) but lower than the previous two years (799 in 2022/23 and 790 in 2021/22) suggesting that last year was unusually low.

#### People motorcycling

To the end of Quarter 3, 11 people have been killed while motorcycling, continuing a sustained downward trend (from 26 in 2019/20 to 15 in 2022/23 and 17 in 2023/24). Compared with before the pandemic, fewer people have been killed while riding larger and heavier bikes with an engine size of over 125cc, whereas fatalities on motorcycles with a smaller engine have remained largely unchanged.

Serious injuries to people motorcycling have also fallen as part of a longer-term trend postpandemic (2022, 2023 and 2024) compared to pre-pandemic. We think this positive trend reflects a reduction in commuting journeys using bigger heavier bikes on car-dominated high-speed roads, whereas smaller motorcycles continue to be widely used by couriers in the gig economy on lower speed high streets where drivers are already looking out for people walking and cycling.

#### Car occupants

The biggest increase in serious injuries in Quarter 3 was among car occupants (from 80 to 107) but this is still lower than the preceding two years (123 in 2022/23 and 120 in 2021/22).

Year-to-date there have been a similar pattern with the number of car occupants killed or seriously injured (321) being higher than last year (308) but lower than the two preceding years (362 in 2022/23 and 348 in 2021/22).

#### Improvement Activity

#### Road Safety Week (17-23 November)

During this week we supported Brake in raising awareness of deaths and serious injuries that occur on UK roads. There were numerous policing educational and enforcement activities seeking to tackle the dangerous behaviour which can lead to collisions. Our speed marketing campaign which ran across radio, paid social media, digital audio, road facing posters and a new out-of-home placement on petrol pumps at 143 petrol stations across outer London was trialled. It has been estimated this reached over three million people during the week.

TfL's Walking and Cycling Commissioner, Will Norman, along with Seb Dance, the Deputy Mayor for Transport, attended the World Day of Remembrance for Road Traffic Victims memorial service held on Sunday 17 November.

#### Safe Speeds

Speeding is the largest contributor to injuries on our road network and it is important that we address compliance with speed limits but also ensure we have the correct speed for the usage of the road, protecting those who are choosing to walk, wheel and cycle.

We continue to introduce 20mph speed limits on more of the TfL Road Network and now have 20mph limits on a total of 264km of our roads.

Work is taking place to identify where complementary speed-reducing features such as green infrastructure, lane reallocation and raised crossing points can be installed to provide a self-enforcing speed limit where it has recently been introduced. This is in line with the Department for Transport's guidance on setting speed limits.

#### Safe Streets

Detailed analysis of London's casualty data takes place to identify areas which have seen large numbers of collisions resulting in serious casualties and areas of concern for future collision risk.

Design work continues at more than 40 locations across London to improve safety for those walking and cycling. Public engagement on several schemes has commenced and will continue into Quarter 4 of 2024/25.

Delivery of schemes continues on the Road Safety programme. The consultation report for the walking and cycling improvements between Finsbury Park and Nag's Head was published on 3 December. We will publish a further report in spring 2025, containing our next steps for the scheme.

Public consultation on the Safer Junction scheme at Hogarth roundabout in Hounslow concluded on 12 September 2024. The next report to the Panel will include key highlights.

We have achieved our Vision Zero commitment to consult on 10 further Safer Junctions locations by the end of 2024. The latest consultation to improve junctions in Shoreditch launched on 16 December.

In November 2024, construction started on the Battersea Bridge Safer Junction scheme with completion due in late-September 2025. This will deliver new pedestrian crossings, additional bus lane and improvements for cyclists including a section of segregated cycle track and dedicated cycle signals at the junction at the north of the bridge.

#### Safe Vehicles

From 28 October, we strengthened the minimum safety requirements for the world-leading Direct Vision Standard, to reduce the level of risk that heavy goods vehicles (HGVs) can pose to all road users, especially people walking and cycling.

Operators will receive a penalty charge notice of up to £550 if they operate an HGV more than 12 tonnes in Greater London without a minimum three-star Direct Vision Standard rating or without a valid HGV safety permit.

In 2023 there was a 49 per cent reduction in the number of fatal collisions involving an HGV, compared to the 2017-19 baseline. Improving vehicle safety features will further reduce the level of risk to all road users. The change in requirement was regularly communicated through a variety of channels, including weekly calls with industry representative groups and a marketing campaign which was featured across trade press publications, posters in service stations on the north, south, east and west approaches to London, paid search content and service emails to existing permit holders.

The launch event (28 October) held to publicly congratulate the freight industry for their continued commitment to road safety was attended by Will Norman, Walking and Cycling Commissioner, among other colleagues and Vision Zero stakeholders.

#### Safe Behaviours

Our digital marketing and radio advertising campaign supporting the speed limit changes, which aims to educate road users on the reasons behind the introduction of lowering speed limits, continues to perform strongly. The latest TfL attitudes tracker from September reported a

decrease in the number of people agreeing that it is acceptable to driver over 20mph in a 20mph speed limit area (from 37 to 32 per cent).

During this period a number of road safety enforcement operations took place. From 23 September to 6 October the MPS's focus was on the 'fatal four' (speeding, drink and drug driving, non-compliance with seat belt law and distraction) with a particular focus on young drivers. The focus was on positive engagement and education to our younger community regarding staying safe.

Our Motorcycle Safety team, Cycle Safety team and Traffic Police Community Support Officers have carried out numerous education and enforcement sessions, delivered a number of road safety workshops to students at Croydon College and to Air Cadets in Enfield, education of cyclists with no lights and using Lasercam equipment captured 844 drivers for excessive speed. Community Roadwatch events have also still been taking place even as the weather turned colder, resulting in a total of 719 letters being sent to drivers.

During this period the MPS contributed to the National Driver Eyesight Campaign. Where possible roadside eyesight tests were conducted where a driver was suspected of having defective vision or where the driver was voluntarily willing to take the test. During this operation there were a total of 1,647 Traffic Offence Reports (TORs) issued by Roads and Transport Police Command Officers for 1,929 TOR offences.

Operation Drive Insured saw 186 TORs issued, with 168 for no insurance and 52 arrests, mainly for being under the influence of drink and drugs.

#### Post Collision Response

It is important that we strive to prevent serious, life threatening and fatal collisions from occurring on our streets, but if they do occur, we need to provide the best possible support to those impacted.

In November 2023, a pilot programme was launched to support victims of road traffic collisions as part of our Vision Zero Action Plan. The pilot will run until October 2025, and is being delivered by specialist organisations such as Brake and RoadPeace. This pilot is co-funded by TfL and the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime and has currently supported over 160 individuals.

We are monitoring the positive impact of the pilot on users and taking steps to procure a permanent support service.

## **Bus safety**



One of our key priorities is making London's buses safer for everyone. Therefore, we have a safety scorecard metric that is specific to injuries related to collisions involving London buses, which forms a subset of the overall road safety metric.

Bus safety is an integral part of our Customer, Colleague and Road Safety story. However, we have a bespoke bus safety programme of improvements, so this section of the report aims to bring these elements together to demonstrate our joined-up approach to safety.

While any loss of life is heartbreaking, these numbers demonstrate progress in ensuring that London's buses are safe.

Measure	Q3 Target	Q3 Actual
People killed or seriously injured in road traffic collisions in or by a London Bus	65	50 (4)

**Data sources:** police reported road traffic collisions resulting in personal injury (STATS19), early fatal notifications from the police.

Date of extraction: 16 December 2024

#### Bus safety performance

In Quarter 3, the number of people killed or seriously injured in collisions involving London buses was lower than the target. It was lower than Quarter 3 last year (58), and lower than Quarter 3 in 2021/22 (51) and 2022/23 (57) resulting in it having a Green rating. However, there were four people tragically killed in collisions involving London buses this quarter and we are committed to reducing this number to zero by 2030.

#### Trends and drivers

Quarter 3 data for 2024/25 is currently unprocessed and provisional, and therefore subject to change. As such, many of the circumstances of the collisions are yet to be finalised while the police complete their investigations (e.g., contributing factors such as speeding, exact locations and mapping of these to the road network etc).

#### Fatalities overview

Four people were tragically killed in a collision involving a bus in Quarter 3 this year, which is particularly high, higher than Quarter 3 for the last five years (three, one, one, three and three respectively), consisting of three people killed while walking and one killed while cycling. Looking at the year-to-date figures, six people have been killed so far, this financial year, comparable to the last two years (seven and five) and lower than pre-pandemic (nine in 2019/20 and 10 in 2018/19). Our thoughts remain with the families and friends of those who died.

#### Serious injuries overview

Forty-six people were seriously injured in collisions involving London buses in Quarter 3 this year, lower than Quarter 3 last year (55) and fewer than the two preceding years (56 and 50 respectively).

For serious injuries year-to-date (163) there has been a decrease on last year (182) and a reduction in numbers compared to 2022/23 (171) but an increase on 2021/22 (144).

#### **Bus passengers**

Comparing Quarter 3 this year to last year, the number of bus passengers seriously injured is similar (26 for Quarter 3 this year compared to 28 for Quarter 3 last year), and there were no customer fatalities in either year.

Year-to-date there has been a reduction in bus passenger serious injuries from 85 to 76, which is a further reduction on 2022/23 when it was 91. This should be seen in the context of the fact that bus passenger safety was improving steadily pre-pandemic (58 bus passengers killed or seriously injured in 2019/20 at this point) but declined in the years immediately after the pandemic.

#### People walking


As mention above sadly, three people walking were killed in collisions with London buses in Quarter 3 this year, which is the same as in Quarter 3 last year. Four people walking have been killed year-to-date. We are undertaking a review of pedestrian fatalities to identify trends and any learning outcomes or further initiatives which could further reduce the risk.

However fewer people walking have been seriously injured in collisions with buses in Quarter 3 this year (12) than last year (16), and year-to-date there has been a similar decrease from 60 last year to 48 people this year.

#### People cycling


Sadly, this year one person was killed in Quarter 3 in a collision with a bus while cycling. This compares to none in Quarter 3 last year. Year-to-date there have been two people killed in collisions with London buses while cycling, whereas there were none last year.

Serious injuries to cyclists in collisions with London buses was lower in Quarter 3 this year (four) than last year (seven), but year-to-date there has been an increase this year (22) from last year (20).



# Figure 14: Scorecard measure: People killed or seriously injured in road traffic collisions on or in a collision involving a London bus





We are continuing to work with operators to meet the 2030 target of zero fatalities of people on or in collision with a bus.

## Improvement activity

Activities that have been carried out include two incident prevention days, analysis of likely pedestrian behaviours, producing a handbook for drivers for our bus stations reiterating safe behaviours in and around our bus stations. The Bus Safety Programme supports our Vision Zero targets for London buses and follows a Safe Systems Approach.

#### Safe Vehicles

We know that improving the safety of London's buses is the most effective way to improve the safety of the bus network and we continue to focus on delivering safer buses through the Bus Safety Standard (BSS). Currently, 1,776 new buses are in the London bus fleet that meet the BSS out of a total of 8,800 buses.

By the end of Quarter 3 we had also retrofitted 189 buses with Camera Monitoring Systems, 428 buses with Intelligent Speed Assistance (ISA), pedal cameras were installed on 90 buses, and 307 buses were fitted with an Acoustic Vehicle Alerting System.

We are developing the next phase of the BSS which will set out requirements for new buses in 2027, 2030 and 2033. The new bus cab design is a key focus of this work, and to inform this we have been undertaking engagement with bus drivers on the design of cabs, visiting bus garages across the UK. We will be publishing a vision document for the driver's design cab in early February 2025. Alongside this we have a range of engagement and research underway and planned to inform the BSS phase 2, including research looking at the potential of connected and automated vehicle technology and advanced driver assistance systems.

We continue to progress research into the causes of, and potential solutions to, Pedal Application Error (PAE). This has included a large-scale study involving more than 120 London bus drivers looking at preferred foot positioning in relation to existing pedal positions. The results of this study are currently being assessed alongside the implications for an updated pedal design specification. Other ongoing research includes investigating the possibility of developing an acceleration suppression feature, which would help mitigate the more severe PAE incidents, and looking at psychological and behavioural factors which may be impacting PAE risk. A report is currently being finalised which summarises recent developments in our understanding of PAE and will be published in due course.

#### Safe Speeds

There are now 4,861 buses (around 55 per cent of the fleet) fitted with ISA, helping drivers to adhere to posted speed limits. This number is continually rising as new vehicles enter the fleet and older vehicles are retrofitted with this technology. ISA is a critical part of the wider BSS as ensuring buses are travelling at a safe speed means that other safety features and technologies will be more effective.

We continue to work with operators to improve speed compliance including on non-ISA buses, such as through speed awareness campaigns and engagement events with drivers at bus garages.

#### Safe Behaviours

Through our bus customer injuries workstream we have a range of research and trials underway, including:

- A behavioural audit into slips, trips and falls on buses. A literature review on the topic has been completed by behavioural science company SoMoCo. A report will be published on the TfL website shortly;
- SoMoCo have also been reviewing CCTV incidents from slips, trips and falls and asking bus drivers and other key stakeholders for views and experiences. This will form part of a larger deep dive which will include observing customer behaviour on-board buses and asking customers for views on these incidents and why they occur. The report from this is expected in April 2025 and a final report will be published on the TfL website in the summer;
- Research into buggy falls on buses by AECOM and SoMoCo. This includes holding focus groups with parents, carrying out a full literature review, incident data analysis, and liaising with London bus operators and public transport authorities worldwide. The report is due in early 2025 and will inform next steps for choosing solution ideas to trial on London buses, the final report will be published on the TfL website in the summer; and
- Research by TRL on the causes of harsh braking on buses is underway. TRL have analysed over 100 CCTV clips from inside and outside the bus from incidents of harsh braking with the main aim of identifying the main causes.

Our customer injury Bus Safety Innovation Challenge continues to progress well. The planning and development stages of the sensor-initiated safety messaging project are well underway, with the aim to trial on two bus routes in April / May 2025. We have carried out market engagement activities for an upstairs seat counter display on buses, with suppliers having until the end of January to answer a number of technical and pricing questions. This innovation will indicate the availability of seating on the upper deck and will be trialled in 2025 on a Stagecoach route. The trial of the original Routemaster Ding Ding sound to indicate the bus is about to depart is in the final stages of planning and will be trialled in February and March 2025 on two bus routes.

We are continuing to develop our workstream on bus driver fatigue, health, and wellbeing. This includes:

- Work with Loughborough University to review driver medicals to consider whether the DVLA medical regime and current arrangements sufficiently safeguard driver health and bus safety. Preliminary research suggests that there are some more stringent medical testing requirements in use in other European countries.. Stage two of this project (subject to funding) would offer an enhanced driver medical to a cohort of drivers to identify safety and health benefits; and
- We have installed fatigue detection systems to 400 buses, and are continuing to work with the trade unions and bus operating companies to be able to switch on the technology to begin gathering intelligence from these systems.

#### Engagement and knowledge sharing

There is much we can learn and share with the wider bus industry to improve bus safety in London. This is particularly helpful when encouraging other public transport authorities in the growing metropolitan bus franchising areas to adopt the BSS, with Transport for Greater Manchester, for example, requiring their new buses in Tranche 3 of their roll-out to meet the standard.

We continue to collaborate nationally and internationally through both the Bus Knowledge Sharing and Incident Network and Women in Bus and Coach. On 8 October we presented at the Women in Bus and Coach Summit on our joint work on the Inclusive and Ergonomic Cab Design. Across the UK and Ireland there are now more than 50 members of the Bus Knowledge Sharing and Incident Network, which is supported by the Bus Centre of Excellence. We have assisted in delivering three knowledge sharing webinars and industry discussions on bus driver fatigue, customer injuries and pedal application error.

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Safety and Security Panel



Date: 12 February 2025

Item: Risk and Assurance Report Quarter 3 2024/25

## This paper will be considered in public

## 1 Summary

- 1.1 This report provides the Panel with an overview of the status of and changes to Enterprise Risk 01 (ER01) 'Inability to deliver safety objectives and obligations', and Enterprise Risk 04 (ER04) 'Significant security incident including cyber security'.
- 1.2 This report also summarises the findings from the associated assurance activity of these risks based on second line of defence audit work by the Quality, Safety and Security Assurance (QSSA) team and third line of assurance work by the Internal Audit team within TfL's Risk and Assurance Directorate. The paper covers the work during Quarter 3 of 2024/25 (15 September to 7 December 2024) (Q3).
- 1.3 A paper is included on Part 2 of the agenda which contains supplementary information that is exempt from publication by virtue of paragraphs 3 and 7 of Schedule 12A of the Local Government Act 1972 in that it contains information relating to the financial and business affairs of TfL and information relating to any action taken or to be taken in connection with the prevention, investigation or prosecution of crime. Any discussion of that exempt information must take place after the press and public have been excluded from the meeting.

## 2 Recommendation

2.1 The Panel is asked to note the paper and the exempt supplementary information on Part 2 of the agenda.

## 3 TfL Enterprise Risks

3.1 Work is in progress to review and update ER01 including amending the title to reflect what this risk now covers and it will be presented at the TfL Executive Committee on 10 April 2025. An update will then be presented to this Panel on 19 May 2025. ER04 was updated following the cyber incident and discussed at the TfL Executive Committee on 5 December 2024 and is elsewhere on the agenda of this meeting.

## 4 Annual Audit Plans

4.1 The annual QSSA and Internal Audit plans contain a series of audits at the second line and third line respectively that address ER01 and ER04. Audits against other Enterprise Risks are also reported to the applicable Committee or Panel as well as the Audit and Assurance Committee.

4.2 The Internal Audit plan for the second half of 2024/25 was approved by the Audit and Assurance Committee on 18 September 2024 and will continue to be updated as appropriate to facilitate any additional audits that might be required because of the cyber incident. The QSSA audit plan has been shared with all risk owners and audit sponsors for consultation in line with our process. Internal Audit and QSSA both commenced audit planning for 2025/26 in Q3 in consultation with key stakeholders across TfL and owners of ER01 and ER04 risks and controls.

## 5 Work of Note this Quarter

5.1 Appendix 1 provides details of the Internal Audit and QSSA audits undertaken in Q3. Audit reports issued are given a conclusion of 'well controlled', 'adequately controlled', 'requires improvement' or 'poorly controlled'. Individual findings within audit reports are rated as high, medium or low priority.

#### **Internal Audit**

- 5.2 In Q3 Internal Audit issued two audits against ER01: 'Medical Assistance Programme Governance' and 'Use of Body Worn Video Cameras'. Additional information is provided in Appendix 1.
- 5.3 Three Internal Audits were in progress at the end of Q3 against ER04: 'Obsolescence of critical hosting software platforms'. Two audits were paused so as to not impact cyber incident recovery, 'Effectiveness of monitoring and patching of TfL's supply chain (Capita)' is due to restart in February 2025 and a new date for 'Effectiveness of Monitoring and Patching of TfL's Supply Chain (Cubic)' will be agreed with the business.

#### **Quality, Safety and Security Assurance**

- 5.4 Fourteen second line QSSA audits were delivered in Q3 against ER01 and there were no QSSA audits completed against ER04. Three were audits of TfL suppliers and concluded as 'well controlled' (two protection suppliers and Alstom Elizabeth Line fleet maintenance). Audits of 'London Underground (LU) Stations and Trains Competence Management System' and 'Elizabeth Line Safety Reporting' were both concluded as 'adequately controlled'. The audit of 'TfL Operations: Bus Station and Network Traffic Control SHE (safety, health and environment) Compliance' was concluded as 'requires improvement'. Additional information is provided in Appendix 1.
- 5.5 Eight Integrated Systems Audits were competed in Q3. Integrated Systems Audits assess LU Operations teams' compliance with a range of risks and management system requirements and are therefore not rated. Additional information is provided in Appendix 1.
- 5.6 All the above audits have an agreed and tracked action plan in place.
- 5.7 No QSSA audits against ER04 were in progress at the end of Q3. Six QSSA audits against ER01 from the 2024/25 plan were in progress at the end of Q3:
  - (a) Managing SHE in our Supply Chain (sourcing);

- (b) Docklands Light Railway Safety Authorisation Compliance;
- (c) Trams Fleet Management of Fatigue;
- (d) High Barnet Area Integrated Systems Audit;
- (e) Greenwich Generating Station Integrated Systems Audit; and
- (f) Turnham Green Area Integrated Systems Audit.

#### **Counter-Fraud and Corruption**

5.8 The Counter-Fraud and Corruption team investigate all allegations of fraud and corruption against TfL involving TfL employees, non-permanent labour and third parties (including suppliers, customers and organised criminals). These cases are part of the wider fraud reporting that is submitted to the Audit and Assurance Committee.

## 6 Cancelled and Deferred Work

- 6.1 One Internal Audit against ER04 was cancelled in Q3, 'Cubic Risk Management', so as to not impact on cyber incident recovery work and will be rescheduled. Details of two deferred audits are provided in paragraph 5.3 above.
- 6.2 Fifteen audits against the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) that relate to ER04 have been cancelled in Q3 as these audits will now be undertaken by TfL Technology and Data Payment Operations and Assurance team. One audit of 'Management of Fatigue Risk: Bus Operating Contractors' was cancelled for 2024/25 in Q3 as it was identified in planning that work was underway to develop, test and pilot in vehicle fatigue detection technology.

## 7 Performance and Trends

7.1 Performance data is provided in Appendix 2 on progress against the audit plan, audit ratings, rating trends by Enterprise Risk and business unit and progress against actions, with comparisons provided across the last two years.

#### **Internal Audit**

- 7.2 Eleven ER01 and ER04 internal audits were completed in the last four quarters compared with four in the preceding four quarters. This is due to an increase in the number of ER04 audits identified through our risk-based approach to internal audit planning.
- 7.3 At the end of Q3 there were 24 open Internal Audit actions against ER01 and ER04, 10 of which were overdue, three by less than 30 days, three by 30-60 days and four by 61-100 days. Over the last six periods there has been a steady increase in the number of actions closed on time and a reduction in the number of actions extended.

#### **Quality, Safety and Security Assurance**

- 7.4 Comparing the number of ER01 and ER04 QSSA audits for Quarter 4 (Q4) of 2022/23 to Q3 2023/24 (66 audits) with Q4 2023/24 to Q3 2024/25 (53 audits) there has been a reduction in the number of audits completed by 20 per cent as this year's audit delivery has been impacted by staff turnover. The distribution of conclusion by Chief Officer team is broadly consistent, with the majority of audits being conducted in the Chief Operating Officer's team, with a small reduction in the number of audits for the Chief Capital Officer, Chief Finance Officer and Chief People Officer teams. Comparing conclusion by Enterprise Risk there is a notable reduction in audits against ER04 from 21 to 10, this is mostly due to the change in responsibility for PCI DSS audits (see paragraph 6.2 above).
- 7.5 The distribution of audit conclusions is consistent across the two years (within five per cent) except for the reduction in audits concluded as 'requires improvement'. There were eight fewer 'requires improvement' audits against ER04 in the last four quarters, previous 'requires improvement' audits were all PCI DSS audits.
- 7.6 Work continues on the close out of management of QSSA actions, particularly overdue actions with management teams and the relevant Chief Officer. At the end of Q3 there were 17 overdue actions for ER01 and ER04 out of 42 open actions with six overdue by 100 days or more (five of which have been closed since the end of Q3), four overdue by less than 30 days and seven overdue by 30-60 days. All actions that are overdue by more than 100 days are reported to the Audit and Assurance Committee and are discussed with Chief Officers.

#### List of appendices:

Appendix 1: QSSA and Internal Audits Completed in Q3 against ER01 and ER04

Appendix 2: QSSA and Internal Audit Summary

A paper containing exempt supplementary information is included on Part 2 of the agenda

#### List of Background Papers:

None

Contact Officer:	Lorraine Humphrey, Director of Risk and Assurance
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## Appendix 1 – Quality, Safety and Security Assurance Audits Completed in Quarter 3 of 2024/25

ER01 Inability to deliver safety objectives and obligations

	Chief Officer	Ref.	Audit Title	Objectives	Conclusion	Summary of Findings
	Chief Operating Officer	24 762	Supplier Audit: Alstom Elizabeth Line	Seek assurance that Alstom is assuring its health and safety accountabilities under the contract for Elizabeth line rolling stock maintenance.	Well Controlled	Alstom assurance of its occupational safety accountabilities for rolling stock maintenance are managed using structured and planned assurance activities. These activities include Planned General Inspection, High Hazard Inspections, Control of Contractor's Performance Review, Safety Observation Visits, Surveillance Audits and Internal Audits. Actions resulting from assurance activities are managed using PowerBI and relevant databases.
	Chief Operating Officer	24 763	Elizabeth Line Safety Reporting	Seek assurance that effective safety reporting systems are in place to report at regular intervals performance to leaders so they can review and be assured that legal compliance is achieved and maintained, and continuous improvement generated.	Adequately Controlled	There are structured systems and procedures for effective safety reporting within RfLI to ensure legal compliance. Reporting roles and responsibilities relating to proactive and reactive monitoring of safety performance are well defined. Safety data is collated using databases and Safety Culture Application; analysed using PowerBI and reported to senior management via periodic reporting packs.
	Chief Operating Officer	24 715	TfL Operations Bus Station and Network Traffic Control – Safety, Health, Environment (SHE) Compliance	Seek assurance that TfL Operations Bus Station and Network Traffic Control are suitably managing their (SHE) risks through compliance with TfL SHE Management System.	Requires Improvement	There were controls in place for most risks however, management assurance was limited as there were no formal programme or completion of Planned General Inspections or Local Manager SHE Checks. Dissemination of SHE information between senior management and operational staff also needs improvement.
	Chief Operating Officer	24 758 U	Protection Supplier Audit - 1st Inrail	Provide assurance that 1st Inrail are providing competent protection staff in accordance with contractual, Quality, Environmental, Safety and Health (QUENSH) and London Underground (LU) Standards requirements.	Well Controlled	1st Inrail Limited were found to be managing and providing competent protection staff and support activities in accordance with the contract QUENSH conditions and LU standards
	Chief Operating Officer	24 759 U	Protection Supplier Audit - Global Media	Provide assurance that Global Outdoor Media are providing competent protection staff in accordance with contractual, QUENSH and LU Standards requirements.	Well Controlled	Global Outdoor Media Limited had established policies, procedures, and processes in place for managing and providing competent protection staff as stipulated in QUENSH requirement and associated LU standards.

Chief Officer	Ref.	Audit Title	Objectives	Conclusion	Summary of Findings
Chief Operating Officer	24 734	LU Stations and Trains Competence Management System	Assess effectiveness and compliance of the Competence Management System for safety critical station and traincrew staff with Office of Rail and Road (ORR) Safety Publication 1 – Developing and Maintaining Staff Competence.	Adequately Controlled	The system design and implementation were generally compliant with ORR expectations. Areas for strengthening were using a broader range of Key Performance Indicators to monitor and report on compliance with the system and specifically attendance of classroom-based training in stations.

## Integrated Systems Audits

Chief Officer	Ref.	Audit Title	Objectives	Conclusion	Summary of Findings
Chief Operating Officer	24 714	Emergency Response Unit Integrated System Audit	Provide assurance that key requirements contained in the management system are being met	Not Rated	70 per cent conformance
Chief Operating Officer	24 707	Mornington Crescent Area Integrated Systems Audit	Provide assurance that key requirements contained in the management system are being met	Not Rated	53 per cent conformance
Chief Operating Officer	24 708	Whitechapel Integrated Systems Audit	Provide assurance that key requirements contained in the management system are being met	Not Rated	52 per cent conformance
Chief Operating Officer	24 709	Arsenal Area Integrated Systems Audit	Provide assurance that key requirements contained in the management system are being met	Not Rated	62 per cent conformance
Chief Operating Officer	24 711	Jubilee North Area Integrated Systems Audit	Provide assurance that key requirements contained in the management system are being met	Not Rated	59 per cent conformance
Chief Operating Officer	24 783	Charing Cross Area Integrated Systems Audit	Provide assurance that key requirements contained in the management system are being met	Not Rated	75 per cent conformance
Chief Operating Officer	24 786	Seven Sisters Area Integrated Systems Audit	Provide assurance that key requirements contained in the management system are being met	Not Rated	59 per cent conformance
Chief Operating Officer	24 791	Earls Court Traincrew Integrated Systems Audit	Provide assurance that key requirements contained in the management system are being met	Not Rated	47 per cent conformance

#### Internal Audit: Draft reports issued in Quarter 3 of 2024/25


ER01 Inability to deliver safety objectives and obligations

Chief Officer	Ref	Audit Title	Objectives	Conclusion	Summary of Findings
Chief Safety Health and Environment Officer	24 001	Medical Assistance Programme (MAP) Governance	Provide assurance on the adequacy and effectiveness of key controls for managing the MAP.	Requires Improvement	There is a small, dedicated team that oversees the delivery and management of the MAP process. The Occupational Health Administrator oversees the administration of the end-to-end process. We found gaps in the documentation and process that do not reflect actual practice and if not addressed it would affect resilience in the team.
Chief Operating Officer	24 037	Use of Body Worn Video Cameras	Provide assurance on the adequacy and effectiveness of key controls for managing the implementation of body worn cameras.	Adequately Controlled	Implementation of Body Worn Video Camera (BWVC) has been successfully rolled out by the Workplace Violence and Aggression team. Although BWVC adoption by staff is generally good, site visits noted areas of patchy use, reducing the overall rate of compliance across the business to around 71 per cent. Three medium severity issues were noted around an out of date Data Protection Impact Assessment, improvements to the user dashboard to increase compliance and mandatory training of staff.

ER4 Significant security incident including cyber security


Chief Officer	Ref	Audit Title	Objectives	Conclusion	Summary of Findings
None					

## Appendix 2 : Quality Safety Security Assurance Audit Summary




Audit Progress against 2024/25 Plan

#### Action Management (ER01 and ER04) By Enterprise Risk by Overdue Days




#### Action Management (ER01 and ER04) - By Directorate by Overdue Days

	Overdue Actions	Closed on time (6-period)
Chief Capital Officer		57%
Chief Customer and Strategy Officer <mark>1</mark>		50%
Chief Finance Officer		0%
Chief Operating Officer 2	7 6	33%
Chief People Officer		0%
Chief SHE Officer <mark>1</mark>		44%
Crossrail		
General Counsel		
0-30 days 👥 31-60 days	61-100 days	100+ days



#### Audit Conclusion Comparison by Chief Officer Team (over 4 quarters)

#### Audit Conclusion Comparison by Enterprise Risks (over 4 quarters)




## Internal Audit Summary

## Q3 2024/25

#### All Audit Progress against 2024/25 Plan






#### Action Management (ER01 and ER04) - By Directorate by Overdue Days

		Overdue Actio	ns Closed on time (6-period)
Chief Capital Officer			0%
Chief Customer and Strategy Officer	3	3	16%
Chief Finance Officer			0%
Chief Operating Officer	4		58%
Chief People Officer			0%
Chief SHE Officer			57%
Crossrail			0%
General Counsel			

#### Audit Conclusion Comparison by Chief Officer Team (over 4 quarters)



### Audit Conclusion Comparison by Enterprise Risk (over 4 quarters)

	Q4 22/23 - Q3 23/24	Total	Q4 23/24 - Q3 24/25	Total
ER01 Inability to deliver safety objectives and obligations	1	1	121	4
ER04 Significant incident including cyber security	111	3	5 <mark>1</mark> 1	7





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# Agenda Item 11

Safety and Security Panel



Date: 12 February 2025

Item: Members' Suggestions for Future Discussion Items

#### This paper will be considered in public

#### 1 Summary

1.1 This paper presents the current forward programme for the Panel and explains how this is put together. Members are invited to suggest additional future discussion.

#### 2 Recommendation

2.1 The Panel is asked to note the forward programme and invited to raise any suggestions for future discussion items.

#### **3** Forward Plan Development

- 3.1 The Board and its Committees and Panels have forward plans. The content of the plans arise from a number of sources:
  - (a) Standing items for each meeting: Minutes; Matters Arising and Actions List; and any regular quarterly reports. For this Panel these are the Health, Safety and Security Quarterly Report and the Risk and Assurance Quarterly Report.
  - (b) Regular items which are for review and approval or noting such as the Health, Safety and Environment Annual Report.
  - (c) Items requested by Members: The Deputy Chair of TfL and the Chair of this Panel will regularly review the forward plan and may suggest items. Other items will arise out of actions from previous meetings (including meetings of the Board or other Committees and Panels) and any issues suggested under this agenda item.

#### 4 Current Plan

4.1 The current plan is attached as Appendix 1. The plan is being reviewed and will be updated for the next meeting of the Panel.

#### List of appendices to this report:

Appendix 1: Safety and Security Panel Plan

## List of Background Papers:

None

Contact Officer: Andrea Clarke, General Counsel

Email: <u>AndreaClarke@tfl.gov.uk</u>

#### Safety and Security Panel Forward Planner 2025/26

Membership: Zoë Billingham CBE (Chair), Omid Shiraji (Vice Chair), Seb Dance, Mark Phillips, and Peter Strachan.

Abbreviations: CCO (Chief Capital Officer), CCSO (Chief Customer and Strategy Officer), CFO (Chief Finance Officer), COO (Chief Operating Officer), CSHEO (Chief Safety, Health and Environment Officer), D (Director), Director of Risk and Assurance (DRA)

19 May 2025		
Bus Safety	CSHEO / COO	To note
Protection against terrorism	CO0	To note
TfL's Safety, Health, Environment Cultural Maturity Annual Update	CSHEO	To note
Safety and Security Quarterly Report	CSHEO / COO	Standing item
Risk and Assurance Report	DRA	Standing item
Enterprise Risk Update – Inability to Deliver Safety Objectives and Obligations (ER01)	CSHEO	Annual item

2 September 2025		
Safety and Security Quarterly Report	CSHEO / COO	Standing item
Risk and Assurance Report	DRA	Standing item
Safety and Security of children and young people travelling in London	COO	To note

12 November 2025		
Using Innovation to Improve Safety and Security	CSHEO / COO	To note
Protection from Sexual Harassment for Colleagues	CO0	To note
Ending Violence Against Women and Girls	COO	To note

Using Innovation to Improve Safety and Security	COO & CSHEO	To note
Safety and Security Quarterly Report	CSHEO / COO	Standing item
Risk and Assurance Report	DRA	Standing item

9 February 2026		
Safety and Security Quarterly Report	CSHEO / COO	Standing item
Risk and Assurance Report	DRA	Standing item
Enterprise Risk Update – Significant Security Incident Including Cyber Security (ER04)	COO	Standing item
Policing partnerships and special services agreement performance with MPS and BTP	C00	To note

Guest speakers from organisations such as the Confidential Incident Reporting and Analysis System (CIRAS) and the Office of Rail and Road (ORR) will also be invited to meetings.

To programme:

IIPAG Safety sub-group Third Line Assurance

# Agenda Item 15

By virtue of paragraph(s) 3, 7 of Part 1 of Schedule 12A of the Local Government Act 1972.

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# Agenda Item 16

By virtue of paragraph(s) 3, 7 of Part 1 of Schedule 12A of the Local Government Act 1972.

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